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Abstract 
Agrarian expertise has been employed in the context of Swedish development aid since 
the 1950s. Throughout this time, the Swedish institutions of higher agrarian 
education—the Agricultural College, the College of Forestry, and the Veterinary 
College, in 1977 merged to form the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences—
have played important roles. In this dissertation I consider three problems with respect 
to these institutions’ involvement in development aid: (1) How and why did actors at 
the three colleges begin framing their expertise in a development context? (2) How did 
Swedish agrarian experts approach the problem of development in contexts about 
which they had little prior knowledge? (3) How and why did a long-term institutional 
collaboration evolve between the agrarian institutions of higher learning and the 
Swedish development aid authorities, and what were its characteristics? 
The study follows actors and their standpoints through three different aid projects: 
international courses in animal reproduction at the Veterinary College first planned and 
held in the mid-1950s; the planning and implementation of the Chilalo Agricultural 
Development Unit in the 1960s and 1970s; and SLU’s support to higher forestry 
education in Ethiopia in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. It also examines the growth and 
subsequent decline of a continuous institutional collaboration between the institutions 
of higher agrarian education and SIDA, the Swedish government agency responsible 
for development aid. Based on my findings, I argue that the framing of Swedish 
agrarian expertise as relevant to the developing countries—particularly at the 
Agricultural College in the 1960s—was part of a broader attempt to widen the scope of 
agrarian science in Sweden in response to social change at home. At the same time, the 
development strategies proposed by the Swedish experts were anchored in the 
particulars of the Swedish agrarian context. This made them attuned to the local 
adaptation of technologies and to the value of practical knowledge but less sensitive to 
the societal contexts and social effects of their interventions. Their attempts to bring 
their knowledge to bear on the developing world also helped create a long-lasting 
institutionalized relationship between SLU (and the three colleges before it) and the 
Swedish development aid authorities, through which SLU exercised influence on much 
of Sweden’s agrarian development aid from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
IN AUGUST 1962, the Congress of the International Association of 
Agricultural Students was held at the Agricultural College of Sweden. Arne 
Björnberg, secretary-general of the newly founded Swedish Agency for 
International Assistance (Nämnden för internationellt bistånd, NIB), gave the 
opening address. Speaking about the risk of a global food crisis, something 
widely feared at the time, Björnberg stated that agricultural productivity would 
have to increase throughout the world. While he also suggested that population 
control would be a necessary part of any solution to the world’s nutrition 
problems, his talk primarily called on current and future agricultural expertise 
to act. Dealing with the looming food crisis was in a sense, Björnberg argued, 
“the responsibility of all of us,” but in particular, it was a problem to be solved 
by a certain group of specialists: “agronomists and agricultural experts of aid-
giving and aid-receiving countries.”1 
Western-trained and Western-funded agriculturalists and other agrarian 
experts did descend upon Africa, Latin America, and Asia in the years before 
and following Björnberg’s speech. The most well-known instance is the large-
scale application of plant breeding, fertilization, and irrigation knowledge and 
techniques that later became known as the Green Revolution. It brought mixed 
results. The new technologies and methods produced large, if uneven, yield 
increases, and global food production rose markedly. But social unrest often 
followed in the wake of increased production, and while growing harvests of 
wheat and rice made a number of hitherto food-importing states self-sufficient, 
rural poverty and hunger remained. New scientific and technological 
approaches to agricultural development were developed in response to these 
equivocal early results, but malnutrition and hardship are still common 
characteristics of rural life throughout many parts of the world.2 
1 Arne Björnberg, “Opening Address at the Congress of the International Association of 
Agricultural Students,” p. 4, 4 August 1962, Swedish Agency for International Assistance 
archives, series FIII a, vol. 2, National Archives of Sweden (hereafter cited as NIB). 
2 There is a large body of literature that examines the Green Revolution and its effects. A fairly 
recent review, positive but with some qualifications, can be found in R. E. Evenson and D. Gollin, 
“Assessing the Impact of the Green Revolution, 1960 to 2000,” Science 300, no. 5620 (2003). A 
very useful historical summary, which cites most if not all relevant literature, is Jonathan 
Harwood, Europe’s Green Revolution and Others Since: The Rise and Fall of Peasant-Friendly 
Plant Breeding (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), chapters 6–7. For an important work that directly 
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Conceptually, the notion of the Green Revolution suggests a radical break, 
indicating that, as John H. Perkins puts it, “a fundamentally new relationship” 
came to exist “between people and their major food plants.”3 As the term tends 
to be applied specifically to postwar, science-driven interventions in 
developing-country agricultures, it also suggests that this radical break took 
place only after World War II. But both Perkins and, more explicitly, historian 
of science and technology Jonathan Harwood argue that the Green Revolution 
is better understood as part of a longer historical trajectory of agricultural 
technoscience, starting in the late nineteenth century and extending to the 
present. Harwood also contends that the green revolutionaries of the 1960s 
themselves were largely unaware of their history and accordingly set about 
reinventing approaches to and methods for agricultural change. Their solutions 
often proved less successful than those employed by an earlier generation of 
developers. In particular, they were much less peasant-friendly, and many 
smallholders found themselves worse off after the introduction of the new 
technologies.4 
Harwood uses plant breeding (in Germany between 1870 and 1939) as his 
empirical case, but the historiographical insight that undergirds his argument 
has ramifications beyond this domain and the other techniques associated with 
the Green Revolution. His understanding in fact suggests that most of the 
history of postwar agrarian development aid can be seen as an integrated part 
of the longer history of the agricultural and forestry sciences.5 This makes the 
promotion of agricultural science and modern agricultural technology in new 
areas come across more as evolution than revolution, reflecting intrascientific 
continuities as well as discontinuities and changes. 
This perspective informs the present dissertation. My aim is to contribute to 
the history of science- and technology-driven agrarian development, situated in 
the context of the history of agricultural, forestry, and veterinary science. More 
addresses the Green Revolution’s social effects, see Andrew Pearse, Seeds of Plenty, Seeds of 
Want: Social and Economic Implications of the Green Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980). 
3 John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes and the Cold War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), v. 
4 Jonathan Harwood, “Has the Green Revolution Been a Cumulative Learning Process?,” Third 
World Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2013); Harwood, Europe’s Green Revolution. 
5 Agrarian development in this sense encompasses changes in agriculture and forestry technology 
broadly defined. I find Deborah Fitzgerald’s broad, process-focused definition of agricultural 
technology useful: she suggests that “agricultural technology refers to the process of 
systematically cultivating plants and animals, including the economic, mechanical, human, 
scientific, and institutional forces that support such activity.” Deborah Fitzgerald, “Beyond 
Tractors: The History of Technology in American Agriculture,” Technology and Culture 32, no. 1 
(1991): 115.  
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specifically, my purpose is to analyze why and how Swedish agrarian experts 
engaged in postwar development work abroad. The dissertation is thus not 
about the Green Revolution as such. Though two chapters deal with the Green 
Revolution’s techniques, problems, and successes, it also considers other kinds 
of agrarian development, including in the fields of forestry and veterinary 
medicine, as conceived of and carried out by Swedish experts. 
The study is organized around the central institutions for the agrarian sciences 
in postwar Sweden: the Agricultural College, the Veterinary College, and the 
College of Forestry, which later merged to form the present-day Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU). They all played prominent roles in 
Swedish development aid. As early as the mid-1950s, the Veterinary College 
became involved in an aid project supporting veterinary education in the 
developing world. The Agricultural College, where Björnberg gave his speech in 
1962, became a crucial actor in Swedish agricultural development aid in the mid-
1960s, supporting a major science-driven rural development project in Ethiopia 
as well as becoming an institutional consultant to the Swedish development aid 
authorities. The College of Forestry also began to engage in forestry 
development abroad shortly thereafter. The three colleges were thus not only key 
institutions for agrarian research and education in Sweden during the first 
postwar decades but also began to turn their attention to the developing world at 
an early stage.6 My study investigates how and why their leaders and scientists 
began to demonstrate an interest in applying their knowledge in new settings as 
well as some of the consequences of these applications. 
Based on my findings, I will argue that the framing of Swedish agrarian 
expertise as relevant to the developing countries was part of a broader attempt to 
widen the scope of agrarian science in Sweden beyond the boundaries of its 
traditional role. At the same time, the development strategies proposed by the 
Swedish experts were anchored in the particulars of the Swedish agrarian 
context. This made them attuned to the local adaptation of technologies and to 
the value of practical knowledge but less sensitive to the societal contexts and 
social effects of their interventions. I will also argue that the long-lasting 
institutionalized relationship that developed between SLU (and the three colleges 
before it) and the Swedish development aid authorities came to undergird much 
of Swedish agrarian aid from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. In parallel to, and 
sometimes in conflict with, this relationship, the experts at SLU also attempted to 
academize their contribution to development aid, and attempted to introduce 
academic studies in rural development at their university. 
                                                        
6 As a point of reference, Sweden got its first official aid policy and first state agency for 
development aid in 1962, with volumes of aid beginning to increase distinctly after 1968. 
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Research Problems and Questions 
The overarching objective of this dissertation is to understand how and why 
Swedish agrarian expertise engaged in postwar development aid. A central 
concept is thus expertise, which in its most general sense refers to specialized 
skill or knowledge. More specifically, I am concerned with how such 
specialized knowledge is connected to decision-making, authority, and control. 
This means I understand expertise not only as a specific way of knowing, but 
also as a means of exercising authority through knowledge. Sociologist 
Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out how such expert authority is based on the 
assumption that there are correct ways to solve social and technical problems 
but that the knowledge required to do so is unevenly distributed in society. 
Being recognized as an expert essentially means being acknowledged as 
having privileged access to the correct way to frame and solve problems within 
a particular domain. When exercising their authority, experts tend to act as 
mediators: they draw on this access to knowledge that they then apply to 
concrete problems.7 
Modern expertise is closely linked to science and technology. Historians of 
science Joris Vandendriessche, Evert Peeters and Kaat Wils argue that, during 
the late nineteenth century, “the private and public institutions of technoscience 
transformed traditional expert crafts,” and “expert performances became 
loaded with . . . scientific ideals.”8 This process also made expert, 
technoscientific knowledge a cornerstone of the concept of societal 
development throughout the twentieth century, and this in turn made it central 
to the project of Western postwar nation-building as well as to development 
aid. In the words of political scientist Timothy Mitchell, 
 
[f]rom the opening of the twentieth century to its close, the politics of national 
development and economic growth was a politics of techno-science, which 
claimed to bring the expertise of modern engineering, technology and social 
science to improve the defects of nature, to transform peasant agriculture, to 
repair the ills of society, and to fix the economy.9 
 
It was thus no coincidence that Arne Björnberg singled out agronomists and 
agricultural experts as crucial groups in combating malnutrition when he spoke 
                                                        
7 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 196. On 
experts as mediators, see Nico Stehr and Reiner Grundmann, Experts: The Knowledge and Power 
of Expertise (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 39–41. 
8 Joris Vandendriessche, Evert Peeters, and Kaat Wils, “Introduction: Performing Expertise,” in 
Scientists’ Expertise as Performance: Between State and Society, 1860–1960, ed. Joris 
Vandendriessche, Evert Peeters, and Kaat Wils (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2015), 7. 
9 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), 15. 
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at the Agricultural College in 1962. The general assumption that the colonies 
and new states could only be brought into the modern world through 
improvements, transformations, and repairs meant that various kinds of experts 
and expert organizations were afforded center stage. Modernity, the final 
objective of development aid, was inconceivable without them. 
The expertise I study in this work is not of one kind but rather encompasses 
a variety of expertises tied to particular domains. Since they nonetheless had a 
lot in common, I group them together with the composite term agrarian 
expertise, in which agrarian refers to sectors of production directly tied to the 
use of biological resources.10 For the purposes of this analysis, I exclude sea-
based activities such as fishing and comparatively minor pursuits like hunting 
and reindeer herding, and thus understand agrarian expertise as expertise in 
agriculture, including animal production, and forestry. While a wide range of 
people could conceivably lay claim to specialized knowledge in these fields, 
my concern is specifically with the scientific or technical experts who were 
seen as central to the projects of development and modernization. Accordingly, 
the vast majority of those employed as development experts in the contexts I 
study here were academics, familiar with the methods of the agrarian sciences 
and the principles of modern agrarian technology. If not college professors 
outright, they were at least trained as agronomists or agricultural managers, 
veterinarians, or academic foresters or forest engineers. Many came from rural 
backgrounds and perhaps still identified strongly with farmers or forest 
workers, but through their education they had tapped into specific forms of 
technoscientific expertise, held at and guarded by the institutions of higher 
agrarian education and research. It is such expertise and, by extension, the role 
of these institutions that I examine in the study. 
Simply being a recognized expert or expert institution was not enough to 
secure a role in development aid. The application of expert knowledge always 
involves negotiations and struggles over the definition of knowledge objects.11 
More concretely, specific expertise had to be established as valid and 
legitimate in the context of a development problem that decision-makers 
accepted as relevant and fundable. As I will discuss below, the relevance of 
agrarian and rural development was not always self-evident to major donor 
agencies and development thinkers during the first years of postwar 
development aid, and even after it became more accepted, there were—and still 
are—many conflicting views on what sort of agrarian development to stimulate 
                                                        
10 This is a definition grounded in a Swedish conceptualization, where these sectors of the 
economy are collectively known as areella näringar. 
11 See Vandendriessche, Peeters and Wils, “Performing Expertise,” 1–4. 
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and how to best go about it. Those who wanted to play a role had to maneuver 
in relation to these views and to the norms of funding bodies. 
In light of this, my first research problem considers questions of why and 
how actors at the three colleges under the Swedish Ministry of Agriculture 
began attempting to frame their expertise in the context of development aid. 
How did the Veterinary College, the Agricultural College, and the College of 
Forestry obtain roles in Swedish development aid? Who were the leading 
actors interested in such a role? Why were they interested? I will identify these 
actors and explain how they could formulate problems of development that 
were simultaneously congruent with their institutionalized expertise and 
convincing to funders and policymakers. Once firmly established, such 
problem formulations could also be used as a tool to further other 
organizational goals, and I will show how in particular the Agricultural College 
attempted to do so. 
This leads naturally on to the question of how actors at the three colleges 
approached development problems and expertise. When the veterinary 
project began in 1954, and indeed still when experts from the Agricultural 
College began to work in Ethiopia a decade later, there was scarcely any 
experience of Asian or African agriculture at hand in Sweden. It is thus 
reasonable to assume that knowledge and experiences from Sweden were 
used as starting points and that Swedish experts tried to learn from other 
countries. More of an open question is what they were interested in learning, 
or more generally, how the involved experts related to the problem of putting 
knowledge to use in new surroundings. 
My second research problem considers such questions of how the Swedish 
agrarian experts approached and related to the problem of development in 
different contexts. Did the involved actors problematize their lack of local 
knowledge, and if so, how? Which development strategies did they advocate? 
Why did they choose these strategies? How, and why, did this change over 
time? What effects did the strategies have when implemented? How did the 
experts react to these effects? I will approach these questions by studying three 
agrarian development projects. They were widely separated in time and space, 
but the strategies they were based on nonetheless expressed a common 
ideology of agrarian modernization, seemingly shared by most Swedish 
agrarian expertise active abroad over a period of at least four decades. Parts of 
it were common to Swedish development experts more generally, while other 
parts were rooted directly in agrarian conditions and experiences. 
To some extent, Swedish agrarian experts could engage in development aid 
as individuals, chiefly by applying for expert positions at the United Nations 
(UN) or the national aid authorities. But the realization of more significant 
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development projects necessitated some sort of institutional cooperation with 
funders and policymakers. For Sweden, by far the most significant such partner 
was the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), the government 
agency chiefly responsible for Sweden’s development aid.12 All three colleges 
worked with SIDA and/or its predecessors, signing long-term agreements on 
institutional cooperation. This cooperation deepened further with the creation 
of SLU in 1977 and its International Rural Development Center (IRDC) in 
1978, the latter being an organization created with the explicit purpose of 
facilitating SIDA’s access to agrarian expertise. 
This is the area of my third research problem, which considers the purpose, 
characteristics, and effects of this collaboration between experts at the agrarian 
university and the development aid authority. How and why was the long-term 
institutional collaboration created? What characterized it? Which activities did 
it enable and which did it constrain? How did it develop over time? I will make 
clear that this collaboration was on occasions unbalanced and the parties’ goals 
at times divergent, sometimes explicitly so. Nonetheless, it was also 
characterized by considerable mutual trust. It shaped activities both at SLU and 
SIDA, and it served as a foundation for Swedish rural development aid for 
several decades before eventually disintegrating. Playing on a term introduced 
by historian of technology Mats Fridlund, I will label the cooperation a rural 
development pair. 
These problems are relevant to several fields of historical scholarship. The 
dissertation contributes to the history of the Swedish agrarian sciences in 
general and to the history of their application in development aid in particular. 
As it studies institutions of higher education as development aid agents, it also 
contributes to Swedish university history. Furthermore, it adds to our 
knowledge of the history of Swedish development aid, especially of the 
continuities and discontinuities (in the agrarian sector) between the domestic 
context and the foreign aid context. But there is also some relevance beyond 
the scope of historical research. Many of the topics and tension points of the 
history presented here are still being discussed and contested. This means that 
many questions which the historical actors I study asked themselves, such as 
how to best support the development of peasant agriculture, or which skills to 
impart to would-be agrarian experts in developing countries, are still being 
posed by their present-day counterparts. Examining the historical answers and 
                                                        
12 SIDA was created in 1965 to replace the short-lived NIB. Later, several other government 
agencies were also created to take responsibility for particular tasks within the overall framework 
of Swedish development aid. Most central to the topic at hand is the Swedish Agency for 
Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC), which was first created in 1975 and 
became a government agency in its own right in 1979. 
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some of their consequences should thus be interesting not just to other 
historians but also to today’s policymakers at Sida13 and other aid agencies. It 
should also interest those at SLU presently engaged in development 
cooperation in theory and practice. 
The Geopolitics of Development Aid 
Development is a complex concept with multiple meanings and connotations.14 
In the contexts of relevance for the present study, it refers broadly to a process 
of socioeconomic change in the form of modernization (in itself understood in 
various ways and not always explicitly conceptualized as such). Such change is 
something people do, be they technical experts, state officials, or peasants, and 
engaging in development aid amounted to engaging in activities intended to 
facilitate actions that would lead to development. To most of the actors I study, 
this was—either self-evidently or with some degree of reservation—seen as 
something positive. In parallel with the practice of development, there has also 
developed a large number of studies that criticize the notion and its associated 
activities.15 To me, the concept is not an analytical category as such, and I 
remain agnostic about its valuation: as will become clear, I consider the 
instances of development aid that I study to have had both positive and 
negative consequences. 
International development assistance in the sense of support to what 
would-be developers envision as positive social change long predates this 
study’s start in 1950. Examples abound of earlier economic development 
projects (although not always labeled as such) in the West and in the 
colonies, linked both to states and to mission societies. High-ranking colonial 
administrators often advocated investment and development, such as British 
colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain and his policy of constructive 
imperialism, or his interwar French counterpart Albert Saurat’s plan for the 
mise en valeur of the French empire. In the African colonies, the Great 
Depression ushered in what historian of science Christophe Bonneuil calls 
                                                        
13 In 1995, SAREC and a number of other public aid organizations were merged into SIDA, 
which changed its name to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and its 
acronym to the lowercase Sida. 
14 For a review of various understandings of the concept with a focus on the postwar period, see 
H. W. Arndt, Economic Development: The History of an Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987). 
15 See e.g. Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: 
From Western Origins to Global Faith, 4th ed. (London: Zed Books, 2014); Wolfgang Sachs, ed. 
The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, 2nd ed. (London: Zed Books, 
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the “developmentalist state,” with unprecedented government initiatives for 
the development not only of colonial economies but also of the welfare of 
colonial populations. The United States, which would become a global leader 
in development aid after World War II, could likewise draw on a long history 
of technical assistance. It supported both colonies like the Philippines and 
states within its sphere of interest, to the extent that historian Michael Adas 
suggests that “development assistance was a fixture of America’s global 
interventionism” already at the start of the Cold War.16 
The intellectual origins of development assistance lay in the ruminations 
about progress and development that had been a mainstay of Western 
intellectual history since the Enlightenment. Starting in the nineteenth century, 
thinkers in the West also began to explicitly link the concept of development to 
a process of social progress through modernization. Their understanding was 
fundamentally ethnocentric and left no room to challenge the idea that 
development, in this sense, implied a process of improvement and even 
civilization which was to be brought about by science and technology imported 
from the West.17 The early twentieth-century American development program 
in the Philippines is a case in point. Filling its administration with engineers, 
the Americans were convinced that massive investments in technology could 
bring prosperity and democracy to the Philippines. However, the American 
administrators were unconcerned with social reform. Though improving 
infrastructure and education, their development efforts exacerbated social 
inequalities and resulted in a torn and conflict-ridden society post-
independence.18 
Such early experiences did little to change the fundamentally 
ethnocentric, androcentric, and technocentric nature of development 
assistance. After World War II, it instead took on global ambitions, involving 
both the responsibility of the “underdeveloped countries” to strive for 
modernization and the responsibility of the “developed countries” to assist 
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them in this process.19 If imposition from colonial or hegemonic powers had 
earlier been explicitly integrated into the concept of development—
development requiring, in the words of historian Frederick Cooper, 
“authority as well as expertise,”—this now became less visible as 
development began to be posited as something more like a natural process.20 
This helped prevent the notion of development from being too tainted by its 
historical link with imperial pursuits. It increasingly appealed to nationalist 
elites in the colonies and new states, who often took over both development 
thinking and development administration from the departing colonizers. The 
idea of development also became embedded in the radically new geopolitical 
framework of East-West polarization, and development aid became one part 
of the superpower struggle for global hegemony. This allowed for the 
creation of aid programs of new scales and scopes, generally tied to explicit 
foreign policy considerations and often linked to military aid. It was in this 
setting that development aid took on much of the meaning it then retained 
through much of the second half of the twentieth century. 
The roots of this postwar Western development aid ideology are normally 
traced to the immediate end of World War II and in particular to the position of 
the United States in 1945.21 Propelled by the war to superpower status and 
near-hegemony in its sphere of influence, the United States faced two major 
problems in the devastation covering much of continental Europe at the end of 
the hostilities. First, hunger and poverty might lead European populations 
astray ideologically. Second, the still-intact American industry needed paying 
customers. Accordingly, the Marshall Plan was launched in 1948 and very 
quickly succeeded in its aims of reconstructing and modernizing the Western 
European economies. But America also looked beyond Europe. When 
President Truman presented four points of foreign policy in his 1949 inaugural 
address, the fourth one dealt with so-called “underdeveloped areas,” whose 
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poverty was described as “a threat both to them and to more prosperous 
areas.”22 Speaking in the context of the Cold War, Truman referred to the same 
threats that had prompted the Marshall Plan, thus extending its basic 
motivation beyond Europe. With the concept of development still infused with 
ethnocentrism and technoscience, Truman very clearly delineated the West 
from “them” and took for granted that the modern, industrialized Western state 
was both the goal and the recipe of development. 
The “them” in Truman’s worldview would soon come to be lumped into the 
broad category of the Third World, a term coined by French demographer 
Alfred Sauvy in reference to the Third Estate of prerevolutionary France. 
Contrasted with the First and Second Worlds of the Western and Eastern blocs, 
the notion was intended to draw attention to the political potential of the states 
and soon-to-be states that were as of yet not aligned with either superpower.23 
It also grouped together a large number of political entities with vastly 
different backgrounds, problems, and goals, something that did not stop the 
term from becoming a much-used catchphrase for all developing countries. But 
even if it was an inappropriate term in the sense that it downplayed immense 
differences between the included countries, the notion of a Third World 
nonetheless helped create a powerful conceptual framework that could be used 
by political leaders who sought a path separate from superpower domination. 
In 1955, leaders from twenty-nine nonaligned countries met in Bandung, 
Indonesia and laid down principles of anticolonialism and solidarity that later 
evolved into the Non-Aligned Movement which explicitly rejected alignment 
with major powers. The proceeding decolonization helped increase the number 
of states embracing this stance.24 
The ideology of nonalignment had its analog among those industrialized 
countries that were neither superpowers nor colonial overlords. If the United 
States and the Soviet Union saw development aid above all as a means to 
secure global influence and thus national security, and the colonial powers 
provided most of their foreign aid within the framework of continuing 
(post)colonial relationships, then policymakers and aid administrators in 
countries like Sweden, with no territorial colonial past, tended to see 
themselves as occupying a distinctly different position. Sweden was itself 
ostensibly nonaligned and drew heavily on this in its aid rhetoric, and its 
noncolonial credentials and position of freedom from alliances arguably 
increased its ability to choose partners based on self-determined criteria. 
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Development scholar Olav Stokke suggests that all the Scandinavian countries 
had aid programs rooted in norms of international solidarity associated with the 
dominance of Social Democratic parties in their national politics, and thus that 
the aid they gave had basic altruistic features.25 
That a country had had no colonial territories to administer might well have 
helped increase the maneuvering room in terms of foreign aid policy during 
and after decolonization. But not having colonies should not be confused with 
a lack of colonial interests or taken to indicate the absence of a colonial 
mindset among rulers and social elites. The established narrative of 
noncolonial countries, Sweden being a case in point, is now beginning to be 
challenged by historians.26 Furthermore, Stokke’s thesis on Scandinavian 
altruism should not obscure the fact that the phenomenon of development aid 
as such derived, and still derives, much of its meaning and coherence from 
colonial relationships. This has been demonstrated most poignantly by scholars 
working in a postcolonial tradition, and there is an extensive critical literature 
on Western, including Scandinavian, development aid that explicitly takes 
postcolonial theory as its starting point. Such studies have done much to point 
out crucial historical continuities from colonialism to development aid, in 
which attitudes and understandings within the aid sector emanated, and still 
emanate, from colonial structures. These structures can often be discriminatory 
and oppressive, as well as counterproductive to the stated purpose of aid, even 
if not to other underlying motives.27 
Some Characteristics of Expert Authority 
One starting point of this study is that the importance of expert authority is a 
central defining characteristics of modern social order and thus also of a 
development aid aiming to create and recreate modernity. Zygmunt Bauman 
suggests expertise to be a “specifically modern form of authority,” an idea 
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going back at least to Max Weber, who observed how a society characterized 
by a far-driven rationalization—that is, an advanced modern society—would 
not be able to function without the mobilization of cadres of experts.28 In 
Weber’s theorizing, these experts would tend to gather in bureaucratic 
structures that, though formally separated from political power, constitute the 
real basis of modern authority. 
In modern society, expert knowledge becomes necessary not just to solve 
problems but also to identify and define them as well as to legitimize the 
methods needed for their solution. This is particularly closely bound up with 
access to, and control over, modern science and technology. Bauman notes that 
“technology does not serve the solution of problems; it is, rather, the 
accessibility of a given technology that redefines successive parts of human 
reality as problems clamouring for resolution.”29 In the hands of experts, 
technology thus often becomes a resource seeking its utility through the 
problematizing of new areas. 
This is not an uncomplicated process. Expertise remains socially 
constructed and requires constant negotiating work. Vandendriessche and his 
coauthors discuss how the expansion of expert authority, resulting in the 
renegotiating of the boundaries between experts, state, and society, hinges not 
on abstractions but on performances of expertise.30 It is also important to 
recognize the active role played by experts in such renegotiations. Experts are 
generally not neutral mediators but tend to transform knowledge in the process 
of performing expertise. Sociologists Nico Stehr and Reiner Grundmann 
highlight this aspect in discussing expert mediation as comprising “an active 
element,” and they rightly point out that “it is just this activity that must be 
very precisely investigated, for this transformative activity is one of the keys to 
understanding the function of experts in contemporary societies.”31 The same, I 
would suggest, holds true for investigations into the past. 
Limitations of Expertise 
Analyses of modernity-making expertise applied in development contexts are 
often quite critical. For one thing, as anthropologist James Ferguson has 
argued, expertise tends to depoliticize: what originally were social or political 
problems become redefined by experts as technical ones, whose solution 
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requires nothing but the appropriate expertise and its technical interventions. 
As Ferguson and other critics of such expert interventions point out, this tends 
to obscure social injustice and ensures that decision-making does not factor in 
anything beyond the expert-defined problem, with its solution rarely 
overlapping with the full needs of the affected people. Certainly contributing to 
this outcome, as Bauman draws attention to in his analysis, is that the experts’ 
personal responsibility is subjugated to the knowledge they represent.32 
More insights into why experts sometimes tend to formulate problems in 
ways that make them less relevant to intended beneficiaries can be found in a 
branch of feminist scholarship. Since the 1980s, feminist philosophers of 
science and knowledge have, inspired by earlier constructivist approaches to 
the study of science, emphasized the social and historical situatedness of 
knowledge and suggested that all knowledge depends on the knower’s position 
and perspective.33 From this premise of all knowledge being knowledge from 
somewhere, Sandra Harding makes the case that being, as experts are, in a 
central position in a society means there are certain things one cannot know: 
 
[I]n societies stratified by race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, or some other 
such politics shaping the very structure of a society, the activities of those at the 
top both organize and set limits on what persons who perform such activities can 
understand about themselves and the world around them.34 
 
While Harding’s text does not refer to development as such, her insights are 
easily extended to development aid and can help us understand why 
development aid projects sometimes fail or at least commonly produce 
unanticipated effects. All development projects are motivated by a difference 
of some sort between the would-be developer and the intended developees. 
However, this difference also tends to imply a power relation that, following 
Harding, becomes an intrinsic obstacle to the creation and utilization of 
knowledge relevant to and productive for the intended beneficiaries. This 
obstacle takes the form of what we, with environmental philosopher Val 
Plumwood, can call centrist thought. Through centrist thinking, “the 
experiences of the dominant ‘centre’ are represented as universal, and the 
experiences of those subordinated in the structure are rendered secondary or 
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‘irrational.’”35 As a mode of understanding, it can potentially lead to various 
biases in development as well as in society more generally. I have already 
mentioned that, on a macro level, ethnocentrism, androcentrism, and 
technocentrism were characteristic features of development aid, particularly 
during the first postwar decades. Another form of centrist thought, a variation 
on ethnocentrism, is what anthropologist Johannes Fabian calls allochronism. 
He uses the term to criticize the tendency of anthropological writing to portray 
the “Other”—those studied by the anthropologist—as being temporally 
distanced; located in the past.36 But allochronism prevails outside of 
anthropological discourse as well. Much development aid, in particular in its 
first decades, was based implicitly or explicitly on allochronic understandings; 
on the use of modern expertise as a kind of bridge between the present in the 
West and the past elsewhere. 
Agrarian Expertise in Development 
The notion that modern expertise has inherent limitations has also been 
discussed by many authors with an explicit interest in agrarian development. A 
prominent example is political scientist and agrarian historian James C. Scott’s 
book Seeing Like a State, which analyzes modernity and social development.37 
Scott’s work has become an oft-cited take on expertise and is interesting to 
consider in the present context because he devotes a comparatively large 
portion of the book to rural modernization and agricultural development. He 
also formulates something like a general thesis on the nature of agrarian 
expertise. In the following, I will argue that while Scott draws attention to 
important characteristics of such expertise, he and others working in the same 
tradition tend to overlook its historical connection to agricultural practice, 
leading them to draw problematic conclusions. 
Destructive Development: The High-Modernist Thesis and Agrarian 
Development 
In Seeing Like a State, Scott identifies a number of failed development 
schemes and argues that these diverse failures share a common background. 
Most importantly, they are the results of what he labels a “high-modernist” 
ideology, in which modern science is uncritically understood to be able to 
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improve most, if not all, aspects of human life. This ideology is often coupled 
with the willingness to use the power of a centralized or centralizing state to 
back up the large-scale science-based interventions that high modernism tends 
to advocate. They become tools for the state’s attempts to establish control 
over its territory. Scott further suggests that technical experts are key players in 
such processes. As the agents of high modernism, they formulate problems in a 
manner that detaches them from local conditions as well as from local people’s 
concerns, and then help put the immense weight of the state in play to “solve” 
them. But, argues Scott, solutions proposed on the basis of high-modernist 
thinking are often untenable due to their inherent reductionism: they abstract 
away the complexities of particular social and geographic contexts. 
The latter point is central to the chapter in which Scott discusses 
agricultural development. He makes the case that modern agriculture, of the 
kind implemented around the world by Western experts particularly during the 
first three postwar decades, is characterized by radical simplification. “Actual 
farming,” Scott claims, is “an inventive, practiced response to a highly variable 
environment.” By contrast, “the logic of scientific agriculture is . . . one of 
adapting the environment as much as possible to its centralizing and 
standardizing formulas.”38 While acknowledging the power of agricultural 
science’s formulas to produce impressive crop yields, he argues that 
 
[t]he simple ‘production and profit’ model of agricultural extension and 
agricultural research has failed in important ways to represent the complex, 
supple, negotiated objectives of real farmers and their communities. That model 
has also failed to represent the space in which farmers plant crops—its 
microclimates, its moisture and water movement, its microrelief, and its local 
biotic history.39 
 
What Scott suggests here is that agricultural science has little room to represent 
the complexity of real farming conditions or real farmers’ knowledge and thus 
cannot easily adapt its models to the realities of agricultural practice. This 
creates problems, particularly when it is applied in areas whose conditions are 
a bad fit for its models, and for which its techniques are not well adapted. 
Agricultural scientists then become forced to pursue problems of agricultural 
development at, as Paul Richards, one of Scott’s inspirers, puts it, “too high a 
level of abstraction and generalization.”40 Often, this tends to produce a range 
of outcomes that go from failure and a waste of resources in the best case to 
environmental and humanitarian disasters in the worst. 
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Scott’s work has a number of forerunners.41 His discussion of agricultural 
modernization is linked to an earlier postcolonial research tradition in 1970s and 
1980s anthropology and history that emphasized the failures and destructive 
potential of Western agricultural science in colonial contexts and sought to 
highlight the efficacy of the knowledge already held by local populations in 
colonized areas.42 There are also other authors who share these starting points but 
have gone even further in depicting a monolithic and inherently destructive 
Western agricultural science. A good example is an essay by environmental 
activist and critic of the Green Revolution Vandana Shiva. She denounces 
“reductionist science” as implying little but destruction, even self-destruction. 
Whereas traditional agricultural practices “created stable local conditions,” Shiva 
claims that “‘scientific farming’” has upset the balance by its applications of 
chemical fertilizer, its monocultures, and its mechanization, effectively creating a 
vicious circle where only ever more fertilizers and pesticides can keep 
productivity up.43 The imposition of a science with reductionist, universalizing 
ambitions on traditional systems of agriculture has not only failed, Shiva argues, 
but has constituted a direct act of violence. 
Scott’s and Shiva’s respective criticisms have different starting points. 
Shiva attacks modern science and scientific thinking as such. To her, science is 
a deeply flawed and unreformable Western intellectual project.44 Scott’s 
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criticism of agricultural science is, on the other hand, integrated into his more 
general analysis of state power and the methods states employ to make people 
and environments controllable. He is less eager to attack science as such, and 
in fact explicitly recognizes the value of “modern agronomic science” and 
states that he does not intend a “general offensive” against it.45 His concern is 
specifically with the limits of agronomic expertise, and especially with what he 
sees as its inability to recognize other knowledge as valid and potentially 
useful for agriculture.  
While their scope thus differs, Scott’s and Shiva’s analyses are still similar 
in how they highlight the limits of what they see as the hegemonic paradigm of 
agricultural science. To them, this paradigm is characterized by abstraction, 
universalization, and reductionism, and this removes the interventions of 
agricultural experts from more ecologically stable and ethically superior 
traditional practices. This is what gives agricultural science its power to 
increase yields when applied in suitable contexts but also what tends to make it 
inflexible and possibly even violent and destructive. 
This way of thinking, grounded in very valid concerns about the nature and 
effects of agricultural science, opens up for criticism that in many ways is 
relevant. I submit, however, that Scott’s and Shiva’s emphasis on universalism 
and reductionism as defining characteristics of agricultural science is 
problematic. In the next section, I will discuss how historical research has 
demonstrated that agricultural scientists often have been preoccupied with 
agricultural practice and with the concerns both of particular contexts and of 
particular farmers. 
Between Theory and Practice: The History of Agricultural Science 
In reviewing the literature on the history of the agricultural sciences, the most 
salient feature is a recurrent highlighting of the ambiguity that results from 
these sciences’ particular position between scientific theory and agricultural 
practice.46 Historian of technology Deborah Fitzgerald has observed that, from 
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a history of science point of view, agricultural science is “particularly 
interesting precisely because of its ambiguous role as a scientific discipline 
engaged in the practical application of scientific knowledge to social and 
economic problems.”47 To be sure, similar tensions between the theoretically 
interesting and the practically useful exist to some degree in any scientific 
field, and all expertise is, as Vandendriessche and his colleagues contend, an 
“inherently unstable form of authority” on account of its need for recognition 
both “within and outside the academy.”48 But there are grounds to argue that 
such tensions have been particularly prominent in the development of the 
agrarian sciences. This is related to an intrinsic paradox of theirs: it is 
characteristic of modern science that it strives for universal theories, and it is 
equally characteristic of agriculture and forestry that they are localized 
activities, directly dependent on ecological and social particulars which vary 
widely from place to place. On one level, agricultural science is thus almost a 
contradiction in terms.49 
This contradiction has characterized the agricultural sciences since their 
early beginnings in the nineteenth century. At that time, the existence of 
practical, place-bound agricultural problems and the promise of solutions to 
these problems were the preconditions both for the establishment of 
agricultural science as a field of its own and for its social acceptance. However, 
those who took on the role of agricultural scientists were often motivated more 
by theoretical interests and ambitions. This caused a strain that was also built 
into the new scientific institutions established during the nineteenth century. 
Historian of science Margaret Rossiter writes about the situation in the United 
States during the second half of the century: 
 
Trying to reconcile the complexities of agricultural science with the public 
demand for practical benefits became a continuing problem for agricultural 
scientists. These dual pressures were institutionalized into the experiment 
stations in the 1870s and 1880s, and after a period of great frustration and 
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tension, the stations eventually lived up to the early hopes of scientists and 
became a source of fruitful agricultural innovation as well.50 
 
The American experiment stations Rossiter discusses were mainly linked to 
the land-grant universities, which were likewise established in the late 
nineteenth century to teach the practical arts of agriculture and engineering 
and later developed into broad centers of education and research.51 In Europe, 
agricultural higher education and research developed under different 
circumstances, but the tensions between theory and practice were prevalent 
here as well. Jonathan Harwood has studied agricultural colleges in late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Germany, and shows how they were 
torn between practical and scientific ideals. According to Harwood, each 
college initially had either a science-oriented or a practice-oriented profile, 
but over time, many of those committed to practice increasingly began to 
define themselves more in relation to the academic and scientific community. 
Harwood terms this academic drift, which he defines as a “process whereby 
knowledge which is intended to be useful gradually loses close ties to 
practice while becoming more tightly integrated with one or other body of 
scientific knowledge.”52 
Both Harwood and Rossiter highlight how agricultural scientists historically 
have had to struggle for legitimacy in the face of conflicting demands from, on 
the one hand, natural scientists, who judged them on scientific merits, and, on 
the other hand, agriculturalists and policymakers, who wanted science to have 
direct practical utility. Many scientists and institutions drifted academically in 
response, but far from all. The demands for concrete practical benefits did in 
fact turn parts of the agricultural sciences, and parts of the agrarian sciences 
more generally, into what historian of science Robert Kohler calls service 
sciences. Kohler suggests that “practical field sciences like horticulture, 
agricultural extension, or forestry sustain roles for career scientists that are 
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both expert and vernacular—because these are service sciences. Such mixed 
practices become two-way streets of influence.”53 While I believe that it is 
possible to combine the function as a service scientist with the unambivalent 
role and identity of the expert, Kohler’s point that successful service science 
experts must have a connection of mutual influence with the vernacular 
remains very important. 
This is not only visible in historical analyses, but is also something that 
many agrarian experts have explicitly argued throughout history. In early 
twentieth-century Russia, economist A. V. Chaianov argued strongly for the 
relevance of peasant experience to agricultural science; his views inspired 
many agronomists and remained influential in precollectivization USSR. 
Agrarian historians Lourenzo Fernández Prieto and Daniel Lanero identify a 
similar understanding of agricultural science in Galicia in Spain at around the 
same time. Explicitly labeling it a Chaianovian approach, they argue that the 
task of the state’s experts was to achieve a “fusion of scientific or educated 
agronomy with unschooled peasant agrarian knowledge.” Highly concerned 
with the peasants’ own knowledge and objectives, the Galician “[a]gronomists 
studied and understood the social and productive conditions of agriculture in 
order to propose practical solutions that would be acceptable to farmers.” The 
above-cited Jonathan Harwood makes similar points for plant-breeding 
research in pre-World War II Germany.54 And such connections between 
scientists and farmers are not limited to examples from the first half of the 
twentieth century but have arguably remained important within the field of 
agricultural extension as it has developed since then. A more contemporary 
illustration can be found in the work of sociologist Christopher Henke, who did 
field work with University of California farm advisors in the 1990s and found a 
partly “interactional” scientist-farmer relationship in which “scientists and 
users co-produce the form of research and the meaning of its results.”55 
With this in mind, we can return to Scott’s and Shiva’s analyses. In light of 
the history of agricultural science presented above, it becomes apparent that 
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they are linked to the recurring tensions between the universal and the local. 
Given the importance of site-specific conditions for agriculture, any attempt at 
applying results from the agricultural sciences without due attention paid to 
local environments risks producing unwanted outcomes that could eventually 
undermine the legitimacy of the entire enterprise—which is precisely what 
Scott and Shiva argue has happened in the contexts they discuss.56 However, 
they fail to recognize the significance of the service science dimension of 
agrarian expertise, and this undermines their shared assumption that 
agricultural science ignores peasants’ knowledge and reduces the practice of 
farming to excessively simple models. There are too many counterexamples 
available for this to be generally valid. However, this is not to argue that theirs 
and others analyses of distanced, abstracting experts acting as forceful makers 
of modernity are irrelevant. There are, as Sandra Harding suggests, limits on 
what one can take into account when acting from a position of power, and 
centrist thinking is a constant constraint. In drawing attention to this, Scott and 
Shiva highlight what undoubtedly is a very important aspect of expertise in 
postwar agricultural development. But findings from the history of agricultural 
science suggest that the strong version of their high-modernist thesis will be 
challenged when one looks closer at actual instances of agrarian development. 
Productive Development: The Practice of Expert-Led Colonial Agrarian 
Development 
There is research that provides this challenge in the specific context of 
Western-led agrarian development abroad, most prominently in a strand of 
the recent historiography of imperialism and science. These studies draw 
attention to the important roles historically played by cross-cultural 
exchanges, non-metropolitan knowledge production, and intermediary actors 
for the development of the agrarian sciences.57 This work makes it clear that 
colonial experts, and later development aid experts, have had the potential to 
be more than just representatives of an oppressive modernity. They have 
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attempted to understand the local environments they have encountered, have 
learned from their experiences, have acted as transnational mediators and go-
betweens, and have, if sometimes grudgingly, employed local knowledge and 
tried to adapt their own knowledge to local conditions. In her study of a 
French colonial rural development scheme known as the Office du Niger, 
historian Monica M. van Beusekom shows that “[a]longside Western 
scientific/technical approaches to ensuring the sustainability of farming at the 
project, [the project’s] managers made conscious use of local knowledge and 
local agricultural practices.”58 Her research demonstrates that the boundary 
between scientific farming and traditional practices can be rather blurry and 
further suggests that at times Western experts have gone beyond just seeing 
like a (Western) state.59 
In her broader study of colonial science in Africa, historian Helen Tilley 
directly addresses Scott’s thesis of high modernism and argues that his 
 
analysis . . . takes inadequate account of the history of European empire 
building, especially in tropical Africa, and of the rise of scientific disciplines 
that considered complexity and interrelations their key problematics. These 
significant trends occurred during precisely the period in which Scott is most 
interested.60 
 
Tilley’s point is not that Scott is wholly mistaken in his characterization of the 
developmental state or that there have never been instances of high modernism 
such as he describes it, but rather that the application of high modernism needs 
to be understood historically and that we must be open to the possibility that it 
manifested different features in different contexts. She argues in particular that 
British colonial scientists and experts, unlike what Scott suggests that they 
were wont to, in fact “paid a great deal of attention to local conditions and 
environments.” While they undoubtedly set out on the high-modern task of 
transforming Africa, “they envisaged ways of doing so that stressed site 
specificity and even local knowledge.”61 
Even development projects that clearly were more or less oppressive 
interventions from above could have productive dimensions. Christophe 
Bonneuil’s essay “Development as Experiment” illustrates the latter point well. 
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In his discussion of state interventions in African agrarian societies, Bonneuil 
highlights the unequal power relations between the experts and the local 
population and does not shy away from the failures of the rural settlement 
schemes he studies. But the governing he sees in the period 1930–1970 is not 
“governing, thanks to the light of science,” but rather “governing as an 
experimental activity,” and while this experiment mostly failed in achieving its 
goal of opening up the target societies to Western knowledge systems, it 
nonetheless “played a central role in gaining a better knowledge of the 
conditions of farming in tropical Africa, of agrarian societies, and of the way 
that development experts should intervene.”62 His study can thus be said to 
foreground the complexity and friction generated when people and objects, 
along with theories and practices, move between different contexts. The 
concept of friction has been employed by anthropologist Anna Lowenhaupt 
Tsing as a metaphor for what can happen when knowledge moves between 
different contexts, and it is meant to signify that such movement has both 
constructive and destructive potential.63 
Localism or Universalism; Theory or Practice: Agrarian Expertise in 
Development Aid 
Tilley’s reading of Scott as taking inadequate account of important trends in 
imperial history evokes intellectual historian Nils Gilman’s work on 
modernization theory, an American social science approach to development 
that became a paradigmatic ideology for the first decades of development aid 
and is presently often invoked as a symbol of the naiveté of this early aid. In 
particular, it is lambasted for its alleged simplistic understanding of the world, 
said to build on the dichotomy of modernity contra tradition, with the former 
assumed to unavoidably be displacing the latter. However, Gilman argues that 
modernization theory actually came in two main variants, of which only the 
more revolutionary strand emphasized the need for a “radical rupture” with 
tradition. The second variant, which Gilman labels “technocosmopolitan,” 
insisted instead that modernity must build on existing social practice. Scott’s 
description of high modernism maps, as Gilman explicitly suggests, well onto a 
revolutionary modernization ideology if it is also backed up by state power but 
is less congruent with the technocosmopolitan understanding.64 
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In light of the work of Tilley and others, it seems very relevant to move 
from Gilman’s analysis of intellectual trends to the actual implementation of 
agrarian expertise in postwar development aid, a topic comparatively less 
considered by historical research. The above discussion demonstrates that an 
understanding of modern science and technology as strictly Western affairs, 
inherently reductionist and universalistic and imposed by force on the rest of 
the world both in the context of imperialism and of development aid, needs to 
be qualified by way of empirical examination. It highlights the need for more 
studies of expert planning and expert practice in development aid; studies that 
should be open to possible new perspectives on the agrarian development 
expert. While mindful of the limitations of expert knowledge and authority, 
they should recognize that through history people in expert positions have not 
simply imposed ready-made knowledge and technology on new environments. 
It has often been possible for them to adapt their knowledge to new contexts, 
linking different systems of knowing together. They have, at least at times and 
to some extent, encountered new settings rather than forced themselves on 
them, often learning new things and communicating them back home as a 
consequence.65 My work examines such issues in the context of Swedish 
agrarian development aid. 
To help with the conceptualization of my inquiry, I have used a recent, 
discourse-oriented study of Swedish research aid, authored by Veronica 
Brodén Gyberg, that contrasts two struggling discourses at the Swedish 
Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC). The 
two discourses can be said to each represent a particular ideology of 
technoscientific development: universalism, which emphasizes knowledge 
transfer and ideas of universal knowledge, and localism, which highlights the 
importance of local knowledge production and indigenous capacities.66 These 
terms connect well with the discussion of the universal and the local in the 
agrarian sciences and will also be used in this study. 
Brodén Gyberg further notes that at SAREC both discourses remained 
firmly embedded in a technoscientific understanding of development. They 
differed only in their understanding of how research and expertise could and 
ought to aid.67 This draws attention to an important point: a localist 
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orientation can, but does not necessarily, imply openness to change as a 
result of contact with vernacular knowledge. It is very possible, for example, 
for an agricultural scientist to pay close attention to local environments and 
agricultural practices, and indeed to be dependent on local farmers for crucial 
knowledge inputs, without being interested in modifying his own 
understanding of agriculture. Arguing for localist interventions can, but does 
not necessarily, imply a questioning of Western science and modernity, as 
will also be apparent from my work. 
Related to, but distinct from, the tension between universalism and 
localism is a tension between what I will call theoretical and practical 
knowledge. In the last part of Seeing Like a State, Scott turns to this topic and 
suggests that the high-modernist ideology has room only for codifiable, 
theoretical knowledge. It thus loses sight of the crucial “practical skills that 
underwrite any complex activity.” There is certainly some truth to this and in 
particular to Scott’s underlying insight that the distinction between 
theoretical and practical knowledge tends to become part of a “struggle for 
institutional hegemony by experts and their institutions.”68 In the agrarian 
domain, however, Scott’s downplaying of the service science ideal means 
that he fails to recognize that experts who in other respects are committed to 
high-modernist ideals can still have professional self-understandings in 
which a significant degree of practical knowledge and vernacular 
understanding is paramount. For example, in order to function as an effective 
extension agent or farm veterinarian, not only scientific training but also 
solid practical skills and the ability to relate directly to farmers’ problems are 
needed.69 The historically long-standing demands for practical experience 
before and as part of higher agrarian education in Sweden (see below) even 
suggest that many have held the view that all agrarian expertise rests partially 
on a kind of tacit knowledge only practical experience can generate.70 When 
such professional ideals are widespread, as they were in Sweden, they can 
also contribute to the formation of a practice-oriented development ideology, 
in particular with regards to education. I will later empirically analyze the 
extent to which an emphasis on practice became embedded in development 
strategies promoted by Swedish agrarian experts, as well as how this 
approach worked in new natural and sociocultural environments. 
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Experts across Organizational Boundaries 
I do not only examine development strategies and practice in this study, but 
also look at the nature of the institutional collaboration between SLU and 
SIDA, particularly the latter’s agricultural division. I will therefore also discuss 
some work that focuses on the role of experts in organizations and the 
provision of expertise across organizational boundaries. My premise here is 
that the long-term and highly personal nature of the SLU-SIDA relationship in 
the agrarian domain means that it shares certain characteristics of what Mats 
Fridlund calls a development pair. Fridlund’s dissertation work was on the 
relationships that sometimes developed between Swedish public authorities 
and major Swedish engineering firms during the twentieth century, and he 
defines a development pair as “a long-term relationship between a 
manufacturing industrial company and one of its major public customers 
around the joint development of several new technologies.”71 While this 
concept might seem to have little relevance to the present study, which is 
concerned neither with industrial companies nor with technological 
development as such, some of the characteristics Fridlund highlights in this 
type of relationship map very well onto the relationship that developed 
between SLU (and its predecessors) and the Swedish aid authorities. 
First, it is central to Fridlund’s notion of a development pair that the 
relationship is relatively stable over time. For two organizations to qualify as a 
development pair, their collaboration has to span a considerable period and 
extend beyond particular projects. This was one of the main characteristics of 
the SIDA-SLU collaboration, which lasted approximately three decades in its 
institutionalized form. While not as long-lasting as the coupling between the 
Swedish State Power Administration and the electrical company Asea that 
Fridlund analyzes, it was still long enough to make a number of successive 
joint projects realizable. Second, Fridlund highlights the importance of close 
social relations and a high degree of mutual trust to the work in development 
pairs, in turn often building on close-knit interpersonal networks developed 
during engineering studies at one of Sweden’s technical colleges. This, too, 
was a main defining characteristic of the SIDA-SLU collaboration, which, to a 
considerable extent, drew its strength from personal networks created through 
shared experiences. Finally, Fridlund also suggests that development pairs are 
a characteristically Swedish phenomenon. Many of his arguments to this end 
are hard to extricate from the technological context he studies, but even so, it is 
intriguing to consider the possibility that something in the way Swedish public 
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administration was organized tended to facilitate the creation of long-term 
couplings between government agencies and outside organizations for the 
realization of joint projects.72 
The development in development pair primarily refers to the creation of 
new technologies and technological systems, whereas development in the 
present work refers to a process of social change.73 Terminologically, the 
concept of a development pair is nonetheless apt to use also in the present 
context, since SIDA and SLU clearly functioned as development partners—not 
in a process of industrial development, but in a process of stimulating socio-
economic change in Third World countrysides that they knew as rural 
development. I will thus describe the SIDA-SLU collaboration as a rural 
development pair. 
In order to get closer to the practice of organizational collaboration I will 
use the notion of a boundary organization, a concept employed by political 
scientist David Guston to describe organizations with the goal of facilitating 
cooperation and flows of information between the academy and external 
stakeholders.74 The International Rural Development Center at SLU, the topic 
of my chapter 5, was intended to fulfill such a function. Guston’s theory has a 
number of limitations, such as its assumption that boundary organizations serve 
only two clearly separated principals, or its assumption that there are 
equivalent relations of accountability to each stakeholder.75 Even so, I find the 
concept of a boundary organization to be useful in drawing attention to the 
particular organizational niche occupied by IRDC, as it functioned as an 
interface between SLU and SIDA, and the difficulties inherent in that position. 
In chapter 5, I will discuss the problems encountered by IRDC in balancing 
between SLU’s, SIDA’s, its own, and other stakeholders’ interests and 
consider what they implied for the long-term collaboration. 
Earlier Research 
No earlier historical research has directly looked at the subject of Swedish 
agrarian experts involved in foreign development. In this respect, the present 
study is thus heading into uncharted territory.76 However, Jonathan Harwood’s 
                                                        
72 Fridlund, Den gemensamma utvecklingen, 13; 37–38; 218–19. 
73 See also Fridlund’s own discussion of the concept (p. 15). 
74 David Guston, Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of 
Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
75 John Parker and Beatrice Crona, “On Being All Things to All People: Boundary Organizations 
and the Contemporary Research University,” Social Studies of Science 42, no. 2 (2012): 265–66. 
76 To some extent there is earlier work that touches on the topics of the individual chapters, and I 
will present this in the respective chapter introductions. 
 39 
compelling argument about foreign agricultural development being a part of 
the general history of the agricultural sciences suggests that the study can 
fruitfully be positioned in relation to earlier research examining the goals, 
practices, and institutions of the agrarian sciences in Sweden. Furthermore, 
Swedish development aid has been the subject of a number of historical studies 
on both policy and on the practices of particular aid projects or areas. These 
can tell us something about the general political and ideological framework 
within which the agrarian aid also was situated. 
From Practical Agriculture to Fundamental Biology: The History of the Agrarian 
Sciences in Sweden 
In line with the general history of the agrarian sciences, their history in Sweden 
has been characterized by a tension between science and practice. That they 
ought to contribute to Swedish agriculture and forestry has never been in 
question, but there has been an ongoing debate about the means to that end: 
should it take practice as its starting point or take, as historian of ideas Erland 
Mårald puts it, a more “detached, in-depth and long-term approach”?77 
Detailed accounts of the nineteenth-century history of agricultural science 
in Sweden have been provided by Mårald and by agrarian historian Ulrich 
Lange.78 Both are concerned with the establishment of Swedish agricultural 
science and its shaping through recurring science-practice tensions. They are 
also interested in its institutional development and discuss how agrarian 
science was first established under the auspices of the Royal Academy of 
Agriculture. The state soon became its main principal, however, and by 1906, a 
state-run center for agricultural research, the Central Institute for Agricultural 
Experimentation, had been established on the outskirts of Stockholm. It 
consisted of both more theoretically oriented and more practical sub-divisions, 
complemented by a nationwide network of regional and local experiment 
stations, which performed applied research on farming under a variety of 
environmental conditions.79 A few years earlier, the National Forestry 
Research Institute had also been created. Academic education in veterinary 
medicine, forestry, and agriculture was then added to this system through the 
creation of three professional colleges in the early twentieth century. While the 
other higher education establishments in the country were the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Education, these colleges were organizationally subordinate to 
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the Ministry of Agriculture.80 This ensured their close links with the 
agricultural sector and shaped much of their later development. 
The continuing developments through the twentieth century have been 
described by Lennart Hjelm, the first vice-chancellor of SLU. Hjelm’s account 
is more of a chronicle of events than a historical analysis but is nonetheless 
useful for its description of the general developments. Of importance is the 
account of how the weight of the agrarian research system gradually shifted to 
the colleges. After the establishment of the Agricultural College in Ultuna 
outside Uppsala in 1932, most of the Central Institute for Agricultural 
Experimentation was transferred there. The institute’s units for practical 
agricultural and animal husbandry trials retained formal independence, but 
from 1948 they were located with, and shared their board of directors with, the 
Agricultural College. A similar organizational solution was adapted for 
forestry research, and the National Forestry Research Institute was colocated 
with the College of Forestry in Stockholm. The Veterinary College had been 
partly research-oriented since its creation, and its sister organization, the 
National Veterinary Institute, functioned mostly as a veterinary service organ, 
though it also performed some research of its own.81 
Erland Mårald has also written an overview article that takes a more 
analytical approach to twentieth-century developments of Swedish agricultural 
science. He points out that while the three agrarian colleges were academic 
institutions, their position under the Ministry of Agriculture and the prevailing 
social and political conditions in Sweden ensured that there was no immediate 
academic drift. By the mid-1900s, Mårald argues, the two main goals of state-
funded agricultural research in Sweden were “helping in adapting agriculture to 
the industrialized welfare society and in maintaining a high level of contingent 
preparedness.”82 These goals implied what I describe as a service science ideal 
and a close attention to agricultural practice. They also implied a focus on local 
conditions, and the extensive network of experiment stations was utilized to 
produce and disseminate site-specific knowledge. The education imparted at the 
colleges was likewise closely tied to practice. Despite an ongoing debate, 
analyzed by historian of technology Per Lundin, over whether agronomical 
instruction should produce theoretical specialists or practical generalists, 
extensive experience of practical work in agriculture remained a prerequisite for 
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admission to the Agricultural College until the early 1960s.83 After this 
requirement was abolished, long practical preparatory courses were integrated 
into the study programs instead. Similar requirements were in effect for the 
College of Forestry, and at the Veterinary College, all students were taught the 
repertoire of practical skills needed to work as a farm veterinarian.84 
Postwar Swedish public agricultural research and education took place in 
the context of the national agricultural policy, first established in 1947, which 
has been discussed by agrarian historians Iréne Flygare and Maths Isacson, and 
others.85 These authors note how the policy was strongly focused on increasing 
and rationalizing agricultural production for the purposes of freeing up labor, 
safeguarding high levels of self-sufficiency, and guaranteeing farmers a fair 
income. Administered by growing ranks of bureaucrats at the National Board 
of Agriculture, at county-level boards, and within agricultural societies, this 
policy became known as somewhat heavy-handed and insensitive to the 
adverse social consequences it led to in rural communities on account of an 
increasing number of farms being taken out of production. Mårald suggests 
that the colleges under the Ministry of Agriculture were important to the 
rationalization process because, as he puts it, “[a]grarian science was to 
underpin rationalisation in the form of upscaling, professionalisation, 
mechanisation and the increasing use of chemicals.”86 
Per Lundin has a slightly different take on the role of Swedish agrarian 
expertise in the agricultural reforms of the first postwar decades. He argues 
that it was not science but mechanization that drove the first decades of 
rationalization. With its production and income targets, the agricultural 
policy of 1947 had created a situation of institutionalized overproduction, in 
which there was little need for agricultural science to contribute by 
increasing yields. This was a structural constraint that also shaped the 
resource allocation to agrarian research. While the higher education and 
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Sweden, ed. Per Lundin, Niklas Stenlås, and Johan Gribbe (Sagamore Beach: Science History 
Publications/USA, 2010); Reine Rydén, Marknaden, miljön och politiken: Småbrukarnas och 
ekoböndernas förutsättningar och strategier, 1967–2003 (Uppsala: Department of History, 
Uppsala University, 2005), 54–61. 
86 Mårald, “Knowledge,” 98. 
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research system in Sweden expanded massively in the first postwar decades, 
the agrarian institutions were provided with a comparatively small share of 
the resources. The state funding allocated to the Agricultural College 
increased sixfold between 1938 and 1958, while the technical colleges saw 
their resources increase by a factor of seventeen.87 
This lag in the allocation of resources created tensions within the three 
colleges and seems to have driven a change in their orientation. Lundin shows 
how research in fundamental biology became considerably more important 
from the mid-1960s and argues that the Agricultural College’s management 
took advantage of the growing interest in biology at this time by formulating 
the college’s research work in terms that had greater political traction. This 
opened up for a considerable strengthening of basic research both at the 
Agricultural College and at the College of Forestry, something that, according 
to Lundin, marks the start of their transformation from education institutes to 
the research university SLU is today.88 Mårald likewise identifies a drift 
towards biology and, for his part, suggests that growing public concern over 
the negative environmental effects of modern, chemical-based agriculture was 
a driving force.89 
Both Mårald and Lundin thus identify important shifts in the orientation 
of the Agricultural College in the 1960s. These shifts coincide temporally 
with the college’s, and shortly thereafter also the College of Forestry’s, first 
development aid work, and Mårald briefly mentions that the Agricultural 
College “[launched] projects in Africa” in the early 1960s.90 But there is no 
earlier research that discusses the reason for, and the significance of, these 
projects. It remains an open question what role, if any, foreign aid 
engagements played in the more general processes of change. Was the 
foreign aid engagement partly a means to domestic objectives? Were 
developing country agriculture and forestry approached as potential new 
fields of scientific study? Earlier research also says little about continuities or 
discontinuities between Swedish agrarian expertise applied at home and 
abroad. How did the Swedish service science ideal fare when Swedish 
agrarian experts began to work in developing countries? The present 
dissertation will attempt to answer these questions. 
                                                        
87 Per Lundin, “Jordbruksreformerna och de areella näringarnas högskolor” (unpublished 
manuscript, September 2015), 3. 
88 Per Lundin, “Reformeringen av högre utbildning och forskning inom de areella näringarna” 
(unpublished manuscript, February 2015), 31–37. 
89 Mårald, “Knowledge,” 101. 
90 Mårald, “Knowledge,” 99. 
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A Welfare State Goes Abroad: The Swedish Nature of Swedish Aid 
Historical analyses of Swedish development aid are comparatively rare. There 
is no synthetic work spanning the entire postwar period, comparable to, for 
example, the available histories of Danish and Norwegian development aid.91 
Syntheses of Swedish postwar history in general also pay little attention to 
development aid.92 There is, however, several historical case studies of specific 
Swedish development projects, activities, policies, or periods, though none 
analyzes the role of agrarian aid.93 Furthermore, historians taking a wider 
perspective have written on the background and links between Swedish aid 
policy and Sweden’s geopolitical position and perspectives. In this context, 
Swedish development aid is often understood in the framework of the ideology 
and self-understanding that came to characterize Sweden as a result of its 
policy of neutrality during the Second World War and freedom from alliances 
afterwards. Due to this foreign policy it was difficult for Sweden to engage 
                                                        
91 There is, however, an ongoing examination of Swedish aid history by historians Mattias Tydén, 
Urban Lundberg and Annika Berg. Their study, tentatively titled “Improving the World? Swedish 
Development Assistance during Three Decades” will fill a major research gap when it is finished. 
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utvecklingsbistånd och biståndspolitik (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978). 
92 Development aid is always mentioned in such work in relation to postwar social development, 
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volume effort: Kjell Östberg and Jenny Andersson, Sveriges historia: 1965–2012 (Stockholm: 
Norstedt, 2013), 180–81. 
93 Annika Berg, “A Suitable Country: The Relationship between Sweden’s Interwar Population 
Policy and Family Planning in Postindependence India,” Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 
33, no. 3 (2010); Sunniva Engh, “The Conscience of the World? Swedish and Norwegian 
Provision of Development Aid,” Itinerario 33, no. 2 (2009); Sunniva Engh, “Det internasjonale 
folkhemmet? Styringsmentalitet i velferdsstat og bistand,” in Den självstyrande medborgaren? 
Ny historia om rättvisa, demokrati och välfärd, ed. Christina Florin, Elisabeth Elgán, and Gro 
Hagemann (Stockholm: Institute for Futures Studies, 2007); Norbert Götz, “The One Per Cent 
Country: Sweden’s Internalisation of the Aid Norm,” in Saints and Sinners: Official Development 
Aid and its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. Thorsten B. Olesen, 
Helge Ø. Pharo, and Kristian Paaskesen (Oslo: Akademika, 2013); Viveca Halldin Norberg, 
Swedes in Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, 1924–1952: A Study in Early Development Co-Operation 
(Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977); Tomas Kjellqvist, Biståndspolitikens 
motsägelser om kunskap och tekniköverföring: Från konkret praktik till abstract policy 
(Karlskrona: Blekinge Institute of Technology, 2013); Per Åke Nilsson, Svenskt bistånd till den 
tredje världen: Dess uppkomst under 1950-talet. (Hammerdal: Hammerdal Förlag och Reportage, 
2004); Öhman, Taming Exotic Beauties. An account of Swedish agriculture aid up until 1986 is, 
however, given in an anthology written by Swedish development aid administrators: Christer 
Holtsberg, “The Development of Rural Development: Swedish Strategies for the Countryside,” in 
Swedish Development Aid in Perspective: Policies, Problems and Results Since 1952, ed. Pierre 
Frühling (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1986). 
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internationally in the increasingly polarized geopolitical situation of the early 
Cold War. Engagements in the developing countries were one way around this. 
Historian Bo Stråth also discusses how such engagements could be a way to 
deal with the impossibility of constructing a postwar Swedish identity around 
the notion of resistance to the Third Reich, as was done in other Western 
European nations. Through international commitments, Stråth suggests, the 
“bad conscience of 1945 was transformed into a world conscience.”94 
Development aid was an integral part of these international commitments. 
That aid was linked to identity construction is clearly demonstrated in 
Sweden’s first national policy for development aid. Government Bill 1962:100, 
which presented this policy, carefully constructed a particular Swedish kind of 
aid, whose goals, as former aid administrator Bertil Odén has pointed out, were 
closely oriented to the ideas on which the welfare state project was based.95 
Swedish development aid was to help build national economies characterized 
by high rates of growth, but also by internal solidarity and by policies 
combating social inequality. Studies of links between this official aid rhetoric 
and actual motives for the provision of aid have been carried out chiefly by 
political scientists interested in idealist versus realist conceptions of aid, with 
some authors emphasizing the altruistic nature of Swedish aid as the export of 
public welfare, and others pointing out the close relation between development 
assistance and business interests.96 To me, these are not necessarily conflicting. 
It is entirely plausible that a complex web of motives, both altruistic and self-
serving, undergirded the Swedish aid efforts.97 
At any rate, the link between the welfare state and development aid did not 
stop at the level of rhetoric. Several historical studies, notably by historian of 
ideas Annika Berg and historian Sunniva Engh, have made it clear that there 
were close links not just in policy and oratory but also in practice between the 
welfare project in Sweden and its development aid activities abroad.98 In 
Sweden as elsewhere, the construction of the modern state was a project 
closely tied to an ideology of scientific rationality. This meant that groups of 
experts, positioning themselves as non-political bearers of this rationalistic 
                                                        
94 Bo Stråth, “Neutrality as Self-Awareness,” in The Swedish Success Story?, ed. Kurt Almqvist 
and Kay Glans (Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation, 2004), 154. 
95 Odén, Biståndets idéhistoria, 172. 
96 For the contrasting points of view, see e.g. Susan L. Holmberg, “Welfare Abroad: Swedish 
Development Assistance,” in The Committed Neutral: Sweden's Foreign Policy, ed. Bengt 
Sundelius (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); Stephen W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid 
(Boulder: Rienner, 1995). 
97 Similarly, May-Britt Öhman’s view is that altruistic ideals and commercial interests were 
closely entangled: Öhman, Taming Exotic Beauties, 90. 
98 See Berg, “Suitable Country”; Engh, “Conscience”; Engh, “Det internasjonale folkhemmet?.” 
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ideal, could wield considerable influence over the development of Swedish 
society.99 Some of them then took their engagement abroad as part of Swedish 
development aid, with particularly strong connections having been 
demonstrated within family planning and population control.100 As already 
suggested, this dissertation will relate to this tradition of exploring continuities 
and discontinuities between domestic work and development aid. It will also 
take into account international influences. We know that a number of links 
existed between the three agrarian colleges and international science in the first 
post-war decades, and that their most prominent connections were with 
universities in the United States.101 I will further explore how that shaped their 
aid work and how their representatives related to international models. 
Delimitations and Source Material 
My study of Swedish agrarian expertise in development aid is, as already 
noted, limited to an examination of the expertise represented at SLU and its 
predecessor colleges. These were not the only expert organizations that played 
a role, but they got involved in foreign aid early and extensively. Since they 
also were (and are) central institutions for the agrarian sciences in Sweden, I 
argue that studying them is a good way to approach the problem of agrarian 
expertise in such aid. 
There are also further delimitations with regard to the study’s chronological 
and topical design. The first significant aid endeavor at any of the three 
colleges was a course in animal reproduction for veterinarians from India and 
Thailand, given by Professor Nils Lagerlöf at the Veterinary College in 1954 
                                                        
99 Tore Frängsmyr, Svensk idéhistoria: Bildning och vetenskap under tusen år, del II 1809–2000 
(Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 2000), 300; Francis Sejersted, Socialdemokratins tidsålder: 
Sverige och Norge under 1900-talet (Nora: Nya Doxa, 2005), 232. Per Lundin and Niklas Stenlås 
have described these experts as “reform technocrats,” see Per Lundin and Niklas Stenlås, 
“Technology, State Initiative and National Myths in Cold War Sweden: An Introduction,” in 
Lundin, Stenlås, and Gribbe, Science for Welfare and Warfare, 9–10; Per Lundin and Niklas 
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the United States were central points of reference in particular for veterinary science and 
agricultural science in Sweden. See Karl Bruno, “Från Ultuna till Urbana och Uganda: Sveriges 
lantbruksuniversitet i sitt internationella sammanhang, 1945–2000” (unpublished manuscript, 
November 2012), appendix A. For a more general survey of the Americanization of the Swedish 
academy after World War II, see Dag Blanck, “The Impact of the American Academy in 
Sweden,” in Networks of Americanization: Aspects of the American Influence in Sweden, ed. Rolf 
Lundén and Erik Åsard (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1992). 
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and 1955. My chronology starts with this course and its background. In order 
to be able to study long-term developments and cover a range of activities, I 
end the study as late as 2009, when SLU’s administration of Swedish support 
to forestry education in post-revolutionary and then post-Mengistu Ethiopia 
ended. This was the last—to date—major field effort in which SLU served as a 
consultant to the Swedish aid authorities. 
The significant length of this chronology means that it has been impossible 
to examine and analyze every actor and activity of relevance. I have elected to 
focus on those processes and courses of events that, in my opinion, have 
exercised the most significant influence on the general historical trajectory. 
Besides the veterinary courses and the support to forestry education in 
Ethiopia, this includes the Agricultural College’s role in planning and 
executing the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in Ethiopia in 
the 1960s and 1970s and the institutional collaboration between SLU and 
SIDA as it played out between 1966 and 1996. I have studied these more 
formative or significant events in detail while leaving other developments—
including such aid activities in which SLU worked with other partners than 
SIDA—outside the scope of the study.102 The topics of each individual chapter, 
and what part of the chronology they cover, are presented in figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the chronology of the dissertation. The dashed line indicates that 
the courses continued until 1993 even though my chapter is concerned primarily with the first 
decade. The vertical line between CADU and SIDA–SLU depicts the fact that the latter came 
about as a direct result of the former. 
There are also two particular delimitations on an analytical level that I want to 
make explicit here. First, I make no claim to present exhaustive histories or 
                                                        
102 There have been a number of institutional and individual contacts with the developing 
countries at SLU that thus will not figure in the present work. Two of the more significant efforts 
were the Department of Crop Production’s research collaboration with Nicaragua and the 
engagement of the Department of Animal Breeding and Genetics in Ethiopia. For introductions to 
these projects, see Lars Ohlander, “Nicaragua: Från bönforskning till doktorandprogram,” in 
Sammanhang: SLU 25 år, ed. Gunilla Ramberg (Uppsala: Swedish University of Agricultural 
Sciences, 2002); Johan Toborn, “Etiopien: ‘ett SLU-land’,” in Ramberg, Sammanhang. 
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evaluations of the development projects that figure in the dissertation. They are 
not my objects of study as such. Rather, my purpose is to understand some 
aspects of these projects in the context of Swedish agrarian science and 
technoscientific expertise, and, conversely, to understand the agrarian experts 
through examining the development projects they created. Consequently, I 
focus more on the planning phases, with their often explicit (if also often 
strategically adjusted to the context) presentations of expert opinions and 
understandings, than on the practice of development aid as it took place on the 
ground and in the field. Second, the empirical and analytical focus is on 
Swedish agrarian expertise. On occasion, I bring in expert perspectives from 
recipient countries and the voices of the people who participated in projects as 
developees, but I have not attempted to write an account which is symmetrical 
with respect to Sweden and the countries in which her experts have been 
engaged. This opens up the study to criticism for upholding Eurocentric and 
expert-centric biases as it unavoidably leads to a de-emphasizing of local 
agencies and to a lack of focus on the interaction between ideology and 
practice.103 However, it reflects pragmatic considerations over the limits of my 
time and my access to sources rather than a historiographical stance. I do 
consider questions of how expert practices and ideologies were shaped by, for 
example, local resistance to, or appropriation of, development interventions to 
be both valid and very important. However, I have only been able to give 
partial and incomplete answers here. I further discuss some implications of this 
in the section on sources below. 
I also want to make some points about my level of analysis. My interest in 
experts and expertise leads me to afford central importance to prominent 
individuals and the networks they built. Their stances can be explained partly 
in terms of individual projects, scientific ideologies and interests, and 
interpersonal networks. But it is also necessary to situate the actors in the 
institutional context that likewise contributed to shaping how they thought 
and acted. A source of inspiration for the analysis with regard to the link 
between individual and institution has been the notion of formative moments, 
as it is used by political scientist Bo Rothstein.104 He employs the concept in 
a take on the structure-agency problem that acknowledges the dominating 
role of structure while privileging agency under certain conditions. During 
periods of crisis, antagonism, and institutional dysfunction, Rothstein argues, 
actors who normally are constrained by institutional structures can find 
                                                        
103 See the historiographical discussion in van Beusekom, Negotiating Development, 187–92. 
104 Bo Rothstein, “Aktör - Strukturansatsen: Ett metodiskt dilemma,” Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 
91, no. 1 (1988); Bo Rothstein, Den korporativa staten: Intresseorganisationer och 
statsförvaltning i svensk politik (Stockholm: Norstedts juridik, 1992), 17–18. 
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means to change the fundamental conditions of the political system of which 
they are part. Formative moments thus become central turning points on 
which the historical development of organizations and systems hinges, and 
these turning points are actor-driven.  
I am more generally interested in an actor perspective on history and thus 
prone to focus on individual agency also beyond clearly recognizable 
formative moments, but I nonetheless identify a formative moment as a 
crucial turning point in the story of Swedish agrarian expertise in 
development aid. In light of this, I employ different levels of analysis as a 
historiographical tool that highlights the changing nature of Swedish 
development aid and individual actors’ room to shape this nature. The earlier 
chapters focus comparatively more on actor-linked microanalysis, whereas 
the later ones look more at the organizational level. This is intended to reflect 
one of my findings, namely, that as time passed, Swedish agrarian aid 
became more institutionalized and gradually less open to personal 
interventions. However, these are not definite demarcations, and even though 
the opportunity for individual actors to change the fundamental conditions of 
the aid system decreased, there was still ample room for individual initiatives 
to shape expert involvement. Thus, all chapters, to some extent, employ 
explanations in terms of both individual and (inter-)organizational factors. 
Source Material 
The dissertation draws on a range of archival and printed sources, 
complemented by a series of interviews with involved actors. As each of the 
empirical chapters is based on its own body of source material, more detailed 
presentations of the selected material will be provided in the separate chapters. 
This section contains an introduction to the sources used and some general 
source-critical remarks. 
My central source material is unpublished archival material linked to 
decision-making on aid-related matters and to the administration of aid 
projects. The actual decision-making can be followed in material such as 
meeting minutes and other formal documents accounting for particular 
decisions. For the present analysis, it has, however, been much more useful to 
draw on the often large amounts of material created during the preparation of 
decisions and the administration of ongoing projects: memoranda, reports, 
professional correspondence, etc. Analyzing such material has made it possible 
to reconstruct many of the planning and decision-making processes. I use 
material from the archives of the three colleges and SLU as well as from the 
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SIDA/Sida, NIB, and the Central Committee for Swedish Development Aid (a 
predecessor of NIB) archives.105 
To some extent I also draw on published sources, such as press material, the 
Swedish Government Official Report Series, published accounts of 
development aid, published reports from SLU, etc. A special subset of printed 
sources is the numerous accounts of SLU’s development aid history that have 
been published in festschrifts or by the university itself in magazines and 
books.106 These accounts can sometimes provide useful information, but are 
normally of limited utility as narrative sources. They typically present 
simplified accounts and in many instances misattribute initiative and agency. 
In addition to the written source material, I also draw on interviews with 
people who in different ways have been involved in the events I analyze. In 
total, I have conducted twenty-two interviews using a semi-structured method, 
with a set of prepared questions framing an otherwise informal conversation. 
The interviews have taken place throughout the research process, without a 
systematic order or schedule. In most cases, I have contacted informants and 
arranged interviews as a consequence of having noticed the respective persons 
when studying other source material. Sometimes a suggestion or introduction 
by an earlier informant or a third party also opened up for an interview. The 
primary purpose of the interviews has been to gather impressions from 
participating actors that, in turn, have helped me to understand more of the 
context of the problems I examine. On several occasions, I have also used 
interviews to fill gaps in the written source material, and in these latter 
instances, I cite the relevant interview as a direct source in a footnote. 
Source Criticism: Importance and Visibility 
To go from a historical source material to a historical narrative requires a 
critical analysis of the former. The basic purpose of all source criticism is to 
determine whether a certain source can be used to answer a particular question: 
                                                        
105 Access to material on development aid in the SIDA/Sida archives can be restricted if deemed 
sensitive with regard to the foreign relations of Sweden. This has not been a problem for the 
present study. 
106 Examples include Allan Bane, “Nils Lagerlöf och hans insatser i internationellt 
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Agricultural Sciences, 2008). 
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one employs source criticism to avoid jumping to ungrounded conclusions. 
Any historical argument needs to rest on a foundation that can stand up to 
source-critical scrutiny. But this purpose can be achieved in different ways. An 
older, and traditionally normative, form of source criticism in Swedish 
historiography involves asking questions about the tendency, closeness, and 
dependency of a source. These criteria are used to evaluate narrative sources. 
By evaluating the tendency of the author, the closeness in time and space of the 
narration to the event, and its possible dependency on other sources, 
conclusions can be drawn about the narrative’s reliability and the extent to 
which it can be used by the historian.107 
As there has been a shift in the kinds of questions historians tend to ask, 
evaluations of the veracity of narrative sources have become comparatively 
less central to historical research during the second half of the twentieth 
century, and so the need for new forms of source criticism has arisen. In the 
early 1970s, Swedish historian Göran B. Nilsson presented an argument for 
what he calls functional source criticism, in which relevance and 
representativeness are the most important criteria. Relevance entails asking 
questions about whether the information provided by a source is relevant to the 
question, and representativeness involves questions about whether a source is 
typical of or representative for the studied event or period. In a more recent 
article, historian Maria Ågren agrees that representativeness, which she 
relabels importance, is significant but argues that the most central criterion 
ought to be visibility, that is, the question of what is visible in which sources, 
and why.108 Nilsson’s and Ågren’s criteria have guided my appraisal of the 
sources, though in a few cases I have needed to evaluate narrative sources and 
have then made use of the classical criteria as well. 
The use of oral sources comes with its own pitfalls that have to be carefully 
considered, the most obvious problem being the source’s validity: it is often 
difficult to judge the extent to which the informant recalls the past correctly 
and the extent of his or her bias. Moreover, it is almost impossible to know 
whether the informant might seek to actively misguide the interviewer for his 
or her own reasons. This makes careful source criticism and comparison with 
other sources and source-types as crucial to oral sources as to any other 
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Kultur, 1966), 89–103. 
108 Göran B. Nilsson, “Om det fortfarande behovet av källkritik: Jämte några reflexioner över 
midsommaren 1941,” Historisk tidskrift 1973, no. 2 (1973); Maria Ågren, “Synlighet, vikt, 
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source.109 In the present case, most of the interviews were only used to help me 
acquire a better contextual understanding and are not cited in the text. But 
where I do cite an interview as a source, I discuss potential source-critical 
issues as deemed necessary. 
There is also a more insidious risk associated with interviews, namely, that 
the researcher begins to internalize standpoints or interpretations suggested by 
the informants, perhaps in unwitting deference to their personal experience and 
knowledge of the topic. To an extent, to become influenced in such a way is a 
reason to perform interviews, as it often helps with the interpretation of other 
sources, but it can also introduce potentially problematic biases into subsequent 
analyses. Since this is likely to be a subconscious process, and as there is a 
narrow boundary between desired and undesired influences, it is hard to fully 
safeguard against. I have, however, tried to pay attention to how I as a 
researcher have related to what the informants suggest. 
A few of the informants have also given me access to unpublished 
autobiographical material. Such memoirs differ from oral sources mainly in that 
the researcher has no control over the content. Otherwise, it is a material with, in 
principle, the same limitations concerning subjectivity, the nature of memory, the 
interest of the author in presenting him- or herself in a certain way, and so on. 
The fact that such material is not created by way of a dialog, nor under the time 
constraint of the interview situation, can work both ways for these issues. I draw 
on this sort of material mainly for biographical information but also use it to 
support factual arguments in a few cases. I then discuss it as appropriate. 
Finally, I will discuss four concrete issues of visibility and importance in 
relation to the sources I have used. First, apart from the case of Nils Lagerlöf, I 
cite very little informal or private correspondence between the involved actors 
as I have not found significant volumes of correspondence in the archives I 
chose to focus on.110 This is a notable source-related limitation of the study. As 
historian Niklas Stenlås discusses, correspondence was the main way in which 
the professional elite of the time related to their contacts, and since 
correspondents often had a social as well as a professional relationship, the 
                                                        
109 A very useful discussion of the use of oral sources together with written material (along with a 
presentation of the purposes, uses and methods of oral history that I fundamentally share) can be 
found in Lillian Hoddeson, “The Conflict of Memories and Documents: Dilemmas and 
Pragmatics of Oral History,” in The Historiography of Contemporary Science, Technology, and 
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110 Most likely, more letters could be found were one to systematically search for them. This 
would however require an empirical effort that I deemed incompatible with the present study. 
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professional and the social were normally not separated in the letters.111 For 
this study, it is eminently clear from interviews and other sources that personal 
relationships and networks were very important, so analyzing a larger body of 
correspondence between the central actors would have provided interesting 
insights into the background of the developments detailed. The few instances 
in which I have found such letters further confirm this. 
Second, I have limited my empirical work to Swedish archives and to 
interviews with Swedish actors. The study thus includes written source material 
from abroad only to the extent that it has been preserved in Swedish archives. 
Studying the same topics using or including material from abroad could be done, 
and would certainly add to the findings I present here. But in light of my research 
questions and interests, as well as the constraints on my time, I deemed it more 
productive to increase the amount of material studied in Swedish archives rather 
than spending a perhaps considerable time on a likely difficult and perhaps 
uncertain project of gathering material abroad. However, since I partly write 
about foreign settings, this privileging of Swedish experts and authorities over 
foreign partners, counterparts, and intended beneficiaries is somewhat 
problematic. It forecloses the possibility of bringing in multiple and 
complementary perspectives on the topic under study, and this is a constraint on 
the analysis that needs to be kept in mind. As I noted above, a particular risk with 
regards to the criterion of visibility is that the agency of foreign actors, especially 
people far from the official decision-making processes, is hidden by the 
dominance of the Swedish source material. As historian of science Suzanne 
Moon points out in regards to the study of colonial and postcolonial technology, 
“focusing on the easily obtainable . . . archives to the exclusion of all others, 
makes it that much more difficult to recapture the lives of ordinary people as 
active lives, engaged with defining the sociotechnical life . . . and not simply 
passive recipients of state largesse or oppression.”112 Even though the purpose of 
my study is different, Moon’s argument retains a degree of relevance. My choice 
of sources comes with a top-down bias, which makes it considerably more 
difficult to answer relevant questions about if and to what extent Swedish 
agrarian experts were influenced by foreign encounters and by possible instances 
of resistance or attempted subversion they might have faced in the field. In the 
                                                        
111 Stenlås discusses business rather than academic actors, and his study is set in the 1940s, but 
the characteristics of correspondence that he describes are clearly recognizable in my own 
sources, particularly in the material from the 1950s and 1960s. From the 1970 and onwards the 
correspondence culture seems to have changed. Niklas Stenlås, Den inre kretsen: Den 
ekonomiska elitens inflytande över svensk partipolitik och opinionsbildning, 1940–1949 (Lund: 
Arkiv, 1998), 260–61. 
112 Suzanne Moon, “Place, Voice, Interdisciplinarity: Understanding Technology in the Colony 
and the Postcolony,” History and Technology 26, no. 3 (2010): 196. 
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empirical chapters, I will discuss instances where I feel that this creates 
particularly significant gaps in the analysis. 
Third, as will be apparent, almost all the actors who feature in the 
dissertation are male. This does not mean that there were no female agrarian 
experts in development aid, but it reflects both the periods studied and a 
particular visibility issue that pertains to the source material and foci used. To 
begin with, most students and almost all the staff at the three agrarian colleges 
were male until the mid-1970s. Consequently, up until at least the late 1980s, 
the majority of agrarian experts in Sweden were men.113 As for my study, the 
later part of the chronology is then devoted to two separate developments: the 
institutional collaboration between SLU and SIDA, which was largely carried 
by an older, mostly male generation of experts, and SLU’s support to forestry 
education in Ethiopia, also strongly male-dominated on account of it drawing 
on forestry expertise (which remains gendered male even today). Thus, the 
dominance of male experts in the dissertation cannot be taken as an indication 
of a lack of female expertise beyond the limits of my study. It does, however, 
make it seem likely that the expert-promoted ideologies I study here were 
shaped by the gendered nature of the experts’ backgrounds. While I do not 
analyse this aspect as such, I will mention a few apparent indications. 
Fourth, I draw on sources from six decades, of which the latest decades are 
very close to the present. This calls for some specific attention to how the 
nature of the source material changes with time and to issues of visibility and 
importance that arise. Generally speaking, the more recent source material, 
particularly from the last decade of the study, is sparser and less varied. This 
might seem counterintuitive but in fact reflects how, as historians Ronald E. 
Doel and Thomas Söderqvist put it, “[t]he once-stable world of typewritten and 
handwritten letters preserved in university archives, together with bound 
periodicals lining library shelves, is yielding to the realm of email, e-journals, 
weblogs, and other web-based reports.”114 The rise of digital office equipment 
                                                        
113 Both the Veterinary College and the Agricultural College reached a fifty-fifty gender ratio 
among matriculating students in the 1970s. Even so, it took at least another two decades before 
similar gender ratios were achieved within the professions as a whole. For some veterinary 
statistics, see Karin Östensson, “Från manligt till kvinnligt,” in Veterinär – yrke i förvandling: 
Från manligt till kvinnligt; från ensamvarg till lagarbetare, ed. Lars-Erik Appelgren, Ingemar 
Jämte, and Karin Östensson (Stockholm: Swedish Veterinary Association, 2010), 85–89. Forestry 
education has yet to reach equal gender ratios among students, and female students are a 
particular minority in the forest engineer study program. See Gun Lidestav, Elias Andersson, 
Solveig Berg Lejon, and Kristina Johansson, “Jämställt arbetsliv i skogssektorn: Underlag för 
åtgärder” (Department of Forest Resource Management, Swedish University of Agricultural 
Sciences, 2011), 9. 
114 Ronald E. Doel and Thomas Söderqvist, “Introduction: What We Know, What We Do Not—
and Why it Matters,” in Doel and Söderqvist, The Historiography of Contemporary Science, 4. 
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and the decline of the secretarial profession have led to transformations in 
bureaucratic culture and as an effect of that to changes in the material left 
behind for historians to work with. I have tried to work around this constraint 
by writing from the sources available, to some extent complemented by 
interviews, while remaining aware of the limitations in terms of visibility and 
importance that arise from, for example, having access only to a small part of a 
total body of correspondence. 
Terminology 
This dissertation deals primarily with Swedish actors and organizations and is 
mostly based on Swedish-language primary sources. When quoting or 
paraphrasing such Swedish material, I have translated it into English myself. I 
have attempted to do this as accurately as possible, but have prioritized English-
language readability over preserving the style or quirks of the original. Some 
particular translation issues can be mentioned already at this stage. The source 
material uses several different terms that I have translated as “development aid” 
or very occasionally as “development assistance.” Development aid is a direct 
translation of one of these terms, utvecklingsbistånd. In the 1950s and 1960s in 
particular, the term tekniskt bistånd was also used. Its literal meaning is 
“technical aid,” and the term had its origins in the UN concept of technical 
assistance. It referred to the provision of knowledge and expertise for 
development and was distinct from finansiellt bistånd, “financial aid,” which 
referred to the provision of development credits (in practice, there was often a 
degree of overlap between technical and financial aid). Another common word is 
u-hjälp, an ambiguous term that can mean either “aid to developing countries” in 
general or “development aid” in particular. More recently, the word aid has 
mostly been dropped in favor of the word cooperation, so that what used to be 
called development aid is nowadays known as utvecklingssamarbete, 
“development cooperation.” All these concepts have interesting histories in their 
own right, and the changes in their use reflect shifting conceptions of aid and aid 
recipients as well as the shifting self-understanding of donors. But these shifts 
are not the focus of my analysis, and so I have aimed for consistency and use the 
term development aid or, occasionally, development assistance throughout. For 
the latter parts of the chronology, I sometimes use the term cooperation as well. 
Another terminological quagmire is the complex of terms used to refer to 
the recipients of aid or the development cooperation partners. The terms used 
in the source material vary with time. In the 1950s, common terms for 
developing countries were underutvecklade, “underdeveloped,” or efterblivna, 
“backward,” countries. Later the somewhat more neutral u-länder (sing. u-
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land) became the dominant term; it simply means “developing countries.” I use 
“developing country” throughout, but sometimes employ literal translations 
when quoting or paraphrasing. The very common Swedish constructions based 
on the word u-land are also translated in this way, so that, for example, u-
landsforskning, which could mean either research in developing countries or 
research of relevance to developing countries, is translated as “developing-
country research.” To describe the collective of developing countries, often 
referred to as u-länderna in the source material, I primarily use the plural form 
(“developing countries”) or “the developing world,” but also occasionally use 
“Third World.” The last-mentioned is strictly speaking not a correct 
translation, but I use it now and then to avoid cumbersome sentences with the 
word development repeated. 
Finally something on names: chapters 4 and 6 are set in Ethiopia, where 
personal names consist of a given name followed by a patronymic. It is proper 
to use either the full name or just the given name when referring to a person 
(without the latter implying any personal familiarity), and I employ both 
options. Ethiopian names and words are generally rendered in the form 
encountered in the source material and might not reflect present-day linguistic 
conventions of transliteration. 
Organizations featured in the dissertation are referred to with their official 
English name if one exists, and otherwise with a translation of the (in most 
instances Swedish) name. Short forms are sometimes used if there can be no 
misunderstanding. In certain cases, an organization’s acronym is 
conventionally used as the de facto name of the organization, and I have 
followed this usage as deemed appropriate, with the most prominent examples 
being SIDA and SLU. Using the form SLU in an English text is inconsistent 
with the source material, where SUAS is more common, but I stick to the 
present-day convention to minimize the risk of confusion. A list of 
organizations, giving the English name used, the Swedish name, and the 
acronym, is provided in appendix B. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Practical Training for Modern Practitioners 
Nils Lagerlöf, India, and Early Swedish Development Aid at the 
Veterinary College, 1950–1960 
Those who, on June 17 of this year . . . entered the Veterinary College’s 
assembly hall were happy to wait by the door for a few minutes to enjoy the 
scene, as delightful as it was unusual for the premises. You could see dark-
skinned gentlemen and sari-wearing beauties from India in happy conversation 
with beautiful Nordic blondes and tall and somewhat solemn Swedish men in 
dark suits. Cocktails of varying strengths and colors were served to the groups 
of guests, the long tables were laden with southern fruits and sandwiches in the 
most delicious colors. There were sun and happy colors over the tableau. There 
was also sun over Hagaparken’s gorgeous greenery and over the blue waters of 
Brunnsviken, which formed a truly Swedish background to the international 
party. What was it, then, this meeting between East and West?115 
 
THIS SUMMERY FEAST, alluringly if stereotypically described here in the 
1955 issue of a Swedish veterinary newsletter, was in fact a farewell party. 
The Veterinary College was bidding goodbye to a group of Indian and Thai 
veterinarians who had spent a year in Stockholm enrolled on a special course 
in animal reproduction. Held on the initiative of the college’s professor of 
obstetrics-gynecology Nils Lagerlöf, and funded through a tri-partite 
agreement between the United Nations, the government of India, and the 
Central Committee for Swedish Development Aid to Less Developed Areas, 
the “meeting between East and West” was the first significant effort in which 
Swedish agrarian expertise was placed in the service of Swedish 
development aid.116  
The course, whose background, execution, and consequences are examined 
in this chapter, took place in the context of fledgling development aid programs 
in the West that attempted to provide technoscientific knowledge to the 
developing countries. Lagerlöf had conceived of it during a mission to India as 
                                                        
115 E[rnst]. P[ålsson]., “‘Indiskt’ party på Veterinärhögskolan,” Medlemsblad för Sveriges 
Inseminationsveterinärers Förening 5, no. 2 (1955): 3. 
116 Some of the findings presented in this chapter have earlier been published in Swedish in Karl 
Bruno, “Nils Lagerlöf och det tidiga svenska biståndet,” Personhistorisk tidskrift 110, no. 1–2 
(2014). 
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a United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization expert in animal 
reproduction. He reacted against what he saw as naïve optimism over the 
prospects of modernizing Indian cattle breeding through the introduction of 
artificial insemination (AI), which he considered a technology ill-adapted to 
prevailing veterinary conditions in the country. A successful introduction of AI 
would, Lagerlöf argued, require the reform of India’s veterinary education and 
the development of a type of veterinary expertise that did not yet exist in the 
country, and the course was intended to help bring this about. Though his 
standpoints on expertise and education initially clashed with views held within 
FAO, Lagerlöf shared with its staff a fundamental belief in the benefits of 
Westernizing modernization. To criticize the premises of development aid 
would have been foreign to him, and he never questioned that the science and 
the profession he represented had much to contribute to developing countries. 
But he did question certain prevailing ideas within and beyond FAO of how 
food production could be stimulated through the use of animal reproduction 
technologies. His attitude in this respect was linked to his views on the role of 
the veterinarian in animal reproduction, and to his promotion of the 
veterinarian as a legitimate modern professional with a certain expertise that 
could meet the needs of an increasingly technologized animal production. 
Several accounts of Lagerlöf’s career, including his development aid 
activities, have been written in outlines, obituaries, and festschrifts produced 
by his colleagues and successors. Historian Nils Edling has compiled a short 
article based on parts of this material. Lagerlöf’s colleague and former student 
Ingemar Settergren has also written a detailed account of the animal 
reproduction courses.117 This chapter complements these texts with a historical 
analysis based on the extensive material left behind by Lagerlöf. I primarily 
answer two questions that contribute to my first and second research problems: 
                                                        
117 Examples of such work are Allan Bane, “Nils Lagerlöf 70 år,” Svensk veterinärtidning 17, no. 
15 (1965); Allan Bane, “Professor Nils Lagerlöf in memoriam,” Svensk veterinärtidning 22, no. 
23 (1970); Allan Bane, “Nils P Lagerlöf,” in Svenskt biografiskt lexikon (Stockholm: 1977–79); 
Stig Einarsson, “Nils Lagerlöf – grundaren av specialiteten husdjursandrologi,” Svensk 
veterinärtidning 62, no. 4 (2010); Otto Garm, “Professor Nils Lagerlöf,” in Festschrift to 
Professor Nils Lagerlöf on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, the 25th August 1965, ed. 
Erik Blom (Copenhagen: Carl Fr. Mortensen, 1965); Ernst Pålsson, “Med Nils Lagerlöf i Indien,” 
in Lindgren, Bot för boskaps sot; Leon Z. Saunders, “In Ever Widening Circles: Osler’s Influence 
on Veterinary Medicine in Sweden,” Canadian Veterinary Journal 34, no. 7 (1993). Edling’s 
article is published as Nils Edling, “Nils Lagerlöf,” in De areella näringarnas välgörare: Kungl. 
Skogs- och Lantbruksakademien och dess donatorer (Stockholm: Royal Swedish Academy of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2010). Settergren’s account can be found in Ingemar Settergren, 
“Internationella kurser i husdjursreproduktion i Sverige, del 1,” Svensk veterinärtidning 45, no. 6 
(1993); Ingemar Settergren, “Internationella kurser i husdjursreproduktion i Sverige, del 2,” 
Svensk veterinärtidning 45, no. 7 (1993); Ingemar Settergren, “Internationella kurser i 
husdjursreproduktion i Sverige, del 3,” Svensk veterinärtidning 45, no. 8–9 (1993). 
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How and why did Lagerlöf frame his expertise in the 1950s development 
context? Which strategies did he advocate for the development of animal 
reproduction in the Third World? 
I mainly use source material from two archives: that of the Central 
Committee for Swedish Development Aid to Less Developed Areas, part of the 
archives of the Swedish Institute at the Swedish National Archives, and that of 
the Department of Obstetrics-Gynecology deposited in the central SLU 
archives. From the departmental archives, I use Lagerlöf’s own documents—
correspondence, manuscripts, memoranda, and published reports—and other 
material related to the department’s international activities. The material about 
Lagerlöf’s courses in the Central Committee archives also largely consists of 
documents either authored by Lagerlöf or addressed to him. All sources used 
are thus rather closely related to Lagerlöf himself, and so the subsequent 
account becomes very much about him. This raises the issue of whether other 
relevant actors and events are invisible, but I would instead argue that the 
sources’ focus on Lagerlöf reflects the conditions under which the courses 
came about. They were very much his personal project. 
“I Look Forward to Men Like You for Help” 
Nils Lagerlöf’s first contact with India took place in 1951, when he received a 
letter from Indian veterinarian G. B. Singh. Essentially a request for advice, 
Singh’s letter discussed a number of problems he had encountered in his work 
on animal breeding and ended with an appeal to the Western expertise Lagerlöf 
embodied: “I look forward to men like you for help.”118 But this was less 
straightforward than Singh perhaps imagined at first. Lagerlöf immediately 
began to problematize the application of veterinary science and technology to 
the developing world. While he certainly believed in the potential benefits of 
such applications, he was not convinced of the power of science and 
technology to level out differences between widely disparate contexts. 
What was the nature of Lagerlöf’s own expertise? He was born in Sunnemo 
in the province of Värmland in 1895 as the son of a clergyman, and attended 
the Veterinary College in Stockholm where he became a licensed veterinarian 
in 1919.119 He went on to devote his career to research and teaching at the 
college, becoming associate professor in 1922 and full professor in 1934. His 
chair was initially in obstetrics and ruminant medicine, but in 1948 it was 
                                                        
118 G. B. Singh to Nils Lagerlöf, 16 September 1951, 2, Department of Obstetrics-Gynecology 
archives, series Ö1, vol. 7, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences archives (hereafter cited 
as OG). 
119 Unless otherwise indicated, the rest of this section is based on the accounts cited above. 
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transformed into a chair in obstetrics and gynecology. In 1934, Lagerlöf also 
defended his PhD dissertation, though not at the Veterinary College, which was 
only granted the right to award doctorates in 1935. He instead defended his 
work on the relationship between sperm morphology and testicular 
histopathology in bulls at Karolinska Institutet, the medical university in 
Stockholm. 
Lagerlöf was an active researcher who devoted most of his scientific work 
while associate professor to the study of various diseases in Swedish cattle. He 
only decided to focus wholly on animal reproduction during his PhD research 
in the early 1930s, partly inspired by a visit to the United States and perhaps 
influenced by his need for a dissertation topic that would be acceptable to the 
physicians at Karolinska.120 At the time, veterinary reproductive medicine was 
a relatively new research field. Only in the early twentieth century had 
veterinary researchers begun to show a systematic interest in the fertility and 
sterility in domestic animals, linked to the growing economic importance of 
dairy cattle.121 Most of those who worked on cattle focused on fertility 
problems in cows, but Lagerlöf’s own work on the role of the bull followed in 
the footsteps of his predecessor as professor in Stockholm, Harry Stålfors, and 
he was also inspired by W. L. Williams’ and W. W. Williams’ (father and son) 
work at Cornell University. His dissertation work was, however, considered 
pioneering, and it propelled him to international fame. 
After becoming professor in 1934, Lagerlöf proceeded with a program of 
improving the research and education he was responsible for. This was closely 
associated with new developments in the field of reproductive medicine, as 
reflected by the department’s name change in 1948, when obstetrics and 
ruminant medicine became obstetrics and gynecology. The shift highlights the 
increasing importance attached both to the veterinarian in animal reproduction 
and to animal reproduction in veterinary education: gynecology meant a focus 
on sexual physiology and pathology.122 It should, however, not be understood 
as implying singular attention to the female animal. Lagerlöf’s own dissertation 
work had been on the bull, and he established a semen laboratory that was one 
                                                        
120 The hypothesis that Lagerlöf might have adapted his research topic to the interests of the 
faculty at Karolinska is veterinarian Stig Einarsson’s. Lagerlöf had earlier spent time on a more 
descriptive kind of work on the abdominal organs of ruminants, and Einarsson presents evidence 
indicating that he worried this would not impress the physicians. See Einarsson, “Nils Lagerlöf,” 
39–40. 
121 Abigail Woods, “The Farm as Clinic: Veterinary Expertise and the Transformation of Dairy 
Farming, 1930–1950,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 
38, no. 2 (2007): 469. 
122 This veterinary specialty is sometimes known as theriogenology, a term not used in the present 
text. 
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of the first of its kind in the world. Based on work in this laboratory, a number 
of fertility problems in the Swedish cattle stock were effectively overcome. 
Such applied research was in line with Lagerlöf’s general interests, which 
tended toward the ideal of service science. His student and eventual successor 
as professor, Allan Bane, notes how for him the “distance between scientific 
results and practical action [was] short,” and his scientific priority was solving 
practical animal breeding problems.123 Given that this was his area of expertise, 
he also came to play a prominent role in the introduction of AI in Sweden, 
which he helped coordinate from his department at the Veterinary College.124 
Alongside his domestic profile, Lagerlöf was considered an international 
scientific authority, having, among other things, been named the first chairman 
of the permanent international scientific committee for reproductive 
physiology and pathology on its establishment in 1948.125 
 
 
Figure 2. In 1945, Nils Lagerlöf’s department moved into a new, purpose-built building on the 
campus of the Veterinary College. The building, seen here under construction, is also a fitting 
symbol of Lagerlöf’s institution-building ambitions. Photographer unknown. From the Swedish 
Veterinary Museum’s photography collections. 
                                                        
123 Bane, “Nils P Lagerlöf.” 
124 See Stig Einarsson, “Allan Bane – Den första AI-läraren i Sverige,” Svensk veterinärtidning 
63, no. 4 (2011). 
125 Allan Bane, “Den första internationella kongressen rörande husdjurens fortplantning, 
sterilitetssjukdomar och art. insemination,” Meddelanden från Sveriges Yngre Veterinärers 
Förening 3, no. 16 (1948). 
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The Curse of Technology Transfer 
Three years later, in 1951, Lagerlöf published an article on veterinary 
education in obstetrics and gynecology in the Journal of the American 
Veterinary Medical Association. It was upon reading this piece that Singh, a 
London-educated Sikh veterinarian and at the time the director of Animal 
Husbandry and Veterinary Services in the Indian state of Orissa, wrote to him 
for advice. Singh felt that his present work on fertility problems in cattle had 
revealed his own training to be insufficient. The two exchanged a series of 
letters in which Singh asked numerous questions and Lagerlöf, stating his 
“great interest,” tried to answer, though he admitted that he felt he could 
contribute only little without personal knowledge of the local conditions in 
Orissa. Something that especially caught Lagerlöf’s interest in the first letter 
from India was a reflection Singh had made about the recent introduction of a 
new approach to animal breeding in his home state. Artificial insemination, 
Singh stated, was making him acutely aware of “our limitation in this field.”126 
Artificial insemination is a breeding method in which precollected semen 
is introduced into the female animal in order to achieve pregnancy without 
mating. It affords the possibility of a considerably more controlled and 
efficient breeding program as it enables a single ejaculation to be used for the 
impregnation of many females and eliminates the need of physically 
relocating the male. In the early 1950s, this method and its associated 
techniques were still relatively new. Organized insemination associations for 
cattle had existed in Sweden since 1943, but the activities were still very 
much expanding in 1951.127 As noted above, artificial insemination was also 
something of a special interest of Lagerlöf’s, who had been intimately 
involved in the development of an AI organization in Sweden.128 He thus had 
clear ideas about the complexity of AI work and expert knowledge of often-
recurring problems. In many settings, the spread of diseases like brucellosis, 
tuberculosis and metritis among inseminated cows was the most serious 
issue.129 Singh had indicated that both metritis and brucellosis—the first an 
inflammation of the cow’s uterine wall and the second a bacterial infection 
causing spontaneous abortions—plagued the livestock in his state. Since he 
                                                        
126 Lagerlöf to Singh, 23 November 1951, OG, series Ö1, vol. 7; Singh to Lagerlöf, 16 September 
1951, 2. 
127 The early history of AI in Sweden is detailed in Ivar Dyrendahl, “Artificiell insemination,” in 
Lindgren, Bot för boskaps sot. 
128 He had also participated in the government inquiry that investigated the matter. See SOU 
1948:36, Betänkande med förslag angående artificiell inseminationsverksamhet bland nötkreatur. 
129 Through a vaccination program, tuberculosis and brucellosis had been brought under control in 
Sweden, but as late as the 1940s these infections were serious problems there as well. See 
Dyrendahl, “Artificiell insemination,” 221–22. 
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inquired about effective hormonal therapies for these illnesses rather than 
about causal factors, prophylactic methods, and hygienic standards, Lagerlöf 
drew the conclusion that India’s veterinary medicine was ill-equipped to 
handle artificial insemination.130 
This conclusion was grounded in Lagerlöf’s understanding of the AI system 
in Sweden and more generally in his understanding of sterility problems in 
dairy cattle as being complex and multifaceted issues with both hereditary and 
environmental causes. When addressing the XIVth International Veterinary 
Congress in London in 1949, Lagerlöf had highlighted the importance of 
continuous sexual health control of a country’s cattle stock for investigating the 
causes of sterility.131 Swedish veterinarians involved in AI seem to generally 
have held that the Swedish system of systematic sexual health and sterility 
controls along with pregnancy examinations had laid the foundation for a 
relatively successful introduction of artificial insemination in the country. 
Responding to a critical appraisal of Swedish AI, Lagerlöf’s student Allan 
Bane had argued a few years earlier that if not performed in tandem with such 
qualified preventive medicine, AI would be a much less effective process.132 
To Lagerlöf, Singh’s letter testified to this. 
The correspondence between Singh and Lagerlöf would lead to a friendship 
between the two colleagues, but for Lagerlöf, it was also the beginning of a 
process that would turn his professional focus to fertility problems in 
developing countries. Just a week after the first letter from Singh, he was 
contacted by a Greek veterinarian who, like Singh, asked his advice. The letter 
left him with the impression that the Greek authorities were likewise planning 
to “introduce [AI] without knowing anything about it,” and from this, he began 
to deduce a pattern.133 He was simultaneously corresponding with a Danish 
colleague, Hans Christian Bendixen, who held a professorship at the Danish 
Veterinary and Agricultural University but at the time was working as a 
veterinary officer for the Animal Production Branch of FAO in Rome. In a 
                                                        
130 See Lagerlöf to Singh, 23 November 1951, OG, series Ö1, vol. 7; Lagerlöf to Hans Christian 
Bendixen, 21 September 1951, OG, series Ö1, vol. 8. 
131 Nils Lagerlöf, “The Veterinarian and the Breeding and Rearing of Animals,” in Report of the 
XIVth International Veterinary Congress (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1949), 109–10. 
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Lantmannen 32, no. 8 (1948); Allan Bane, “Den artificiella inseminationen i Sverige,” 
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papers, but the exchange is referred to in Lagerlöf to Bendixen, 24 September 1951, OG, series 
Ö1, vol. 8. 
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letter to him, Lagerlöf explained what he had begun to piece together, with a 
highly significant paragraph discussing the conditions of artificial insemination 
technology transfer: 
 
I am now starting to understand that Messrs. “agriculture men,” within or 
without F.A.O. I do not know, but after the war, they have rushed to “bless” 
backward countries like India and Greece with artificial insemination. If they do 
this without a functional veterinary apparatus that can take responsibility for the 
hygiene in the a.i. work, it is a probable risk that this a.i. will cause widespread 
sterility. It is good that F.A.O. now has sensible veterinarians who can correct 
this where it is needed.134 
 
This was an early expression of thoughts that would come to inform Lagerlöf’s 
work in and for developing countries during the last twenty years of his life. In 
one sense, he presented an expert opinion about artificial insemination: it is 
meaningless, even counterproductive, to start AI programs in areas where the 
requisite veterinary competence is not at hand to ensure that hygienic standards 
are upheld and that breeding problems are correctly diagnosed and treated. AI, 
Lagerlöf suggested, is only one part of a larger system of reproductive 
medicine upon which its efficiency is dependent. If the technology is taken out 
of context, it will not increase breeding efficiency but rather contribute to the 
spread of infections and sterility. In a wider sense, Lagerlöf’s understanding of 
the problem also implied a criticism of prevailing notions of technology 
transfer and modernization. Attempts to “bless” poorer countries would tend to 
become curses rather than blessings if they ignored the recipient context. This 
was a radical stance in the early 1950s, when belief in modernization through 
technology was widespread and contextual factors were habitually 
downplayed. 
Modernization’s Framework 
Lagerlöf corresponded with Singh and Bendixen at a time when a discourse on 
underdevelopment as a global problem was emerging within the polarized 
framework of the Cold War. Situated within this discourse, early development 
aid focused on modernization and economic growth, with the latter being 
understood as more or less synonymous with development. New institutions 
with global ambitions and aspirations, like the UN or the World Bank, also 
developed and expanded at this time. The dominant ideological framework, 
formalized as a theoretical paradigm from the late 1950s, was a fresh trend in 
American social science known as modernization theory. It built on distinctly 
allochronic foundations: it located underdeveloped areas in the past and took 
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Western history as a model for development. A basic assumption was that 
underdeveloped areas could embark on the development path from tradition to 
modernity if the requisite needs were satisfied and Western ideals of rational 
science and technological progress were appropriated.135 
As a consequence, early development thinking focused on capital 
investment and knowledge transfers. Experiences from the Marshall Plan had 
led to the conclusion that growth came by way of investment, with the chief 
problem for developing countries being that they lacked sufficient resources to 
invest in their own economies. The role of development aid thus became to 
support growth by providing the resources necessary for investment, together 
with the knowledge needed for the diffusion of modern science and 
technology. With this made available, Western industrialization would, as it 
were, repeat itself in the rest of the world. This understanding rested on a 
conception of science and technology as inputs that could straightforwardly 
stimulate development and economic growth. There was widespread belief in a 
technological fix for developing-world problems, and little attention was paid 
to potentially complicating factors or to the wider idea of sociocultural 
development.136 Anthropologist Arturo Escobar, associated with the critical 
post-development approach, puts it clearly: “Development was conceived not 
as a cultural process . . . but instead as a system of more or less universally 
applicable technical interventions intended to deliver some ‘badly needed’ 
goods to a ‘target’ population.”137 
FAO was one of the new institutions with global ambitions.138 Formed 
almost immediately following World War II as the first of the UN specialist 
agencies, its activities had since then gradually expanded to include a rather 
large-scale consultancy program, in which FAO-affiliated experts worked as 
technical advisors in various developing countries as part of the UN’s 
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA). Having been approved 
by the General Assembly in November 1949, the program, based on voluntary 
contributions from UN member states, financed three kinds of aid: the training 
of managerial personnel, the granting of scholarships to citizens of developing 
countries, and the sending of technical experts to the Third World.139 FAO’s 
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early expert assignments tended mostly to be top-down and narrowly defined 
to focus on limited technical problems. Historian Amy Staples suggests that 
while the narrowness of these missions often made them inefficient, broader 
efforts to build local capabilities were “effectively ignored” on account of the 
dependence on EPTA funds.140 
In 1951, Lagerlöf was still uncertain whether the AI programs he worried 
about belonged within or outside FAO. But his welcoming of FAO hiring 
“sensible veterinarians” to deal with breeding problems suggests that he knew 
that veterinary expertise and veterinary problems were becoming more 
important within the organization in the early 1950s. Australian veterinarian K. 
V. L. Kesteven had been appointed chief of its Animal Production Branch in 
1950 and became a driving force in developing a center of animal health 
expertise at FAO.141 At about the same time, a collaboration between FAO and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) that focused on the importance of 
veterinary skills and knowledge to the protection of (human) public health 
afforded a central role to veterinary expertise within a different branch of the 
organization.142 And Lagerlöf, clearly on the outside when he corresponded 
with Bendixen in Rome, would soon find himself on the inside of FAO’s 
project of providing veterinary expertise to the developing world. 
An Unusual Modernizer 
The views Lagerlöf had developed on artificial insemination as a technology 
that required a well-adapted context to function as intended made him a 
somewhat unusual modernizer at the time, both in the field of animal 
reproduction and in international development assistance in general. The 
former is illustrated well by his initial clashes with FAO over what sort of 
assistance India needed. In the correspondence cited above, Bendixen and 
Lagerlöf had broached the matter of FAO providing animal reproduction field 
experts. At the same time, the central government of India had made a request 
to FAO for experts who could help organize their new AI program, and had 
indicated the widely known Lagerlöf as their preferred candidate. FAO was not 
inclined to employ Lagerlöf for this task, and there are no indications in the 
sources that Lagerlöf had planned to apply for a UN position on his own 
initiative. He was however approached with an offer after FAO’s first 
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candidate declined.143 Their proposal was, however, worded in a way that was 
typical of the narrow expert assignments of the time and thus contrary to 
Lagerlöf’s views on artificial insemination. They requested three experts, and 
Lagerlöf’s role as the group leader would be to spend one year as an “artificial 
insemination expert to advise and assist the Government on the technical 
aspects, organization and operation of artificial insemination centres.”144 
As his colleague Ernst Pålsson points out, Lagerlöf was overqualified for 
this task. It focused on the operational minutiae of AI stations, and thus only 
required someone with organizational skills and solid experience of AI, rather 
than an international authority on reproductive medicine.145 But much worse, 
from Lagerlöf’s point of view, was the proposal’s narrow focus on artificial 
insemination without a complementary effort to develop reproductive 
medicine. He made it clear to FAO that he could not accept the position as it 
stood because, in his opinion, India would not benefit from an artificial 
insemination program unless other necessary actions were taken as well. 
Lagerlöf argued that while developing countries might “hope that all 
difficulties would be overcome” with the introduction of AI, experience told 
him that the more likely result would be “a definite increase in breeding 
troubles.” Lagerlöf was, however, in principle positive about going to India, if 
only “it can be arranged so that I can be of the intended usefulness.”146 
Bendixen, who supported Lagerlöf’s views, was eventually able to convince 
his superiors at FAO, and the instructions were amended in accordance with 
Lagerlöf’s objections.147 While a part of the mission still focused on artificial 
insemination, the main emphasis was now on supporting the central 
government in developing the education of veterinarians in the field of animal 
gynecology.148 The timetable was also reworked. Instead of spending an entire 
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year in India, Lagerlöf would be there for two separate periods of two months 
each, and in between the two other experts would do fieldwork more directly 
linked to AI. Lagerlöf also convinced FAO that this three-person team could 
only be effective if he could hand-pick his colleagues. He chose Bengt 
Lundgren and Ernst Pålsson, two Swedish veterinarians who both directed 
insemination stations:  Lundgren in Kalmar and Pålsson in Ystad.149 
Nothing in the material analyzed here points to the reasons Lagerlöf might 
have had for accepting the FAO mission. It is reasonable to assume that he had 
some degree of personal interest in development, because despite both being 
overqualified for and averse to the technical focus of the first FAO proposal, he 
decided to engage in a negotiation process instead of simply declining the offer 
or suggesting someone better suited for it. Why did he want to go to India, a 
trip that in the early 1950s was strenuous and not perceived as risk free?150 In 
his professional correspondence from the time, Lagerlöf does not discuss his 
motivations beyond rather loose comments about wanting to be of use.151 What 
likely played a part was that he already had some experience of aid work at 
home. During the 1940s, he had been heavily engaged in helping veterinarians 
among the refugees from the Baltic States who came to Sweden in 1944 to find 
work.152 He had also been exposed to severe poverty, not to say misery, on a 
trip he had made in the American zone of occupation in Germany in 1948. His 
account of this trip demonstrates his interest in population sustenance and its 
links to productive cattle.153 His interest was likely also further piqued at the 
XIVth International Veterinary Congress, which had had global food 
production as its theme and had featured an opening lecture by Lord Boyd Orr, 
the first director-general of FAO.154 
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From a professional point of view, an international engagement was also a 
new outlet for Lagerlöf’s capabilities. His career in Sweden lay, in a sense, 
behind him in 1952. He had held his professorial chair for eighteen years, was 
a widely respected researcher domestically and internationally, and had a group 
of protégés and potential successors in place.155 There was little left for him to 
prove in Sweden, or indeed even to do beyond holding his lectures and running 
his department. It is thus likely that he was driven by a mixture of a desire to 
provide aid and simultaneously offer some resistance to what he saw as overly 
naïve international reformers, and by a feeling that work abroad could 
reinvigorate his career. He would not have been alone in holding the latter 
view. He was in fact part of a broader movement: a number of prominent 
Scandinavian intellectuals complemented their domestic careers with an 
engagement in international organizations at the time. Some notable examples 
are Norwegian physician Karl Evang, and Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal 
and physician Axel Höjer; the last-mentioned worked, like Lagerlöf, in India in 
the early 1950s.156 
Unlike Myrdal and Höjer, Lagerlöf was apparently uninterested in fusing 
his international activities with an ideological engagement or a political 
analysis. The material analyzed here contains no references to decolonization 
and its consequences, though Lagerlöf cannot have been unaware of the 
traumatic recent past of the country to which he was going. Nor did he 
seemingly pay much attention to matters of social change in India or 
elsewhere; nothing in the sources indicates a particular interest in political 
issues or in social reform more generally (with the exception of his interest in 
the cow slaughter ban being introduced in India; see my discussion below). A 
further comparison suggests, however, that Lagerlöf’s understanding of 
modernization as a technical problem was both radical and critical, and that 
in this respect too, he was an unusual modernizer. At the time, Axel Höjer 
described the World Health Organization’s international consultants as 
“enzymes” spreading “blessing forces in the large inert mass” of people in 
underdeveloped countries, and this attitude was common among international 
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experts of the period.157 When Lagerlöf wrote to Bendixen about FAO’s 
international expert program, he too had used the word bless, but only within 
ironic quotation marks intended to reverse its meaning. Of course Lagerlöf, 
like Höjer, advocated education and knowledge as the way ahead for poorer 
areas of the world, but at least in the early 1950s he had a considerably more 
problematizing view of how this could be brought about and in particular of 
the role international expertise ought to play. As Lagerlöf saw it, experts 
certainly could bring blessings to the developing countries, but unless they 
were careful and paid proper attention to the context in which they were 
working, they might find these blessings turned into curses. 
Swedish Veterinarians in India 
Lagerlöf, Lundgren, and Pålsson left Sweden for India in February 1953.158 
They arrived in a country less than six years independent of colonial rule and 
still reeling from the bloody and traumatic Partition that followed the end of 
the Raj.159 But it had a government under Jawaharlal Nehru that was 
committed to modernization and development, the initial strategy for which 
had been outlined in India’s first Five-Year Plan from 1952. The plan split its 
goals between industrialization and rural modernization, devoting slightly more 
than a third of its expenditures to rural development.160 One method employed 
to achieve the latter was known as the Key Village Scheme, which intended to 
improve animal breeding through the use of pedigree bulls as well as AI.161 It 
was in the context of this scheme that Lagerlöf’s and Singh’s correspondence 
had taken place, and it was also the reason for the request for help from FAO 
which had brought the Swedes to India. 
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The Imperative of Practical Training 
After their arrival, Lagerlöf and his colleagues had a few days of meetings with 
government officials in Delhi before they started on a two-month tour of the 
country. The primary objective was to visit the veterinary education institutions 
and insemination stations. One of the stops was Madras Veterinary College, 
which Lagerlöf considered “probably the best in the country, which however 
does not mean that it is good. . . . With respect to my own field, there was no 
practical training whatsoever.”162 In Calcutta, Lagerlöf noted that the 
veterinary college remained at the “old equine stage” even though all horse-
related practice had disappeared with the British military and in Nagpur that 
the veterinary college only offered a two-year course. Training for the Swedish 
veterinary degree nominally took five years, and Lagerlöf commented that a 
short course such as the one in Nagpur “can hardly lead to any particular 
result.”163 These college visits gave Lagerlöf some initial insight into Indian 
veterinary medicine and what he perceived as its principal problems. Prime 
among them, and central to the ideas he would go on to develop, was the lack 
of practical training for veterinary students. 
The visits to the insemination stations demonstrated to the Swedes the 
consequences of the Indian veterinary education model. In a later 
retrospective talk, Lagerlöf remembered how the veterinarians at the stations 
had developed 
 
the system that they would sit in the laboratory and examine semen with every 
possible and impossible complicated method, without ever looking at the bulls, 
which very often were uninterested in mounting. The veterinary directors had 
given orders as to how many cows should be inseminated. Everyone had to obey 
and we were dismayed to find that many made-up figures regarding the 
insemination operations were sent to the central government.164 
 
From such experiences the Swedish experts drew the conclusion that to 
improve Indian cattle breeding in line with the government’s intentions, the 
insemination program had to be complemented with a system of 
comprehensive sexual health control grounded in veterinary expertise. This 
led them to argue that it would be absolutely necessary to reform the 
veterinary education. Of particular importance, in their view, was to appoint 
professors and organize new departments in the field of obstetrics and 
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gynecology, departments where “as much practical training as possible” 
could be provided.165 The most pressing problem, in Lagerlöf’s eyes, was 
precisely the lack of practical, clinical training. Without such training, Indian 
veterinary candidates would not learn the techniques necessary to assist 
animal reproduction, nor would they be made aware of the on-farm hygienic 
measures needed to prevent the spread of disease. As historian of medicine 
Karin Johannisson discusses, the distinction between laboratory and clinical 
medicine is a central point of tension in all medical science, and the quote 
above plainly illustrates the problems Lagerlöf saw in a one-sided focus on 
the isolated, theoretically oriented laboratory environment over the clinic’s 
demands for practical skills and intuition.166 To him, veterinary reproductive 
medicine had significant clinical dimensions. If those who were supposed to 
practice it lacked the requisite clinical experience, understanding, and 
abilities, then the foundation was laid for situations like the one he had 
encountered at the Indian insemination stations, where, according to his 
understanding, the veterinarians did little useful work, instead splitting their 
time between pointless exercises in microscopy and fabricating statistics for 
their superiors. 
In other words, even in the cases where the Indian veterinarians had 
good theoretical knowledge of reproductive physiology and pathology, 
Lagerlöf felt that meaningful veterinary work was close to impossible 
because they lacked the training, experience, and inclination to physically 
interact with animals. Throughout South Asia, there was a degree of 
contempt for manual and potentially dirty labor, and high social status and 
education effectively liberated one from having to perform such work.167 
The veterinarians, belonging to an educated social elite, thus often left 
physical contact with animals to stockmen and other animal handlers. In 
Lagerlöf’s eyes, this reluctance to work hands-on with animals was an 
attitude incompatible both with good veterinary education and with 
legitimate veterinary practice. While he thought that there could and should 
be a differentiation of responsibilities in AI, he was convinced that 
veterinarians ought to perform the most qualified tasks. A few years earlier, 
he had outlined those in the context of Swedish insemination stations, and 
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while he included semen collection and appraisal as veterinary tasks, he 
also argued that veterinarians had to take responsibility for the health and 
welfare of the bulls. Although not explicitly stated, this undoubtedly 
included physical examinations and treatments as needed.168 
Traveling through India had thus confirmed and reinforced Lagerlöf’s 
conviction that artificial insemination was meaningless if not supported by an 
effective veterinary organization. The three Swedes stated this unambiguously 
in their final report to the central government: 
 
When artificial insemination is introduced into a country, it will often happen 
that infertility problems become more pronounced and apparent. . . . 
If the leaders of this work do not have good scientific background and 
practical experience, or if the veterinarians do not have good knowledge of 
fertility and sterility problems, it will very often happen that after some years 
following the introduction of A.I. into a country, there will be many new 
problems concerning reproduction.169 
 
Restated, their conclusion was that in the case of India the practical 
competence of the country’s veterinary corps was low enough to imply that 
any modernization strategy based on a simple transfer of AI equipment was 
likely to end in failure. Lagerlöf and his colleagues were convinced that a 
precondition for successful AI was its combination with sexual health controls 
and efforts to combat sterility, and that this, in turn, demanded an improved 
training of veterinarians in obstetrics and gynecology. Consequently, they 
came up with their recommendation to create new professorial chairs and add 
more practical training. 
Exporting the Swedish Model 
In their final report to the Indian central government, the three Swedish 
veterinarians not only argued that new departments of obstetrics-gynecology 
had to be created but also cautioned the government to use the appropriate 
models when reforming the veterinary colleges. They recommended “that the 
veterinary colleges in India should not take Great Britain or the U.S.A. as 
models for improving their research and training,” but that they should look to 
“countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries.”170 Behind this recommendation lay Lagerlöf’s growing interest in 
promoting a particular vision of veterinary obstetrics-gynecology in India that 
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reflected his experiences with the model for teaching and research he had 
developed and championed at his own department. 
The interest was rooted in the importance Lagerlöf afforded to clinical 
exercises. An inherent problem with the proposal to create new obstetrics-
gynecology chairs was that since the existing corps of teachers themselves as a 
rule had little clinical experience, there was a severe lack of competent 
candidates for the proposed professorships. Being trained outside India, as, for 
example, Singh had been, did not necessarily help in this respect. In the United 
Kingdom, where most Indian veterinarians who had been abroad had received 
their education, the new advances in reproductive medicine had entered 
veterinary curricula in the interwar period, but students were only taught the 
theory.171 Though this had changed during and after the war, there had not yet 
been much of an impact on India, where most veterinarians in teaching or 
decision-making positions had been trained before the war (Singh, for 
example, had graduated from the Royal Veterinary College in London in 
1936). It was this analysis of the problem and its solution that inspired 
Lagerlöf’s idea of a course. Just before he left India in April 1953, he wrote to 
Per Wijkman, the Swedish ambassador to Delhi, and suggested that a “small 
troop” of Indian veterinarians could be trained in Sweden in order to later take 
up work as teachers in the Indian veterinary colleges.172 This would, according 
to Lagerlöf, to a “very appreciable degree” contribute to more rational Indian 
cattle breeding and thus to economic development. 
In his letter to Wijkman, Lagerlöf also referred to a new committee in 
Sweden working with technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. This 
was the Central Committee for Swedish Development Aid to Less Developed 
Areas, which channeled early Swedish bilateral aid to the Third World. 
Sweden had provided multilateral aid through the United Nations since the late 
1940s, handled by Swedish government agencies as counterparts of the UN 
organizations. But from 1952, there was also a small Swedish program for 
bilateral—state to state—aid controlled by this Central Committee. It was not a 
government agency but rather a vehicle for cooperation between the main 
popular movements of Sweden (labor unions, political parties, cooperatives, 
mission societies, etc.), even if it was also provided with government funding. 
It was closely associated with the parastatal Swedish Institute, which already 
had a small aid department. This department, led by Sixten Heppling, became 
the secretariat and executive organ for the committee and handled all daily 
operations.173 Lagerlöf’s awareness of the newly formed Central Committee is 
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a further indication of his interest in international issues, and the letter to 
Wijkman, with its references to rationality and economic development, also 
shows that Lagerlöf neither opposed these development goals, nor questioned 
the value of Western science and technology in helping to achieve them. When 
wanting to train Indian veterinarians in Sweden, his intention was to find better 
means to the end of economic growth. 
The idea of bringing foreign students to the Veterinary College in Stockholm 
was not new in itself. Lagerlöf had mentored international visitors before, and 
when G. B. Singh indicated his interest in studying in Stockholm he had 
immediately been invited.174 But the new proposal was original in that Lagerlöf 
now wanted to bring a group of people to Stockholm for an organized course. A 
simple explanation for this shift in his thinking is that he had come to believe that 
India had a need which could not be met through individual studies. He 
suggested that at least four or five of India’s veterinary colleges needed teachers 
with further training.175 It is also possible that Lagerlöf considered the 
knowledge level of the Indian veterinarians so low that they would not benefit 
from independent work in Stockholm. He later suggested that organized courses 
were preferable for this reason: “It is 10 times better to have a first-rate course 
with many participants than to have a number of scholarship recipients who just 
obstruct our work and nobody has time to take care of.”176 
But the strongest motivating factor was arguably linked to the emphasis the 
Swedish team placed on establishing obstetrics-gynecology as its own 
discipline with its own professors at the veterinary colleges in India. That 
organizational model dominated in Scandinavia and continental Europe, but 
had historically not existed in the United Kingdom, which had been the model 
for the Indian veterinary colleges.177 Of significance here is also that the United 
States provided development aid to India to expand its veterinary education in 
the 1950s, an expansion that was to take place according to the older 
organizational model. This supposedly “enraged” Lagerlöf, who, according to 
Ernst Pålsson, considered the United States—where veterinary colleges also 
mostly lacked obstetrics-gynecology departments—to be an “underdeveloped 
country, when it came to veterinary education in obstetrics, gynecology and 
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AI.”178 Pålsson’s recollection is congruent with Lagerlöf’s own account of the 
time he spent at Cornell University in the early 1930s. Though generally very 
impressed with American veterinary medicine, he considered the education of 
American veterinarians to be inferior to the one offered at his own college in 
Sweden.179 Also, he unquestionably regarded an organizational model with 
obstetrics-gynecology as its own discipline, and consequently obstetrics and 
gynecology as significant parts of veterinary education, to be imperative for the 
resolution of breeding problems both in the developed and developing worlds. 
It was, Lagerlöf had suggested in his address to the XIVth International 
Veterinary Congress, only by devoting their full attention to reproduction that 
veterinary academics could master the complexities of sterility and other 
breeding problems: 
 
[I]ndependent professor’s chairs of obstetrics and gynaecology (breeding diseases) 
should be instituted at the veterinary colleges, where this has not been done 
already. The scientific demands now placed on a professor of this subject are so 
great that it is not possible for him to be good at surgery and medicine as well.180 
 
It was also crucial that the professors of obstetrics-gynecology did not lock 
themselves up in ivory towers. As should be clear, Lagerlöf strongly believed 
that veterinary obstetrics-gynecology had to be a discipline with a significant 
practical-clinical orientation.181 It also had to have good ties to farming. He 
continued his address by stating that 
 
[f]or the teaching there should be one stationary and one ambulatory clinic, as it 
is hardly possible to get sufficient contact with the sterility problems under 
practical conditions without an ambulatory clinic. In teaching, practical 
demonstrations with phantoms and with animals set up in slaughter houses 
should be held to a great extent.182 
 
Another reason for wishing to train an entire group of Indian veterinarians in 
Sweden can thus have been a desire to export the clinically oriented training 
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model that had been firmly established at the Veterinary College in Stockholm 
since the days of Lagerlöf’s predecessor as professor of obstetrics and ruminant 
medicine, Harry Stålfors.183 
Beyond the strong emphasis on practical training, the main difference 
Lagerlöf seems to have perceived between his own and others’ approaches to 
animal reproduction is that his was more systemic. To Lagerlöf, it was 
counterproductive to break out bits and pieces, such as AI technologies, and 
attempt to develop them on their own. While acknowledging that modern cattle 
breeding hinged on the introduction of artificial insemination, he argued that it 
had to be combined with a whole system of sexual health controls and sterility 
research if it was to be successful. This, in turn, had to rest on well-developed 
veterinary expertise that could support the system both theoretically and 
practically. When Lagerlöf criticized other veterinary traditions, it was 
primarily this lack of a systemic understanding he attacked. In earlier 
correspondence with his Danish colleague Bendixen, he had polemicized about 
“Americans and Englishmen,” suggesting that they had a limited understanding 
of reproduction issues and an attitude that he summarized as: “if only artificial 
insemination is introduced, everything will be fine.”184 He clearly wanted to 
prevent this attitude from gaining a further foothold in India. 
It is of some interest that Lagerlöf apparently saw the United States as 
offering little of value to his aid project. He was at least partially critical of 
American influences at a time when the United States was otherwise a very 
strong influence on the Veterinary College. Part of this was probably posturing 
intended to promote his own project over rival American proposals, but it is 
still clear that Lagerlöf believed the American model for veterinary education 
to be inferior to the one he represented and that he considered development in 
his field in the US to have been “slow.”185 Since the American presence in 
India and elsewhere was so prevalent at the time, he had to point this out as 
part of his argument for the Swedish model. As a Swedish actor playing a role 
in a global context, Lagerlöf in a sense was an early, and apolitical, example of 
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an alternative outlook that resisted the global influence of the United States. He 
wanted to resist by exporting a Swedish model, and an effective way of doing 
this was to demonstrate that model first-hand to a larger group of Indian 
veterinarians. 
Modernization and Sacred Cows 
During the journey, Lagerlöf had also developed an interest in the culture of 
India and not least—probably for both professional and personal reasons—in 
the role of cattle in Hindu religious culture.186 Long sections are devoted to this 
topic both in the final report to the central government and in the travel report 
he published in the journal of the Swedish Veterinary Association. He read up 
on the subject in order to understand its background, later corresponded with 
India in order to get a special study of it sent to Stockholm, and always brought 
it up when lecturing on his aid work.187 
Like the majority of Western observers at the time, Lagerlöf considered the 
religiously motivated prohibition of cattle slaughter being introduced in most 
of India a grave economical and ethical misstep. He recounted sights of cows 
with missing limbs or with horrible sores that nonetheless not even the 
veterinary colleges felt able to put down.188 But he was able to look beyond the 
suffering cattle to view the slaughter ban in a historical, political and cultural 
context in which there was no reason to believe that it would easily disappear 
through short-term modernization efforts. When reporting on his second trip to 
India, he stated that 
 
[s]ince India became independent and after the separation of Pakistan, the 
religious demand for a prohibition of cattle slaughter has in fact become 
stronger and in most states such a prohibition ought to soon be in place. . . . 
Even if the responsible authorities and most intellectuals are fully aware of the 
very serious situation for the sustenance of the population, which is created with 
such a prohibition, they are also aware that in the present situation it is 
impossible to combat the religious view. It is however very likely that 
conditions will change in 10–15 years.189 
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While expecting change in the medium-term future, Lagerlöf thus still 
acknowledged that because of the complex political-religious conditions that 
prevailed in post-partition India, the Western valuation of the life of a cow would 
not constitute the foundational attitude of the law in the 1950s. From this he 
concluded that any work aimed at improving the cattle economy in India would 
need to take religious sentiment into consideration, rather than simply assume 
that it would soon be made irrelevant by an overpowering modernization. This 
does not mean he ignored the issue: both during this first trip and during later 
visits to India, he appears to have always attempted to formulate a critique of the 
slaughter prohibition when lecturing to audiences that would be receptive.190 He 
also tried to offer pragmatic alternatives, arguing, for example, that a suitable 
way ahead could be to stimulate the breeding of buffaloes. The buffalo was not 
protected by religious notions, and so the buffalo stock was in considerably 
better shape than the cattle stock. Lagerlöf considered trials with dairy 
cooperatives based on buffalo milk “the most promising sign of a new trend 
within Indian animal husbandry that has occurred.”191 
His thinking on the sacred cows of India serves as another example of how 
Lagerlöf’s attitude differed from a linear view of modernization and 
development. While favoring modernization as a goal, and obviously holding 
the prohibition on cattle slaughter to be steeped in tradition and strongly 
negative for the Indian economy, he simultaneously recognized the limits of 
seeing modernization as a simple and unidirectional process. In 1954 as well as 
in later writings, he always gave prominent weight to historical and cultural 
contexts when he discussed the ban on cattle slaughter. 
Educating Prophets 
After returning to Stockholm, Lagerlöf spent spring and early summer 
developing ideas about how the course he envisioned might be realized. In 
June, he mentioned in a letter to Pålsson (who was still in India) that he “had 
tried to interest the [Central Committee] to contribute financially if I could 
bring some Hindus suitable to be trained as prophets to Sweden for a year.”192 
The word “prophets” reveals more of what Lagerlöf had in mind with the 
course. Beyond giving the presumptive students the clinical training and 
experience they lacked, the course was also intended to export a very specific 
idea of veterinary gynecology. What was to be prophesied was a systemic view 
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of animal reproduction along with the necessity of establishing obstetrics-
gynecology as its own academic field including significant clinical elements. It 
was to this end that Lagerlöf contacted the Central Committee and embarked 
on a project of establishing his expertise as relevant to the fledgling Swedish 
bilateral development aid. 
Linking up with Swedish aid 
In August 1953, the XVth International Veterinary Congress was held in 
Stockholm. This brought many veterinary dignitaries to the city, among them 
K. V. L. Kesteven and Sir Thomas Dalling (a British veterinarian well known 
for his work on foot-and-mouth disease) from FAO. Lagerlöf used the occasion 
to further his plans by arranging a meeting between himself, Dalling, and 
Sixten Heppling, the secretary and main driving force of the Central 
Committee.193 The meeting went well and afterward Lagerlöf felt sufficiently 
assured of support from both FAO and the Central Committee to continue 
working on a more specific plan for the course. This was based on a tripartite 
cooperation in which FAO would pay the teachers’ salaries, the Swedish 
government through the Central Committee would pay for scholarships to the 
participants, and the government of India would take responsibility for 
necessary expenses in India during the course (for example, compensation to 
the participants’ families).194 
In a memorandum Lagerlöf wrote for Heppling to use to explain the project’s 
purpose to the Central Committee, he further explicated the reasons why he 
considered a course such as this to be necessary. He reiterated the 
aforementioned arguments about AI, but now also emphasized that the choice of 
participants had to be based on aptitude for research. Even if the primary reason 
for the course was to produce teachers who could train other veterinarians in 
clinical obstetrics-gynecology—training that had “to start as soon as possible”—
it was, furthermore, important that they were capable of independent research 
because “one cannot easily transfer research results obtained in Europe to 
conditions in India, which most often are completely different.”195 
Lagerlöf thus did not embrace an unproblematizing and diffusionist 
understanding of science and the movement of scientific knowledge. He was 
no epistemological relativist, but he did question the possibility of an easy 
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transfer of research results between different contexts. As noted, he understood 
sterility problems as depending on a complex of environmental and hereditary 
causes and had earlier explicitly stated that “the causes of sterility vary 
considerably in different countries, and . . . great consideration must be paid to 
factors such as breed, the manner in which the breeding is carried out, climate, 
soil, feeding and care of the animals.”196 This implied that reproduction 
knowledge which was to stimulate development in India could not entirely be 
produced outside India, and thus “prophets” who could teach and create valid 
knowledge in different contexts were needed. In a wider sense, the argument 
was about a perceived necessity of institutionalizing a local research capacity 
with the ability to generate its own innovative solutions to spatially localized 
problems. Lagerlöf did not see the expertise he represented as a closed system 
of practices but as something that required a degree of contextual openness. He 
thus advocated what I earlier described as a localist approach to development. 
At the time, the Central Committee was focusing on field projects in 
Ethiopia and Pakistan, but Heppling was keen to find a place for Lagerlöf’s 
initiative as well.197 In a memorandum later put to the committee, Heppling 
argued that the relatively small investment Lagerlöf’s proposed course 
represented would be a suitable gesture of goodwill towards India “in the 
political situation which has now arisen on the Indian subcontinent.”198 The 
relationship between India and Pakistan had been very tense following 
Partition and the subsequent First Kashmir War, and Heppling thus suggested 
that by providing aid to both India and Pakistan, Sweden could avoid giving 
the impression of having chosen sides in their conflict. Heppling also argued 
that unlike the more long-term projects in Ethiopia and Pakistan, a course in 
Stockholm would be a way for the newly created Central Committee to quickly 
obtain a positive result without this having to be too laborious. Educating a 
group of Indian academics in Stockholm required very little work compared 
with the administration of field projects halfway across the world, and 
achieving a demonstrable success was important to the committee, whose goals 
were not just to carry out aid projects but also stimulate the Swedish general 
public’s interest in aid. Finally, Heppling referred to an earlier initiative by the 
foreign-based Swede Paul Mohn, which was based on the idea of inviting 
around a thousand Asian grantees to Sweden to study Swedish democracy.199 
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This somewhat bizarre plan had garnered strong support among the youth 
organizations that were part of the Central Committee. Heppling, staunchly 
opposed to Mohn’s initative, argued that Lagerlöf’s plan was moderately 
similar but much better: Lagerlöf also proposed a project that would bring 
Asian people to Sweden—if not on the massive scale envisioned by Mohn—
but one that had great potential to actually become practically useful.200 
A Service Science Course 
The course Lagerlöf wanted to teach was based on a conception of veterinary 
reproductive medicine as requiring the union of theoretical knowledge and 
practical skills in order to be useful. FAO’s veterinary expertise had by now 
accepted the outline of his plan, which both Kesteven and, particularly, Dalling 
supported. The FAO leadership was still unconvinced, however, and Lagerlöf 
found it necessary to write “stern and detailed letters” to its headquarters in 
Rome.201 Sir Herbert Broadley, FAO’s deputy director-general and the official 
responsible for the technical assistance program, still preferred a narrower 
project that would train technicians in the use of AI equipment. In early 1954, 
Lagerlöf wrote directly to Broadley and explained in detail why his proposed 
course aimed at improving the education at India’s veterinary colleges.202 After 
this campaign, FAO came around to Lagerlöf’s views and confirmed its 
commitment to the course. In contrast, the negotiations with the Central 
Committee were painless. Convinced by Heppling of the viability of Lagerlöf’s 
plan, its representatives raised no ideological objections and presented no other 
difficulties, even though bringing foreign students to Sweden was not a 
prioritized activity at the time.203 It probably helped that there would be no 
recruitment issues as all the work was to be performed by personnel already at 
the Veterinary College, and that the cost, shared by FAO and the government 
of India, was relatively insignificant compared with the field projects in 
Pakistan and Ethiopia. In June, the third party, India’s central government, also 
confirmed that it would contribute to the course.204 Moreover, during this final 
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planning phase, it became clear that there was money available for two extra 
participants, who were recruited from Thailand.205 
This planning process turned Lagerlöf’s idea of technology transfer as 
necessarily based on knowledge, professionalism, and practical skills into an 
actual course design, which Lagerlöf then had to get all involved parties to 
agree to. This involved negotiations that illustrate how Lagerlöf functioned as a 
go-between who mediated between different contexts: his own clear 
conception of the project design, the new Swedish aid administration, the UN 
bureaucracy that characterized FAO in Rome, and the government of newly 
independent India, with its modernizing desires. Lagerlöf proved able to 
formulate his project in terms acceptable in all these contexts. But he was not 
just a go-between in different national and political contexts: he also drew on 
his role as a scientist, acting in a mediating role between science and politics as 
well. An interesting example of this can be found in a set of handwritten notes 
on the back of a letter from H. M. Patel, an undersecretary of state at the Indian 
Ministry of Agriculture, which Lagerlöf apparently used as a memory aid 
during a discussion in Delhi.206 In the notes, he reminds himself that what is 
interesting to the expert might not interest the policymaker, and that it is 
important to make clear that the plans under discussion could be carried out 
using existing resources. The notes also contain a cryptic reference to Carl 
Linnaeus, arguably the best known Swedish scientist of all time. A possible 
interpretation is that Lagerlöf wanted to emphasize that his project, though 
largely practice-oriented, would still be solidly grounded in Swedish science. 
Another, more alluring hypothesis is that he wanted to compare the Indian 
students to Linnean apostles, whom he would train in the latest reproductive 
medicine before sending them out in the world. This is congruent with his use 
of the word prophets as well as with his continuing involvement in the 
students’ careers after their time in Stockholm (see below). 
In September 1954 the course participants gathered in Stockholm and the 
teaching began. It involved some theoretical instruction, but most of the time 
was spent on clinical exercises at the Veterinary College, at the Stockholm 
slaughterhouse, and later also at insemination stations in other areas of the 
country, primarily in Kalmar and Ystad, where Lundgren and Pålsson 
worked.207 Tangible organs and bodies, living as well as dead, were in focus. 
One part of the course consisted of clinical case training, during which every 
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student was given responsibility for examinations and record keeping of one 
particular case, while given feedback and critique by Lagerlöf and the other 
students. Another part consisted of what was known as phantom training. 
Using artificial uteri contained in wooden boxes, together with dead calves or 
calf fetuses (a technique developed by Lagerlöf’s predecessor as professor, 
Harry Stålfors), the students practiced obstetrical techniques and handling 
obstetrical problems. 
Much of the course content was geared toward familiarizing the students 
with the idea and practice of physical animal interaction, thus giving them the 
clinical experience that they had been lacking and, hopefully, a new attitude to 
clinical work. That Lagerlöf considered this latter aspect crucial is clear from 
his account of his second trip to India. He had then taught a shorter course 
there and noted how the most important part of the training was teaching the 
Indian veterinarians to “not be ashamed of working with their own hands.”208 
During their time in Kalmar and Ystad, the students thus took part in the daily 
routines of Swedish AI work. In a typical account of the time in Kalmar, the 
student S. M. Ishaque describes how he “went out practically every day with 
the chief veterinarian and did artificial insemination and treatment and 
pregnancy diagnosis.”209 In this way the students both got to see firsthand and 
participate in the combination of AI with diagnostic work and examinations of 
the cattle stock. The field visits also included work at the local 
slaughterhouses, which the students had already experienced in Stockholm. 
This could be particularly bloody and challenging. Allan Bane describes how 
the students 
 
had to present themselves at the Enskede [in southern Stockholm] 
slaughterhouse early in the morning, get dressed in rubber boots, rubber coats 
and rubber gloves, and start the examination of animals before the slaughter, 
record their findings, and perform dissections of the reproductive organs after 
the slaughter.210 
 
Bane notes that many of the participants initially reacted with shock to this 
training environment and tasks, which is not strange considering their social 
standing and limited experience of such work.211 But as Lagerlöf saw it, all 
veterinarians needed the skills these exercises fostered. Beyond the 
transmission of skills, the sexual examinations, the obstetrical exercises, and 
the practical work at the insemination stations were also part of a broader 
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attempt to convey a new sense of the veterinary profession, which Lagerlöf 
considered highly important given that he ultimately saw the course as being 
about training teachers and prophets. He explicitly addressed this point in a 
paper on “Veterinarians’ Duty to the Farmer and his Livestock.” Its main 
argument was that veterinarians must not remain aloof from agricultural 
practice but instead take part in it and learn from it: 
 
The young veterinarian should try to learn as much as possible from the farmers’ 
observations and experiences. He should gain the farmer’s confidence by trying 
to understand his sentiments and economic conditions, not by sitting in the 
Government offices or in the hospitals but by going out to the villages in order 
to obtain closer contacts with the farmers. 
To achieve this, he will have to mix with the farmer without assuming 
himself. . . . 
. . . He must remember that he is meant for the farmers and not the farmers 
for him.212 
 
While on the farm, the veterinarian’s role was not simply to supervise and 
instruct but to do hands-on work: “In order to achieve good livestock 
development, the veterinarian has to remember that he has to keep his eyes 
open for keen observations and to work with his own hands to gain more and 
more experience.”213 This clearly reflects not just Lagerlöf’s understanding of 
his own specialist field but also his more general understanding of what it 
meant to be a modern, effective veterinarian. Like his research interests, this 
professional self-image was founded on a service science ideal in which 
agricultural utility was imperative, and true veterinary expertise required not 
only academic studies but also direct interaction with farmers and wide-
ranging experience of practical and sometimes utterly gory work. 
Ultimately this was about more than putting knowledge and skills at the 
disposal of agriculture. It was also, as Lagerlöf openly argued, about raising the 
status of the veterinarian. His paper concluded not with a remark on food 
production or economic growth, but with a proclamation on the profession 
itself: “The veterinarian in this country [i.e. India] will surely prosper, if he 
does his duty first.”214 This implies that this and the subsequent courses were 
parts of a wider project of creating legitimacy for the veterinarian as a modern 
and effective professional ready to take on supporting and administrating roles 
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in relation to the rapidly industrializing and economically ever more important 
animal production. Abigail Woods discusses a similar development in her 
study of British dairy farming and veterinary expertise, and in a comment on 
her findings, historian of science Jean-Paul Gaudillière describes it as being 
about “translating the demand for more milk into a question of reproductive 
control.” A new audience and social role for veterinarians were created in the 
postwar period through “the redefinition of rarely used bodily techniques like 
rectal examination” and the application of “a package of skills for diagnosing 
pregnancy and to handle the newly discovered mass of ‘unfertility’ 
problems.”215 Lagerlöf’s remarks on the veterinarians’ duties suggest that he 
and his teaching were very much a part of this project. 
                                                        
215 Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “The Farm and the Clinic: An Inquiry into the Making of our 
Biotechnological Modernity,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences 38, no. 2 (2007): 526. 
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Figure 3. Phantom training at the Veterinary College during the 1954/55 course. Photo Lars 
Drejare. From the Swedish Veterinary Museum’s photography collections. 
From Sweden to the World 
All participants got over the initial shock and successfully completed the 
course, which concluded with a study tour of other veterinary colleges 
around Europe in the summer of 1955. By then, Lagerlöf had evidently 
begun to acquire a taste for international engagements, and he also found 
himself sought after by FAO for further assignments. In the winter of 
1953/54, he had been back in India for the second part of his mission there. 
Thereafter, he spent some time working in Israel, and the year after, from late 
1955, he was visiting professor at a university in Cairo. From Egypt, he then 
immediately went to Thailand on behalf of FAO. Although Lagerlöf was over 
sixty years old, his schedule was intensive: “I will stay [in Rome] until 
January 6, when I go to Bangkok on behalf of FAO. Will stay there until 
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around March 1. Then India has asked me to stop by for a short while on my 
way home, and FAO has also suggested a visit to North Rhodesia, but that I 
am trying to postpone until June.”216 
“We Need a New Training Center in Stockholm” 
If Lagerlöf had previously intended his course project as a one-off attempt to 
help India in relation to his FAO mission there, his time in Egypt made it clear 
to him that other countries were also in dire need of assistance, and this laid the 
foundation for his continued international involvement. He deemed the 
situation in Egypt to be at least as bad as it had been in India. In a letter to 
Heppling in Stockholm, he painted a very gloomy picture: 
 
No instruction in my field had been provided here at the college and there is 
tremendous ignorance among the veterinarians. The peasants have very valuable 
buffaloes, on which they depend, but the vets cannot because of their poor 
education help them even with a complicated delivery. This college trains all 
veterinarians for the Arab countries, with the exception of Turkey.217 
 
Perhaps Lagerlöf overemphasized the magnitude of the ignorance, for the 
purpose of his letter was exploratory: could another course be arranged in 
Stockholm with support from the Central Committee? Or as Lagerlöf matter-
of-factly wrote: “Frankly, we need a new training center in Stockholm in 
obstetrics and gynecology at the Veterinary College.”218 Not just the valuable 
buffaloes were at stake here: in Egypt, planning was also underway for a new 
AI organization. Lagerlöf predictably considered this ill-advised as long as no 
veterinary competence in reproductive medicine was available. His desire to 
arrange a second course emanated from this encounter with yet another country 
that “had gotten the idea . . . to hastily implement artificial insemination, and 
this is meaningless before the veterinarians have been taught the A to Z of 
sexual physiology and sexual pathology.”219 Egypt too would benefit from the 
Swedish model, and a course in Stockholm based on clinical training in 
obstetrics-gynecology might help rid the country of “the old English influence 
with English veterinary education which up until the last world war, as long as 
England imported her animal eatables, was lousy when it came to the clinical 
subjects.”220 The second course was intended to target veterinarians from the 
                                                        
216 Lagerlöf to Tore Tallroth, 17 December 1955, CK, series F1, vol. 155. 
217 Lagerlöf to Heppling, undated (probably December 1955), underlining in original, CK, series 
F1, vol. 155. 
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Arab countries and Turkey, and possibly also—with implicit reference to the 
Central Committee’s flagship aid projects—from Pakistan and Ethiopia.221 
The above-cited letter to Heppling is of particular interest in that it gives 
one of the rare glimpses of a personal motivation for Lagerlöf’s active interest 
in the developing world: “One commits to very hard work when trying to start 
something like this, but I am convinced that it is tremendously beneficial and 
valuable to these countries. I believe I would fail in my task unless I do 
something about this.”222 These wordings again suggest a utilitarian motive, 
but stronger than before. It is no longer just about possibly doing some good 
but about work that quite obviously is of great value. Lagerlöf had clearly been 
affected by his experiences in developing countries. He also wrote about 
failing in his task if this work was to stop. That is the closest we get in the 
material analyzed here to his personal reasons for engaging with the 
developing world, and trying to understand what he meant becomes 
speculative. But a reasonable interpretation is that by this time he was not only 
ready to go if asked but also felt a personal responsibility for developing 
veterinary gynecology in poorer parts of the world. Perhaps he saw it as a 
transfer of responsibility from the local and national context—the Veterinary 
College and Sweden—where his “task” had been completed, to the 
international context, where there were enough difficult and complex problems 
to keep him busy for the rest of his working life? Engaging with these 
problems probably also seemed more interesting and satisfying to him than to 
end his career at the Veterinary College, with what that implied of paperwork 
and teaching responsibilities. 
In the end, he proved able to convince the Central Committee again, and a 
second course was held in 1957, the same year Lagerlöf was appointed vice-
chancellor of the Veterinary College. The reproduction courses were then well 
on their way to becoming institutionalized. Although Lagerlöf had indicated to 
Heppling that he did not expect to be involved in further courses, he eventually 
arranged another five and was preparing a sixth at the time of his sudden 
passing in 1970, aged seventy-five.223 After retiring from the college in 1962, 
Lagerlöf also resumed his international travels, which had been put on hold by 
his obligations as vice-chancellor. Accompanied by young colleagues like 
Ingemar Settergren and Börje Danell, he worked in both Latin America and 
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Pakistan during the late 1960s, both on FAO missions and on course-related 
follow up and recruitment trips.224 
Impact and Scope of the Courses 
The courses not only shaped Lagerlöf’s later life, they also had a notable 
impact in the recipient countries. According to Nils Edling, all of India’s 
veterinary colleges taught obstetrics-gynecology around 1960, and most had 
professorial chairs held by former course participants.225 In itself, this fact does 
not allow for judgments about the impact of the courses on teaching practices. I 
thus cannot say to what extent the participants fully appropriated Lagerlöf’s 
views, given that they returned to live and work in a very different social 
environment. But there are some indications that the courses made a difference 
as to how both reproductive matters and the veterinary profession were 
understood. A glance at the present-day web pages of Indian veterinary 
colleges, like the webpage of the Department of Animal Reproduction, 
Gynaecology and Obstetrics at the Nagpur Veterinary College, at least suggests 
as much. The department’s name itself betrays something of Lagerlöf’s 
influence, and the presentation of its history even more: it notes how the 
department’s founding father, A. S. Kaikini (who had been a student of 
Lagerlöf’s), “was a trendsetter” who “designed the road map of this 
Department.”226 According to Stig Einarsson, who took over the chair in 
obstetrics-gynecology after Lagerlöf’s protégé Allan Bane retired, it was also 
quite common that previous course participants would eventually secure not 
just teaching positions but also rise to prominence in the veterinary 
administrations of their home countries.227 These positions would have 
presented opportunities to promote Lagerlöf’s views, if there was an interest in 
doing so. 
When G. B. Singh first inquired about the possibility of studying in 
Stockholm, he stated that he was “not interested in any Degrees or Diplomas, 
but in the practical application of the work.”228 This spirit also came to inform 
the reproduction courses, and no formal academic degrees were awarded to 
those taking them. Sweden did not have a one-year master’s degree when they 
were initiated, and conferring one of the existing Swedish postgraduate degrees 
                                                        
224 Bane, “Nils Lagerlöf och hans insatser,” 278–81. See also Lagerlöf, “Erfarenheter av 
veterinärmedicinska insatser i u-länder.” 
225 Edling, “Nils Lagerlöf,” 514. 
226 “Nagpur Veterinary College, Department of Animal Reproduction, Gynaecology and 
Obstetrics,” last modified 2015, accessed November 3, 2015, 
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227 Stig Einarsson, interview by author, 7 March 2013. 
228 Singh to Lagerlöf, 16 September 1951, 1. 
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on participants of a comparatively brief and largely practical course was not 
possible. Instead, Lagerlöf obtained permission from the faculty of the 
Veterinary College to award participants the title of Fellow of the Royal 
Veterinary College of Sweden (FRVCS). This fellowship had no academic 
significance as such and was only given to international course participants, 
but to them, it could be useful to have something formal to show for their long 
absence when returning home. Ingemar Settergren also suggests that the title 
eventually gained “general recognition” in veterinary circles (cf. figure 5 
below).229 The Indian Council of Agricultural Research later judged that 
FRVCS holders were “fully competent” to teach postgraduate courses, even if 
the title itself was not given equal status with academic degrees.230 
In financial terms, the veterinary courses played a relatively minor role in 
the fledgling Swedish development aid. They are not discussed at all in Per 
Åke Nilsson’s study of the Central Committee. But they are generally given 
positive evaluations in both the contemporary and retrospective material that 
do discuss them.231 In 1961, Heppling described them as one of the 
committee’s “most valuable efforts in the work of raising living standards in 
the underdeveloped countries,” a judgment he also stood by in a later, 
retrospective text.232 So even if the courses were only a small part of the early 
Swedish development aid, most stakeholders considered them significant and 
valuable contributions. This likely helped create a positive impression of 
agrarian expertise and might thus have facilitated the establishment of the more 
significant joint project between the aid authorities and the Agricultural 
College which was to follow.  
As more definite structures for Swedish agrarian and rural development 
aid evolved, the courses continued in a more institutionalized form under the 
name SIPAR: Swedish International Programme on Animal Reproduction. 
SIPAR courses, funded by FAO and SIDA, were given biennially, with 
follow-up trips by the course management taking place in the course-free 
years.233 These trips, originally undertaken by Lagerlöf to provide support 
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and advice to former students, but also to check that they were sticking to 
what they had been taught, became important forms of aid in their own right. 
Beyond advertising and recruiting for the courses, such visits created more 
tangible connections between the Veterinary College (which from 1977 
became the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine at SLU) and universities and 
veterinary administrations abroad. These connections meant that the Swedish 
model for training in veterinary obstetrics-gynecology could be exported in 
more ways than through training courses, for example through the spatial 
planning of veterinary college departments. 
Figure 4 below shows a sketch of a space for phantom training and other 
activities that Lagerlöf’s student (and then head of the Veterinary College’s 
international office) Börje Danell sent to Kasetsart University in Thailand. The 
sketch was based on an original that Danell and Lagerlöf had prepared together 
for a veterinary college in Lahore. It came with a document authored by 
Lagerlöf in March 1970, in which he very explicitly spelled out both how a 
department for obstetrics-gynecology should be designed and what sort of 
activities should be conducted there.234 Other proposals for physical layouts, 
building on the same principles, were later sent to other places, for example to 
the School of Veterinary Medicine in Lusaka, Zambia.235 These sketches, 
which can be said to feature Lagerlöf’s vision of an ideal department, highlight 
another interesting feature of this knowledge transfer project. Though sensitive 
to the need for local knowledge production, neither Lagerlöf nor his successors 
were seemingly interested in adapting the core contents of their field to 
different contexts. A department of obstetrics-gynecology was to look more or 
less the same in Zambia as in Thailand, Pakistan, or Sweden. 
There is one salient difference between the sketches, however: the layout 
of the dressing rooms. The sketch Lagerlöf sent to Lahore does not have a 
dressing room for women, while the one Danell sent to Kasetsart has one, 
though much smaller than the one intended for men. This presumably reflects 
gendered understandings of the veterinary profession in the respective 
countries rather than the situation in Sweden, where the number of female 
veterinary students exceeded the number of male ones in the early 1970s—
but in relation to the knowledge transfer project as a whole, it is an 
insignificant exception.236 
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That the sketches are otherwise so similar suggests that Lagerlöf’s localism 
remained embedded in centrist thinking. In a sense, his was a totalizing 
approach to the transmission of reproduction knowledge, in which courses, 
follow-up visits, and architectural suggestions formed a coherent whole. It 
required local research work, but the central constituent parts of the vision 
itself were closed to local modification. Stig Einarsson recalls how Lagerlöf 
could be not just a helping but also a judging expert who would sternly upbraid 
former students if he felt that they were not working hard enough or if they had 
deviated from his model and prescriptions.237 
 
Figure 4. Sketched proposal for a phantom hall and laboratories, sent by Lagerlöf’s student Börje 
Danell to Kasetsart University in Thailand in 1974. Sketches such as this were another way of 
communicating a Swedish model for training in animal reproduction: the sketch itself, and the 
accompanying description, implied a very specific idea of a department of obstetrics-gynecology, 
in terms of both physical layout and relevant activities.238 
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94 
Effects on the Veterinary College 
The courses were mostly Lagerlöf’s personal project. He never attempted to 
integrate them with the Veterinary College’s regular activities but rather tried 
actively to keep them apart. Writing to Heppling in 1956, he explained that he 
was “extremely eager not to have to steal [resources] from my own division so 
that I can be criticized for bringing foreigners and neglecting the teaching of 
my own [students].”239 This is in clear contrast to the Agricultural College, 
where a decade later development aid came to be closely tied to institutional 
change (as I will show in the next chapter). This reflects the different contexts 
in which the respective projects took place. Unlike the aid authorities of the 
mid-1960s, the Central Committee had neither the financial nor the executive 
resources to support a more far-reaching agrarian effort. Conversely, in the 
1950s Lagerlöf had neither reason nor means to attempt to link his aid work to 
the Veterinary College’s general objectives. In fact, only by keeping the two 
distinctly separate could he maintain legitimacy for an aid project built mostly 
on his own personal motives and ideas. But the courses still made their mark 
on the college. Lagerlöf’s successor as vice-chancellor, Carl G. Schmiterlöw, 
was also interested in development aid and, among other things, brought a 
number of Cuban students to Sweden.240 Furthermore, the courses in 
reproduction were from 1962 complemented by similar courses in pathology, 
organized by the college together with the National Veterinary Insitute and run 
by Sven Rubarth, professor of pathological anatomy (later professor of 
pathology).241 Like their reproduction counterparts, these combined biennial 
courses in Sweden with follow-up trips abroad. The Veterinary College also 
eventually established an international office, which would go on to become 
part of SLU’s International Rural Development Center. 
Courses organized according to the same model, although with curriculum 
updates, continued to be given until the early 1990s, when SIDA, by then 
finding them an old-fashioned, Swedish-centered and unproductive form of 
aid, became more reluctant to finance them.242 In response, the course leaders 
asked former participants to give their opinions of the course to the agency. It 
says something about the impact the courses had on the individual 
participants—if nothing else—that in 1991 a flood of letters from veterinarians 
across the world, all addressed to Director-General Carl Tham, arrived at SIDA 
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in Stockholm protesting the proposed cancellation.243 Despite the protests and 
later attempts to move the courses to a developing country, the longer courses 
in animal reproduction and pathology were both canceled in 1993. Some of 
their legacy lived on for a few more years through shorter courses in AI and in 
udder health. The department also introduced a Master of Science program in 
veterinary medicine for international students, which ran until 2007.244 
                                                        
243 The letters can be found in the SIDA archives: Swedish International Development Authority 
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Figure 5. Letter from Indian veterinarian Ashok W. Deshmukh to SIDA’s director-general, Carl 
Tham, protesting the proposed cancellation of the international courses in animal reproduction. 
Deshmukh had been a course participant himself; note his use of the FRVCS title in the 
letterhead. Many letters like his were sent to SIDA at the time.245 
Practical Training for Modern Practitioners 
The rise of development aid in the 1950s was linked to the early Cold War and 
the ongoing decolonization. From the ideological construction of 
“underdevelopment” as a global problem emerged an attitude that one could, 
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and ought to, help the increasingly independent so-called “underdeveloped 
countries,” but this attitude was linked to a rather shallow understanding of the 
societies encountered and the effect of the efforts made. Supporting 
development was seen chiefly as a matter of supplying capital as well as 
knowledge and technology that could instigate the transformation from 
tradition to modernity. FAO’s narrowly defined expert assignments, including 
efforts to introduce AI in cattle breeding in various countries, were typical 
examples of this modernization ideology in practice. 
Yet as the example of Nils Lagerlöf shows, the ideology could be 
renegotiated on the ground. He did not subscribe to what he perceived to be the 
prevalent understandings within FAO of the driving forces and dynamics of 
animal production development. He could not support narrow attempts to 
transfer AI technology and methods and argued instead for a more systemic 
approach. Its core was the comprehensive development of local institutions 
based on a Swedish service science–oriented model for veterinary obstetrics 
and gynecology. In particular after his encounter with India, he became 
convinced that a veterinary educational reform that created more space for 
reproductive expertise was the only viable way ahead. Drawing on his 
international recognition as a scientist and expert, Lagerlöf proved able to 
convince FAO of this view. The organization helped fund his courses, and a 
decade later, at the second joint FAO/WHO international meeting on veterinary 
education, accepted a declaration that directly reflected Lagerlöf’s views in its 
attribution of “outstanding importance” to the “physiopathology of Animal 
Reproduction.”246 
While Lagerlöf distanced himself from what he considered problematic 
attitudes to development, he engaged in renegotiation and not rejection, and 
it would be a mistake to understand his engagement as being of a 
fundamentally critical nature. His criticism of “Messrs. ‘agriculture men’” 
was not grounded in distancing himself from ideas of development or 
modernization. Lagerlöf in fact strongly believed in the benefits of a 
Westernizing modernization, and was in this respect no different from the 
FAO leadership. But he did question certain prevailing ideas of how 
development worked. To him, promoting modern animal breeding could not 
hinge solely on technology transfer. It had to focus on the promotion of the 
veterinarian as a modern professional, whose combination of theoretical 
knowledge and practical skills could efficaciously serve the needs of an 
animal reproduction that—to be sure—increasingly worked along 
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technological lines. Accordingly, his training courses served the dual purpose 
of providing both a necessary set of skills and a new professional identity. 
Lagerlöf’s knowledge export was based on a combination of different 
standpoints. He resisted what he saw as the universalizing tendencies in the 
project of transferring knowledge and technology to the developing countries, 
and instead promoted local capacity-building. He was also strongly oriented to 
agricultural production and explicitly argued that the development of 
veterinary expertise presupposed an interactive relationship with farmers and 
their knowledge. Finally, like those theories of modernization Nils Gilman 
labels technocosmopolitan, Lagerlöf rejected the idea that modernity could 
come about through a clean break with the past. He instead argued for the need 
to take tradition and local conditions into account. But his engagement, though 
oriented to local problems, remained steeped in ideas of the superiority of the 
science and modernity that he himself represented. It was universalizing on a 
higher level: though Lagerlöf consistently argued for local knowledge 
production and the development of local capabilities, he had no particular 
interest in changing the contents of the model he wanted to export in response 
to what he encountered abroad. 
Lagerlöf thus combined a strong service science ideal with a form of 
centrist thinking that set strict limits on what he understood as relevant to take 
into account. This illustrates the difference between recognizing the need to 
adapt to local contexts, problems, and obstacles on the one hand, and being 
open to change in response to new cultures and knowledge systems on the 
other. It provides further support for the idea that the two should not be 
conflated or understood as necessarily being intimately associated, as, for 
example, James Scott tends to do in his discussion of high modernism. The 
amalgamation of production-oriented localism with centrist thinking will also 
return as an important feature of Swedish agrarian expertise abroad throughout 
this book. We will next encounter it as a defining characteristic of the expertise 
represented at the Agricultural College as it found a place for itself in Swedish 
development aid planning and began to create the strategy that would inform 
one the major Swedish aid efforts in the 1960s. 
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Figure 6. Nils Lagerlöf (sitting, left) with students and the vice-chancellor of the Veterinary 
College, professor of pharmacology Carl G. Schmiterlöw, at the closing ceremony for the 1967 
FAO/SIDA postgraduate course in animal reproduction. Photo Allan Myrman. From the 
collections of the Nordic Museum.247 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Formative Moment 
The Agricultural College and the Formation of Swedish Agricultural 
Aid, 1960–1965 
IN 1970, THE Agricultural College of Sweden held an “education day,” 
bringing together would-be students with teachers and representatives of the 
agricultural sector. One of the matters raised on this occasion was whether it 
would be suitable for the college to start an “education branch” in Africa.248 
That this topic was discussed highlights how matters regarding Africa and 
development aid had become relatively prominent on the college’s agenda. The 
primary reason was its ongoing involvement in a rural development project in a 
region of Ethiopia’s Arussi province. Since 1967, the newly created Swedish 
International Development Authority had financed most of this project, known 
as the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit, or CADU. It was run, as we will 
see, with support from the Agricultural College, representatives of which had 
also performed most of the preparatory work. 
The college’s involvement stemmed from the fact that rural development 
abroad had become a significant concern for its leadership during the 1960s. 
By the mid-1960s, the Agricultural College had convinced the Swedish aid 
authorities to initiate a program of science-based agricultural development aid. 
This meant that Swedish aid practice came to link up with what is now known 
as the Green Revolution (my usage of this term in the context of CADU is 
anachronistic, though only slightly so: the term was coined in the late 1960s, 
and authors writing about CADU in the 1970s explicitly referred to it as a 
Green Revolution project).249 The notion itself is a general label for science-
driven agricultural development based on genetically improved food crops and 
the implementation of modern cultivation techniques such as artificial 
fertilizers and irrigation.250 Through the Agricultural College’s involvement, 
248 “Rapport från Lantbrukshögskolans utbildningsdag 1970,” 23, Agricultural College archives, 
Planning division, Secretary Section, series B III, vol. 9, Uppsala Country Archives (hereafter 
cited as AC-SS). 
249 See, e.g., John M. Cohen, “Effects of Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants and Small-Scale 
Landowners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia,” The Journal of Developing Areas 9, no. 3 (1975). 
250 It is most often associated with the activities of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in South 
Asia in the 1960s, but the first postwar Green Revolution project dates back to 1946, when the 
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Sweden also engaged in this type of development activity, as the college’s 
experts brought their localistic and productivity-oriented approach to bear on 
an agricultural society in Ethiopia. The present chapter primarily answers 
questions about this involvement, which relates to all three of my research 
problems: How and why did the college’s experts maneuver to secure a place 
in Swedish development aid? How did they formulate their understandings of 
agricultural and rural development? How did they relate to the technologies 
and methods associated with the Green Revolution, and why? How and why 
did they begin to construct a relationship with the Swedish aid authorities? The 
following chapter then goes on to inquire how the strategies developed when 
the Swedish experts began to work on-site in Ethiopia. 
I base the chapter primarily on documentation preserved in the archives of 
the Agricultural College and in those of the Swedish aid authorities, mostly the 
archives of the Swedish Agency for International Assistance, or NIB (1962–
1965), and then SIDA from 1965 onward. Complementary material cited 
includes reports and archives of public commissions that investigated Swedish 
development aid, as well as newspaper and magazine articles. I also employ 
oral sources and written memoirs from some of the involved actors. 
While these sources account well for the official decision-making processes 
by which the Agricultural College found its way into development aid, they 
pose some problems of visibility and importance. Something I expected to find 
but which is invisible in this material is indications of tensions at the college 
over the introduction of development aid. It is somewhat difficult to judge 
whether or not this reflects a true state of affairs. A central matter as regards 
importance has to do with the Agricultural College’s various actors’ 
motivations for engaging in development aid and for advocating the particular 
form of aid that they did. I make an extensive argument about this, which is 
empirically stronger in parts and somewhat more conjectural in others. The 
overall argument could have been strengthened by a complementary analysis 
of private or semiprivate correspondence between the actors, but as discussed 
in the introduction, such material has not been included. 
A New Context for Agrarian Development Aid 
The origins of the Agricultural College’s institutional engagement with 
development aid can be traced to the end of the 1950s, a time when the public 
debate on Swedish aid policy intensified as part of a more general reorientation 
of Swedish foreign policy. The earlier focus on strict neutrality was replaced 
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by a more active stance in international politics that became increasingly 
apparent through the 1960s.251 This also opened up for an increased 
engagement in bilateral aid. A 1959 Central Committee inquiry had 
recommended that Sweden increase its bilateral aid commitments, something 
for which there was strong political support. This, however, problematized the 
Central Committee’s position. It was at most a quasi-governmental 
organization, whereas many policymakers now saw an expanded aid program 
as an obvious matter for the state.252 In May 1960 Ulla Lindström, the minister 
whose portfolio included aid issues, established a government inquiry with 
instructions to develop a new organizational structure for the administration of 
Swedish development aid. In March the following year the inquiry proposed 
the creation of a new government agency with a more comprehensive 
responsibility for the field, and on January 1, 1962 the new government 
agency, NIB, was created, superseding the Central Committee. With NIB, 
bilateral development aid fully became a state responsibility, handled by a 
central organ under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.253 Yet NIB was not 
organized as a traditional government agency but was something of a sui 
generis organization, led by a secretary-general and with an advisory council 
attached. This council consisted of representatives of the popular movements 
that had formed the Central Committee as well as other interests, and it 
operated alongside the agency’s executive unit, the secretariat.254 
In the early 1960s, planning also started for an expanded aid program. The 
government wanted to develop some principal aid policy guidelines and to 
include as many different stakeholders as possible in this work: “the few who 
knew something of aid and the many who were interested,” as SIDA official 
Lars Kalderén would later put it.255 In February 1961 a special government 
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board, known as the Swedish Government Advisory Board on International 
Aid Issues and chaired by Prime Minister Tage Erlander, was created to 
function as an arena for this work. It brought together numerous interests, 
including government ministers and members of parliament, as well as 
representatives of industry, cooperatives, the banking sector, academia, and 
various popular movements.256 It also included two special working groups for 
education aid and humanitarian aid. In total, it met ten times in 1961 and 1962. 
In March 1962, two months after the creation of NIB, the prime minister then 
presented the result in the form of a new aid policy bill (often referred to as the 
Swedish “aid bible”) for the approval of parliament.257 By personally 
underwriting the bill, Erlander greatly increased the symbolic value of this 
moment for Swedish aid, a value further accentuated when the bill then passed 
unanimously. The prime minister and all of parliament supported the new 
Swedish development aid policy. 
Government Bill 1962:100 outlined a comprehensive program that, in Per-
Åke Nilsson’s words, stood “as a dividing line between a pioneering stage of 
experimentation and experience-based firm activity with the purpose to realize 
the plans for development aid.”258 Together with the new agency, it meant that 
Swedish development aid was now poised to become a substantially more 
significant endeavor. In the present context, the bill also serves as a symbolic 
dividing line between the more informal aid project driven by Nils Lagerlöf at 
the Veterinary College, and the much larger and more organized aid work that 
would be conducted by the Agricultural College from the 1960s. 
Agricultural Science and Development 
In the international development debate, modernization theory had found what 
would become its most influential formulation in W. W. Rostow’s 1960 “non-
communist manifesto,” The Stages of Economic Growth.259 Rostow, who 
served as an advisor to President Eisenhower and would go on to advise 
Kennedy, had developed a theory based on a mechanistic understanding of 
societal development in five distinct stages, from tradition to mass 
consumption. This stage theory has later become something of a symbol of a 
linear, Westernized, and politicized understanding of development, and it was 
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fittingly published during the first year of what the United Nations had 
pronounced the “Development Decade.” 
Rostow’s development model assumed that agriculture would be 
commercialized, and peasant farming would lose its importance, during the so-
called “take-off” stage.260 In the early to mid-1960s, economists and 
development scholars began to pay more direct attention to this problem of 
agricultural development in the Third World.261 They acknowledged that 
international patterns of trade were disadvantageous to exports from 
developing countries, while their severe poverty kept domestic markets for 
industrial productions small and insignificant. Seeing that the vast majority of 
developing-country populations lived as rural farmers, these scholars argued 
that agricultural development would increase the prosperity of rural areas, thus 
creating an augmented domestic demand for industrial products.262 
Consequently, agricultural development was increasingly seen as a first step 
towards successful industrialization. Agrarian historian Janken Myrdal has also 
suggested that the spotlight was turned on peasants and agriculture partly 
through the process of decolonization and the rise of liberation movements. 
This led to “peasants and rural societies [being] identified as essential elements 
of the social structure.”263 
In Sweden, ideas about a new and more central role for agriculture in 
development aid began to be clearly articulated in the early 1960s. I opened 
this book with the example of how the secretary-general of NIB, Arne 
Björnberg, addressed a congress of agricultural students in 1962. His speech 
not only suggested that industrial development had hitherto been 
overemphasized in postwar development aid, it also contextualized the need for 
increased agricultural productivity clearly in terms of feeding the world’s 
population.264 This was a second, and crucial, dimension of agricultural 
development aid. The question of how to mitigate the perceived tension 
between a rapidly growing global population and the excessive demands this 
would put on the world’s resources—what historian Björn-Ola Linnér has 
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termed the population-resource dilemma—had in fact been discussed since the 
end of World War II, but was at its height in the early 1960s, when a 
“voluminous outpouring” of literature was published on the topic.265 The 
importance afforded to this problem was a second key factor in the promotion 
of efforts to develop Third World agriculture at the time. 
There was general consensus in development circles and among agrarian 
experts that such development had to be effected through the application of 
modern agrarian science and technology in developing countries. In 1963, the 
UN “Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit 
of the Less Developed Areas” was held in Geneva. Agriculture was the subject 
that attracted the most contributions, in total over five hundred papers, while 
speakers from every section of the conference “acknowledged the development 
of agriculture as the key to an expanding economy.”266 Science-driven 
agriculture aid was thus becoming firmly established both as an important 
aspect of economic development and as a weapon that could be brought to bear 
on the population-resource dilemma. Sweden sent a number of delegates to 
Geneva, several of whom came from the Agricultural College and so were well 
aware of the international discussions. 
Development Aid at the Agricultural College? 
The initial impulse that eventually led to a link between the Agricultural 
College and Swedish development aid was not the Geneva conference, 
however, but a Swedish government report. In mid-1963, one of the working 
groups of Erlander’s Advisory Board on International Aid Issues published a 
report that drew up guidelines for expanded Swedish aid to education in 
various fields. One of the chapters was devoted to agriculture. Its author, 
Claes-Erik Odhner from the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, was an 
agronomist who had a long-standing interest in development issues.267 
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Odhner began with some general remarks on the role of agriculture in 
development, taking up the new international trends also seen in Björnberg’s 
speech: 
 
In recent years, one ought to have increasingly realized that industrialization is 
not the sole determinant of economic and social development in the developing 
countries in the way one earlier had imagined. Agriculture has and will continue 
to have a large, and in many countries dominant, importance as a base for 
economic development.268 
 
He then proposed as the most useful a Swedish aid effort to train agricultural 
students at what he called the “higher mid-level,” which meant something that 
approximately corresponded to a Swedish degree in agricultural management 
(this was awarded after a shorter and more practically oriented course than the 
agronomy course offered at the Agricultural College). After finishing the 
higher mid-level course, the students should be able to work as agricultural 
instructors, managers of larger properties, or civil servants in the agricultural 
administration of their home countries. But he also argued that a problem with 
any form of Swedish agricultural aid was that Swedish-trained agronomists 
lacked the requisite expertise in tropical and sub-tropical agriculture. Thus, as a 
prerequisite for any aid project, the report further proposed that NIB should 
finance supplemental education for “around ten” agronomists at a suitable 
foreign university where these subjects could be studied. Finally, Odhner 
considered the higher-level education offered at the Agricultural College and 
proposed its expansion: first, in order to be able to train more Swedish 
agronomists, and second, to make it possible to consider starting an English-
language course, leading to a full agronomy degree for a “not insignificant 
number of students from developing countries.”269 
Up to that time, the Agricultural College’s international interests had been 
limited. Its focus lay firmly on its role in Sweden, where it supported the 
rationalization of the agrarian sector. It had also recently, and very 
controversially, swallowed up the previously partly independent agricultural 
experiment organization.270 But a crucial shift took place within the college in 
the summer of 1963, when the professor of agricultural economics Lennart 
Hjelm was named vice-chancellor. Hjelm had previously worked at the 
National Research Institute for Farm Construction in Lund and the Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute in Stockholm, but since 1955, he had held a 
chair at Ultuna, and when Vice-Chancellor Gunnar Torstensson retired, Hjelm 
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was elected to succeed him. In Hjelm, the college found a leader with good 
political connections, significant institution-building ambitions, and also—
partly thanks to these ambitions—a pronounced interest in development aid.271 
Hjelm’s appointment as vice-chancellor 
coincided with the publication of the 
report containing Odhner’s ideas about aid 
to agricultural education. When asked to 
comment, the Agricultural College replied 
positively and expressed support for the 
working group’s basic understanding of 
agricultural educational aid.272 The 
proposals to train Swedish agronomists 
abroad and to speed up the college’s 
expansion were warmly recommended. 
The proposal to consider an English-
language course for students from 
developing countries was, on the other 
hand, viewed with notable hesitation.273 
The college argued that there were scant 
resources for such a course and that there 
would likely be problems when the 
students were to return to their home 
countries. Any such activity at the 
Agricultural College should be of a more 
limited character. It “should be planned in 
conjunction with larger efforts and should 
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Figure 7. Lennart Hjelm (1915–
2009), professor of agricultural 
economics and vice-chancellor of the 
Agricultural College (1963–1977) and 
SLU (1977–1982). Photographer 
unknown. From the collections of the 
Royal Swedish Academy of 
Agriculture and Forestry. 
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be completed in a suitable way in the aid-receiving country.”274 
These initial contacts between the Agricultural College and Swedish 
development aid took place in the context of the formation of a new aid policy 
and a new government agency for development aid and of the gradually 
increasing emphasis on agricultural development in the international aid 
debate. Together these two factors created the necessary external conditions for 
the development of an aid role for the Agricultural College. The former, which 
can be more generally understood as the construction of a new role for Sweden 
as an actor on the international scene, created institutional and ideological 
structures to which the college could be attached, or rather attach itself, while 
the latter meant that an international and national context came into being in 
which the college’s expertise was in demand. However, as we will see in the 
next section, the college resisted the way in which NIB wanted to utilize its 
expertise, and proposed its own alternative instead. 
Experimentation or Education? 
In October 1963, NIB approached the Agricultural College with an inquiry 
about precisely that suggestion made by Odhner that had been less well 
received, namely, if the college would be willing to organize courses at Ultuna 
for students from developing countries. This triggered activity among a group 
of professors eager to see the college play a role in development aid, but whose 
vision of that role diverged from NIB’s. The activities at the college ultimately 
came to be aimed at a reformulation of the problem in question, from being 
about education to being about agricultural science. 
When NIB’s request arrived, the college’s faculty appointed a special 
committee to analyze it and produce a response. The committee consisted of 
professors Börje Åberg (professor of plant physiology), Ewert Åberg 
(professor of crop production), and Artur Hansson (professor of animal 
breeding and one of the Ultuna delegates at the Geneva congress), as well as 
acting associate professor of agricultural economics Bengt Nekby (who 
functioned as secretary), and Vice-Chancellor Hjelm, who acted as 
chairman.275 The inclusion of Hjelm and Nekby indicates a new and more 
assertive attitude to the question of development aid at the college. Hjelm was 
the college’s academic leader and most prominent representative, and Nekby 
was the main source of experience of developing countries and of development 
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practice available at Ultuna. He had been a student of Hjelm’s and had 
graduated from the college in 1957 with a specialization in agricultural 
economics. Hjelm had then arranged for him, with the help of a Kellogg 
Foundation scholarship, to study with the well-known agricultural economist 
Earl O’Heady at Iowa State College.276 O’Heady directed the Center for 
Agricultural and Economic Adjustment, a newly created research unit focused 
on the study of agricultural economics and policy in the United States as well 
as abroad. This was part of a larger trend of an increased interest in 
international issues among American universities, many of which played 
important roles in American development 
aid.277 Even though his own work in Iowa 
was on the structural development of 
American agriculture, Nekby must have 
been aware of at least some work on 
agricultural development abroad as this was 
a topic of increasing importance among 
American agricultural economists, including 
those at O’Heady’s research center.278 In 
Iowa, he wrote a PhD dissertation which he 
later, with the support of Hjelm, could 
convert to a Swedish licentiate degree. He 
then returned to take up a position at Ultuna 
but did not stay long in Sweden. 
Encouraged by Hjelm, he was recruited by 
the Ford Foundation to work as an economic 
advisor to one of the regional governments 
of newly independent Nigeria.279 His tasks 
concerned agricultural development 
planning in relation to Nigeria’s long-term 
economic plans. 
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Figure 8. Bengt Nekby (b. 1930), 
agricultural economist and former 
student of Lennart Hjelm. Nekby was 
a driving force when the Agricultural 
College first became involved in 
Swedish development aid. He then 
went on to an international career at 
the World Bank. Photographer 
unknown. From the collections of the 
Royal Swedish Academy of 
Agriculture and Forestry. 
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That Hjelm, who at this time was not yet vice-chancellor but head of the 
Department of Economics, encouraged Nekby to go to Nigeria rather than to 
stay at Ultuna suggests an interest in developing countries and in development 
matters. Why he was interested is less apparent: nothing in his biography hints 
at his being previously concerned with the field. He had, however, traveled in 
the United States in 1960 and might have been inspired by the increasing 
interest in international development at the American land-grant universities.280 
Furthermore, by 1961 it would have been clear to a politically perceptive 
individual—as Hjelm undoubtedly was—that development aid would become 
a major political issue and a significant public expense in Sweden over the 
coming years. He might thus have considered it beneficial to obtain some 
personal expertise in this area for his department. More personal motives might 
have figured as well: Hjelm had grown up as one of seven children on a farm at 
a time when rural poverty was still widespread in Sweden, and perhaps this 
background contributed to his interest in foreign development. 
Nekby spent two years in Nigeria working alongside other development 
professionals, many of whom were former colonial officials. When Hjelm then 
became vice-chancellor in 1963, Nekby returned to the Department of 
Economics, and while working there he was appointed to the committee tasked 
with producing a suitable reply to NIB on behalf of the college’s faculty. 
Land or Labor Productivity for Development? 
This committee seemingly did not spend much time on developing the Ultuna-
based agronomy course NIB had requested, for when a reply was finished in 
April 1964, its primary suggestion was that the Agricultural College should 
participate in a development project in the Third World instead. The proposed 
project was to consist of scientific interventions that could increase yields from 
smallholder agriculture.281 Two crucial points of strategy that the committee 
made were related to this smallholder focus: first, the report argued for 
promoting land rather than labor productivity, and second, it strongly 
advocated a strategy based on localized, adaptive research. I will discuss the 
first point here and the second in the next section. 
Before discussing its own proposal, the committee had to address NIB’s 
original request for an agronomy course. It was swiftly dismissed, with the 
committee arguing that the possibilities of receiving students from developing 
countries at Ultuna were “strictly limited” due to a lack of resources. Even if 
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resources were provided, it was, they argued, extremely doubtful whether this 
type of course was suitable. The teaching at the college was not adapted to 
foreign conditions, foreign students’ prior knowledge was often (they claimed) 
significantly lower than what was expected of Swedish students, and both 
language and social problems were foreseen.282 In retrospect, it is hard to judge 
the extent to which these were genuine concerns.283 As will become clear, the 
college had other interests that figured into the proposal they had presented. Its 
representatives had reason to be more interested in creating a large-scale, 
farmer-oriented field project than in training a comparatively small and elite 
group of students in Sweden. They might thus have overemphasized the 
expected problems. 
Though rejecting the proposal to train foreign students in Sweden, the 
committee highlighted that the college’s involvement in development aid was 
important, motivated in terms of both the population-resource dilemma and 
agriculture’s role in general economic development. Based on a discussion of 
the importance of agriculture to development, with reference to an address by 
Gunnar Myrdal to the World Food Congress the year before, the committee 
concluded that it “ought to be of great interest to investigate the ways in which, 
and to what extent, the agricultural college appropriately could contribute to 
the work for developing countries.”284 Both research and education activities 
were identified as such appropriate contributions, and the importance of an 
integrated project, with different efforts brought together in a common context, 
was emphasized. As the centerpiece of the project, the plan proposed that NIB 
should establish a research station in a developing country. This station was to 
be affiliated with the Agricultural College, and around it research and 
education were to be organized. The focal point of the research work would be 
the creation of higher-yielding plants and cattle. The plan also included 
extension as well as produce distribution and marketing efforts.285 
A reasonable hypothesis is that the idea of the Agricultural College taking 
part in agricultural development abroad was a result of foreign influences. 
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There were international models, as many European agricultural colleges had 
departments of tropical agriculture, originally linked to colonial ventures. With 
the colonial empires gone or disappearing, a natural postimperial task for them 
was to engage in development aid, continuing the old relationship in new 
ways.286 There were models in the United States as well, where recent 
legislation—Title XII of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act—encouraged the 
land-grant institutions to engage in food production–related aid. According to 
agricultural economist John W. Mellor, a leading actor in Cornell University’s 
international work and later chief economist of the American aid agency 
USAID, they were “the cornerstone of the effort” during the “period of 
ascendancy of U.S. foreign aid to agricultural development.”287 And 
development through research and extension was an important part of the land-
grant philosophy. 
The American example is likely to have been more important to the 
Agricultural College. The early 1960s was a time of American cultural and 
scientific dominance in Sweden, and there were direct links between the 
college and US universities. Nekby had connections in Iowa, and the American 
influence on the Agricultural College as a whole was significant in terms of 
scientific contacts.288 Many of the organizational reforms that Lennart Hjelm 
instigated also gathered inspiration from the American land-grant university.289 
However, the college’s plan focused on small-farm development, which by no 
means was a self-evident strategy in the context of the mid-1960s aid debate, 
neither in the United States nor internationally. Immediately after the war, 
America had in fact promoted family farming and land reform abroad, and the 
Rockefeller Foundation had experimented with peasant-oriented scientific 
interventions in Mexico. But by the 1960s, the emphasis had shifted to a more 
classical modernizing strategy based on large-scale, mechanized farming with 
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capital-intensive inputs and equipment and the associated reduction in labor 
demand.290 In 1963, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation argued that 
“farming as a way of life will give way to agricultural production as a strictly 
business enterprise with significant increases in land holdings and comparable 
decreases in the number of individual land owners and the size of the farm 
labour force.”291 The Ford Foundation and USAID also shared this 
understanding.292 This strategy also informed the only ongoing Swedish 
agricultural aid project: an endeavor in Algeria where a huge agricultural unit 
had been provided with a Swedish management team and American combine 
harvesters in order to restore, improve, and reorient its production.293 
While the Agricultural College’s professors agreed in principle that farming 
as a way of life would eventually disappear in the developing world, they did 
not expect or support a general shift from smallholding to large-scale 
commercial agriculture in the near future. They argued instead that in nearly all 
developing countries, the most pressing concern was the development of 
peasant farming. This led to the crucial conclusion that the project had to focus 
on increasing land productivity through scientific interventions and the 
provision of new inputs, rather than increasing labor productivity through 
mechanization. In other words, the core of the project had to be technical 
innovations and methods to help farmers use them, rather than capital-intensive 
machinery that would drive unemployment. Rural incomes had to increase as a 
prerequisite for the development of a successful industrial sector that might at 
some point, but not now, need surplus labor from agriculture. The report 
explicitly noted that expanding production through the use of capital-intensive 
and labor-saving technology belonged to a “rather late” stage that presently 
could be ignored.294 For the time being, yields needed to increase without any 
significant decreases in labor demand; thus, an intensive rather than extensive 
strategy for the development of farming should be promoted.295 
                                                        
290 On U.S. policies on land reform abroad, see Janken Myrdal, The Dovring Saga: A Story of 
Academic Immigration (Stockholm: The Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and 
Antiquities, 2010), 142; on the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, see Jonathan Harwood, 
“Peasant Friendly Plant Breeding and the Early Years of the Green Revolution in Mexico,” 
Agricultural History 83, no. 3 (2009); on the development strategies of the 1960s, see Harwood, 
Europe’s Green Revolution, 4. 
291 Cited in Harwood, Europe’s Green Revolution, 119. 
292 Harwood, Europe’s Green Revolution, 119. 
293 The press rather preferred the formulation that the Swedes were in Algeria to “save the 
harvest.” See e.g. Hans Granqvist, “Aftonbladet hos svenskarna på NIB:s skandalfarm: De får 
jobba som ‘galningar’,” Aftonbladet, 3 October 1963, 9. See also my account below. 
294 “Forskning och undervisning på jordbrukets område,” 3. 
295 Note that the terms intensive and extensive are used only in relation to each other here; a 
highly mechanized and chemicalized agriculture is certainly intensive in comparison with, for 
 115 
It is instructive to compare this stance with Lennart Hjelm’s simultaneous 
work on the future of agriculture in Sweden. In 1960, a major government 
inquiry was appointed to propose new agricultural policy guidelines. As a 
member of one of the inquiry’s expert groups, Hjelm had conducted a study of 
the future direction of Swedish agricultural rationalization, published in 1963. 
He reached the conclusion that Sweden had chosen a different path than most 
other Western countries. The prevailing production targets meant that land 
productivity was not a prioritized dimension, and so Swedish policy had been 
to free up labor by promoting mechanization and extensive agriculture instead 
of stimulating yield increases.296 This extensive strategy had created certain 
problems related to underutilization of technology and sometimes labor, which 
could easily lead to “disharmonious” production conditions.297 These results, 
though applying to a wholly different context and set of problems, were in an 
important respect mirrored in the college’s stance vis-à-vis agricultural 
development in the Third World: both highlighted the importance of 
maintaining what Hjelm described as “economically appropriate proportions 
between labor, land, and capital.”298 While striving for the economically 
appropriate might sound like a self-evident conclusion of an economist’s 
analysis, it had interesting implications. In the context of both Swedish 
agriculture and Swedish-led interventions abroad, it, in practice, implied less 
focus on mechanization and more on agricultural science than had earlier been 
the case. In both instances, Hjelm thus reached conclusions that afforded 
agricultural expertise a more direct role. 
A Localist Ideology of Agricultural Development 
As the college’s proposal presented agricultural development aid as a science-
based endeavor, it also contained a clear outline of the college’s view of the 
role of agricultural research in development aid. A central paragraph discussed 
the significance of localized experimental activity: 
 
The economic and technical development naturally demand continual agricultural 
research efforts. Despite the obvious importance of research, this point is most 
often the weakest in the development programs. This is perhaps due to an 
underestimation of the latter stages of applied research. The large variations in 
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agriculture in terms of natural, economic and cultural conditions demand extensive 
regional experimentation. Research results can thus only in special cases be 
directly transferred from one environment to another. A failure to complete the 
research to the stage at which the results are practically applicable ought to play a 
larger part in the resistance to technological innovations than the often-cited 
cultural factors. With clearly tested research results, the work of the extension 
services is naturally also made significantly easier.299 
 
The college’s professors evidently took the central role of scientific research 
for granted, assuming it would contribute to progress and productivity. They 
also demarcated scientific knowledge from the knowledge of the local 
population. The latter was granted no epistemic authority at all, being instead 
reduced to “cultural factors” that were only considered as resistance to 
agricultural science’s innovations. The notion that science could and would 
bring about societal improvement—and do so through a quite simple, linear 
process—was not problematized in their proposal, beyond the rather 
perfunctory remark that a “more or less extensive land reform” would be 
needed in many countries to encourage farmers to make changes.300 These are 
starting points imbued with a high-modernist ideology, and they reflected 
widely held views of science in development at the time. 
But while taking a reductionist view of rural societies in the developing 
world, Hjelm and his colleagues did not characterize these societies using 
stereotypes of inherent conservatism and backwardness. They suggested that 
there would be little resistance to “practically applicable” research results, 
which rather implied that smallholding farmers in developing countries would 
be ready and willing to make rational changes to improve their situation if 
given the proper tools by researchers acting as service scientists. Here the 
Agricultural College’s experts actively distanced themselves from those who 
argued that peasant agriculture was so mired in tradition as to be a lost cause, 
ripe for replacement by agricultural entrepreneurs. 
This stance was in line with ideas that American agricultural economist 
(and later Nobel Laureate) Theodore Schultz put forward at the time. Schultz 
was not explicitly cited, but his work appears to have been a major source of 
inspiration for the plan as a whole.301 In his book Transforming Traditional 
Agriculture, published the same year as the Agricultural College sent its 
proposal to NIB, he made the case that earlier development thinkers had 
misunderstood the situation of farmers in so-called traditional societies. 
American modernization theorists in particular tended to link what they 
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described as tradition with passivity, stagnation, and resistance to change. Walt 
Rostow, their main ideological force at the time, had introduced the dubious 
notion of “pre-Newtonian” to describe traditional societies that he judged 
incapable to rationally and productively manipulate nature.302 But Schultz 
argued that if traditional agriculture had stagnated, it was not because of 
fatalism or irrational reverence for past practices. He suggested that the cause 
was rather the opposite: agrarian societies had, over centuries, employed 
rational methods to optimize their systems of production as far as their 
technologies allowed, but over time such optimization tended toward equilibria 
where further production increases were impossible. In economics 
terminology, the marginal productivity of investments in the existing factors of 
production approached zero for traditional agricultural societies.303 Schultz’s 
conclusion was that such societies needed to be provided with modern 
technology to break the impasse. 
Schultz’s theses on “traditional” agriculture were distinctly ahistorical, were 
supported only by problematic evidence, and paid no attention at all to social 
or material inequality.304 But his challenge to psychological and cultural 
explanations for agricultural stagnation lent support and credibility to those 
who favored peasant-oriented development. The argument that peasants were 
in fact rational economic agents who would “turn sand into gold” if provided 
with proper incentives suggested that peasants could be main drivers in 
development processes.305 It also implied another conclusion drawn by the 
Agricultural College’s committee, namely, that resistance to innovations 
tended to result from the failure to supply such incentives due to a dearth of 
research. More particularly, the committee concluded that resistance followed 
from the failure to sufficiently adapt technologies to local conditions. This was 
an idea that would come to have a formative impact on the future of the 
Agricultural College’s development aid work. 
In order to make sure that innovations became incentives, the committee 
argued—similar to Nils Lagerlöf’s views on the need for veterinarians to 
interact with farmers—that it was not enough to communicate research results 
to the farmers: their problems should guide the research.306 And similar to 
Lagerlöf’s point about local research, the committee discussed this in light of 
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an understanding of agricultural research results as something that rarely will 
retain its full applicability when moved from one context to another. In 
agricultural science, the committee claimed, it is impossible to perform a direct 
transfer of established knowledge and produce the desired results in the new 
location. They argued, in other words, for what Paul Richards has called 
ecological particularism over scientific universals, for local adaptations instead 
of transfers of allegedly universal knowledge.307 While they took for granted 
that the experimental methods employed by Swedish experts would work in 
developing-country conditions, the knowledge generated by applying these 
methods was, according to this line of reasoning, local and not universal. This 
is the direct reversal of the point Scott puts forward for the case of high-
modernist agriculture: that it seeks to reshape local environments in favor of 
pre-packaged solutions, rather than adapting solutions to existing conditions.308 
A more concrete example of localist thinking can be found in the 
committee’s discussion of plant husbandry, where it outlined some principles 
for plant breeding and varietal use: 
 
The cultivation material can consist of already-present varieties or of introduced 
varieties with better cultivation characteristics. Insofar as the already-present 
cultivation material is well adapted to the environment, it should primarily be 
used. It is eminently probable that this material’s quantitative and qualitative 
return can be improved through breeding. Plant breeding, which at the outset 
can likely be carried out with relative simple methods, can be expected to yield 
good results.309 
 
Such prioritizing of local varieties was not a commonly held view among 
international agricultural experts in the mid-1960s. Most of the varieties used 
as inputs in contemporary Green Revolution projects were instead developed 
by what Jonathan Harwood has described as a “cosmopolitan strategy,” a 
universalistic plant breeding approach that aimed at creating varieties which 
would perform well under a wide range of conditions.310 In contrast to the 
cosmopolitan strategy, Harwood describes a local strategy, starting from 
existing local varieties and aiming at developing a variety that would perform 
well under specific, local conditions. The Agricultural College experts did 
not unequivocally side with either strategy: another point made further on in 
the proposal was that introducing new varieties complemented by pesticides, 
an approach more related to the cosmopolitan strategy, could also be a viable 
way ahead. The local approach was, however, the prioritized one, in line with 
                                                        
307 Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution, 10. 
308 Scott, Like a State, 301. 
309 “Forskning och undervisning på jordbrukets område,” 4. 
310 Harwood, Europe’s Green Revolution, 45–46; 122–23. 
 119 
the more general argument about the importance of localized and de-
centralized research. 
The contrast between cosmopolitan and local plant breeding strategies 
reflects deeper tensions between the local and the universal in agricultural 
science. Though agricultural researchers ignore differences in cultivation 
conditions between different localities only at their peril, agricultural science 
has nonetheless been characterized by a range of universalizing attempts, 
from Harwood’s cosmopolitanism to the idea that almost any environment 
can be reshaped to fit with preexisting agricultural approaches, to a belief in 
what has been described as “transfer through analogy”—the idea being that if 
the target area’s climate and soil conditions are close enough to those of an 
area for which solutions have already been developed, these solutions can be 
used off the shelf.311 While, as noted in the introduction, localist approaches 
to the development of tropical agriculture were often advocated in the 
colonies during the interwar period, a lack of attention to local contexts in 
some postwar development projects had resulted in well-publicized failures, 
often based on a problematic combination of aggressive mechanization and 
chemical fertilizer inputs.312 But the Agricultural College representatives 
argued from the outset for a distinctly local approach based on the adaptation 
of technologies to local environments. 
Presumably the argument was made with the rather recently failed projects 
in mind, but the approach they argued for was also rooted in the history of 
Swedish agricultural experimentation and extension activities. The committee 
used “a hundred years of Swedish experience in experiment organization and 
design” as an argument for why this type of effort was suitable for Swedish 
expertise.313 This was surely an attempt to relate the proposal to the established 
policy that Sweden ought to provide aid in areas to which its nationally 
available expertise was especially well-suited. But it also gives insight into 
how agricultural experimentation was understood at the Agricultural College. 
It referred to the experimental activities performed since the nineteenth century 
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under the auspices of the Royal Swedish Academy of Agriculture, the regional 
agricultural societies, and, from 1907, the Central Institute for Agricultural 
Experimentation. The last-mentioned was a government agency that eventually 
developed into a national experiment organization for plant and animal 
research. This research system had always included a regional and localized 
component, with experiments sometimes even being carried out on private 
farms. It also included an extension dimension through which new knowledge 
was disseminated to farmers.314 Since 1948, the main body of the national 
experiment organization had been co-located with the Agricultural College and 
shared its board of directors (in 1962, the two organizations were formally 
merged). The college was also developing special extension activities, by 
which it provided advice to extension agents in agricultural societies and the 
county-level boards of agriculture.315 
Those responsible for this experiment system emphasized the important role 
played by the local dimension both for knowledge production and 
dissemination. In 1955, Erik Åkerberg, a plant breeder and then-head of the 
National Institute for Agricultural Experimentation, outlined the importance of 
having both a fixed experimental setup, run by the national experiment 
organization, and local experimental activities under the aegis of the 
agricultural societies. These complemented each other, Åkerberg explained: 
the fixed experimental activities evaluated newly bred varieties in comparison 
with presently cultivated ones, whereas in a second step, local experiments 
were employed to investigate under which specific conditions or in which areas 
promising varieties could be recommended to farmers.316 The service science 
tasks Åkerberg outlined for the local experimentation activities corresponded 
well to what the college’s committee proposed to establish in a developing 
country. Erland Mårald also notes how another report published by the inquiry 
into the future agriculture policy had stated that experimental activities were 
“natural points of contact between research and farmers.”317 The committee 
made a similar point and explicitly recommended the Swedish (and 
Norwegian) model of study farms for the proposed project. These farms were 
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cultivated by their owners under the supervision of a researcher who proposed 
experiments and improvements, and so simultaneously functioned as 
knowledge production sites and as model farms for knowledge dissemination 
both to the owner and within the local farming community.318 
The organization of the Swedish agricultural research system, with its local 
components and close ties between the college’s higher education and research 
on the one hand, and the more practically focused experiment organization on 
the other, is thus likely to have shaped how the faculty of the Agricultural 
College understood agricultural development. Knowledge of the failed 
mechanization schemes in Africa in the 1940s might have contributed as well. 
Moreover, Nekby’s tenure in Nigeria, with its links to British colonial 
knowledge networks that at least at times had manifested a strong interest in 
the local, probably also had an influence. The small-farm focus of the end 
result, and the importance it attached to exhaustive localized experimentation 
and extension in the developing world, makes the Agricultural College’s 
proposal stand out among other contemporary Green Revolution projects. As 
Harwood compellingly argues, few of these projects based their interventions 
on historical experiences of smallholder-oriented agricultural development. 
With scant concern for ecological particulars, they instead implemented 
cosmopolitan programs and thus ended up having to relearn lessons already 
learned before the war.319 But as we have seen here, in the Swedish case such 
experiences did carry over into postwar international development, even if the 
initial ideas would come to change in a number of respects. This will be 
considered further below and in the next chapter. 
Development Aid as Institution-Building 
When submitting its plan to NIB, the Agricultural College had—rather similar 
to how Nils Lagerlöf reacted to the FAO proposal for a mission to India—
reformulated a development initiative so as to be more congruent with its own 
expertise. This congruence had a convenient side effect for the college: it 
meant the plan could also function as an argument for its own expansion. This 
becomes clearer if we look at the parts of the plan that considered education in 
connection with the proposed project: training of people in the recipient 
country and training of Swedish experts for development work. 
The plan did not simply posit the college in a supervisory role in a 
developing country but also argued that the college itself needed to expand. 
This was not, however, to receive foreign students but to make it possible to 
accept more Swedish students. As noted, the Agricultural College’s experts 
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differed from Lagerlöf in that they had no interest in training a relatively small 
group of elite students in Sweden. Rather, Hjelm and his colleagues proposed 
to employ Swedish expertise in field settings, working much closer to 
developing-country farmers. This enabled them to construe development aid as 
a new labor market for Swedish agronomists: 
 
The major difficulty [concerning the training of agronomists for development 
aid] is naturally the limited resources of the agricultural college. The Swedish 
labor market can easily absorb the present production of agronomists. If a larger 
agricultural development aid effort should be desired, then this must imply an 
increased admission level and thus that increased material and personal 
resources must be placed at the college’s disposal.320 
 
This argument had been suggested already in the consultation response from 
the year before, but it was now developed into the statement that any 
significant Swedish effort in agricultural aid would require more agronomists. 
At this time, it was the government and not the college itself that determined its 
number of student places (the same applied to all other professional colleges in 
Sweden), and to lobby the government, development aid—being a political 
project unanimously supported by the parliament—was a potent vehicle. This 
is why the argument went beyond positing development aid as a new career 
path for the college’s students to suggest that the Swedish provision of such aid 
presupposed an expansion of the college. It contrasted with Odhner’s remarks 
on education aid from less than a year earlier, in which he had stated that even 
if there was no abundance of agronomists in Sweden, there ought to be 
“relatively good” recruitment opportunities for aid assignments and certainly 
better than, for example, for engineers and physicians.321 
While the comparison might suggest that the college’s argument was 
deliberately misleading, a fairer take on it is that the labor situation was 
complex and could be interpreted in different ways. Choosing an interpretation 
that strongly emphasized the need for more personnel could be turned into a 
very useful argument to secure for the college a larger allocation of resources 
in a political context where there was strong support for an expansion of 
development aid. The focus on science-driven agricultural aid played directly 
into this. Such aid presupposed agronomists for its planning and execution, and 
the more agronomists needed, the more had to be trained at Ultuna, and the 
more resources had to be provided to the college. In this way, it is possible to 
discern an underlying expansionist motive behind the aid engagement. There is 
no reason to doubt that Hjelm and his colleagues had a genuine interest in 
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development or that they believed in the strategy they advocated, but their 
interest was intertwined with the realization that the college stood to benefit 
from an increased Swedish agricultural aid effort and from a good relationship 
with the aid authorities. 
The desire to increase the number of students was only one expression of a 
more general motive of self-interest and institutional safe-guarding. Hjelm’s 
tenure as the college’s vice-chancellor was associated with its expansion but 
also with its transformation into a decidedly different institution for teaching 
and research in the agricultural sciences in a wider sense, ending with the 
creation of SLU in 1977. A clear indication that Hjelm considered the 
development aid work an important part of this more general transformation 
can be found in a memorandum he presented to the faculty working committee 
a few years later. There he argued that there were three main reasons for the 
college’s continued expansion over the next five years: (1) problems relating to 
the ongoing rationalization of Swedish agriculture; (2) pressing environmental 
issues; and (3) the matter of development aid and food production in 
developing countries.322 
The prominent role Hjelm afforded to development aid in his planning for 
the future suggests that he viewed the engagement as part of a more general 
institution-building process, of which the increase in student intake was just 
one part.323 Further support for this thesis can be derived from the fact that his 
memorandum envisioned the development aid work as being closely linked to 
the college’s core activities of education and research, rather than being 
separated from them, as Lagerlöf’s courses at the Veterinary College had been. 
In 1964, the committee that handled NIB’s proposal had also put forward this 
point. It had suggested that since the need for agricultural development aid was 
likely to increase, it would be “realistic to consider it a permanent activity at 
the Agricultural College,” a wording that suggests a vision of a prominent and 
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permanent center for development-related agrarian expertise at Ultuna.324 
Institution-building is a motive in line with what has been suggested by people 
who knew Lennart Hjelm at the time.325 The thesis is also further strengthened 
by the fact that the college pushed for its conception of development aid in 
other contexts as well. A few years later, in its consultation response to the 
major government inquiry on the new agricultural policy, the college used a 
comment on food supply issues in developing countries as an excuse to make a 
broader multiparagraph argument on agricultural development aid and the 
college’s possible contribution.326 In the end, something like what Hjelm 
envisioned was established at Ultuna with the International Rural Development 
Center. IRDC became important to Swedish development aid, but it never 
really made development aid a major avenue of expansion for the college; this 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
Development Aid as a Legitimacy Project 
The importance Hjelm and his colleagues afforded to institution-building and 
institution-protection becomes more understandable if we consider the wider 
context. We know that modern agriculture began to come under fire from the 
new environmental movements in the early 1960s. It was thus hardly a 
coincidence that Hjelm’s expansion plan included environmental research on, 
among other things, “biocides,” a word that had entered the Swedish language 
straight from Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.327 Acknowledging the problem 
and expanding into research on environmental aspects of agricultural 
production could help safeguard the college’s future legitimacy as well as 
increase its social relevance at a time when the environment was a growing 
concern for Swedish policymakers and the Swedish public at large.328 Precisely 
the same case could be made for development aid, also a high-profile political 
and public issue in the mid-1960s.329 
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Furthermore, the social changes that followed agricultural rationalization 
put all institutions bound up with the agrarian sector in a problematic position 
in a different way. Agriculture’s reduced need for manpower was a necessary 
precondition for the expansion of the industrial sectors. This undermined the 
influence of the agrarian sciences and their institutions, as rural populations 
decreased and farmers became just one special interest group among many. 
There was a certain paradox in the development: the more efficient and 
extensive Swedish agriculture became, the less political leverage its institutions 
would have.330 
Per Lundin’s studies of agrarian higher education and research reforms in 
the 1950s and 1960s provide more insight into the particular situation of the 
Agricultural College. He argues that the college (and the College of Forestry) 
was limited in its possibilities to expand in the ways the rest of the higher 
education institutions could. As a professional college training a limited 
number of students for particular professions, it could not plug into the ongoing 
movement toward mass higher education; at the same time, it sorted under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, which was preoccupied with the agricultural reforms 
and did not prioritize higher education and research issues. By the mid-1960s, 
Lennart Hjelm seems to have believed that these were acute issues which had 
to be dealt with. Lundin shows that after becoming vice-chancellor, Hjelm 
began to manifest a strategic agenda through his work on one of the Swedish 
Government Research Advisory Board’s (Forskningsberedningen) committees. 
The core of his strategy was to present the field of biology as the cornerstone 
of the research at the Agricultural College as well as the College of Forestry. 
Formulating the research in terms of what at the time was a prioritized 
scientific field was, Lundin argues, “the agrarian colleges’ first step toward 
claiming their own space in the Swedish (basic) scientific landscape.”331 
Lundin does not consider Hjelm’s maneuvering with regard to development 
aid, but there is a striking contemporaneity between the struggle to increase the 
college’s legitimacy in the eyes of science policymakers he analyzes and the 
attempt to expand through development aid that I have presented here. It is also 
striking how the proposal for an intensive rather than extensive strategy for 
agricultural development aid—with its consequent focus on agricultural 
science—is mirrored in Hjelm’s findings on the future of Swedish agriculture, 
which likewise emphasized a focus on research instead of further 
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mechanization. And the memorandum I cited above, in which Hjelm suggested 
that rationalization, environmental issues, and development aid would grow to 
become core issues for the college in the early 1970s, adds additional weight to 
the idea that the aid effort was part of a larger project. Against this, I argue that 
the engagement in development aid was one expression of a broader intent: the 
expansion and transformation of the college that Hjelm strived to effect. By 
arguing for the importance of agricultural research in fresh contexts, thus 
expanding the college’s area of interest and turning to new stakeholders, 
besides the traditional ones within the Swedish agricultural sector, he 
attempted to expand the college; to maintain and strengthen its position in 
society and its social and political legitimacy. 
If the college’s engagement in development aid is understood as a foray into a 
new political field, the flip side was the possibility of colonizing new scientific 
fields. The 1964 plan suggested that activities at the experiment station could be 
linked to research at the college on “agricultural problems of developing 
countries.”332 Two years later, in his five-year expansion plan, Hjelm also noted 
the importance of research: both research on tropical agriculture and on synthetic 
foods were mentioned as examples there.333 As chapter 5 will show, it would 
prove very difficult to establish development-related research at the college, but 
there was an interest in the idea from the very outset, and it most likely 
functioned as an important motivating force. Moving into development aid could 
also cater to more idealistic motives. It would enable the interested college 
professors to play their part in the new developments in the Third World; to help 
realize the utopic dreams of the first development decade by constructing one 
piece of the cornucopia promised by the green revolutionaries. One of the 
involved professors, Ewert Åberg, became particularly interested in the question 
of how to feed the world and published several works on the topic. He also 
became involved in the Consultative Group for International Agricultural 
Research, a consortium of agricultural research centers that would later engage 
many other scientists at SLU.334 
The Agricultural College had thus taken NIB’s inquiry about agricultural 
education aid and reformulated it into a proposal for science-based 
agricultural development aid, based on a localist development strategy 
intended to stimulate smallholder agriculture. For Hjelm and his colleagues, 
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this was a way to simultaneously communicate their unwillingness to provide 
basic training to students from developing countries and their desire to still 
play some kind of part in Swedish development aid. This desire was 
undergirded by the conviction that the college stood to gain from such an 
engagement. The college’s professors recognized that their participation in 
development aid would enable them to use the Third World for their own 
institutional and scientific purposes. But I do not mean to imply that the 
college’s professors cynically designed a plan for agricultural development 
abroad that in fact would only serve their own ends. There is no reason to 
doubt that they wanted to participate in development aid because they felt that 
they could be of much-needed assistance to poorer countries, nor to question 
that they believed that the strategy they advocated was the best way to provide 
such assistance. But they were sensitive to the fact that this strategy seemed 
one of the few avenues of expansion open to the Agricultural College. This, in 
turn, meant that development aid quickly became part of a project—driven 
primarily by Vice-Chancellor Hjelm—to widen the scope of the college and to 
secure its present and future relevance by, ultimately, changing it from a 
sector-bound agronomical institute to a broader research university. 
The NIB Crisis, the “Scandal Farm,” and the Agricultural Aid 
The Agricultural College’s proposals for a new aid project were received by a 
NIB scarred by internal strife and external pressure. After its creation in 1962, 
the agency had seen an influx of staff with little experience of Swedish public 
administration, and this had created friction in its inner workings. Tensions 
also mounted between the head office in Stockholm and project staff in the 
field. The press gradually picked up on the problems, and in September 1963, 
the Gothenburg daily paper Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning initiated a 
press campaign that questioned the agency’s organization and its management 
of Swedish aid. It soon intensified to the point that the responsible minister, 
Ulla Lindström, later would describe it as “the stormiest attacks of [my] 
political life.”335 The press attacks, in turn, triggered a political crisis, known as 
the “NIB crisis,” and Arne Björnberg, the agency’s secretary-general, was 
eventually forced to leave his position.336 
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The NIB crisis and its aftermath brought about the end of the older 
Central Committee model, in which civil society organizations had formal 
influence over development aid. NIB would soon be replaced by SIDA, 
which was organized as a standard government agency according to the 
conventional principles of Swedish public administration. But the crisis also 
opened up new possibilities, among other things for agricultural aid. A 
contributory reason for this was that one of the more notorious projects 
during the crisis had been an agricultural endeavor in Algeria, a project the 
press had dubbed the “scandal farm.”337 
The “Scandal Farm” and Its Aftermath 
In Algeria, NIB provided personnel support and machinery to a major 
agricultural unit created by the merger of six farms that had been abandoned by 
their French owners after or during the Algerian War of Independence. Its total 
size was more than two thousand four hundred hectares.338 General Swedish 
sympathy for the cause of the FLN and the newly formed NIB’s desire to find 
suitable projects to support had led to a Swedish-Algerian agreement on the 
development of the farm. But the project suffered from poor planning. There was 
no agronomic expertise in place during the project launch, and none of the 
Swedes present spoke either French or Arabic. The scandal-hungry press also 
took some pleasure in pointing out how NIB had supplied inappropriate 
technology and how the combines obtained from the United States had broken 
down in transit.339 But what really made the news was the conflict between the 
field staff and the NIB management in Stockholm. The project director, former 
missionary Signar Öman, wrote a letter of complaint—not intended for public 
consumption—in which he adopted drastic biblical language when pointing out 
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the shortcomings of the secretary-general: “Björnberg, Björnberg, why have you 
forsaken me?” When this ended up in the press, it further fueled the crisis.340 
When Hjelm and his colleagues at the Agricultural College had finished 
their proposal in the spring of 1964, the acute phase of the NIB crisis was 
over and important personnel changes had been effected at the agency. 
Björnberg had been replaced as secretary-general by Ernst Michanek, a 
Social Democrat of high standing and with much administrative experience. 
Serving under Michanek, the two most prominent civil servants at NIB were 
Per-Erik Rönquist, who had been Björnberg’s deputy, and Anders Forsse, a 
diplomat who had been peripherally involved with the Algerian project in his 
role as the first Swedish consul in independent Algeria before being asked to 
help out at the crisis-ridden NIB.341 As Forsse remembers it, he and Rönquist 
worked out a plan in which organizational stability was to be achieved by 
limiting Swedish efforts to education, health care, and family planning, and 
to five different countries. Michanek had in principle accepted this as a sound 
plan, but in the fall of 1964, agriculture nevertheless found a prominent place 
on NIB’s agenda.342 
This was a result of Lennart Hjelm personally calling on Michanek in 1964 
and arguing that Sweden ought to engage in agricultural aid by establishing an 
agricultural experiment station in a developing country, as the Agricultural 
College had earlier proposed.343 Michanek, who paid close attention to food-
related matters and, unlike his subordinates, wanted a broader aid program, let 
himself be convinced by Hjelm, and, according to Forsse, from then on Hjelm 
came to have “very evident influence” on Michanek in agricultural matters.344 
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The experiences from Algeria likely helped make Michanek more receptive to 
the idea of a new, smallholder-oriented and more thoroughly expert-planned 
agricultural project.345 Moreover, the small-farm and local focus of the college’s 
plan were possibly accentuated in response to the news from Algeria, where the 
farm had been operated based on a universalistic and commercializing strategy 
for development and technology transfer. Michanek was probably also impressed 
by the effort the college had put into the proposal. NIB received many project 
suggestions at this time, not all of them well-motivated, and Michanek, frustrated 
by this, would often refer to a principle employed by USAID: that the burden of 
proof of a project’s viability rested on the proposer.346 
Behind the particular considerations at NIB lay the broader and more 
complex problem of how to best approach the population-resource dilemma. 
As Björn-Ola Linnér notes, agricultural development was the technological 
optimists’ answer, whereas the more pessimistically inclined pointed out that 
population control was needed as a long-term solution.347 Sweden already had 
a family planning aid program, which Forsse and Rönquist would have 
preferred to focus on. Before being forced to leave NIB, Björnberg was open to 
combining food production with family planning, as is evident from his 1962 
address to the student congress that I quoted at the opening of this book. 
Michanek’s interactions with Hjelm eventually led him to adopt a similar 
stance, and after 1964 he publicly argued strongly for the need for food 
production efforts as well as for family planning.348 That increased food 
production would tend to come with its own set of social disruptions was not 
an issue at this stage. The debates on the Green Revolution would only begin in 
earnest at the end of the decade.349 Yet unavoidably, both the notion of a food 
crisis and the effects of science-driven agricultural change were part of the 
wider intellectual context of the early Swedish aid. Concerns in particular 
about the social effects of, and the social constraints on, scientific interventions 
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into small-farm agriculture would soon find their place in the discussion about 
a possible agricultural project, as we will see in the next chapter. 
Foundations of the Rural Development Pair 
In their work on expertise, Joris Vandendriessche and his colleagues discuss 
what they call “expert encounters” with state and society. If the experts are 
convincing enough, they suggest, the result is a “(re)shaping [of] the social and 
political objects under expert scrutiny.”350 Hjelm’s convincing of Michanek was 
one such encounter, which changed Swedish development aid by bringing in 
agricultural expertise. Unlike the project to develop the Algerian farm, which 
was initiated based on general Swedish sympathy for Algeria and without having 
relevant expertise available, the new relationship between NIB and the 
Agricultural College ensured that future projects would be planned by experts 
and motivated if not explicitly in scientific terms then at least along the lines of 
technical rationality. And in the specific project the college had proposed, its own 
scientific expertise and methods had a preeminent place, centered as it was on 
the scientific development of agriculture and animal husbandry. This entailed its 
own particular logic of scientific rationality and connected it to the tradition of 
Swedish localized agricultural experimentation. It also linked up with the 
ongoing international attempts to employ modern science and technology to 
reshape agriculture in the developing world, though it addressed this problem 
from a distinctly localistic approach that was less common internationally. 
In reformulating the method for agricultural aid, Hjelm and his colleagues 
had effectively created a problem designed to be solved by expertise only 
available within, or at least trained by, the Agricultural College and the 
incorporated national experiment organization. They defined agricultural 
development aid as primarily a matter of agricultural experimentation, and 
once that definition was accepted at NIB, no other organization in Sweden had 
a better claim than the college to being able to provide the relevant expertise. It 
is also of importance here that the agricultural modernization project in 
Sweden was fundamentally state-driven. Few private firms had agronomic 
competence, and none could credibly challenge the Agricultural College’s 
claim to having the most relevant expertise.351 So when Hjelm had Michanek’s 
ear, the college’s professors found themselves able to largely decide the future 
shape of Swedish agricultural aid. 
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In light of this, I understand the NIB crisis and its aftermath to have 
constituted a formative moment for Swedish agrarian aid. Being a period of 
institutional dysfunction, the NIB crisis enabled strong actors to affect the 
fundamental characteristics and goals of the aid administration. In 1964, 
Lennart Hjelm took advantage of this to place agricultural development on 
NIB’s agenda, but more importantly to make the Agricultural College central 
to such an aid effort. While other factors ensured that Swedish aid soon would 
have expanded beyond education and healthcare anyway, most likely also into 
agriculture, it now did so with the Agricultural College in a central role.352 This 
created the foundations of what would become the rural development pair of 
SIDA and SLU, which would affect Swedish agrarian aid for decades to come. 
The college’s central role also played some part in shaping future Swedish 
research cooperation with developing countries, as experiences from what 
would become the CADU project influenced the later creation of SAREC, the 
government agency responsible for research cooperation with developing 
countries. The creation of SAREC drew on experiences from CADU and other 
early projects with important research components, such as the Children’s 
Nutrition Unit (CNU), also in Ethiopia, and Vice-Chancellor Hjelm was 
personally a member of the commission proposing the agency’s formation.353 
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Figure 9. Lennart Hjelm (facing the camera) and Ernst Michanek in Ethiopia, probably during the 
planning stages of CADU. Hjelm and Michanek’s good relationship was key to making SIDA and 
the Agricultural College development partners. Third person unknown. Photo Harald Linder.354 
Enter Regional Development 
Once NIB had abandoned the idea of enrolling the college in an education aid 
effort, it instead began preparations for a larger agricultural field project. In 
October 1964, an agricultural working group was appointed to take 
responsibility for this task.355 This group was dominated by members from the 
Agricultural College (see table 1 below), recruited directly from the committee 
that had designed the earlier project proposal. Hjelm and his colleagues had 
thus formally secured roles as key agriculture aid experts. In this respect, their 
actions fell into a larger pattern of expert maneuvering within the postwar 
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Swedish state. Per Lundin and Niklas Stenlås discuss how state initiatives at 
the time often originated with experts: “small [groups] of individuals” who 
were able to enroll themselves in the government apparatus. For major reform 
issues, experts often served on large government inquiries; in the present case, 
the arena was more modest, but the basic mechanism was the same: the 
elevation of experts to positions where they could make proposals that often 
led to them becoming government-backed “implementers of their own plans 
and visions.”356 In the rest of this chapter as well as in the next one, we will see 
how this pattern played out in the field of agricultural development aid. 
The new expert group was chaired by Hjelm and had Nekby as its working 
secretary. Besides Hjelm, Nekby and the other Agricultural College professors, one 
notable member of the group was Gösta Ericsson, then head of division at the 
National Board of Agriculture, who would later become the director of SIDA’s 
agricultural division. Another was the aforementioned Erik Åkerberg, then the 
director of the Swedish Seed Association (which ran the internationally renowned 
plant breeding institute in Svalöv). 
Table 1. The members of NIB’s agricultural working group. Professors from the Agricultural 
College dominated the group and performed almost all of its work. 
Member Home institution 
Professor Lennart Hjelm (chair) Agricultural College 
Associate professor Bengt Nekby (secr.) Agricultural College 
Head of Division Gösta Ericsson National Board of Agriculture 
Professor Artur Hansson Agricultural College 
Budget Secretary Ulf Hänninger Ministry of Agriculture 
Consultant Håkan Rydén Swedish Union of Agricultural Banks 
Professor Börje Åberg Agricultural College 
Professor Ewert Åberg Agricultural College 
Professor Erik Åkerberg Swedish Seed Association 
 
This working group—the “agricultural group,” as it soon became known—
came to function as an arena for the development of a new strategy for 
agricultural aid. Its creation also amounted to the genesis of an 
organizational coupling between the Agricultural College and the 
development authorities, for five of the group’s nine members were 
representatives of the college, and, in practice, these five dominated its 
work completely. It gave the group a distinctly double allegiance: to NIB, 
on whose behalf it worked, and to the college, whose interests directly 
played into the planning of the new aid strategy. 
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According to the group’s instructions, its most important task was the long-
term planning of NIB’s agriculture aid, including the formulation of concrete 
project proposals.357 Bengt Nekby also remembers that the work, at least 
unofficially, focused only on Africa and, consistent with the college’s earlier 
proposal, on projects aimed at smallholders.358 The working group’s second 
task was to consider the training of Swedish experts for agricultural work 
under foreign conditions and to support NIB in designing education programs. 
The group was also supposed to comment on proposals received by NIB, 
follow FAO’s activities, and follow up on existing projects in which Sweden 
was engaged. Such projects were rather few: besides the farm in Algeria, the 
most significant was the Nordic Tanganyika Project, later known as the Kibaha 
Education Center, in Tanzania. This was a joint Nordic educational and health 
aid project launched in the early 1960s which also included an agricultural 
component.359 Aid historian Jarle Simensen calls the agricultural center at 
Kibaha “a fascinating piece of agricultural history” and notes how its strategies 
would shift “from two weeks [sic] demonstration courses for local farmers, to 
out-reach efforts in the region and back to an ordinary agronomist school.”360 
However, though the agricultural group was informed about Kibaha and later 
briefly visited it, it seems to have had little direct influence on their work. 
In practice, the group mainly focused on two things: the planning of a large 
Swedish rural development project, and the problem of recruiting and training 
Swedish experts for developing-country assignments. While these were partly 
interlinked efforts, my analysis here will focus on the former. 
The Idea of Integration 
From the outset, the agricultural group was committed to the idea that the 
project should target small farmers and that it should integrate different aspects 
of agricultural production and marketing. The idea of an integrated approach, 
understood as the application of simultaneous efforts in different fields with the 
aim of modernizing an agricultural system, had been present since the college’s 
first consultation response. But until now, this had primarily been a point of 
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principle. With a real project to plan, the group wanted a more solid 
understanding of what an integrated approach to agricultural development 
could amount to, and for that, they looked to the Indian sub-continent and to 
Israel. 
In January 1965, Nekby traveled to Pakistan and India to study two ongoing 
rural and agricultural development efforts: the Comilla project in East Pakistan 
(present-day Bangladesh) and the Intensive Agricultural District Program 
(IADP) in India.361 The latter was a Ford Foundation initiative, described by 
Perkins as “the organizational framework for the green revolution [in 
India].”362 Its main thrust was the demonstration and distribution of artificial 
fertilizers and improved seed in large-scale rural districts. The Comilla project, 
the brainchild of Pakistani social scientist Akhter Hameed Khan, focused on 
regional development of a more limited area by way of research, education, 
demonstrations, public works, and the organization of farmer cooperatives for 
the distribution of credit and inputs.363 After a slow start, the project had begun 
to achieve significant results by the mid-1960s, and it made a strong 
impression on Nekby. When presenting his experiences to the agricultural 
group, he stated his opinion that the Comilla project would be of 
“extraordinary importance” to the continued planning.364 Though the concrete 
suggestions in Nekby’s later summary of the knowledge gained from the trip 
were worded carefully, it is clear that certain aspects had stood out. The project 
ought to have a regional focus, continually evaluate its experiences, contain an 
experiment station led by foreign experts, and be based on an innovation that 
could easily be demonstrated to be profitable, so as to facilitate the 
mobilization of the local population.365 This focus on production and profit-
generating innovations was the main novelty of this approach compared with 
the earlier notion of community development, which was a very influential 
strategy in the 1950s and likewise aimed at popular participation to improve 
rural life but tended to de-emphasize income generation.366 By contrast, to the 
Agricultural College’s experts, it was crucial that farmers’ incomes increased. 
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After leaving the sub-continent, Nekby met up with Hjelm in Israel, another 
source of inspiration in the field of regional development where an integrated 
approach was also emphasized.367 They then continued to North Africa, 
visiting Tunisia and NIB’s farm in Algeria. Coming from the development 
programs in Asia, the Algerian project appeared to Nekby as an antithesis of 
successful development. He considered the project to consist of separate 
capital-intensive efforts in an environment where they served little apparent 
purpose, as is clear from the report he wrote together with Hjelm: 
 
As far as NIB is concerned, the project seems to have been characterized by a 
lack of a well-thought-through plan and by an unnecessarily bureaucratic 
attitude. From the start, there has been no development plan based on the 
conditions in the area, the availability of resources, and the possibilities of later 
applying and taking over the constructions.368 
 
At the time, there were discussions about having the Swedish National Board 
of Public Building design and construct a large barn so that the farm’s milk 
production could increase. This construction project would, according to 
Nekby’s memoirs, “command an astronomic price,”369 and in the report to the 
agricultural group, the very idea of commercial milk production in an area with 
“strictly limited” sales possibilities was rejected, followed by a harsh dismissal 
of the suggested construction project itself: “It must be extremely unsuitable to 
at all construct a Swedish monument building that cannot be imitated for the 
next 25–50 years.”370 Their forcefully distancing themselves from the Algerian 
project can be seen as a way for Hjelm and Nekby to strengthen their own 
position. The project they advocated was based on a wholly different strategy: 
a focus on smallholders instead of large-scale commercial farming, and an 
integrated system of efforts based on scientific research rather than the 
disintegration they felt they had witnessed in Algeria. 
In early spring, Nekby briefed the NIB board of directors on an FAO 
agricultural credit project that the agricultural group had been asked to 
consider. On this occasion, Nekby also related to the board the group’s 
ongoing planning of an integrated agricultural project. During the ensuing 
discussion, the board expressed that agriculture ought to be a prioritized area 
for Swedish aid.371 Emboldened by this vote of confidence, in June the 
working group presented a comprehensive report containing recommendations 
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on how to proceed.372 The guiding ideas were largely the same as in the 
college’s earlier proposal, from which a few sections had been directly copied, 
but were now presented in a more fleshed-out form. Inspired primarily by the 
Comilla project and to an extent by experiences from Israel, the group thus 
proposed a project characterized by an integrated system of agricultural efforts 
complemented by efforts in other areas: 
 
Within the agricultural sector, it has therefore [since deficiencies in some areas 
could negate the effect of efforts in others] been considered desirable to 
combine experimentation, extension, credit provision, property structure, 
marketing of produce and inputs, etc., depending on the conditions in the area 
chosen. . . . In accordance with the theories of balanced development, and 
following experiences from Israel and Pakistan, agricultural as well as 
education, family planning, health care, industry, infrastructure efforts, etc., 
ought to complement each other in an extremely valuable way.373 
 
An implication of the integrated understanding also meant a further shift in the 
type of project envisioned. The Agricultural College had initially taken an 
agricultural education problem and made it into a problem of research-based 
agricultural development. Building on the Comilla model now implied a 
further shift: while agriculture was still the centerpiece of the project, the 
ambitions had grown from agricultural development as such to regional rural 
development, including, but not limited to, efforts directly linked to the 
agrarian production. 
Even so, increasing production was still the proposed project’s centerpiece, 
and the agricultural group now explicitly referenced Theodore Schultz’s work 
on the transformation of traditional agriculture in arguing that the key to any 
production increase in traditional agricultural systems was the introduction of 
modern factors of production. The small-farm focus was retained, and the 
proposal emphasized the importance of local knowledge production, local 
approaches to plant breeding, and extensive education and extension activities 
in order to provide small farmers with good incentives to change to more 
productive practices. This highlighting of adaptations to the local, instead of 
adaptations of the local, means the proposal was still firmly based on a localist 
understanding of agrarian development. But much like the Agricultural 
College’s earlier project outline, the report was heavily slanted toward a 
technical and top-down perspective and paid little attention to complicating 
factors, such as the fact that any project of this type would be inserted into a 
                                                        
372 “Preliminär rapport över formerna och möjligheterna för en utökad svensk biståndsinsats på 
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complex society with its own agricultural practices embedded in existing social 
systems. The critical condition of land tenure was mentioned only briefly and 
strictly as a potential obstacle to development: “Any insecurity concerning 
land-ownership conditions and/or high rents ought to significantly counteract 
any attempt to develop agriculture. Creating satisfactory conditions as regards 
the property questions must be a basic precondition for other work.”374 
The report’s final recommendation was that the project planning ought to 
go ahead by way of further studies of potentially suitable locations. Three 
countries selected by NIB as potential locations—Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and 
Tanzania—had already been presented in the report, but the presentations were 
superficial, with little information beyond brief technical accounts of the 
countries and their agricultural sectors.375 The group pointed out certain factors 
as especially important for future studies and for the eventual selection of a 
location: that the project could be part of a larger Swedish or Nordic aid 
context; that climates and other agricultural conditions were reasonably similar 
to those in which Swedish experts had been trained; and that the recipient 
country had a significant interest in development.376 These factors suggest that 
Ethiopia had already become the preferred choice of recipient country, as I will 
discuss further in the next chapter. 
Exporting Swedish Agricultural Modernism 
The agricultural group was a collective of Swedish agrarian experts strongly 
rooted in the Swedish agricultural research and education system. This shaped 
their understanding of agriculture and of agrarian societies in general, and thus 
also influenced how they planned their project. Some characteristics of this 
become clear if we consider how the group related to the models in Asia. These 
had a formative influence on the Swedish experts: Nekby’s tour of Comilla and 
the IADP made it clear to him that there existed seemingly successful models 
of small-farmer-focused rural development projects, on which a Swedish effort 
could be based. The combination of the integrated approach with the 
application of scientific methods and the economic and agronomic competence 
available at Ultuna would allow for a wholly new type of rural development 
aid for Sweden. But the suitability of applying the Asian methods to other 
areas was hardly self-evident. Nekby acknowledged this in a presentation to 
the agriculture group, in which he raised the question of whether the system 
could be used in other areas. However, he only broached the subject in general 
terms and primarily focused on the role an aid organization could play rather 
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than on institutional constraints in the target environment.377 The group did 
seemingly not probe the matter further, and its finished report did not seriously 
engage with the issue of whether there were specific constraints on the contexts 
in which the integrated model or the strategy of increasing smallholder 
production could be applied. The report noted that close cooperation with local 
and national authorities would be needed, and it contained some cursory 
remarks on the institutional conditions in the three locations, but beyond this 
had little to say on the topic.378 
This lack of attention to the consequences of transferring an overarching 
strategy for development to a new location contrasts sharply with the strong 
awareness the group demonstrated of the problems involved in transferring 
agricultural knowledge. There was thus a certain ambivalence in the working 
group’s proposal. On the one hand, it emphasized environmental adaptations of 
agricultural technologies; on the other hand, it was not particularly concerned 
with the society in which these technologies were to be applied. As written, the 
report did not ignore the problem of the local context, but it was limited in the 
range of factors it took into account: while arguing strongly for a local 
experimental program, it paid much less attention to the larger social setting 
into which this program would be embedded and which it would unavoidably 
affect and be affected by. 
I understand this as resulting from a selective blindness during the planning 
process. Since the original impulse was less an idea about developing a 
particular region and more an argument for a particular kind of aid, the initial 
planning stages dealt with the project’s location in highly abstract terms, and 
specific institutional constraints were not given much attention. The 
Agricultural College’s first proposal located its experiment station only in a 
“developing-country environment,” a phrase imbued with a profoundly high-
modernist abstracted spatiality that left little room for the intricacies of 
particular societies.379 This is not to claim that the experts were unaware of the 
fact that economic and societal conditions differed from place to place and that 
this would need to be taken into account. The point is rather that they were 
from the outset concerned primarily with development as a technical process 
and that this shaped the continued planning. 
The report’s citation of Gunnar Myrdal’s speech to the 1963 World Food 
Congress provides a good illustration of how the agricultural group 
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downplayed social and institutional factors. Its report drew on Myrdal’s 
argument that industrialization would not succeed if it was not preceded by a 
significant increase in agricultural productivity. But throughout much of that 
same speech, Myrdal had also forcefully argued for the importance of land and 
tenancy reforms to agricultural development. To an extent, the agricultural 
group acknowledged this in its passage on property questions, but the brevity 
of that passage and the failure to more fully integrate the problematic into the 
report show that they had not taken Myrdal’s cue. On the very next page in the 
cited version of the speech, Myrdal highlighted the intrinsic political and 
practical differences in carrying out such reform even for well-intentioned 
governments, but this was not discussed in the report. Nor had the group taken 
full account of Myrdal’s analysis of national and local power structures: 
 
The economic, social and political power in most [of the developing] countries, 
yes, virtually in every village, are in the hands of a narrow stratum of 
landowners, merchants, money lenders, and other intermediaries who feel they 
have a direct interest in conserving the old order with regard to landownership, 
tenancy conditions, and other institutions and attitudes.380 
 
This analysis would turn out to apply rather well to the later developments in 
Ethiopia, where a coalition of such conservative interests became a major 
obstacle for the project. 
The primacy they afforded technical factors, from the initial proposal and 
on, reflects the authors’ institutional background in the Swedish agricultural 
research system and policy framework. In the 1960s, there was little room at 
the Agricultural College for subjects such as agrarian history or rural 
sociology.381 In its relation to domestic agriculture, the college represented a 
kind of Swedish agricultural modernism that paid very close attention to local 
conditions of agriculture and to the mechanisms of agricultural change but 
which was much less oriented toward analyzing the social conditions of 
farming and the social effects of agricultural change.382 Stated somewhat 
bluntly, this modernism can be understood as an expression of a particular 
service science ideal geared much more to serving agricultural production than 
to serving rural communities. The same modernism, which had room for the 
local but not for the social to the same extent, also shaped the planning of early 
Swedish agricultural aid. 
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The Formative Moment 
In the aftermath of a serious crisis for the newly created Swedish aid 
authorities, a group of professors from the Agricultural College, led by Vice-
Chancellor Hjelm, began to lobby to place their own science-based view of 
agriculture aid on the agenda of Swedish development aid. The government 
institutions of the day were generally receptive to expert authority, and so the 
college’s experts were able to secure affiliation with the aid authorities and 
obtained prominent roles in shaping the future of Sweden’s agrarian 
development aid. Several reasons explain their interest in linking up with the 
aid authorities. Such a link could provide expansion opportunities as well as 
a broader social role and thus a greater sociopolitical legitimacy, especially 
important because of the new debates about the troubling consequences of 
modern agriculture. It could also provide opportunities for scientific 
expansion, making new fields of research relevant to the college. Most 
importantly, as the traditional association with the Swedish agricultural 
sector was problematized by a changing social context, the college sought to 
associate itself with new sectors, one of which was the expanding 
development aid. 
Hjelm and his colleagues emphatically rejected both the idea of adapting 
their educational program to cater to students from developing countries, as 
NIB wanted them to, and the idea of developing large commercial farms 
abroad, which was what NIB did in its only ongoing agricultural aid project. 
Instead, they reformulated the problem in a way more directly compatible 
with the Agricultural College’s expertise. As they conceptualized it, 
agricultural development became a problem of agricultural experimentation. 
They argued for a small-farmer-centered effort that would focus on research-
driven productivity improvements, complemented by simultaneous activities 
in related fields, such as marketing and education. Such productivity 
improvements were the basis of the Green Revolution projects that had been 
going on since the 1940s. But the college appropriated the Green Revolution 
in its own way: though committed to the basic premise of applying 
agricultural science to the problem of raising farm productivity in the 
developing countries, its representatives resisted the universalism shared by 
most green revolutionaries at the time. Although the development strategy 
the college’s professors championed asserted the primacy of science, it was 
not informed by a universalistic view of easily transferable knowledge but of 
an understanding that agricultural knowledge production to a considerable 
degree had to be applied and localized in order to produce usable results in 
new settings. They united clearly high-modernist premises with a 
commitment to a significant role for local adaptations. 
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When beginning to design an actual project, the planners looked abroad, 
appropriating development models earlier employed in India, Israel, and 
above all, East Pakistan. But they did not seriously consider the question of 
whether these models could be adapted to any of the contexts where a 
Swedish aid project would be likely. Shaped by the conditions of the 
college’s initial engagement, their ideology of agricultural research 
prioritized ecological particularism over scientific universalism, but they 
remained committed to an agricultural modernism that did not particularly 
concern itself with social development. As a consequence, they did not 
seriously analyze how the strategy they advocated would function in new 
settings. So even if the Agricultural College’s approach to development was 
more technocentric, it still parallels Nils Lagerlöf’s knowledge transfer 
project in an important respect. It is a second example of how Swedish 
agrarian expertise advocated a local, farmer-, and productivity-oriented 
approach that was nonetheless still embedded in a universalist framework 
rooted in a form of centrist thought.  
Under the influence of, in particular, the East Pakistani Comilla project, 
the college’s experts also raised the ambitions of the project, transforming it 
from being focused primarily on an experiment station to a larger-scale 
regional development project. In doing so they pushed the project to the 
limits of their own knowledge. Social development issues became 
increasingly important in a large rural development project but lay largely 
outside the experts’ fields of competence. This implies that they, 
unintentionally, reopened the question of relevant expertise. While few could 
challenge the relevance of agronomic expertise to the operation of an 
agricultural experiment station, it was much less self-evident that 
agronomists were the best-suited experts for planning a regional development 
project with grand ambitions for socioeconomic transformation and with 
many components besides agriculture. The next chapter will return to this 
problem and its implications in the context of the subsequent fieldwork and 
later the project implementation in Ethiopia. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Bringing Ultuna to Addis and Arussi 
The Agricultural College and Swedish Rural Development Aid to 
Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, 1965–1974 
ON JUNE 30, 1965, NIB ceased to exist. The crisis had made the limits of its 
unorthodox structure clear, and it was replaced by a new agency, the more 
conventionally organized Swedish International Development Authority, or 
SIDA.383 This marks a turning point in the history of Swedish development aid 
as well as in the planning of the agricultural project. When SIDA was created, 
Bengt Nekby left his position at Ultuna to work full-time there.384 He became 
head of SIDA’s planning division for development aid, where he worked 
directly under Anders Forsse. The latter headed the entire department for 
development and humanitarian aid, SIDA’s Department I, which was largely 
made up of the old NIB. Ernst Michanek was retained as head of the agency, 
now with the conventional title of director-general. With Nekby working for 
the development aid authorities, the project planning entered a new phase, and 
the members of the agricultural group—also transferred to the new agency—
began to consider potential locations for the proposed new regional 
development project in more detail. 
The purpose of this chapter, which is chronologically and topically linked 
to the preceding one, is to discuss the role of the Agricultural College’s 
expertise in the final planning of the project as well as in its subsequent 
implementation in Ethiopia. So if the previous chapter mostly focused on 
how the college’s expertise first came to be involved in development aid, this 
chapter considers how its involvement further shaped the theory and practice 
of Swedish aid. It also looks at the effects the development practices 
advocated by the college had on the natural and social environment in which 
they were employed. The primary questions I seek to answer relate to my 
383 Whereas NIB had been an organization of its own kind, with several unconventional 
organizational elements (such as its advisory council and the composition of its board of 
directors), the new SIDA was organized as a normal government agency with a hierarchical 
structure and a board of directors chaired by the agency’s director-general. 
384 Nekby’s career under Lennart Hjelm at the Agricultural College was thus cut short—he would 
not return to Ultuna. After working at SIDA and in Ethiopia, he took up a position at the World 
Bank where he stayed until retirement. 
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second research problem: How was the development strategy championed by 
the Agricultural College affected by the encounter with Ethiopia? And what 
effects did it have when implemented? 
The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), as the project 
eventually became known, grew into one of the most influential, and most 
controversial, projects of early Swedish development aid. It was discussed and 
debated intensively in its time and later, and especially during the 1970s it was 
considered an important source of experience for international discussions of 
rural development.385 It also became a recurring point of reference both in the 
Swedish aid debate386 and in the historiography of late-imperial Ethiopia.387 It 
was highly influential in the context of post-1960s Swedish agricultural and 
rural development aid, having functioned, according to an anthology written by 
Swedish development assistance administrators, “as a laboratory and nursery 
for the first generation of SIDA’s agricultural/rural development experts.”388 It 
also had a number of effects on the recipient country. CADU formed a physical 
and mental zone of interaction where Swedish and Ethiopian scientists, 
bureaucrats, politicians, and farmers interacted and exchanged knowledge. An 
entire generation of Ethiopian agricultural experts was trained at or by CADU, 
and the project had a profound impact on the target population in the Chilalo 
area. It was also increasingly embroiled in the Ethiopian rural tensions and 
conflicts that eventually culminated with the 1974 revolution and the 
subsequent rural transformations in the country. Finally, CADU had a distinct 
influence on the Agricultural College in Ultuna, six thousand kilometers away. 
It helped establish close personal and organizational links between the college 
and the new SIDA and served as the original foundation of what I describe as 
the rural development pair. 
Despite CADU’s influence at the time, it has not been the subject of much 
historical research. There is, however, a significant body of literature devoted 
to the project in fields like development studies and political science, but 
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lacking historical analyses, this literature pays little attention to the background 
and planning process and tends to downplay, if not miss altogether, the crucial 
fact that the project was essentially created at the Agricultural College.389 The 
notable exception to this claim is Seleshi Sisaye’s PhD dissertation 
Development Aid to Rural Ethiopia, 1954–1977.390 While not a study of history 
as such (it is a policy-oriented work that primarily examines the problem of 
how foreign aid has affected Ethiopian governmental efficiency), Seleshi’s 
dissertation includes a chapter on CADU that analyzes historical source 
material in order to investigate how the project came about. He correctly 
identifies the central importance of the Agricultural College not just in 
providing expertise and personnel but also in initiating and planning the 
project. I use partially the same material as he does for my analysis of the late-
stage project planning, though with a different focus: in light of his research 
objectives, Seleshi does not attempt to trace the background of the college’s 
involvement or the motives and standpoints of the participating actors. There is 
nonetheless some overlap with his work, but also several instances of diverging 
interpretations and conclusions. 
I have primarily drawn on sources from the archives of NIB’s agricultural 
group and the CADU dossier in the SIDA archives. I complement this with 
other material from the SIDA archives, published material on CADU, and 
interviews and unpublished memoirs. I have tried to contrast these last-
mentioned sources with other sources to the extent possible and discuss source-
critical matters in the text as necessary. One particular issue also needs to be 
pointed out with respect to the dossier sources. SIDA’s dossier system, in 
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which all documents relevant to a specific project are filed together, can be 
very convenient for the historian but also raises the issue of whether all 
relevant material actually has been included in the dossier. In one case, I have 
encountered a direct attempt by one of the involved actors to reorganize the 
dossiers, which gives some cause for concern.391 However, after going through 
the material and contrasting it with interviews and other sources, my judgment 
is that there are no significant gaps in the CADU dossier. Furthermore, in the 
introduction, I discussed the absence of foreign source material in the thesis. I 
will not reiterate my arguments here, but want to point out a particular problem 
as it relates to this chapter. One argument I will make is that the Swedish 
experts underestimated the agency with which different groups in Ethiopian 
society would come to relate to, and appropriate the lessons of, the CADU 
project. It would have been highly interesting to explore this matter further 
through an analysis of Ethiopian source material. 
Developing Feudal Countrysides? 
Though decorated with an archaic-sounding title, His Imperial Majesty Haile 
Selassie I, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, King of Kings of Ethiopia, 
Elect of God was known to take an interest in modernization and 
development.392 He had aligned his country with the Western bloc, from which 
he had secured large amounts of foreign aid, primarily from the United States. 
Ethiopia had a historical relationship with Sweden as well. Alongside Pakistan, 
it had been the first recipient of Central Committee aid; however, the 
connections between Sweden and Ethiopia actually long predated the 1950s. 
Swedish missionaries had been active in the country since the nineteenth 
century, providing education and healthcare. The Ethiopian government had 
also employed a number of Swedes, and Sweden had supplied substantial 
military aid to Ethiopia: the Ethiopian Air Force was largely a Swedish 
creation and Swedish officers served in the Ethiopian army.393 Furthermore, by 
the mid-1960s, several Swedish development aid projects were underway in 
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the country: the Central Committee-initiated Ethio-Swedish Institute of 
Building Technology, a research-based nutrition project known as the 
Children’s Nutrition Unit (CNU), and a healthcare effort, the Ethio-Swedish 
Pediatric Clinic. In total, more than five hundred Swedes were already working 
in the country at the end of the 1950s.394 
Beyond the development projects, however, the state over which Haile 
Selassie ruled was gradually being torn apart by intrinsic conflicts of interest. 
A landholding feudal elite395 clung to its class-based privileges, while more 
Western-oriented radicals and aspiring reformers demanded changes and put 
increasing pressures on the imperial regime; in the countryside, heavy burdens 
on the peasantry had provoked a series of peasant rebellions since the 1940s. It 
was in this setting that the agricultural group eventually proposed to locate the 
planned regional development project. But the choice of Ethiopia as the 
recipient country became a complicated process, reflecting the complexities 
involved in locating a rural development project in a setting where, as it soon 
became apparent, it could not but generate friction. 
Ethiopia became the main candidate for the location of the project after 
Bengt Nekby, Lennart Hjelm, Artur Hansson, and Ewert Åberg from the 
agricultural group, along with social anthropologist Karl Eric Knutsson from 
the University of Gothenburg and CNU, had spent a couple of weeks in the late 
summer of 1965 in East Africa. Their mission was to study agricultural 
management, agricultural development, existing aid efforts, and possible 
locations for the regional project.396 They traveled through Sudan, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Ethiopia, and based on their experiences formally recommended 
that SIDA ought to proceed with the planning of a regional development 
project in Ethiopia. 
However, the group was not in unanimous agreement over the 
recommendation. Citing the problematic political and property conditions in 
the country, Artur Hansson registered a dissenting opinion.397 That one of the 
members of this primarily collegial group publicly distanced himself from the 
group’s recommendation is intriguing in its own right, suggesting as it does 
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that the matter of how the college’s proposed strategy would work out in 
Ethiopia was seen not only as complex but also as controversial and, to a 
degree, contentious. It indicates that the question of land tenure had become a 
much more important issue for the group compared with how it was 
represented in the June proposal. Studying the discussion about Ethiopia and in 
particular the land tenure situation is thus revealing in terms of how the 
Agricultural College’s experts actually considered the problematic of scientific 
interventions in developing-country agriculture, and how they came to 
understand the relation between the efforts they proposed and the social and 
political context of these efforts. 
Conditions at the End of an Empire 
The country the agricultural group suggested as a suitable project location 
was poor and little urbanized, certainly in line with how they might have 
expected a developing country to look. More than 90% of the Ethiopian 
population was illiterate and over 80% worked in the agricultural sector, 
which was strongly dominated by subsistence agriculture. The power of the 
aging emperor rested on an intricate balancing of different political interests 
as well as on the loyalty of his armed forces.398 While a constitutional 
revision in 1955 had given Ethiopia the outward appearance of having 
modern and democratic political institutions, in practice most political 
initiative remained in the hands of Haile Selassie. 
Like other autocrats of his time, he arguably subscribed to the idea that 
economic development would eliminate or at least postpone the need for social 
and political reform.399 Acutely aware that the reform path would risk ripping 
his power base apart, Haile Selassie had accordingly prioritized development 
by supporting major infrastructure investments, mostly funded by the United 
States. Moreover, the emperor had taken measures to improve levels of 
education in the country. He established a university in Addis Ababa and also 
gave an increasing number of young Ethiopians the opportunity to study 
abroad. These educational endeavors had created a small, but growing, group 
of Western-educated technicians, administrators and would-be policymakers 
who were hungry for modernization and reform. Their efforts were, however, 
constrained by the conservative landholding elites, who were generally 
opposed to change, as well as by an older generation of politicians. The latter 
often aligned with conservative interests, but even when they did not, they 
were grossly inefficient as policymakers in the Western sense. Their 
                                                        
398 An attempted coup d’état in 1960 had been put down by army and air force units loyal to the 
emperor. 
399 This is suggested by Neal Ascherson in his introduction to Kapuściński, The Emperor, viii. 
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conception of statecraft was based not on policy initiatives but on palace 
intrigues aimed at winning the emperor’s favor. So even though Ethiopia had 
undergone changes in certain respects by 1965 compared with the immediate 
postwar period, many of them were largely superficial. In his detailed study of 
Haile Selassie’s government, Christopher Clapham describes the situation in 
1969 thus: 
 
One comes away not so much with the impression of development as of 
stagnation: despite changes the ancien regime is still basically with us; and the 
various reforms have not yet gone down to essentials.400 
 
The development efforts that nonetheless were taking place included 
agricultural development, mostly linked to American development aid. As 
early as 1952, the land-grant Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College 
(later renamed Oklahoma State University) had helped the Ethiopian Ministry 
of Agriculture establish an experiment station at Bishoftu, and experimental 
work was also carried out at a few other sites around the country. Furthermore, 
the Oklahomans established an agricultural technical school at Jimma and an 
agricultural college in Alemaya in eastern Ethiopia. The latter—the Imperial 
Ethiopian College of Agricultural and Mechanical Arts—was based directly on 
the American land-grant model. It was provided with considerable institutional 
support from Oklahoma and initially had an all-American teaching staff. In 
1961, it became a faculty of the Addis Ababa University College, then soon to 
be renamed the Haile Selassie I University.401 
Before making any formal recommendation, the experts from the 
Agricultural College summarized their experiences from the East African trip 
in a series of travel reports. The one on Ethiopia was the most detailed and 
included an extensive presentation of the country and Ethiopian conditions 
relating to the proposed project.402 It was seen as reasonably fulfilling the 
criteria for the recipient country outlined in the earlier report in June, in all but 
the matter of institutional conditions and particularly land tenure. These factors 
were now, for the first time, discussed more extensively and in relation to a 
particular case. The tenure situation, with its traits of feudalism, was 
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401 Donald E. Green, A History of the Oklahoma State University Division of Agriculture 
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September 1965, SIDA, series F1 AA, vol. 9.  In comparison with the other reports, this one (on 
Ethiopia) is significantly more detailed. 
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understood as a significant obstacle to rural development. A large proportion of 
Ethiopian land was owned by the state, the church, or private landlords with 
extensive holdings, and this land was in most instances cultivated by tenant 
farmers under a sharecropping system; the rent being paid in kind with the 
harvest divided between tenant and landlord.403 The agricultural group 
recognized that this system would make it “very difficult” to introduce new 
and improved cultivation techniques.404 Sharecropping tenants would have 
little incentive to attempt to increase their production because any positive 
result would have to be shared with the landlord, whereas the costs and risks of 
experimenting would be borne by the subsistence-farming tenant. The group 
concluded that the project had to be carried out in an area with at least a 
somewhat more favorable tenure situation, especially as it was also pointed out 
that the possibilities of legal reform were limited due to many “vested 
interests.”405 But though rightly noting that these conditions were constraints 
on the proposed project, the group also argued that this was a matter partly 
outside its field of expertise and that it had not had enough time to form a well-
founded opinion. 
Not mentioned in the travel report was the impression made on the 
delegation by the Ethiopian vice-minister of agriculture, Tesfa Bushen, who 
would become an important facilitator of and driving force for the subsequent 
project.406 He was a development enthusiast who embraced the idea of an 
integrated project and who, together with a group of like-minded officials, 
favored rural development in Ethiopia. In meeting him, the Swedes had found 
not only a cooperative counterpart and a necessary contact in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, but also someone who shared their views on development and 
who perhaps indicated the possibility of future reforms that would mitigate the 
land tenure problems. Anders Forsse describes him in an account that, though 
partially inaccurate in its details and chronology, nonetheless serves as a good 
illustration of the impression he made on the Swedes: 
 
In Ethiopia, Hjelm and Nekby got in touch with Tesfa Bushen, Vice Minister of 
Agriculture . . . and one of the few really dynamic forces in an otherwise 
stagnant ministry (which constituted no exception to the imperial political 
system as a whole). . . . 
Here was a kindred spirit, a catalyst, someone who helped make something 
out of the rather vague initial thoughts behind the Hjelm mission. . . . The idea 
                                                        
403 For a more detailed description of Ethiopian land tenure and tenancy conditions in the 1960s, 
see Ståhl, Ethiopia, chapter 6. 
404 Hjelm et al., “Reserapport nr 6,” 7. 
405 Hjelm et al., “Reserapport nr 6,” 7. 
406 Nekby, “Margareta och Bengt,” 7:75. 
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of an integrated attack on underdevelopment, previously practically unheard of 
in Sweden, took form and was expressed in SIDA submissions to the Swedish 
Government. Lennart Hjelm, Tesfa Bushen and Bengt Nekby were its 
architects.407 
 
Tesfa Bushen was a representative of the new kind of educated, reform-
oriented expert that Haile Selassie’s modernization and education efforts had 
created. To the Swedes he came across as a positive force, in contrast to the 
older policymakers who had little interest in making changes.408 The situation 
was similar throughout the Ethiopian government. Christopher Clapham’s 
1969 analysis discusses a “power vacuum” in the central government, where 
most ministers had neither the power nor the inclination for independent policy 
initiatives.409 This reflected Haile Selassie’s attempts at navigating between 
conservative interests and the requests of the young technocrats. As noted, the 
Swedes were aware that what they called vested interests would obstruct any 
attempts at reform. But after meeting Tesfa Bushen, Nekby and his colleagues 
perceived that there was a group of potential reformers interested in their rural 
development ideas, with whom they could cooperate. 
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Table 2. Timeline of important events in Ethiopian history between 1930 and 1974 (of relevance 
for the dissertation). 
1930 –1955 1955–1974 
1930: Haile Selassie crowned Emperor 1960: Attempted coup d’état by Haile 
Selassie’s Imperial Guard; put down by other 
military units 
1935–36: Italy invades and occupies Ethiopia;  
Haile Selassie goes into exile 
1963–1970: A series of peasant rebellions take 
place in various provinces; grievances include 
tax burdens, mechanization and land alienation 
1941: British troops and the Ethiopian 
resistance liberates Ethiopia; Haile Selassie 
returns 
1965: First major student demonstration 
against the government takes place during a 
parliamentary debate on agricultural tenancy; 
students demand “Land to the Tiller” 
1952: Imperial Ethiopian College of 
Agricultural and Mechanical Arts founded at 
Alemaya 
1967: CADU is initiated in Arussi south-east 
of Addis Ababa 
1954: First Swedish bilateral aid project, the 
Ethio-Swedish Institute of Building 
Technology, is launched 
1973: Catastrophic famine in Wollo province; 
consequences exacerbated by government’s 
inept handling 
1955: Modern constitution prepared (with 
American help) and adopted 
1974–1975: Ethiopian revolution; Haile 
Selassie deposed by the army in September 
1974; power passes to a socialist military 
government 
Ethiopian Tenancy Conditions and Swedish Aid Objectives 
While the trip report from Ethiopia shows that the agricultural group had begun 
to pay more attention to the land tenure situation, it still bypassed the important 
question of what would happen if agricultural productivity did in fact increase 
in a society such as rural Ethiopia. It considered tenancy conditions a constraint 
on the possibilities of productivity increases, but not as a factor potentially 
shaping social developments in conjunction with such increases. To cast more 
light on what insights the group actually had in this regard, it is useful to look 
at the correspondence between Nekby and Harald Ståhlberg, a Swedish 
agronomist from the National Board of Agriculture who was working in 
Ethiopia at the time. Though concerned about the political consequences, the 
Ethiopian government had begun discussing the possibility of rural land reform 
and had even created a ministry of land reform to oversee the issue. Ståhlberg, 
who served in Ethiopia as an FAO expert, had been attached to this ministry 
and was tasked with working out a plan for reform legislation. After they had 
met when the group visited Ethiopia, he and Nekby stayed in touch throughout 
the second half of 1965. Though Ståhlberg’s work had thus far been met with 
limited enthusiasm by the Ethiopian authorities, he had personal knowledge of 
the land tenure situation and was one of the few people able to provide the 
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agricultural group with direct and reliable information about the situation on 
the ground in rural Ethiopia. 
The focal points of the Nekby-Ståhlberg correspondence were the state of 
affairs in different possible project areas, with a strong focus on tenure 
conditions and on the proportions of land being cultivated by tenants. Ståhlberg 
sought to describe conditions first in the Ambo and Sodo areas, later in Tigre, 
and finally in what would come to be the actual location, the Arussi province 
south-east of Addis Ababa. Ambo and Sodo were not suggested for the project, 
chiefly because other development-related activities were already taking place 
there.410 Arussi, whose capital Asella also was the site of a Swedish mission 
which ran a primary school, was, however, seen as a favorable location. Much 
of Arussi were cereal-producing highlands where Swedish agronomic expertise 
could work under reasonably familiar climactic conditions.411 Yet as Ståhlberg 
continued his inquiries, the suitability of Arussi province became less apparent. 
In November, he wrote to Nekby to say that the land tenure conditions in 
Arussi were unsuitable for the project and further discussed the unsecure 
tenancy agreements and the risks of tenant evictions if agricultural productivity 
was to increase. He suggested that, unless an area with better tenancy 
conditions could be found, a project in Arussi would need either a reform of 
the legal framework for land tenure, or a more ad hoc local operation tailored 
to project needs, in which tenants were given ownership rights to the land they 
cultivated while the original owners were compensated with other land. Nekby 
expressed disappointment at this but asked Ståhlberg to continue his 
investigations. In his following letter, Ståhlberg’s attitude to Arussi as a project 
location had changed again. He wrote that “there are now several of us who 
believe the land tenure problems can be dealt with,” but still argued that the 
project could only be successful if advance action was taken to somehow 
improve tenancy conditions.412 
This correspondence is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it demonstrates 
the conditions under which the agricultural group began to plan the project. 
With little reliable official information available, they had to depend on 
Ståhlberg for proxy information and personal judgments about conditions in 
areas that he visited. It was even difficult to locate good maps of the Ethiopian 
provinces, so Ståhlberg drew a map of Arussi and attached it to one of his 
                                                        
410 Ståhlberg to Nekby, 8 September 1965; 15 October 1965; 22 October 1965; Nekby to 
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412 Ståhlberg to Nekby, 26 November 1965; Nekby to Ståhlberg, 3 December 1965; Ståhlberg to 
Nekby, 9 December 1965, 2, all in SIDA, series F1 AA, vol. 9. 
156 
letters to Nekby (see figure 10). Second, and more importantly, it shows that 
the planners were preoccupied with the question of land tenure during the fall 
of 1965, that tenure conditions were a decisive factor in selecting an area, that 
they found it hard to find an area with suitable tenancy conditions, and that 
they were well aware of the risk that prevailing tenancy conditions would 
shape the effects of the rural transformation under consideration, up to and 
including tenant evictions as a result of the intended increases in production. 
That would of course conflict not just with the project goal of supporting the 
development of small-farm agriculture but also with the Swedish aid policy 
objective of promoting social equity. 
 
Figure 10. Map of Arussi province drawn by Harald Ståhlberg and sent to Nekby in November 
1965. Asella, the capital of the province and of Chilalo awraja (district), is marked with an 
arrow.413 
Why Ethiopia? 
Given the significant political and socioeconomic disadvantages, what were the 
advantages the group could see in situating the project in Ethiopia? A very 
important advantage appears to have been that the highland regions of the 
country had a climate and, at least in some areas, agricultural conditions not 
too far removed from Sweden’s.414 This did not imply that there was no need to 
perform adaptive research in Ethiopia, but it did mean that the Swedish experts 
                                                        
413 Ståhlberg to Nekby, 26 November 1965. 
414 The travel report noted that Ethiopia allowed for reasonable possibilities to “translate” Swdish 
experiences. Hjelm et al., “Reserapport nr 6,” 8. 
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would be able to work with familiar plant species and under reasonably 
familiar conditions. There was a certain contradiction in this. The main reason 
for the second part of NIB’s agriculture group’s work—investigating how to 
secure a reservoir of expertise for Swedish agricultural aid—had been the 
almost total lack of Swedish expertise in tropical cultivation,415 but a project 
situated in the Ethiopian highlands would not entail such cultivation and could 
do quite well with Swedish-trained expertise. However, given the fact that the 
work on the expertise question had so far only resulted in three Swedish 
agronomists being sent to Trinidad to study tropical agriculture at the 
University of the West Indies, for pragmatic reasons Ethiopia must have 
looked like a good choice.416 In light of the personnel situation, it would have 
been difficult to implement a project of the intended type in a country where 
Swedish training and experiences were mostly inapplicable. And even if there 
were other regions of Africa where a project might have been practically 
feasible, conditions in Ethiopia were favorable for a speedy and technically 
successful implementation. 
A second factor was the historical context of the rather special Ethio-
Swedish relationship. The long-standing connections between the two 
countries meant that in some ways Ethiopia was comparatively well known in 
Sweden, and vice versa. A new project in Ethiopia would not have to face a 
completely unknown society and administration. It also meant that there were a 
number of existing projects to which the regional project could be linked. The 
agricultural group argued that in particular it would be relevant for the nutrition 
research at CNU to collaborate with the regional project.417 Given that Sweden 
emphasized its noncolonial past in the aid context, it was also an advantage 
that Ethiopia had never been colonized. Moreover, many in Sweden still 
sympathized with Ethiopia in light of the Italian invasion and occupation 
during World War II. 
A third factor was that Ethiopia was impoverished even by developing-
country standards and was seen as in dire need of foreign aid. Henock Kifle, 
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later executive director of CADU, retrospectively describes the Ethiopian 
countryside as a “vast sea of rural backwardness,” and political scientist 
Michael Ståhl, who visited Ethiopia in the late 1960s to study agricultural 
development, allochronically remembered the setting as evoking the Old 
Testament.418 The impression made on the Swedish experts by the brutal 
poverty they encountered should not be underestimated. At the same time, 
while most Ethiopian peasant agriculture was indeed based on an ox-ard 
cultivation system that was distinctly old-fashioned compared with European 
agriculture at the time, it was less far removed from 1960s Sweden than its 
context might have led non-agriculturalists to believe.419 Cultivation with the 
ard had been common practice in parts of nineteenth-century Sweden, and the 
components of the technological complex employed by Ethiopian peasants 
would have been easily recognizable to the Swedish agrarian experts 
(conversely, the hoe cultivation practiced in parts of the other East African 
countries the group visited would have struck the experts as more old-
fashioned and likely harder to develop). This meant that they could easily 
envision improvements that could be made and so came to perceive Ethiopia as 
a place where the project could make a real difference. That Ethiopia needed 
aid of this kind was also validated by the fact that the World Bank had 
proposed a similar project in Ethiopia and was planning to send a delegation 
there to investigate further.420 
A final factor was that the agricultural group had made contacts in the 
Ethiopian government that they believed they could work with. Their 
encounter with Tesfa Bushen had given the Swedes a very positive view of 
both the vice-minister personally and the possibilities of him and other like-
minded officials to contribute to positive change in Ethiopia. They also saw 
some signs of such change. When summarizing, in early 1967, why Ethiopia 
indeed would be a good location for the project, Forsse wrote that it was “the 
opinion of most Swedes who have worked or are working in Ethiopia . . . that 
several important initiatives for social and political reform have been taken or 
are being contemplated by the régime since the beginning of the present 
decade,” and further that “it is interesting to note that the régime . . . has now at 
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long last embarked on a programme of land reform.”421 Forsse was clearly 
influenced by his desire to see the regional project realized, and his comments 
should be approached with caution (it is enlightening to compare his analysis 
with the one by Christopher Clapham, which rather emphasized the stagnation 
of the imperial regime, cited at note 400 above). Even so, he would hardly have 
stood behind a deliberately misleading analysis (he also cautioned that rapid 
and efficient reform would meet with difficulties—in retrospect, this turned out 
to be quite an understatement), and thus his comments indicate that the 
planners, though mindful of the political problems, did not view Ethiopia as a 
hopeless case politically. Ethiopia also had a practical advantage. While an 
oppressive police state in most respects, it allowed total freedom for the experts 
to move around in order to make the requisite studies for the project.422 
Taken together, these factors were enough to make everybody but Artur 
Hansson overcome their concerns about the tenure situation, and so the 
working group recommended Ethiopia for the regional project. But why were 
the advantages afforded more weight than the disadvantages, given that the 
latter posed a real and recognized threat both to the project implementation and 
to Swedish aid policy objectives? A recurring explanation in the literature is 
that the planners did not significantly appreciate the fact that problems could 
arise due to the complicated social and political conditions. Bengt Nekby 
himself addresses this in his book on CADU and suggests that while the group 
recognized that the tenure situation was a potentially problematic issue, it had 
“neither instructions nor competence to judge the political situation in 
Ethiopia.” Cohen, citing Nekby, also writes that “[i]nitially, little attention was 
given the [sic] larger policy environment and need for its reform.”423 Both 
statements imply that the group did not, indeed could not be expected to, 
understand the potential socioeconomic and political complications and 
controversies that could arise from a peasant-oriented rural development 
project in Ethiopia. They were agronomists and economists, experts in 
increasing agricultural production and in making farms profitable, but they had 
no special knowledge of African politics or rural sociology, and did not—could 
not—take social or political issues sufficiently into account. This explanation, 
drawing on the stereotypical figure of the expert as a narrow-minded 
technician, has earlier been invoked to explain shortcomings in the 1960s 
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Green Revolutions in general.424 It has some validity for CADU’s Agricultural 
College planners as well, but I want to suggest that things were more 
complicated than that. 
It is clear that if not before, then at least once Ethiopia became the focal 
country for the planning, the planners, no matter how deep or shallow their 
political insights in general, were well aware that the feudal characteristics of 
rural Ethiopian society would pose problems for the planned project.425 The 
problem was twofold. On the one hand, tenancy and sharecropping were 
obstacles to development. Sharecropping tenants would have little motivation 
to invest in their agricultural production, which implied that the desired 
agricultural development would be difficult to achieve in areas with high 
tenancy rates. On the other hand, there was the problem of insecure tenancy 
agreements and the subsequent risk of tenant evictions and displacements as a 
result of increased agricultural productivity in an area. This second aspect was 
much less emphasized in the material produced by the working group, but the 
project planners were well aware of it, as the correspondence between Nekby 
and Ståhlberg cited above illustrates. There was thus an awareness of a matter 
that can be rephrased more generally as a tension between modern, science-
based agriculture with associated increases in production on the one hand, and 
social equity on the other.426 
As I understand it, it would have been hard to publicly acknowledge this 
tension in the discussions of the project at this stage. Doing so would mean 
opening up for a critical discussion about the extent to which the proposed 
project strategy was commensurable with the goals of Swedish development 
aid. The 1962 aid policy explicitly specified that “as far as it is possible to 
assess,” Swedish aid should promote social equity.427 As it evidently was 
possible to assess already at this stage that the project risked promoting social 
inequity instead, an open discussion would have endangered the project’s 
realization. As much as the planners might have hoped for political progress, 
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there were certainly no guarantees of any speedy implementation of new land 
reform or tenancy legislation. As Ståhlberg had made clear to Nekby in several 
letters, progress on land reform matters was painfully slow and faced a lot of 
resistance. Cohen states that once this tension between the project strategy and 
the prevailing landownership structure and tenancy conditions became clear, 
the planners decided to proceed by simply ignoring the principle of equity, 
eager as they were to experiment with rural development.428 In a sense, this is a 
valid claim, though Cohen’s strong wording exaggerates and does not do 
justice to the complexity involved, as is shown if nothing else by the fact that 
the working group did not unanimously recommend Ethiopia. 
Something missing from Cohen’s analysis, but which supports and 
simultaneously nuances his conclusion, is the close link between the 
agricultural group and the interests of the Agricultural College in seeing the 
project realized. Opening up for a broader discussion of the social 
consequences of agricultural development would have risked undermining the 
strong focus on agricultural experimentation, which, in turn, was the 
justification for the dominance of the college’s experts in the project planning, 
and the intended prominent role for the college in the project execution. 
Ultimately, such a discussion could thus have posed a threat to the Agricultural 
College’s new strategy of incorporating development-aid-related work. The 
agricultural group, dominated by Agricultural College professors, was certainly 
aware of this. 
Path-dependency and momentum also played a part. Once the planners 
began to fully grasp the constraints that the tenancy conditions might put on 
project activities, the planning had already proceeded quite far and Ethiopia—
where suitable climates for the application of Swedish expertise could be 
found, freedom of movement was available, and a long-term relationship with 
Sweden existed—was arguably the only realistic choice if the project was to be 
implemented within a reasonable time, or at all. Under such circumstances, it is 
easy to see why the agricultural group would have been tempted to give greater 
consideration to the upsides. 
As a bookend to this discussion of how Ethiopia came to be selected as the 
recipient country, I want to return to the possibility that Ethiopia was 
politically so strongly desired as an aid recipient that the agricultural group de 
facto had its hands tied if it wanted the project to be realized. There is no direct 
evidence of this in the material examined for the present study. But it is a fact 
that Ethiopia was one of the high-priority countries for Swedish aid. It is also 
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likely that the country selection criteria, as outlined in the agricultural group’s 
June proposal, were tailored to Ethiopia in that they expressed a preference for 
a country with climates reasonably similar to Sweden’s and in which the 
project could be linked to, for example, nutrition or education efforts.429 This 
could reflect a preference for Ethiopia from the group’s members, but since 
they had not yet visited the country at the time, it is perhaps more likely that it 
reflected a preference of NIB, which might, in turn, have been attuned to 
political preferences. In one of his retrospections, Anders Forsse suggests that 
amid some Ethiopian concerns over the long-term outlook of Swedish 
development assistance to the empire, Michanek had personally reassured a 
high-level official that Sweden “would not desert Ethiopia,” and that this was a 
factor in the choice.430 All in all, I cannot exclude the possibility that the 
working group’s recommendation was shaped by political constraints above 
and beyond issues pertaining to the project as such. But neither would I 
conclude as much on the basis of the material analyzed in this study. 
Be that as it may, Ethiopia was recommended by the agricultural group, and 
SIDA accepted this. In October 1965, Nekby and Forsse returned to Addis 
Ababa and presented the Swedish proposal for a regional development project 
to a number of government officials who “welcomed” the idea of more 
Swedish aid.431 Following the visit and a subsequent formal request for aid 
from Ethiopia, SIDA decided in December to petition the Swedish government 
for approval of further investigations in-country.432 
Field Planning 
The Swedish cabinet approved SIDA’s petition in early 1966, and after an 
exchange of notes between Sweden and Ethiopia in March, a Swedish team led 
by Nekby was put together in Addis Ababa during the spring. Its task was to 
further investigate the possibilities of a regional project in-country. This more 
extended encounter with Ethiopia triggered a broad spectrum of fieldwork as 
the planning team employed a range of ethnographic and scientific methods to 
investigate the social and natural conditions in their preferred project area. The 
final report that resulted from these studies then led to tensions with SIDA in 
Stockholm over the project design, tensions that reveal more about the links to 
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the Agricultural College and the development strategies advocated by the 
Ultuna-affiliated experts. 
Anthropology and Agronomics: Early Project Preparations 
Moving to Ethiopia meant that the planning team could now directly examine 
societies and agricultural practices of interest to the project. Empirical work 
started immediately with a three-week anthropological village study in Arussi. 
The newly hired Karl Eric Knutsson carried it out together with another 
anthropologist, Arne Lexander, and an Ethiopian counterpart, Tesfaye Akalou. 
Nekby approvingly considered their study potentially very useful for future 
work.433 Besides the two anthropologists, the team that started working in 
Ethiopia employed a number of Ultuna-trained agronomists.434 Nekby was the 
team leader and its specialist in agricultural economics. Its crop production 
specialist was Harald Linder, who had previously worked for the national 
experiment organization and the special counseling division at the Agricultural 
College (this division later evolved into the Research Information Center and 
was primarily tasked with providing research-based advice and information to 
the Swedish extension services). Both posts had given him a very practitioner-
oriented view of agricultural experimentation.435 Carl Clason, who had 
previous experience from Ethiopia, was responsible for animal husbandry.436 
By summertime, the team further included forester Gunnar Poulsen, 
veterinarian Hans Patriksson, land surveyor Erland Gabrielsson, industrial 
economist Bo Wickström, and education specialist Lennart Ohlsson (who was 
also trained as an agronomist). In August, the three junior agronomists who 
had been trained at the University of the West Indies—Bo Bengtsson, Hans 
Johansson, and Lars Leander—joined too. All members of the team were 
Swedish, except for forester Gunnar Poulsen, who came from Denmark. As 
Cohen points out, no Ethiopian technical expertise took part in the planning at 
this stage, though the team worked with Mulegeta Ghebrewold and Beyene 
Chichaibelu, liaison officers from the Ministry of Agriculture. Beyond the 
above-mentioned Tesfaye, the team also employed Almaw Negassa and 
Mesfin Sahile as data collection assistants. Later, a number of Ethiopian 
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higher-level expert staff were also recruited, most notably economist Paulos 
Abraham and US-educated crop production expert Dagnatchew Yirgou.437 
Nekby and the team’s most pressing concern was to definitely decide the 
project’s location. While ostensibly still an open question that depended on 
input both from the Ethiopian administration and the aforementioned World 
Bank delegation, the Swedes in fact seem to have been committed to locating 
the project in Arussi before Nekby had even arrived in Ethiopia. At the final 
meeting of the agricultural group, just before Nekby left Sweden, Ewert Åberg 
presented a memorandum on crop production based on the agricultural group’s 
trip to Ethiopia and on information provided by Ståhlberg. In it, Åberg argued 
that of the areas considered in Ethiopia, agronomic reasons made Arussi the 
only one suitable, and that further planning of the crop production activities 
should be tailored to conditions in that province.438 At the same meeting, a 
proposed organization plan for the project, tentatively named “Arussi 
Development Authority,” was put forward.439 In Ethiopia two months later, the 
same view prevailed. After deeming the anthropologists’ first report 
interesting, Nekby asked Lexander to return to Arussi in May to spend the 
entire month in the province and to receive the technical experts one at a time 
for discussions with the local population on topics of relevance to each specific 
field.440 A very important factor in the choice of Arussi was that Swedish 
missionary and physician Harald Nyström, who had spent most of his life in 
Ethiopia and lived in Asella, recommended the province and helped creating 
local connections there.441 
The relatively strong emphasis on early field studies, anthropological and 
technical, indicates that once work started in Ethiopia, the interest in socio-
cultural factors increased markedly. While most members of the planning team 
were indeed “academics from the University of Agriculture at Uppsala,”442 as 
Cohen puts it, they made a conscious effort to unite their agronomic expertise 
with insights gained from ethnographic fieldwork. Lexander continued his field 
studies into 1967 and the project later published his findings in a 
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comprehensive report.443 The project planners also set up meetings and 
interviews in which its technical experts could meet with and talk to local 
farmers. In addition, the young agronomists Bo Bengtsson and Lars Leander 
both carried out ambitious field and survey studies of local agricultural 
practices and knowledge, which included extended periods of living in the 
countryside.444 Some of the Swedish experts thus received significant exposure 
to the conditions they were planning to change and were able to interact 
extensively with, and learn from, the people living in Arussi. Whether any true 
rapport was established is another matter; Leander recalled that even after 
living in the same area for six months, the local peasants still questioned his 
intentions and suspected him of wanting to claim their land.445 
The primary purpose of the fieldwork was to facilitate the intended rural 
transformation. Gathering information through field studies and surveys, and 
structuring the resulting knowledge in a scientific report, implies a degree of 
simplification and represents an attempt to make local farming practices more 
visible and thus more open to the project whose outlines were already drawn 
up. There is no evidence that the fieldwork was intended to shape the strategic 
planning.446 But it is still significant that some of the experts spent considerable 
time in the field interacting with farmers and that the project thus at least 
attempted to avoid some of what Robert Chambers has described as outsider 
biases, “biases against contact with and learning from the poorer people.”447 It 
was an approach congruent with the Swedish service science ideal, which 
arguably set the project apart from many contemporary efforts to increase food 
production in the developing world.448 Local knowledge and societies, 
underplayed during the desk planning phase in Sweden, were for a while 
factors taken quite seriously, even if it was for the purposes of a project whose 
main outlines were not subject to change. 
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The first anthropological survey tentatively highlighted some of the relevant 
conditions in the Chilalo awraja (district, or sub-province) of Arussi.449 
Lexander, Knutsson and Tesfaye were not willing to draw any far-reaching 
conclusions from such a limited study but simply pointed out that Arussi was 
similar to a number of other highland provinces, thus making it a suitable 
location from the perspective of the possibility of later applying project 
experiences to other parts of the country. They also called attention to the fact 
that the population in Arussi largely consisted of internal migrants, which 
meant that they might be comparatively more open to change (or, as it might 
have been read by the more technocratic-minded planning staff, less able to 
mobilize resistance against the deployment of technical expertise).450 Yet if 
these were advantages, the survey again brought the problematic tenure 
conditions to light. Many of the tenants interviewed expressed suspicion of 
attempts to increase agricultural productivity. They feared the loss of their 
tenure if yields were to increase.451 
Evidently, this did not much affect the view of Arussi as a befitting 
location. In mid-May, Nekby reported to Forsse in Stockholm that “the team 
concludes that Arussi would be the most suitable area for a regional 
development project.”452 Tenancy conditions were considered better in Chilalo 
than elsewhere in the empire, and the planning team expressed some hope for a 
political solution to the problem of tenancy and land distribution. In the letter 
to Forsse cited above, Nekby describes how he had called on the new minister 
for land reform, whom he considered to go about his business with 
“seriousness” and who had been “favourably inclined” to a program for 
improving landlord-tenant relationships.453 Whether Nekby actually believed in 
the prospect of immediate progress is another matter; I think these comments 
are best understood as positioning toward the SIDA management in 
Stockholm. While the minister for land reform might well have expressed a 
favorable inclination, he was neither in a position to initiate such reform 
himself nor presumably very interested in pressing the matter.454 At any rate, 
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Ethiopian approval for Arussi was not immediately obtained: in a letter from 
Nekby to Hjelm in late June, one of the few examples of preserved 
correspondence between them in the material examined, Nekby complained 
about the slowness of the Ethiopian Council of Ministers in approving Arussi 
as the project location.455 He expressed his eagerness to continue with the 
acquisition of land if “only Messrs. Ministers see fit to establish that we shall 
be in Arussi.”456 
This informally written letter also reveals how Nekby and Hjelm viewed the 
relationship between the project and the Agricultural College. Regarding a 
planned visit to Ethiopia by Hjelm and Professor Eskil Brännäng from the 
college’s Department of Animal Breeding, Nekby wrote that beyond placing 
their knowledge and experience at the project’s disposal, such a visit would 
serve the purpose of “[tying] the planning of the project’s experimental 
activities closer to [the Agricultural College] and thus facilitating this 
honorable institution’s commitment to the professional management of these 
activities.”457 Nekby was evidently still looking out for the college’s interests, 
and the wording suggests that at the time both Nekby and Hjelm envisioned at 
least a partially executory role for the college. Hjelm had also raised this matter 
at an earlier meeting with the agricultural group.458 They likely had in mind an 
arrangement in which the college would assume direct responsibilities for at 
least the agricultural experimentation activities. In the end, this did not 
materialize. The Ethiopian government favored a closer integration of the 
project into its own administrative system, and so CADU instead became an 
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autonomous division within the Imperial Ministry of Agriculture.459 
Nonetheless, the letter shows that the relationship between the planning team 
in Ethiopia and the college remained a close one. 
 
Figure 11. Experts in the field, Arussi province, 1966. Horseback riding was a convenient way of 
getting around the mostly roadless rural areas. From left to right: Lennart Hjelm, Karl Wallgren, 
unidentified Ethiopian, Ewert Åberg, Hans Johansson, Bengt Nekby. Photo Harald Linder.460 
Agrarian Expertise Challenged: The Reception of Report No. I 
In October 1966, Nekby’s team delivered its project proposal to SIDA and the 
Ethiopian government. It consisted of two massive volumes plus appendices, 
and it contained an in-depth description of the Ethiopian administrative 
structure as well as of the project design.461 It also discussed international 
experiences of similar projects, with most attention being given to the Pakistani 
Comilla project, and one conclusion drawn was that it was crucial that the 
project must be designed to be flexible and open to modification based on 
experiences gained—indeed, that one of the project objectives should be the 
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development of methods and the training of staff in them.462 The report 
proposed the Chilalo awraja of Arussi, eventually agreed to by the Ethiopian 
government, as the project location. In line with the strategy of integrated 
development, the project would—beyond research in crop production and 
animal husbandry—include agricultural marketing activities, attempts to find 
methods for the desired knowledge and technology transfer to the local 
farmers, education, and infrastructural investments in roads and in buildings 
for the project. 
The population in Chilalo was dominated by two ethnic groups: Oromos 
and Amharas. Some of the Oromo people were descendants of a previous 
nomadic population in the area; others had moved in, along with most 
Amharas, as part of colonizing migration streams after Arussi was incorporated 
into the Ethiopian Empire in the 1880s. The Amharas, the old Christian elite of 
Ethiopia, made up a small minority of the rural population but dominated the 
towns. The urban population only amounted to approximately 5% of the total 
population of Chilalo, however, with Asella, the largest town, having about 
seventeen thousand inhabitants. 
A little over 80% of the rural population were settled farmers and most of 
the rest semi-nomadic pastoralists. The farmers mostly grew barley and wheat, 
with slightly more than half of the cultivated land devoted to the former and a 
little less than 20% to the latter.463 The vast majority practiced mixed farming 
and kept cattle for traction and for milk. The land was owned in part by major 
landowners who often had holdings of hundreds of hectares cultivated by 
tenants, and in part by freeholding peasants who farmed their own land and 
perhaps had one or a few tenants as well. The average smallholder had less 
than five hectares of land. About half of them were tenants; on average they 
had slightly smaller holdings than those who owned their land. The 
smallholders, who generally used traditional methods and implements, were 
subsistence farmers in the sense that most of the household consumption 
normally came from their own production. But market interaction was also 
important: self-owning farmers needed to sell part of their harvest as they had 
to pay taxes in cash (generally, the wheat was sold while barley was used for 
home consumption). Likewise, all farmers needed cash to buy clothes and 
other necessities not available on-farm or through local barter transactions. No 
real opportunity to sell milk was available except as ghee (clarified butter), 
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which sold at a very low price. The milk was thus generally consumed by the 
household, in part as fresh milk but mostly churned into butter.464 
Table 3. Basic statistics regarding Chilalo at the start of the project (for sources see notes 463 
and 464). 
Chilalo awraja, basic information (1966)  
Population Ca 350 000 
Number of farm households Ca 65 000 
Illiteracy rate Ca 90 % 
Most common crops Barley (on 52% of the cultivated area) and 
wheat (on 18% of the cultivated area) 
Average land-holding Slightly less than 5 ha 
Tenancy rate among small-holders Approx. 50%, some on relatives’ land 
Being a proposal for an actual project design, Report No. I was much more 
detailed than the agricultural group’s earlier outlines, but in terms of the overall 
approach it did not diverge much. For the first time, explicit, though rather 
vague, project purposes were stated: these were to stimulate the ability of the 
local population to participate in the development effort, and thus to improve 
economic and social conditions in Chilalo, and to create possibilities for an 
expansion of the development program.465 The project was thus intended as 
help to self-help and as a way to empower the local population so that they 
themselves could take on increasing responsibilities for development. One 
section of the report also discussed the Agricultural College’s role in the 
project. It proposed to tie the project’s research activities to the college, but 
with the latter in an advisory rather than an executory role. It also suggested 
that the college should employ a liaison officer to perform tasks in support of 
the project.466 In general, however, the report was mostly descriptive. Its 
accounts of the Ethiopian administration and social setting, and of the 
international models that had inspired the project approach, were little more 
than extended descriptions. 
On receiving the report, many of the SIDA managers in Stockholm reacted 
negatively to what they saw as a lack of critical analysis of the proposed 
project and to what some considered lax financial planning. The report was 
heavily criticized, and for a while the entire project seemingly risked either 
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being canceled or being drastically reduced in scope.467 This reception was not 
a complete surprise to the planning team. Forsse had privately informed Nekby 
about the fundaments of what people at SIDA thought during a visit to Addis 
and had expressed similar concerns in a letter already during the summer.468 
But even if Nekby and his colleagues had expected to be asked to provide 
additional information and calculations, they were startled by the level of 
resistance their proposal encountered.469 
To reduce initial project costs, an option suggested in Stockholm was that 
the project at first ought to focus on validating methods by which knowledge 
could be transferred to the target population, rather than start with a broad 
research and development program. In effect, this amounted to examining how 
well its transfer mechanism functioned before creating the knowledge to be 
transferred. This idea was not positively received by Nekby. In an irritated 
letter to Forsse, he reiterated the importance of focusing on an integrated 
approach and adaptive research, but now with a clear productivist slant which 
contrasted sharply with his earlier positive pronouncements about 
anthropological studies: 
 
This [referring to an example of an innovation not adapted to its context] 
illustrates again the international experience of the need for a goal-directed 
experiment activity. With all due respect to the social anthropologists, I consider 
it empirically proven that the most important thing in development is to be able 
to create economic opportunities for the farmers to increase and sell their 
production. If one can do that, then demonstrating these opportunities ought to 
be relatively simple. If one cannot, then an ever so thorough understanding of 
local conditions is unlikely to lead to development.470 
 
Not everybody in the planning team shared Nekby’s view that knowledge 
transfer would be “relatively simple” once a profitable innovation with a direct, 
positive impact on production was developed. The pointed comment about 
social anthropologists was probably directed at Knutsson, who earlier that year 
had argued that it would be risky to establish the project’s central institutions 
before making sure that the local population was organized in a way which 
would make them see the project as a relevant concern for them and help them 
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adopt its innovations.471 Nekby and Knutsson thus advocated divergent goals 
for the project’s start-up phase. They both favored a localistic approach to 
development but focused on different parts of the technology transfer process. 
Knutsson wanted to start by organizing the local population and then devise a 
transfer mechanism based on a deeper understanding of the local society. 
Nekby, for his part, advocated focusing on the local development of profitable 
innovations that would tangibly demonstrate the benefits of the project. This is 
not to say that he did not acknowledge the need for adapting innovations to the 
context; on the contrary, the report emphasized the importance of the continued 
study of Chilalo society.472 But to Nekby, obtaining a demonstrably profitable 
innovation was an absolute priority and in fact a precondition for any 
meaningful project. Without it, he suggested, no amount of organizing work 
would help. 
The Schultzian stance Nekby took reiterated the viewpoint the Agricultural 
College’s professors had held throughout the planning. They had continuously 
emphasized that experimentation was the central element of the planned 
project, even if it had to be complemented by marketing and extension to be 
effective.473 Nekby’s argument also mirrored earlier colonial discussions about 
agricultural development. Joseph Morgan Hodge quotes an agricultural 
research officer working in Nigeria in the late 1950s, whose opinion was that a 
“lack of a proven product is more likely the cause” than a lack of extension 
facilities when farmers are resistant to change.474 That this understanding was 
completely in tune with the one Nekby promoted in 1966 suggests that he had 
been influenced by these late-colonial debates when working in Nigeria.475 
“A Slap in the Face”: Negotiations with SIDA 
To further analyze the report and to find a way out of the impasse the criticism 
had created, Forsse put together a reference group in Stockholm, consisting of 
himself as chairman, several other SIDA managers as members, and three 
external experts who were to evaluate the proposed project: Hjelm, Knutsson, 
and Lund University economics professor Torsten Gårdlund. Neither Hjelm 
nor Knutsson could claim to be neutral evaluators: Hjelm had been one of the 
driving forces behind the project from its inception, and Knutsson had been in 
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the employ of the planning team.476 Gårdlund, a well-known Swedish 
economist and an authority on development issues, was ostensibly a more 
neutral choice, but he too knew the people involved, having lectured at a 
preparatory/recruiting course the agricultural group organized in 1965.477 The 
three experts could be expected to each advance a particular point of view: 
Hjelm in favor of the strategy, Knutsson critical, and Gårdlund perhaps in the 
middle. Forsse himself had to balance a number of interests against each other 
in his role as department head, but personally he was by this time strongly 
committed to the project: in a letter to Nekby he stated that “from my 
perspective, no other possible project is more essential than this.”478 
The discussions in the reference group appear to have been quite tense.479 
Opinions diverged over priorities and the importance attributed to the 
integrated approach, and many of the SIDA staff who participated remained 
critical of the project proposal and wanted significant reductions in scope. 
Predictably, Hjelm fully supported the strategy outlined in the report, but he 
was the only participant to do so. Gårdlund was more hesitant but did express 
an opinion similar to Nekby’s when he argued that economic incentives were 
of primary importance. Knutsson, for his part, reiterated his earlier concerns, 
with his views being summarized in the minutes as follows: “It is not possible 
to start as ambitious an operation as the team wants. But a test of social 
conditions and of the transfer mechanism is absolutely important.”480 
Following the discussion, Tomas Bergendal at SIDA composed a 
summarizing memorandum, which remained critical of the project as outlined 
in Report No. 1 and suggested ways to scale it down. This was distributed to 
the participants for comments, and Hjelm responded in a forceful and 
illuminating way. He returned his copy full of crossed-out paragraphs and with 
extensive marginal notes, together with a cover letter that left no doubts in the 
reader’s mind as to his dim view of SIDA’s handling of the matter. He 
understood the memorandum as an “expression of an ongoing policy change 
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within SIDA,” which would make it “extremely difficult” to plan rationally 
and “substantially more difficult” to realize any plans. He further stated that the 
guiding idea all along had been to develop the project around agriculture and 
animal husbandry experimentation, and that this idea also had shaped the 
composition of the agriculture group. In light of this, he charged that “at this 
stage beginning to talk about limiting the project to ‘marketing’ or ‘road 
construction’ . . . is incomprehensible to me. . . . In that case we ought to have 
sent engineers and not agronomists to plan the regional project.”481 Changing 
the nature of the project now, Hjelm argued, would spoil several years of 
method development. It would also require SIDA to find other institutional 
partners given that agricultural competence was no longer relevant. Hjelm also 
sarcastically proposed that the Ethiopian nutrition project should immediately 
be canceled as it would no longer be able to benefit from synergies with 
agricultural research. Finally, reiterating his personal commitment to Nekby 
and the staff, he stated that 
 
the working group, which has been in Ethiopia for almost a year, has gone about 
its work with remarkable energy and carefulness and has presented a proposal 
which really seems a sound base for a whole-hearted and well-integrated effort 
for, primarily, agricultural development. Against this, proposing the 
delimitations suggested in the PM is nearly tantamount to a slap in the face of 
the team leader and his colleagues.482 
 
Hjelm was defending standpoints that he had invested some measure of 
personal prestige in. But he also stuck up for what he viewed as the interests of 
his college. As Hjelm explicitly suggested in his letter, only by sticking to a 
conception of the project as being primarily about agricultural experimentation 
would agrarian expertise have a clear and apparent role. Without such a role, 
the college would lose influence and its involvement in future activities would 
be a lot less certain. This letter thus further goes to show the very intimate link 
that had developed between the college and the project, and how (most of) the 
planning team in Ethiopia had fully appropriated the particular conception of 
agricultural aid developed at the college. That SIDA was now formally in 
charge had done little to undermine these linkages. 
Both Hjelm’s and Nekby’s writings at the time betray surprise and anger at 
what they perceived as an incomprehensible and unfair change of policy at 
SIDA.483 And they had a point: if many at SIDA were this hesitant, then why 
had so much planning been entrusted to agronomists, and why had SIDA sent a 
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team to Ethiopia based on the recommendations of the agricultural group? Its 
members had made no secret of their ideas about development, and SIDA, for 
its part, had earlier shown a strong commitment to an agricultural project in 
Ethiopia. This was apparent from its hiring policies, which included two-year 
contracts and long-term living arrangements for many of the planning staff, 
who were agricultural experts.484 
Several factors can help explain the new attitude at SIDA. What the team 
proposed was truly a mammoth project that could well have threatened to 
become a cuckoo in a Swedish aid nest still very much under construction. The 
report calculated total costs (including Ethiopian contributions) of SEK 33 
million for the first three years, with Swedish costs for the first year estimated 
at SEK 12.5 million.485 The latter amounted to more than three times the 
budget of the single largest Swedish development aid project in 1965, which 
had an annual cost of SEK 3.7 million. In fact it exceeded the total Swedish 
payments to the largest recipient country of development aid (in the sense of 
technical rather than financial assistance), Pakistan, which annually received 
around SEK 10 million at the time.486 
Beyond these financial factors, there were most likely also diverging 
expectations between the agronomic expertise in Ethiopia and the aid 
bureaucrats in Stockholm as to what the first report should contain and how it 
should be written. The report’s appraisal in Stockholm was complicated by the 
fact that the new SIDA had been created by merging the staff from NIB 
(SIDA’s Department I) with the financial aid administrators from the Ministry 
of Finance (SIDA’s Department II), who primarily looked to the strict 
procedures of the World Bank for inspiration. This had given rise to a clash of 
cultures within SIDA and its management.487 Gösta Westring at Department II 
recalls how, from his perspective, the staff at Department I had no “principle-
based inhibitions,” but happily launched ill-defined, Swedish-styled projects, 
“preferably in the Empire of Ethiopia.”488 Slightly later, Bengt Sandberg, also 
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at Department II, wrote a critical memorandum faulting the planning team for 
its unwillingness to prioritize and schedule its activities on the grounds that 
they were supposed to be “integrated.” He further pointed out that the project 
idea “emanated” from the agricultural group, “which also ‘chose’ Ethiopia.”489 
Sandberg’s remarks suggest that behind the fiscal worries lay an ideological 
conflict, manifested as criticism of entrusting so much of the planning of a 
regional development project to a group with virtually only agricultural 
expertise (and, presumably, also lacking the “principle-based inhibitions” of 
Department II). The particular conception of rural development as an 
agricultural science project that the Agricultural College had promoted was 
thus somewhat belatedly challenged. There is an irony in this, for by expanding 
the project into regional development, the agricultural group had opened itself 
up to this attack. As long as the problem they formulated was limited to one of 
agricultural experimentation, no one could have proposed reducing it to 
marketing or road construction. 
The sarcastic quotation marks that Sandberg put around the word chose 
were primarily intended to convey his general annoyance at an ad hoc body 
such as the agricultural group having so much influence over the location of an 
aid project, but he might also have had his concerns about Ethiopia in 
particular. It is at least clear that members of the SIDA board of directors had 
begun to express doubts about Ethiopia’s suitability as a recipient of Swedish 
development assistance, much to Nekby’s annoyance.490 At the time, the 
comprehensive aid to Ethiopia was in fact increasingly becoming a Swedish 
foreign policy anomaly. Sweden’s Social Democratic government did not 
necessarily demand impeccable democratic credentials from its aid partners, 
but they had to present some meaningful claim to strive for equality and for the 
empowerment of ordinary people.491 Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, however much 
in need of foreign aid, had little credibility in that regard. This was increasingly 
recognized by policymakers and debaters and would be an important reason for 
the controversies that would later arise over CADU. 
In Ethiopia itself, Report No. 1 had initially been received more positively, no 
doubt influenced by the fact that it was first reviewed by a technical committee 
chaired by Tesfa Bushen.492 This committee endorsed the report’s proposals and 
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passed their recommendation on to a ministerial committee for political 
review.493 But there the process stalled. According to Cohen, the Ethiopian 
officials “were concerned with the political difficulties likely to arise from the 
introduction in a limited area of concentrated resources aimed at economic and 
social change for small-holders.”494 Cohen cites no sources, but he is 
undoubtedly correct. If Sweden hesitated to aid regimes that did not actively 
promote equality, the Ethiopian government, for its part, was put in a bind by 
proposals for projects that were intended to improve the conditions of ordinary 
people. As historian Larry Grubbs argues, many African states found themselves 
in a similar paradoxical situation at this time: “They sought rapid development––
symbolized by big projects, plans, and big aid packages––but feared the political 
and social consequences of empowering (economically and politically) ordinary 
farmers, workers, and women.”495 Eventually, this paradox would prove 
unresolvable in the Ethiopian empire. 
The Ethiopian government’s hesitation gave SIDA time to find a way to 
overcome its concerns about the project. The project preparation team was 
requested to work out a reduced program, but the Stockholm office eventually 
conceded the main strategic point and gave instructions to the effect that the 
new plan should encompass, among other things, “such experimental activities 
in the field of agriculture as would seem particularly likely to result in 
interesting ‘innovations’ within an initial period of three years.”496 Most likely 
because of Hjelm and Nekby’s strong resistance to changes in that regard, 
SIDA thus remained committed to an integrated rural development program 
based on scientific interventions in agricultural production. The challenge 
posed to the role of the college’s agrarian expertise faded away, and the project 
planning continued along the lines originally envisioned by Hjelm, Nekby, and 
their colleagues. A productivist, scientific focus came to guide the first phase 
of the project. 
The Ethiopian government eventually also overcame its concerns. Cohen 
suggests that it concluded that the project’s impact could be compatible with 
the existing political system, which presumably meant that the government 
believed that the social implications of technical progress could be 
contained.497 The final negotiations were conducted by Forsse and Tesfa 
Bushen during the late summer of 1967, resulting in the conclusion of an 
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agreement in early September. Sweden agreed to provide the project with 
competent expatriate staff as required and to bear 67% of the financial costs of 
the project, excluding salaries for Ethiopian high- and mid-level staff. Besides 
paying 33% of the financial costs, Ethiopia would also contribute land and 
perform some road construction.498 The agreement would be in effect for three 
years, from 1967 to 1970, after which the suitability of an extension would be 
evaluated. 
An U-tuna in Ethiopia 
Project activities, with preliminary studies of local climates, vegetation, and 
farming practices, had already been ongoing in Chilalo for some time. With the 
formal signing of the Ethio-Swedish agreement in September 1967, the U-tuna, 
as SIDA officials now playfully called it, could also be formally initiated.499 U-
tuna is an untranslatable, but very telling, piece of wordplay: the u-prefix stood 
for development or possibly developing (utveckling in Swedish), and at the 
time was widely used in Swedish concepts referring to the developing world: 
u-land (developing country), u-hjälp (development aid), and so on. The U-tuna 
notion thus described CADU as a developing country instantiation of the 
Agricultural College in Ultuna, succinctly summarizing how clear the 
important role of the college in the project was to SIDA’s decision-makers. 
CADU was established as an agency within the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Agriculture, overseen by an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Minister 
of Agriculture and with Bengt Nekby as its executive director.500 It thus 
became the first Swedish aid project to be organized as an integrated part of the 
recipient country’s administration, even if it came to have considerable 
autonomy in practice. Nekby summarizes the official objectives as follows: 
 
 To bring about economic and social development in the project area 
 To give the local population an increased awareness of and 
responsibility for the development work 
 To verify methods of agricultural development 
 To train staff501 
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These goals were not in any official order of priority, but creating economic 
incentives was de facto prioritized in the early stages of the project, with social 
development expected to follow from this.502 In practice, this meant creating 
innovations with the potential to increase farmers’ production and providing 
new outlets for selling the increased production. 
The project was organized into five departments, most of them with a 
number of subsections, as well as six independent sections under the executive 
director (see the organizational plan in figure 12). 
 
Figure 12. CADU’s organizational structure during the period of the first Ethio-Swedish 
agreement, 1967–1970.503 
This organizational structure suggests that the project, even after the reductions 
mandated by SIDA, retained a wide scope of activities. The central ones, in 
line with the general strategy, were those related directly to agricultural 
production and marketing—agricultural and animal husbandry 
experimentation, extension and education, marketing activities, and the 
provision of credit for the purchase of inputs. Also central to the project was 
the planning and evaluation section, tasked with gathering data and monitoring 
project developments and effects as well as developing new methods based on 
project experiences.504 
                                                        
502 Nekby, CADU, 47. 
503 From Nekby, CADU, 95. 
504 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, 76. 
180 
Local Science and Centrist Thinking: Research and Extension for Agrarian 
Transformation 
CADU’s research activities made up the center of the project; it was from them 
all development incentives would be generated. Its crop production and 
protection experiments were carried out by the crop production department. 
Led by Harald Linder and Dagnatchew Yirgou, it began to implement the 
program of adaptive research envisioned by the project planners, 
experimenting with twenty-one different cereals, legumes and oilseed crops.505 
Most significantly for the project, trials with various kinds of wheat, including 
Ethiopian material as well as material collected from research programs in 
Mexico and Kenya, soon produced well-adapted varieties. The most notable 
successes were made with varieties of wheat bred in Mexico. When 
supplemented by a tested fertilizer package, these yielded harvests up to twice 
as large as the local material.506 CADU also ran its own seed production 
operation at the project farm in Kulumsa, where the improved seed varieties 
were produced, cleaned and tested before being sold to farmers. Other 
activities included crop protection and weeding experiments. 
The focus of the animal husbandry research was cattle breeding. Though 
oxen were central to the rural economy of Chilalo, the breeding program did 
not aim to improve draft animals but instead centered on establishing a viable 
dairy production in the region.507 Indigenous Chilalo cattle yielded little milk, 
so CADU crossbred local heifers with higher-yielding breeds imported from 
Europe. The department’s research focused on devising methods of feeding 
and housing the new crossbreeds in ways well adapted to the local conditions: 
this included research on milking, feeding, fencing, and cattle shed design. 
When tended correctly and fed sufficient amounts, yield increases could be 
enormous: the crossbreeds yielded up to 1500 liters of milk annually, whereas 
the yield from indigenous cattle normally was around 200 liters.508 Farmers 
were instructed on the basis of the research results and were then provided with 
crossbreeds as a kind of test. Those who successfully managed the higher-
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yielding animals were given the opportunity to buy them, or alternatively were 
offered artificial insemination of their own cattle.509 
CADU also performed research on agricultural implements with the aim 
of developing new and more efficient farm tools. The research focused on 
creating alternatives or new implements for soil preparation, harvest and 
postharvest activities, and transport. A new iron plow was developed as an 
alternative to the ard, a harrow was introduced, and other research focused on 
sickles, scythes, threshing, grain storage, wheelbarrows, and ox-carts. 
Though its planners had rejected the idea of introducing capital-intensive 
technologies, during its first years the project also provided hire services for 
mechanized equipment.510 
In order to transfer the research results to local farmers and encourage them 
to take up the new innovations, CADU operated extension and marketing 
activities. The premise for the latter was that farmers needed to know that they 
could easily turn increased production into increased incomes if they were to 
have reason to experiment with new agricultural approaches. CADU thus 
established a number of trade centers throughout Chilalo where the project 
bought wheat and milk from farmers. These centers competed with traditional 
wheat merchants, who, according to Nekby and Cohen, tended to take 
advantage of the local farmers’ ignorance of the prices at larger markets. The 
milk trade, for its part, was effectively created by CADU.511 CADU also 
attempted to form peasant cooperatives for marketing and procurement but 
decided to move slowly in this regard and first build local trust in the project. 
Status differences among farmers and resistance from local elites were also 
constraints on the formation of cooperatives, and in the end, they had little 
impact in Chilalo before the revolution.512 
Extension activities were based on a system of model farmers and extension 
agents. Model farmers were elected by farmers living in designated 800-
hectare areas and were then given instructions by CADU’s extension agents, 
early in the project primarily in the use of the new crop production inputs. Part 
of the model farmers’ land was also used as demonstration plots where 
extension agents held field days. Further demonstration plots were established 
in locations where people would gather, on major roads and around churches 
and marketplaces. This demonstration approach, which had a long history in 
Sweden and in Western societies more generally, was chosen as a way to 
spread information and illustrate what the project offered in an illiterate 
                                                        
509 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, 89–90. 
510 Nekby, CADU, 70. 
511 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, 81–82; Nekby, CADU, 53–56. 
512 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, 116–17. 
182 
society. The project also emphasized the importance of identifying innovative 
farmers, who were ready to experiment and whose example could inspire more 
cautious neighbors.513 The number of model farmers grew steadily, exceeding 
four hundred by 1973.514 As a whole, these extension methods proved effective 
in terms of outreach. “[A]ll but the most remote” farmers in Chilalo became 
aware of the project’s message, according to Cohen.515 
 
Figure 13. A CADU extension agent outside the extension office in Itaya. Offices like these were 
established in the extension districts set up throughout Chilalo awraja, and the extension agents 
working there provided instruction to model farmers and held field days throughout the district to 
disseminate the project’s message.516 Photo Per L-B Nilsson. 
The final piece of the package intended to generate agricultural development 
in Chilalo was the provision of cheap credit to farmers, specifically to enable 
them to buy the inputs provided by the project. The interest rates on these 
loans were low enough to make them de facto subsidies.517 It was an early 
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form of microcredit, something that had also been an important part of the 
Comilla project. Credit provision was handled at the trade centers under the 
supervision of CADU extension agents and credit was only given in kind, as 
seed and fertilizer. 
The activities carried out by CADU’s research departments were wide-
ranging and in many ways successful. But on close inspection, they also 
highlight that it proved difficult for the project to fully reconcile modern 
agronomic techniques with the idea of local adaptation. The project’s 
innovations made farming a significantly more complex activity. The new 
wheat varieties and the crossbred cattle were great technical successes in the 
sense that they drastically increased yield potentials. However, they demanded 
much more attention than traditional cultivars and cows if the potential was to 
be realized. They also needed more in terms of input. The crossbred cattle 
produced significantly more milk, but at the expense of significantly more 
feed. Similarly, the new wheat varieties required fertilizer inputs, which, in 
turn, increased the demand for either labor for weeding or the application of 
herbicides. In both cases, it was easier for the already better-off farmers to 
experiment with new methods and inputs. So although the technologies CADU 
developed were technically well-adapted to their environment, they were in 
some ways less well-adapted to the task of supporting low-income farmers. 
Other technologies exemplify more serious problems of adaptation. 
Notably, CADU’s European-style iron plow, designed to improve soil 
preparation and reduce the time needed for plowing, was largely rejected by 
farmers. While they recognized the benefits of a more efficient plow, they 
considered CADU’s design too heavy for the farmers who had to carry the 
plow to the field but particularly for the oxen that were to pull it.518 In this 
case, the problems with the new technology in fact vindicated conclusions 
already drawn, as insufficient traction power was a risk that the project 
planners had earlier highlighted in their Report No. 1.519 Similar trends could 
be found in the crop production department as well. CADU attempted to 
promote other crops—mainly maize, legumes, and teff—besides the new wheat 
varieties, but with little success. Farmers also rejected CADU’s attempts to sell 
them clean seed produced by the project, preferring to use their own.520 The 
new and more complex crop rotations and weed control methods advocated by 
CADU likewise failed to become popular, and a later evaluation of the 
department suggested that the problems had resulted from a lack of research. 
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For the weed control methods, the evaluation specifically blamed the lack of 
investigations under “actual farm conditions.”521 
Many of these problems arguably were due to continued centrist thinking. It 
proved hard for the Swedish experts to escape from their habitual way of relating 
to a rural environment, even when this conflicted with the adaptation ideology 
that constituted the core of the project’s research strategy. Traces of this centrist 
thinking can be found in rather innocent examples, such as when Harald Linder, 
who had been instrumental in building up CADU’s crop production department, 
wrote about his travels through a “wonderful” agricultural landscape in Ethiopia 
in an article in the Agricultural College’s staff magazine. Linder, a major 
proponent of the service science ideal, had long experience of working with 
farmers in Sweden and had been pivotal in planning and carrying out the 
practical adaptive research that enabled very significant yield increases in 
Chilalo. He would also later explicitly argue for the importance of foreign aid 
focusing on practical agriculture and farmers’ actual problems.522 Even so, his 
article described how he daydreamed about seeing the wonderful landscape 
exploited by “large-scale, highly mechanized agriculture,” before he snapped 
back to reality and reminded himself that he and his colleagues were in Ethiopia 
to help small farmers and needed to keep agriculture labor intensive.523 This is 
not to suggest that Linder could not distinguish daydream from reality, nor to 
discount the profound value of his research at CADU, but rather to indicate that 
the context in which one’s expertise has developed unavoidably keeps 
influencing how one relates to one’s surroundings.  
I will also present a wholly different example that shows clearly how 
centrist thinking can undermine the entire project of producing knowledge. 
CADU included a set of activities oriented to what was identified as women’s 
issues. These activities went through several incarnations, from being part of 
adult education in general to a separate project division for women’s extension 
and finally a division for what was labeled home economics.524 CADU’s 
reports on them provide interesting insights into how CADU staff understood, 
or failed to understand, some basic premises of the society in which they were 
operating. One of the reports contains a survey used to gather information on 
the activities of women in one part of Chilalo. In one of the questions, the 
women were asked to indicate how long they cooked certain common 
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foodstuffs: “Not at all,” “To boiling point,” “1–10 min,” “10–20 min,” or 
“More.”525 That counting time in minutes was a central organizing principle of 
most activities for the Western or educated Ethiopian person evidently 
obscured the fact that few rural women owned watches or, even if they did, 
would not time their cooking and thus could not answer this question in the 
way intended by the survey’s designer.526 It is a good example of how centrist 
biases, in this case likely also shaped by gender biases, limited what could be 
learned and how that knowledge could be used. 
Rural Transformation in Practice 
Experimentation, marketing, extension and credit constituted the core of 
CADU’s efforts to transform Chilalo agriculture, much as had been envisioned 
by its creators at the Agricultural College.527 After two years of these activities, 
CADU was evaluated by a team of experts appointed by SIDA and the 
Ethiopian government. The evaluation was generally favorable and 
recommended a geographical expansion of the project, though it noted that the 
project had had difficulty in achieving its social mobilization objectives. One 
of the Ethiopian-appointed experts, Professor Brana Milosavljevic, was 
particularly critical in this respect and noted that it would be impossible for a 
“production-oriented project such as CADU, under what might be described as 
the paternalistic control of agricultural technicians,” to stimulate the local 
population’s ability to participate in a development project.528 What 
Milosavljevic referred to here was not participation in the narrow sense of 
taking advantage of what the project offered but in the broader sense of 
participation in processes of social change. He suggested, ultimately, that 
CADU’s methods and goals were incompatible; that the technocentric 
approach concerned primarily with the economic effects derivable from the 
project’s research, extension, and credit facilities would not lead to the desired 
local empowerment in Chilalo. 
Milosavljevic was more or less correct in this regard. CADU’s promotion of 
participation struggled in the face of a hostile political environment. Its 
management had come to distrust the conservative local government officials 
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and attempted to isolate the project from them as much as possible.529 These 
officials, for their part, tended to see CADU as a threat to their own power base 
and could, together with other local elites, discourage smallholders from 
participation.530 The estrangement from large swaths of the local community is 
well illustrated by the failure of the awraja development committee, an organ 
intended to facilitate dialog between the project and its environment. Most 
local interests were represented on the committee, which consisted of the 
“awraja governor, the mayor of Asella, the governors of woredas [awraja 
subparts] in the project area, the provincial education officer, health officer, 
agriculture officer, and land reform officer, the executive and assistant 
executive directors of CADU, representatives of farmers in each of the six 
extension areas, and representatives of the major area businessmen and 
landowners.”531 But this broad representation was itself a reason for the 
committee’s failure. Cohen notes how, when the committee first met in early 
1969, it became obvious that “its members varied considerably in terms of 
status and power,” something that “inhibited discussion.” The farmers’ 
representatives were in fact hesitant even to speak, not to mention put forward 
criticism, in the presence of elites. Thus the meeting led to nothing, and no 
further meetings were held.532 This failure is somewhat ironic given that the 
planning documents attached considerable importance to good relations with 
local officials. As it turned out, CADU’s best relations in Ethiopian politics 
were with Tesfa Bushen and a few other high-ranking central government 
officials in Addis Ababa (notably Belay Abal and Baleba Demeksa),533 while 
the local government turned out to be largely in the hands of the social and 
economic elite and became seen by the project as something best avoided. In 
the end, much of the coordination between CADU and the local administration 
had to go through Addis Ababa.534 
Though the project had good connections in the national government and 
the project’s promoters in Sweden tended to emphasize its role as a progressive 
force in Ethiopian politics, there was in fact little headway being made on 
tenancy or land reform legislation.535 While the Ethiopian government had 
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issued a proclamation of its intention to reform tenancy laws and to make other 
changes with regards to land ownership and distribution, little of this had 
actually taken place. When the first three-year agreement on CADU neared its 
expiry date and negotiations started about a five-year extension, this lack of a 
proven willingness to reform made the future of the project uncertain. The 
Swedish side was particularly concerned about the lack of progress on new 
tenancy legislation, which was considered a precondition for reaching the large 
tenant population in Chilalo. 
Part of the problems of reaching a new agreement resulted from the fact that 
the social consequences of agricultural development were more acute issues in 
1970 than they had been when the project was planned. The context of the new 
negotiations was thus different from when the project’s principal guidelines had 
first been drawn up by the experts from the Agricultural College. They had 
acknowledged the need for reform but had put most of their efforts into their own 
areas of expertise, a prioritization they shared with most agricultural 
development expertise at the time. In 1970, Erich Jacoby, who had headed 
FAO’s Land Reform Branch from 1951 to 1967, was interviewed in a SIDA-
published magazine. Jacoby criticized FAO for not having succeeded in 
integrating technical and social aspects of development during the 1950s and 
1960s and generally for prioritizing technical factors while, for political reasons, 
being “very afraid of touching upon the whole problem of income 
distribution.”536 Jacoby was an important authority, who after his time at FAO 
had moved to Gunnar Myrdal’s Institute for International Economic Studies at 
Stockholm University (as discussed above, Myrdal himself strongly emphasized 
the social and institutional dimensions of agricultural development). 
Though directed at FAO, it would have been clear to all involved that parts 
of Jacoby’s criticism applied to CADU as well (the editors of the SIDA 
magazine had, rather pointedly, put the interview with Jacoby on the same 
page spread as a full-page photograph of grazing animals in Chilalo). This is 
not to say that everybody fully shared his views, but to suggest that the matter 
could not be avoided and thus that it would be politically difficult for SIDA to 
sign a new agreement with the foot-dragging Ethiopian government. This was 
further exacerbated by the fact that the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
had established a new department for development aid, staffed to a large extent 
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by younger and more radical diplomats hostile to Sweden’s provision of aid to 
such a distinctly non-progressive regime as Haile Selassie’s.537 
In the end, Sweden agreed to a six-month temporary extension, at the end of 
which its support would be withdrawn if the Ethiopian government had not 
made tangible reform progress.538 Further activities by the Ethiopian 
government in late 1970 were however received positively by the Swedish 
negotiators, and CADU was eventually extended through 1975, on the 
condition that reform progress continued. Point 2 of Article VI of the new 
agreement explicitly made this a responsibility of the Ethiopian government: 
 
In support of but not included in the Project, the Imperial Ethiopian Government 
shall carry out as specified in the Plan of Operation agricultural tenancy and 
other land reform measures and undertake or cause to be undertaken such other 
measures as are essential prerequisites for the accomplishment of the purpose of 
the Project. In particular, the Imperial Ethiopian Government shall start the 
implementation throughout the Project Area of agricultural tenancy legislation 
not later than one year after its promulgation.539 
 
Sweden thus formally predicated its support for CADU during the period of the 
second agreement on an Ethiopian commitment to tenancy and land reform. In 
fact, little progress would be made before the revolution in 1974. A limited bill 
on agricultural tenancy reform made it to the Ethiopian parliament but no 
further.540 SIDA, however, never exercised its possibility to withdraw Swedish 
funding, for reasons not explored here. 
Another part of the friction over the extension had to do with the fact that 
by 1970 experiences from Chilalo had further heightened awareness of the 
need for reform. In the early 1970s, a local agrarian revolution was taking 
place in the area and CADU was its driving force. Contemporaneous accounts 
make it clear that it was visibly apparent that Chilalo was rapidly changing. In 
a 1970 article in the Agricultural College’s staff magazine, Swedish CADU 
employee Martin Wik described the return to the awraja (after vacationing in 
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Sweden) as going back to an area moving forward amid Ethiopia’s general 
poverty and stagnation: 
 
We were not very happy when we thus reacquainted ourselves with Addis 
Ababa. We suddenly saw everything clearly again. The dirt and the poverty hit 
us with almost the same withering force as the time when we first set foot on 
Ethiopian soil. . . . We enter Chilalo. Something has happened here. The road is 
lined with undulating wheat fields. Just maybe! Our spirits rise. Kilometer after 
kilometer. We pass Kulumsa. The maize stands tall and fine. We stretch our 
necks. Yes, the fodder beets look like they should. So last year’s astounding 
results were no coincidence. 
Asella town usually makes no one happy. Most of it is much the same, yet 
something has happened. There is eager digging on both sides of the road. A 
store of pipes confirms the thought. The Asella residents will finally be rid of 
having to fetch their water from the polluted little brooks that meander among 
the chicka houses.541 
 
The “undulating wheat fields,” which to Wik represented some of CADU’s 
achievements, did indeed signify important change. Wheat was the crop that 
CADU’s crop production department had been the most successful at adapting, 
and the area under wheat cultivation in Chilalo was steadily increasing. The 
number of farmers taking part in the credit scheme increased as well. By 1971, 
the project reached 25% of its target population, and those participating stood 
to significantly increase their harvests and incomes.542 But the benefits did not 
always reach the intended target group of low-income farmers. For by the early 
1970s, the tenancy conditions and social relations of rural Ethiopia had clearly 
begun to shape the effects of the project’s interventions, just as Ståhlberg and 
the early anthropological studies had predicted. While incomes were up across 
the population, the distribution was skewed, with large farmers’ incomes 
increasing much faster.543 One reason had been recognized all along: the 
poorest farmers were generally sharecropping tenants with little incentive to 
increase their production. Another reason was that it was easier and less risky 
for more prosperous farmers to experiment with the increased farming 
complexity brought on by CADU’s innovations. 
Most crucially however, the aforementioned alienation from the local 
structures of power meant that the project’s effects were shaped by a social 
environment that it had little power to influence. The prevailing patron-client 
relations, rigid social structures, and prolandowner policies of local officials all 
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tended to steer project benefits disproportionally toward the larger farmers and 
the local elite.544 In the clear-cut language of agricultural economist Winfried 
Manig’s analysis of the project, “[t]he productivity growth achieved by 
utilizing modern technologies was redistributed along the lines of existing 
societal modes of distribution.”545 This problem was not unique to CADU but 
was a more general problem of the Green Revolution. For example, the 
situation in Chilalo bears clear resemblance to Harwood’s conclusions about 
the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP), one of the early Green Revolution 
projects from the 1940s.546 MAP’s agronomists developed cultivars well-
tailored to the Mexican environments, and initially wanted to promote these 
among small-holding farmers. But the project lacked a good knowledge 
transfer mechanism and MAP’s staff was eventually pressured into adjusting 
their breeding work with the goal of rapid uptake in mind. This brought with it 
a shift toward a focus on large-scale farming. CADU did not experience such a 
shift, but the basic tension was the same. In Chilalo as in Mexico, it was easier 
for larger farmers to experiment with agricultural innovations. 
That the project found it difficult to reach its primary target group was a 
serious problem in itself. But a more sinister process that would come to 
seriously damage the project’s external reputation was also well under way: a 
large number of tenants had been evicted from their land by landowners to 
whom CADU had made it abundantly clear that modern agriculture, in 
particular in its mechanized form, could be a profitable commercial 
endeavor. The development was aggravated by the fact that the Ethiopian 
government supported landowners who wanted to mechanize agricultural 
operations on their holdings.547 The Second Ethiopian Five-Year 
Development Plan, in effect from 1962 to 1967, stated that “[t]he 
Government will help and stimulate, by all convenient economic measures, 
the establishment and development of big private commercial farms.” These 
measures included tax exemptions, credit on favorable terms and access to 
government land.548 They had helped bring about a new group of landowning 
entrepreneurs interested in large-scale commercial agriculture, which they 
wanted to undertake themselves, in contrast to the traditional absentee 
landlords, who were content with extracting rent from their tenants.549 
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The scale of the evictions in Chilalo became apparent to SIDA and the 
project through a study by Henock Kifle at CADU’s planning and evaluation 
department, made available by the project in August 1970 (before the new five-
year agreement had been signed).550 A cover letter to the study by CADU’s 
new executive director, Paulos Abraham, expressed concern about 
developments in the project area: 
 
As you can gather from this study, mechanization has taken place at a fast rate 
especially during the last three years; CADU as an agent of improved practices 
seems to have contributed to the process; the process seems likely to continue. 
The consequence of primary concern to CADU are [sic] the likely effects on 
tenants, the worsening of the terms of contract for tenants and increased 
skewedness of income distribution.551 
 
SIDA took Henock’s findings seriously. At a follow-up meeting, all present 
considered the contents of his report “very serious” with regard to the future of 
CADU. A number of mitigating strategies were discussed, including the hiring 
of evicted tenants by CADU and the suggestion that the project might itself 
lease land from absentee landlords, and then, in turn, lease this land to some of 
those evicted.552 Mitigation strategies were also eventually implemented, and 
most likely had some positive impact, though Cohen suggests that none was 
fully successful. Evictions continued in areas affected by the project until the 
revolution.553 
In his dissertation, Seleshi Sisaye raises the important question of whether the 
evictions or other socioeconomic problems related to CADU were foreseen by the 
project planners. He argues that “examination of the internal correspondence and 
interviews with people who were actively involved in the project planning and 
administration made it clear that eviction [sic] was not anticipated in advance.”554 
In contrast, the internal correspondence and working material I have examined for 
this study show that it was repeatedly pointed out during the planning stages that 
tenant evictions would be a likely consequence of productivity-stimulating 
interventions in Chilalo agriculture, unless these interventions were preceded by 
land and/or tenancy reforms. My conclusion is that although the planners and 
managers could not officially admit it, they must have considered the risk of a 
                                                        
550 Paulos Abraham to Lars Leander, 18 August 1970; Henock Kifle, “Preliminary Investigations 
on Mechanized Farming and Its Effects on Peasant Agriculture,” both in SIDA, series F1 AB, vol. 
778. 
551 Paulos to Leander, 18 August 1970, 1, SIDA, series F1 AB, vol. 778. 
552 Lars Leander, “Anteckningar från sammanträde på SIDA den 10.9.1970 beträffande rapport 
från CADU: Preliminary Investigations on Mechanized Farming and Its Effects on Peasant 
Agriculture by Henock Kifle,” SIDA, series F1 AB, vol. 778. 
553 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, 127–29. 
554 Seleshi Sisaye, Development Aid, 164. 
192 
certain number of evictions acceptable (if unfortunate) in light of the greater good 
the project was assumed to bring. Perhaps this was still a sensitive issue for SIDA 
in the late 1970s, when Seleshi performed his research. 
Seleshi also presents a second conclusion: that no one at SIDA or none of the 
planning staff had expected CADU to make such a noticeable impact so quickly. 
I believe this is correct. The scale of the eviction problem came as a surprise and 
caused genuine and serious concern among project managers and SIDA staff. 
The evictions also turned the project into a politically sensitive matter, as they 
began to take place at a time when the question of what sort of societies Swedish 
aid should support, and whether there were more palatable candidates than Haile 
Selassie’s stagnating empire, was increasingly being discussed. 
The Appropriation of Project Knowledge 
One reason why CADU’s planners and managers were surprised by the 
project’s impact is that they underestimated the ability of actors in Chilalo to 
appropriate project knowledge. The mechanized operation of the project’s 
experiment and seed production farm at Kulumsa is a case in point. According 
to Cohen, Kulumsa was a main source of inspiration to many of the landlords 
who evicted tenants.555 Its development into a Western-style farm had been 
deemed necessary for the project’s purposes: in a trip report by the Agricultural 
College’s Ewert Åberg, in which he detailed his travels through the project 
area in late 1966, his view of the matter is clear: 
 
With the current agricultural operations at the [Kulumsa Seed Improvement 
Station], the present resources are not utilized. The crop rotation needs to be 
radically changed. In conjunction with this, managers with good practical 
experience are needed, such as agricultural managers with experience of 
intensive operations in Swedish agriculture. . . . It seems however possible that 
the farm could be developed into a seed production farm if measures for a 
rational agricultural operation are taken.556 
 
However, the discussion about the project’s need for a rationally organized 
seed production farm apparently did not consider the possible knowledge 
transfer effects of operating a farm according to a Western model of 
mechanized farming in the project area, especially in an Ethiopian context 
where government subsidies were available for mechanization. 
As Michael Ståhl has pointed out, there was also a deeper contradiction at play 
here: all of CADU’s attempts to support small-farm agriculture were embedded in 
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a political environment where large-scale commercial farming was simultaneously 
encouraged by the Imperial government.557 The project planners underestimated 
the implications of this contradiction. This conclusion can be stated more 
generally: they underestimated the extent to which Chilalo society could shape the 
project’s effects because (in spite of their commitment to peasant agency) they did 
not fully grasp that this society was full of actors who could appropriate project 
knowledge in their own ways and for their own purposes. This top-down bias 
reflects the conditions of the project’s initial conception at the Agricultural 
College, where, as noted, there was little research in fields such as rural sociology, 
history, or anthropology. The underappreciation of the agency of actors in Chilalo 
society is well illustrated by the fact that while the project’s strategy largely rested 
on the power of the model, with an elaborate system of extension agents and model 
farmers created to disseminate knowledge among the peasants, no one seems to 
have considered that the example of Kulumsa could likewise work as a model for 
an audience of larger landowners.558 As a consequence of this underappreciation, 
the Swedish experts had not prepared for what in fact happened: CADU became 
involved in a rural transformation process that increased social tensions and 
became devastating for a significant number of tenant farmers in Chilalo. 
This point is also perhaps the most significant instance in this dissertation in 
which my use of Swedish sources limits my analysis. It would have been very 
interesting to gain more detailed insight into Ethiopian agency with regard to 
the knowledge offered by, and represented at, CADU; to study how different 
actors in Ethiopia understood and related to the project and what purposes they 
thought it could serve for them. It is clear that different parts of the project 
were actively appropriated in different ways by different actors, and studying 
this would have brought me closer to a reciprocal understanding of CADU and 
what it meant in the setting in which it was situated. Further research 
contrasting my views on the Swedish expertise with an analysis of CADU from 
an Ethiopian perspective would be very welcome, in particular in relation to 
the ensuing revolution which partly originated and fed on rural tensions, 
including in Chilalo (see below). 
As knowledge of the evictions and their links to CADU spread, the debates 
about the project became increasingly polarized. Those who emphasized the 
technical side and focused on quantitative measures such as the number of 
farmers reached, agricultural yields, or average household incomes saw the 
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project as a great success, if with some inadvertent side effects.559 Most SIDA 
decision-makers as well as the project’s planners at the Agricultural College 
belonged in this camp. On the other hand, those who factored in social equity 
as a measure of success tended to have attitudes ranging from hesitant to 
denunciatory. The fiercest criticisms came from leftist radicals who understood 
CADU as doing little but promoting private ownership and increasing social 
disparities.560 In a review of Bengt Nekby’s book on CADU for the socialist 
periodical Kommentar, economist Anders Sjöberg even claimed that the real—
if secret—goal of CADU was to accelerate Ethiopia’s transition to capitalism 
by mechanizing agriculture and contributing to the creation of a landless 
proletariat available for industrial labor.561 
My study provides little empirical support for Sjöberg’s Marxist analysis of 
CADU’s ultimate goal,562 but it still draws attention to an important point. Even 
if we assume that CADU had no hidden agenda, it still proved beneficial to those 
Chilalo landowners who had an interest in mechanized agriculture, though this 
was never a project goal; it likewise proved disastrous for those tenants who 
were evicted, even if they were part of the group of smallholding Chilalo farmers 
whom the project was intended to empower. Secret agendas are not needed to 
explain the fact that complex projects such as CADU generally accomplish a 
variety of things, many of which often go well beyond the intentions of the 
designers.563 In this case, a small-holder-focused project was inserted into a 
sociopolitical setting supportive of large-scale farming and, as a consequence, 
came to function as a much broader knowledge transfer instrument than had been 
intended; came to serve more interests than those envisioned. The chief value of 
Sjöberg and his less extreme comrades’ criticisms lay in their drawing attention 
to this, and in their consequent analyses of how the design of the project’s 
interventions shaped who was able to benefit. 
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The merits of this argumentation were not always recognized by the 
project’s defenders, such as Lennart Hjelm. He toured Chilalo in 1971 and then 
wrote a travel report to SIDA that downplayed the evictions and CADU’s 
causal role in the ongoing rural transformation: 
 
An earlier investigation has showed that some landowners now terminate tenancy 
agreements and go on to run their own agricultural operations. This would, 
however, only affect some one hundred tenants. [The project] intended to further 
study this development, which probably would have taken place without CADU 
since fertilizer, seed and machinery can easily be bought and utilized with good 
economic benefit. Through CADU the technological advances can instead also be 
used by small farmers, who, moreover, have received stable marketing conditions. 
CADU has also convinced many landowners to establish contracts with their 
tenants and improve the tenancy conditions.564 
 
Hjelm’s suggestion that the number of evictions was limited to a hundred tenants 
is remarkable, given that CADU’s own estimates indicated well over four 
hundred evictions in 1969 and 1970 alone. This number also continued to 
increase, though it is impossible to judge how many of these evictions would 
have taken place also in the absence of the project.565 The experiences from 
Chilalo had thus done little to make Hjelm reconsider the development strategy 
he had promoted. In fact, he was ready to take serious liberties with statistics in 
order to defend it, perhaps because he considered this necessary for the ongoing 
evolution of the Agricultural College, or because he genuinely believed in 
CADU as a force of good in the long term—or possibly for personal reasons, as 
the project, at least in certain circles, was closely associated with his name. 
Hjelm continued his defense of the project by lambasting, in his 
characteristically acerbic fashion, those who saw fit to criticize CADU while 
themselves lacking all agricultural experience: 
 
It is naive and unfair to claim that CADU has strongly stimulated [the 
commercialization of Ethiopian agriculture]. The ignorance exhibited by a 
number of Swedish youth, journalists and even visiting administrators and 
members of parliament could perhaps be excusable, were it not for the fact that 
they propagate these falsehoods in contexts of significance. They very 
confidently pronounce on agricultural matters while never having had any 
practical or theoretical contact with the field and despite never having caused a 
single seed to sprout.566 
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Hjelm also stood by these points publicly. He reworked the travel report for a 
general audience and published it in the major daily newspaper Svenska 
Dagbladet as a contribution to the by-then quite heated public debate about 
CADU and Swedish aid to Ethiopia in general.567 
It must be acknowledged that while he grossly underestimated the number 
of evictions in his efforts to defend the project, Hjelm still had some good 
points. He was right in suggesting that CADU had helped many small farmers, 
both tenants and freeholders, to gain access to new technology and stabler 
marketing conditions. He was also correct in pointing out that outside the 
project, few institutions in Ethiopia cared for peasants and their interests. Even 
so, it is still easy to read Hjelm’s defense of the project, complete with a 
statement implying that only the opinions of those with agricultural experience 
carry any weight, as unwitting evidence of the socially blind technocracy the 
project was accused of being based on. He ignored—intentionally or not is 
hard to tell—the most crucial aspect of the debate, which was less about the 
causal effects of CADU as such, and more about the significance of a Swedish 
aid project being inadvertently drawn into and partly accentuating a rural 
conflict in which many poor farmers did in fact suffer. 
But even though CADU’s planners underestimated the rural tensions in 
Chilalo and how they would shape the results of the project, CADU did not 
create these tensions, nor can it be said to have directly caused any rural 
transformation by itself, except in some very particular and localized 
situations.568 And it is clear that CADU had a positive impact in Chilalo as 
well, as it gave many poor farmers an opportunity to improve their fortunes. 
The importance of the project’s demonstration of how food production could 
be increased in a national setting where, to use Cristopher Clapham’s words, 
“the relationship between food production and death by starvation is brutally 
clear,” should also not be underestimated.569 One can turn here to the concept 
of friction, as employed by Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing. She uses it as a metaphor 
for what can happen when knowledge moves between different contexts, and it 
is meant to signify that such movement has constructive as well as destructive 
potential.570 Both forms were realized when the development strategy devised 
at the Agricultural College was put to use in Chilalo. 
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CADU in Context 
From its inception, one of CADU’s goals had been to verify methods of 
agricultural development. As it proved very successful in increasing 
agricultural production, its core activities—credit provision and the 
demonstration of new inputs—were extended across Ethiopia in the early 
1970s, in what was called the Minimum Package Program (in contrast to 
CADU, which with its plethora of activities was seen as the maximum package 
for rural development). The Minimum Package Program was linked to the 
creation of the Ministry of Agriculture’s Extension and Project Implementation 
Department (EPID), itself a project with links to the Agricultural College. The 
SIDA-supported EPID aimed to strengthen the administrative capabilities of 
the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture, and it oversaw the implementation of 
the Minimum Package Program. I will not elaborate further on this here, but it 
is relevant to this dissertation, and to the historical record, to note the Ultuna 
connection: EPID, originally named the Agricultural Services Unit, was largely 
designed and set up by Nekby and another of Hjelm’s students, Nils-Ivar 
Isaksson, with Hjelm himself lobbying for the project in Sweden. During the 
early 1970s debate on Swedish aid to Ethiopia, Hjelm wrote a letter to the 
SIDA board of directors in which he argued in his familiar exasperated style 
that the Agricultural Services Unit was necessary to complete the work started 
by CADU, and that taking the “inexplicable” decision to cancel the planning 
would be a “considerable waste” of resources.571 
Though it initially had been hesitant about CADU’s goals, once in operation 
the Ethiopian government thus ostensibly supported the project and its 
extension across the country. CADU was regularly praised in the government’s 
English-language organ, the Ethiopian Herald, and was often shown to visiting 
foreign dignitaries, both heads of state and powerful development figures, 
including the director of the World Bank and former US Secretary of Defense, 
Robert McNamara. Haile Selassie himself also went to see the project on more 
than one occasion. But an incident in conjunction with an imperial visit in 1971 
betrays that fundamental tensions still existed over the project’s function and 
purposes. In preparation for the visit, Swedish ambassador Carl Bergenstråhle 
had prepared an address to the emperor. After submitting it to the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Agriculture for comments, Tesfa Bushen strongly recommended 
him to delete an offending passage. The passage, which both Tesfa and the 
minister of agriculture deemed wholly inappropriate to publicly put to Haile 
Selassie, dealt with the imperative to improve the conditions of the common 
man who “works in the fields.” Bergenstråhle relented and wrote a new speech, 
                                                        
571 Hjelm to the Board of Directors of SIDA, 16 February 1971, SIDA, series F1 AB, vol. 779. 
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but also sent a report to Stockholm in which he suggested that he considered 
Tesfa’s reaction exaggerated and to which he added the handwritten comment 
that, for his part, he did not think the emperor would have been disturbed by 
the original passage.572 
I cannot judge Bergenstråhle’s knowledge of court protocol, but his report 
to Stockholm betrays the limited insight he seemingly had into the sore spots of 
Ethiopian politics and CADU’s position in intra-Ethiopian conflicts. For one 
thing, increasing land alienation and other forms of socioeconomic pressure on 
peasants had given rise to a series of rural rebellions in Ethiopia since the end 
of the Italian occupation. A new uprising had taken place in Wollo province as 
late as 1970, directly linked to the introduction of mechanized farming.573 
Furthermore, political tensions were generally rising at the time, and rural 
issues played a major part. The most important opposition to the regime came 
from the radical student movement, centered at the Haile Selassie I University 
in Addis Ababa. It was growing into a revolutionary mass movement, and the 
government employed increasingly violent methods in its attempts to repress it. 
Land reform and peasant empowerment were core issues for the students who 
had promoted them since the mid-1960s under the slogan “land to the tiller.”574 
Bergenstråhle’s intended comments about the common peasants thus touched 
on issues much too sensitive to belong in a ceremonial address like the one he 
was to give. 
CADU, of course, focused its work on peasants, and this meant that it was 
becoming both an object and a subject of the political tension. The student 
movement was generally critical of CADU, seeing it as a government project 
that favored private interests at the expense of tenants and the most 
disenfranchised of the rural poor.575 Within CADU itself, many of the Ethiopian 
staff opposed the prevailing order as well, though they rather tended to view the 
project in a similar way to some at SIDA: that it in fact did not reinforce existing 
power relations but could help bring about the necessary conditions for 
change.576 In this regard, the project increasingly differed from other projects 
employing Green Revolution techniques, many of which were guided by a 
technocratic vision of problems solvable without political intervention.577 As I 
                                                        
572 Carl Bergenstråhle to Lennart Klackenberg, 3 November 1971, SIDA, series F1 AB, vol. 780. 
573 Bahru Zewde, History of Modern Ethiopia, 215–18. 
574 Bahru Zewde, History of Modern Ethiopia, 220–26. 
575 Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, 136–37. 
576 Johan Holmberg (interview by author, 29 October 2013), who worked at CADU in the early 
1970s, recalled that many of his Ethiopian colleagues had held this view. 
577 “Promoters of the Green Revolution,” write historians of science Alexis De Greiff A. and 
Mauricio Nieto Olarte, “assumed that a technical solution could solve deep social problems such as 
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have discussed above, CADU’s development strategy certainly put primacy on 
technical factors, but the Swedish aid administrators and diplomats’ push for 
social and legal reform in conjunction with CADU and, particularly, the 
Agricultural College’s strategy of focusing on poor peasants helped create 
conditions for a radicalization of the project (cf. figure 15 below), another thing 
that the Swedish ambassador perhaps ought not to remind the emperor of in 
public. The radicalization especially came with the rapid Ethiopianization during 
the second project period. Nekby stepped down at the end of 1970 and was 
replaced as executive director by first Paulos Abraham and then Henock Kifle.578 
The latter became involved in drafting plans for a rural land reform while 
directing CADU, and was at the center of a controversy that engulfed the project 
in the final months of Haile Selassie’s rule as a coalition of landlords engaged in 
a struggle against him and the project.579 
The rising rural tensions, of which CADU had become a part, contributed to 
the further mounting of political pressures in Ethiopia as the 1970s progressed. 
The military conflict in Eritrea (where an independence movement had arisen 
after its post-war federation with, and later annexation by, Ethiopia), the 
government’s inept handling of the catastrophic famine in the Wollo province 
in 1973, and the increasingly active and uncontainable student movement 
added further fuel to the fire. Eventually, the situation overtook the 
octogenarian emperor, who had lost touch with political developments and was 
unable to maintain the balance of power on which his position rested. In 1974, 
a coup d’état deposed Haile Selassie and ultimately led to a new socialist and 
Soviet-backed military regime. This meant that the social and political 
conditions that had shaped CADU’s activities and effects were overturned. The 
military junta, known as the Derg, was not hampered by any of the connections 
to the feudal elite that had prevented the imperial government from 
implementing a land reform. In early 1975, the military government thus 
abolished private ownership of land and allotted up to ten hectares to 
                                                                                                                                
land distribution and the exploitation of the work force.” De Greiff A. and Nieto Olarte, “South-
North Technoscientific Exchange,” 250; see also Harwood, Europe’s Green Revolution, 115. 
578 The pattern was similar throughout the project, with forty Swedes in senior positions in 1968 
being reduced to five in 1974. The total number of contract staff was around a thousand, 
complemented by another thousand daily laborers. Cohen, Integrated Rural Development, 80. 
579 The political tensions and struggles that arose around CADU at the end of the emperor’s reign 
have not been part of my analysis, but are discussed in a fairly recent master’s thesis from 
Ethiopia: Tariku Degu, “Transformation of Land Tenure and the Role of Peasant Associations in 
Eastern Arsii (1974–1991)” (MA Thesis, School of Graduate Studies, Addis Ababa University, 
July 2008), 23–32, http://etd.aau.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/6712/1/1.%20Tariku%20Degu.pdf. 
See also Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974–1987: A Transformation from 
an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 99–
100. 
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cultivators. CADU was expanded to cover all of Arussi—renamed Arsi—
province and then became known as the Arsi Rural Development Unit 
(ARDU). The new political and property regimes meant that the conditions 
under which ARDU operated, and the tasks it had to fulfill, were very different 
from CADU,580 and an analysis of ARDU and SEAD, as the final incarnation 
of the project was known, is beyond the scope of this book.581 
 
Figure 14. CADU crop production expert Dagnatchew Yirgou demonstrates an experimental plot 
to H.I.M. Haile Selassie, who is accompanied by his dog, Lulu. Photographer unknown.582 
Bringing Ultuna to Addis and Arussi 
The Agricultural College’s integrated development and technology transfer 
strategy was characterized by a strong commitment to the application of 
agricultural science to the problem of developing agrarian societies. It was 
founded on a conception of applicable knowledge as highly localized, and so 
the project aimed to adapt knowledge to contexts rather than contexts to 
knowledge. When it became the basis of an actual development effort in 
                                                        
580 The new regime, infamous for its bloody purges, had a direct impact on many of CADU’s 
Ethiopian staff. Dagnatchew Yirgou briefly became Minister of Agriculture but later disappeared 
and is presumed to have been murdered. Tesfa Bushen narrowly escaped the same fate. Bengt 
Nekby’s successors as project director, Paulos Abraham and Henock Kifle, were given top 
government positions, but both eventually left Ethiopia, as did many other CADU-trained officials. 
Nekby, “Margareta och Bengt,” 8:90; Nekby, “Start Up and World Bank Perspective,” 6. 
581 For information on project developments after 1974, see Cohen, Integrated Rural 
Development, chapter 6. 
582 From Ulf Renborg, Birger Granström, and Nils-Erik Kasberg, eds., Lantbrukets högskola 50 
år: Utbildning, forskning, försök, information 1932–82 (Uppsala: Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences, 1982), 61. 
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Ethiopia, its planners and managers also paid attention to the characteristics of 
local societies and local farming practices, and they ensured that the project 
would have a built-in evaluation section to provide continuous self-reflection 
and method development. But for all the attention to the local, the planner’s 
perspective was limited by certain technocentric biases that came with their 
background as experts in agricultural production and economics. From their 
point of view, anthropological surveys and in-depth studies of local societies 
were very interesting but could ultimately only be auxiliary to the central part 
of the project, namely, agricultural experiments resulting in profit-generating 
innovations. They downplayed how social aspects would shape the uptake and 
effect of the new technologies utilized within the project. The very choices of 
Ethiopia and Chilalo as the location of the project were in important respects 
based on agronomic factors, in the face of socially disadvantageous conditions. 
And while the planners were aware of the risks inherent in economic 
development that had not been preceded by land and tenancy reform, the 
vested interests of the Agricultural College and their belief in science as a 
positive social force meant that they were ready to initiate the project even 
before any real reform progress had been made. The chapter thus shows how 
the Agricultural College’s proposed development strategy, which rested on a 
kind of localism embedded in a universalistic and centrist framework, went on 
to shape CADU as well. 
Its most clear expression, which is central to any understanding of CADU, 
was the gradually apparent imbalance between the in parts very successful 
knowledge production and the much more ambivalent knowledge 
dissemination. The project’s research activities were able to lay the foundation 
for very impressive cereal and milk yields in the area. But while these new 
seeds and cows had the potential to lift participants out of poverty, much of the 
benefits in fact went to farmers that were already better off. These problems 
with CADU’s knowledge transfer mechanism partly resulted from rigid social 
structures that could not be overcome, and partly from the fact that over time it 
became less sharply focused on local adaptations. Many failures of the 
knowledge transfer effort, such as the new iron plow, resulted from shortfalls 
in adaptation and in fact vindicated conclusions already drawn. Thus, even 
when cognizant of the need for adaptations and explicitly committed to this as 
a strategy, the Swedish experts easily fell back into their habitual patterns of 
relating to an agricultural environment. This is, I think, symptomatic of a more 
general problem, namely that they were unlikely to have fully understood that 
adaptation of technologies, in its strong sense, implied an extensive 
mobilization of local people in the adaptation process and the use of methods 
beyond the standard repertoire of experimentation and extension. 
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Another expression of the centrist localism is the project planners and 
managers’ underestimation of the extent to which different parts of Chilalo 
society would be able to actively appropriate selected parts of the project’s 
message. The clearest example is that while the project attempted to spread 
knowledge using model farmers and demonstration plots, the idea that the 
project’s own mechanized farm at Kulumsa could also function as a model to 
another group of actors was seemingly never taken into account. Ultimately, 
this meant CADU came to fuel a rural transformation that looked different 
from the one envisioned and intended. Though some negative social 
consequences, including evictions of tenants, must have been expected, the 
speed and scale of the transformation caught the project off guard. The obvious 
and well-publicized negative impact on some of the poor farmers in Chilalo 
then problematized CADU’s status in the context of an increasingly activist 
Swedish aid program. Aid policymakers, especially of the newer and more 
radical kind, who heard about evicted tenants and then contrasted Haile 
Selassie’s cautious speeches from the throne with Julius Nyerere’s Arusha 
Declaration found it very hard to view the former as a suitable candidate for 
further aid, and CADU’s supporters at SIDA were lucky that the project was 
not cancelled in 1970. 
It is difficult to conclude with certainty what determines the results of 
complex projects like CADU, and it has not been my aim to do so here. But the 
background I have presented at least suggests that both CADU’s successes and 
its failures can be understood as consequences of the encounter between the 
overall strategy developed at the Agricultural College and the Ethiopian natural 
and social environment. Under the prevailing conditions in Chilalo, this 
strategy stimulated a socioeconomic change that in several respects diverged 
from the one intended. This is not to say that the original idea of development 
through the creation of economic incentives for small-holding farmers was 
necessarily flawed as such, but once committed to this strategy and to the 
Ethiopian location (which, to some extent, was necessary for its technically 
successful implementation), there was probably little the project could have 
done to avoid negative social effects. And from the perspective of Hjelm, 
Nekby, and their colleagues, their help to self-help strategy was the only viable 
road toward development. It was also, as they clearly appreciated, necessary in 
order to legitimize the central role of the Agricultural College in a field project. 
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Figure 15. CADU was increasingly radicalized in the early 1970s and by the time of the 
revolution openly dissident factions were in control. The image shows the front page of the 
CADU newsletter, “Limat” (the Amharic word for development), from the September 1974 issue, 
the very month Haile Selassie was imprisoned by the army. Its editorial begins by stating: 
“History has time and again taught us that at a transitional stage, the ruling class makes a frantic 
and desperate attempt to hold on to the old order.” It later makes the (somewhat revisionist) claim 
that “[e]nd to all feudalist oppression has been CADU’s goal ever since its inception” and that 
“[t]here should be no illusion that the forces of reaction will peacefully accept fundamental 
changes.” My thanks to Lars Leander for letting me borrow the newsletter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Rise and Fall of the Rural Development Pair 
The Institutional Collaboration between SIDA and SLU, 1966–1996 
SIDA’s cooperation with [SLU] is particularly substantial. [SLU’s] new and 
integrated rural development division, which has been created from the 
development sections of the former Agricultural College as well as the College 
of Forestry and the Veterinary College, employs around 20 people – more than 
are working at SIDA’s agricultural division.583 
IN 1978, A government inquiry published the quote above in its final report on 
the organization of Swedish development aid. It describes the growth of 
institutional structures for cooperation between SIDA and the then newly 
formed SLU. Over a ten-year period, these had grown from a one-man 
operation specifically servicing the CADU project into a twenty-person 
division at the university that employed more staff than its counterpart and 
principal at SIDA and handled a wide range of tasks including education, 
recruiting, and project-related consulting. On the face of it, this growth would 
seem to indicate that the college’s attempts at obtaining benefits, legitimacy, 
and institutional security by linking up with the growing Swedish development 
aid had been successful. In fact, however, it was at most a partial success. 
Despite what is suggested in the quote above, the planned research program 
had proved hard to realize. Though theses and dissertations were written in the 
context of CADU, a permanent research agenda focused on development 
problems had not been established. The rural development division remained 
for the most part a consultant to SIDA and functioned more as an extension of 
the aid agency than as an integrated part of SLU.584 As such, the division was, 
however, of considerable importance to aid policy and practice. It acted as an 
institutional consultant to SIDA’s agricultural division, and in particular after it 
was reorganized in conjunction with the establishment of SLU in 1977, the 
rural development division—later re-branded as SLU’s International Rural 
Development Center—was the focal point of a significant and institutionalized 
                                                        
583 SOU 1978:61, Biståndets organisation, 42. 
584 An early presentation of the division in SIDA’s staff magazine acknowledges this in its title, 
describing the division as a “branch of SIDA”: Maria Larsson and Gunilla Åkerlund, “En SIDA-
filial i Ultuna,” SIDA Inside, no. 6 (1978). 
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collaborative relationship between SIDA’s decision-makers and project 
administrators and SLU’s experts (I will henceforth refer to the rural 
development division as it existed from 1978 to 1996 with the English name or 
the IRDC acronym. This terminology was sometimes used in English-language 
documents even before it was officially adopted as a name). 
I describe this relationship as a rural development pair. This plays on Mats 
Fridlund’s use of the term development pair in his work on the cooperation 
between Swedish industrial firms and public authorities. It is not, however, 
meant to imply that the SIDA-SLU collaboration was the same kind of 
relationship as those that Fridlund describes. SIDA was not organized like an 
infrastructure-building public utility and SLU not like a commercial firm. Also, 
the SIDA-SLU collaboration came about as the result of purposive strategic 
work from both sides and was always regulated by a formal contract, whereas 
Fridlund’s development pair grew out of joint activities, with the involved 
actors only gradually beginning to conceptualize the relationship as something 
beyond their particular undertakings. Even so, enough characteristics are 
shared for the label to be relevant. Crucially, it signifies the relationship’s 
interactive and mutually constructive character as well as its foundation in 
strong interpersonal connections, derived from shared educational experiences 
as well as from joint development activities. 
As already indicated, the rural development pair had its roots in the 
cooperation that evolved between the Agricultural College and NIB/SIDA 
when CADU was planned and executed. In this chapter, which deals with the 
growth and subsequent decline of the institutional collaboration, I seek to 
understand its developments from CADU until the closure of IRDC in 1996, at 
which point the rural development pair also ceased to exist. My primary 
concern is with research questions that relate to my third research problem: 
Why and how was the institutional, long-term collaboration created? What 
characterized it? How did it develop over time? Which activities did it enable 
and which did it constrain? 
Instead of the chronological account employed until now, this chapter has a 
partially thematic structure. I will, however, begin with a chronological 
analysis of the early stages of the rural development pair, based on an 
examination of the background and the formation of organizational structures 
for development aid at the three colleges. This is followed by a discussion of 
the amalgamation of these structures into one rural development center when 
the colleges themselves were merged to form SLU in 1977. Thereafter, I will, 
in turn, analyze two parallel processes central to the evolution of the rural 
development pair throughout its existence. First, I consider IRDC’s extensive 
consulting activities, with special focus on its attempt to find new 
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organizational forms for its consulting expertise in order to change its 
relationship to SIDA. Second, I look at SLU’s attempt to establish a rural 
development research program at IRDC linked to the cooperation with SIDA. 
Following these analyses, I will return to a chronological narrative when 
discussing the decline and fall of the rural development pair, which involved 
the end of IRDC and the creation of the Department of Rural Development 
Studies at SLU. These processes both followed from and reinforced a 
reconfiguration of the relationship, so that by the time they concluded in 1996, 
a break with the institutional and social structures that originally were created 
through CADU had taken place, and the SIDA-SLU rural development pair, in 
the sense understood here, had come to an end. 
The source material used for this chapter comes primarily from IRDC’s and 
SLU’s central administration’s archives. I have, furthermore, made use of the 
SIDA dossier on the institutional collaboration with SLU and have reviewed 
some of IRDC’s and SLU’s publications. This material gives a reasonably 
good view of the development of IRDC and its relationship with SIDA, but I 
have also used my interviews as sources on some occasions where the written 
material has not answered my questions. There is, however, still one notable 
gap: my prioritization of SLU and SIDA material means I do not draw on any 
material from the Ministry of Agriculture. Being SLU’s principal and, as will 
be clear, an important constraint on its aid activities, examining directly how 
the ministry appraised the situation at various points in time would have 
contributed considerably to the chapter. 
CADU and the Rural Development Pair 
In the fall of 1966, with the planning for CADU was in full swing, Lennart 
Hjelm visited Ethiopia to advise the planning team. He also took the 
opportunity to discuss with Nekby the Agricultural College’s future role within 
the project. Having at this point had to abandon the idea of giving the college 
an executory position with respect to CADU’s experimental activities, Hjelm 
and Nekby nonetheless strived to make sure that there would be a close link 
between Ultuna and the project. In a letter to SIDA in Stockholm, Nekby 
referred to his consultations with Hjelm and stressed that there would be an 
“acute” need for cooperation with the Agricultural College if and when the 
project was initiated. He urged the agency to consider this issue of 
collaboration side by side with the larger issue of the regional project itself.585 
                                                        
585 Nekby to SIDA, 17 October 1966, SIDA, series F1 AB, vol. 769. 
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To the letter, Nekby attached a document he and Hjelm had drawn up, 
which spelled out the forms of cooperation they deemed necessary. They 
envisioned five areas of work: education, experiments, service activities, 
general advice, and recruitment.586 As the main education activity, they 
proposed that the college should offer a special course on Third World 
agricultural development problems, open to students both before and after they 
had finished their agronomy degree. As for the CADU experimental activities, 
the proposal was that a group of experts should be constituted at Ultuna to 
follow up, provide scientific advice, and at least informally oversee the project, 
by, for example, reviewing annual experiment plans. The college’s proposed 
involvement in recruitment was based on the argument that suitable staff for 
CADU would probably need to be headhunted and that the college, having 
trained more or less every agronomist in Sweden, would be in a good position 
to handle this.587 The two final areas—service and general advice—had to do 
with the provision of technology and expertise not available in Ethiopia. The 
college could help with things such as chemical analyses, and also provide 
links with the expertise at hand within the college’s various departments as 
well as in other Swedish institutions. To coordinate all these activities, they 
suggested that SIDA ought to pay for a permanent position at the Agricultural 
College; the person appointed could be responsible for organizing the 
education activities, be the point of contact at the college for CADU personnel, 
and otherwise act as a liaison as needed between the project and the college, 
for example, by providing contacts to the various research departments. 
This proposal was incorporated into the final project proposal for CADU 
and was realized as the project got under way. In 1967, SIDA and the college 
signed a formal agreement which specified that the latter should place its 
expertise at CADU’s disposal roughly along the lines proposed by Hjelm and 
Nekby.588 Bo Bengtsson, who had returned to the college after his tenure in 
                                                        
586 “Samverkan SIDA-Lantbrukshogskolan i faltprojekt,” SIDA, series F1 AB, vol. 769. 
587 Agricultural managers, also good candidates for field positions in development aid, were at 
this point not trained by the college but by an independent institute in Alnarp. Even so, it can be 
assumed that a knowledgeable person at Ultuna would have been in a good position to reach out 
to them as well. By 1967, the Alnarp institute was subsumed under the board of directors of the 
Agricultural College, and by 1974 it was wholly integrated into the college.  
588 Meeting minutes, Board of Directors of the Agricultural College, 12 October 1967, § 38 with 
attachments, AC-SS, series A1 a, vol. 7. While the Agricultural College was the most important 
one, CADU had other external consultants in Sweden as well. For example, the National 
Association for A.I., Cattle-Breeding and Milk Recording played an important role in the cattle-
breeding activities. 
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Ethiopia, was recruited to act as the Ultuna liaison.589 He established what 
became known as the Developing-Country Section, a small organizational unit 
that coordinated the CADU-related activities. An expert committee, initially 
known as the CADU committee and later as the developing-country advisory 
committee, was also constituted, consisting of Vice-Chancellor Hjelm as 
chairman, Bo Bengtsson as secretary, agronomist Lars Augustinsson as SIDA’s 
representative, professors Ewert Åberg and Eskil Brännäng as senior 
representatives of the college’s scientific expertise, and Håkan Åkerman, 
deputy director-general of the National Board of Agriculture, as a 
representative of the public interest in the agricultural sector.590 This committee 
oversaw Bengtsson’s work, provided advice as requested, and approved, in 
consultation with SIDA, the proposed recruits for CADU. SIDA was impressed 
with some successful early recruitments made by Bengtsson, and this led to the 
college taking over responsibility for all of SIDA’s recruiting of agricultural 
field experts, extending the college’s aid responsibilities beyond the limits of 
CADU in 1969. It was eventually also given documentation responsibilities 
and began to collect books and other publications of relevance to agricultural 
and rural development. It produced published work of its own as well, mostly 
reports on various countries to which Sweden considered giving rural-oriented 
aid, and expanded its number of staff.591 
The section was also responsible for some educational activities. In 
accordance with a point added to the agreement with SIDA, it nominated 
candidates for a program in which interested students could conduct smaller 
research tasks on behalf of CADU.592 It also began to offer a course on 
developing-country agriculture (which was then taught for decades and became 
an important way of introducing the students to developing-country topics). 
When designing the course, Bengtsson decided to mostly use teachers with 
field experience. This meant that most of the teaching was done by external 
lecturers, which, according to Bengtsson’s recollections made it popular among 
the students, but less popular among many of the college faculty.593 It would 
                                                        
589 According to his own recollection, Bengtsson was Ewert Åberg’s candidate. Lennart Hjelm 
had much preferred an agricultural economist to hold the position. Bo Bengtsson, interview by 
author, 24 May 2013. 
590 Hjelm, Åberg and Brännäng were proposed by the faculty of the Agricultural College, see 
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593 Bengtsson, interview. 
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prove an influential decision as it meant that the course and, by extension, the 
wider activities of the Developing-Country Section, became somewhat distant 
from the regular research and teaching departments. This gap between the 
departments and the section—and later IRDC—would remain for the next 
thirty years and became formative for future developments. 
The gap is also interesting in a broader sense. It reflects how conditions for 
expertise in development aid were changing, in ways that the career of a person 
like Bengt Nekby can illustrate. He went through a professional 
transformation, from a Swedish agricultural economist to an international 
expert in development. He never returned to his teaching post at Ultuna, 
instead moving to SIDA, CADU, EPID, and then on to the World Bank. His 
career exemplifies the ongoing reconfiguration of professional networks at the 
time. It was a consequence both of decolonization and the expansion of 
development bureaucracies during this period, and it made development aid a 
viable career path in itself.594 At Ultuna, IRDC would come to house 
development professionals rather than academic researchers. 
While organizational structures for the cooperation with SIDA were built 
up at the Agricultural College, the Swedish forestry sector’s interest in 
development was also increasing. An influential paper published in 1962 by, 
among others, the chief of FAO’s Forest Economics Branch, Jack Westoby, 
had outlined a model in which forest industries were to play an important 
part in promoting growth in developing countries.595 Citing Westoby, 
Swedish forester and FAO employee Erland von Hofsten argued a few years 
later that given the advanced state of forestry in Sweden, SIDA should turn 
its attention to this field.596 These arguments also stimulated the interest of 
the College of Forestry in Stockholm, something that eventually culminated 
in the establishment of a development-oriented course and subsequently a 
developing-country section at the college in 1970. It was modeled on the one 
at Ultuna and had similar tasks: recruitment for SIDA and instruction in 
developing-country forestry. Its director was forester Sten Norén, who had 
earlier been an FAO associate expert in Iran. As he recalled it, he looked to 
Ultuna, where Bengtsson ran his section in an expansionist fashion. Norén 
strove to expand his own section in a similar manner, eventually recruiting 
                                                        
594 See e.g. Gold, “Scientific Career Networks.” 
595 Jack C. Westoby et al., “Forest Industries in the Attack on Economic Underdevelopment,” 
Unasylva 16, no. 4 (1962). 
596 Erland von Hofsten, “Skall SIDA satsa på u-ländernas skogsnäring?,” Skogen, no. 17 (1968); 
Erland von Hofsten, “SIDA och skogsnäringen: Skäl för svensk satsning,” Skogen, no. 22 (1968). 
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three more people and broadening the scope of its tasks much as Bengtsson 
had done.597 
At the Veterinary College, the emphasis was on the SIDA/FAO courses in 
animal reproduction and in pathology. Nils Lagerlöf had taught one SIPAR 
course in 1967 and another in 1969, and was preparing for one scheduled for 
1971 when he passed away in late 1970. His former student Ingemar 
Settergren then took over responsibility for the program.598 Since the courses 
were mostly a self-contained activity within the respective department, the 
Veterinary College did not establish a developing-country section similar to 
the two other colleges. But in 1973, it too signed a more general agreement 
with SIDA and set up an international office, ran by Börje Danell together 
with Katarina Carlqvist.599 Like Settergren, Danell had been a student and 
close associate of Lagerlöf’s. 
These three organizational units had all grown out of a mutual desire to 
place the expertise available at the colleges at the disposal of the new 
government agency for development aid. The Agricultural College was 
formative in this regard, and the collaborative relationship between SIDA and 
the college that emerged in the context of CADU became the model for the 
cooperation SIDA later established with the other two colleges. When first 
instituted, the colleges’ development sections were only envisioned as 
facilitators of contacts between SIDA (which paid for their work) and the 
Swedish base of expertise (inside and outside the colleges) in relevant fields. 
They were supervised by committees on which core scientific expertise was 
represented, providing SIDA with expert advice as necessary. The divisions at 
the Agricultural College and the College of Forestry soon outgrew this basic 
role, however, and began to function as recruiting and documentation centers 
servicing broader needs of Swedish agriculture and forestry aid. This step was 
crucial to the further development of the relationship I term the rural 
development pair, as it meant that other forms of expertise, beyond the purely 
scientific, became increasingly important. This would come to be both a central 
tension point and a defining feature of the pair. 
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Development at the Agricultural University 
For a number of reasons beyond the scope of my study, the three colleges 
which came under the Ministry of Agriculture were spatially reorganized in the 
mid-1970s. The Veterinary College was gradually moved from Stockholm to 
Uppsala and Ultuna, while the College of Forestry ended up being split 
between four locations: Stockholm, Uppsala, Garpenberg, and Umeå. The 
largest part was in Umeå, far north of the college’s earlier site in Stockholm as 
well as of the Ultuna campus, which the other two colleges had been moved to. 
Despite this geographical obstacle, the three institutions were increasingly 
coordinated with each other. First, a hybrid form was created in what was 
called the Swedish University of Agriculture, Forestry and Veterinary 
Medicine, in which the separate colleges were merged into a joint organization 
but retained their own collegial structures. This soon proved an unworkable 
solution, and so a single university, SLU, with three faculties, one for each 
college, was created out of it in 1977. This is not the place to analyze the 
complicated and conflict-ridden process of relocating and merging the three 
colleges.600 Suffice it to say that the SLU which emerged was largely modelled 
on the Agricultural College, with Lennart Hjelm, whose creation it essentially 
was, being named its first vice-chancellor. At the two other colleges, now 
faculties in the new university, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the 
process and its outcome, and for a long time, intrauniversity relations were 
noticeably chilly. 
As a result of the merger, the development-related sections at the different 
colleges were more closely coordinated with each other, and it was eventually 
decided to merge them, too. This likewise proved a difficult task. It was 
relatively easy to settle for Ultuna as the location for the new unit. The 
question of how it should be organized was more problematic. Bengtsson and 
the Agricultural College advocated a functional structure, that is, internal 
subdivisions for the separate functions (recruitment, education, documentation, 
etc.), each with staff from all three colleges. A sector-based structure, preferred 
by veterinarian Börje Danell and forester Sten Norén, would instead mean that 
the separate existing development sections would in a sense be maintained as 
their own organizations, each handling the same functions but exclusively for 
its own professional domain.601 The discussion mirrored the university-level 
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aktiviteterna på jordbrukets högskolor,” 30 January 1975, IRDC, series A1, vol. 1. Norén’s 
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developments, where—simply put—the Agricultural College’s representatives 
were the ones most in favor of integration, while the other two colleges strove 
to protect their independence and their own professional and collegiate 
identities. In the end, Bengtsson’s suggested organization won out, no doubt 
mostly because he had the support of Vice-Chancellor Hjelm and of SIDA, and 
he was named head of the new rural development division.602 But Bengtsson 
would not remain long in this post. He had found a position in the recently 
formed SAREC and left Ultuna relatively soon after the new rural development 
division was founded. The directorship then fell to Börje Danell.603 
SLU and Rural Development 
The first years were rocky for the new joint division. It struggled not only with 
its internal organization and with the integration of experts from three 
professional domains but also with its tasks and with its relationship to SIDA 
and the university. Not until another reorganization in 1978 did it find a stabler 
form, which became constitutive of a more integrated SIDA-SLU relationship. 
To understand this process, it is necessary to first consider some earlier 
developments at the division’s main financier. 
Within SIDA’s Department I, a new organization with subdivisions for 
different technical sectors had developed in the late 1960s, a change that 
reflected early experiences of planning and managing aid projects. Because of 
the agency’s heavy involvement in rural development through CADU, a 
section for rural development and nutrition was among the new subdivisions 
formed.604 A reorganization of the entire agency, effected by the director-
general in 1971, took this organizational idea a step further. The departments 
were abolished and the old hierarchical organization replaced with a flatter 
structure in which different specialized divisions, technical or administrative, 
came directly under the agency’s central management. The food supply and 
rural development section was renamed the agricultural division, but it was 
often just identified as LANT, short for its Swedish name Lantbruksbyrån.605 
The agricultural division’s work was shaped by the fact that the threat posed 
by the population-resource dilemma had begun to seem less acute after the 
                                                                                                                                
memorandum summarizes arguments for the two alternatives. The same archive series contains an 
extensive material detailing these discussions of the future organization of the division. 
602 Meeting minutes, division meeting of the Rural Development Division, 8 October 1975, 
IRDC, series A1, vol. 1. 
603 Renborg, Granström, and Kasberg, Lantbrukets högskola 50 år, 61. 
604 SOU 1978:61, 27. 
605 SIDA employed such capitalized short-forms for its internal subdivisions. The agricultural 
division was known as LANT, the industrial division as IND, the personnel aid division as PB, 
and so on. 
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Green Revolution had demonstrated agriculture’s potential to feed the world. 
But the same process that had sent agricultural yields soaring had also 
accentuated the differences between rich and poor; urban and rural, something 
that SIDA’s own CADU project had made perfectly clear to its administrators 
in Stockholm. They thus became increasingly concerned with the challenge of 
rural poverty, and particularly with how rural development aid could be 
designed so as to combat rural poverty. To this end, LANT’s director, Gösta 
Ericsson, previously one of the members of NIB’s agricultural group, and who 
had since left his position at the National Board of Agriculture to work at 
SIDA, turned to the Agricultural College for help. Ericsson, who was an 
agronomist with good links with Ultuna, decided in the mid-1970s that his 
division lacked both the in-house knowledge and the time to focus on 
conceptual issues. He contacted Nils-Ivar Isaksson, the Agricultural College’s 
professor of agricultural economics, and asked whether he would be interested 
in doing a SIDA-funded study of integrated rural development.606 
This meant that experiences from Ethiopia would continue to affect 
developments, for Isaksson had rather recently returned from there. Another of 
Hjelm’s former students and a good friend of Bengt Nekby’s, he had, after 
graduating from Ultuna, worked for the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute and the Federation of Agricultural Societies, but returned to the 
Agricultural College to take up a post in the Department of Economics after 
Nekby left for Ethiopia. A few years later, at the behest of Hjelm, Isaksson too 
went to work in Ethiopia, replacing Nekby at EPID, the Ministry of 
Agriculture department created as a result of the experiences from CADU. 
After his tenure in Ethiopia, Isaksson returned to the economics department at 
Ultuna. To work out the SIDA assignment, he recruited Johan Holmberg, who, 
in turn, had succeeded him at EPID. Holmberg, an economist with a degree 
from the Gothenburg School of Economics, had come into contact with rural 
development through his work in Ethiopia rather than through any previous 
connection with the Agricultural College.607 
At the same time, there was an ongoing discussion at the newly integrated 
rural development division about expanding the capacity for planning and 
inquiries.608 Beyond recruiting for SIDA and handling education and 
documentation tasks, the latest agreement, in force since 1975, specified as its 
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Development: A Discussion of This Concept and Its Implications for Swedish Aid” (Department 
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608 See Ingemar Croon, “Utökning av planerings- och utredningskapaciteten vid 
lantbruksuniversitetet inom området lantbruks- och landsbygdsutveckling i u-länder,” 30 March 
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very first point that the university should “help with advice and inquiries, both 
of a general character and in relation to the preparation, management and 
evaluation of efforts/projects with connections to rural development.”609 The 
director of the division, Ingemar Croon (who had replaced Börje Danell), was 
concerned that this latter part of the division’s work had never really gotten off 
the ground. In March 1977, he had raised the question of how to organize a 
“field study unit” (which would be responsible for such assignments), along 
with the question of whether this was in line with the university’s mission. 
Vice-Chancellor Hjelm evidently also shared Croon’s concerns.610 As he knew 
that Isaksson and Holmberg were studying rural development at SIDA’s behest 
and that both had field experience in the area, Croon asked them to outline a 
proposal for how the division could be (re-)organized to include these tasks.611 
Reorganizing the Rural Development Division: SIDA’s New Needs for Expertise 
Croon’s concerns were matched by an increasingly felt need at SIDA to draw 
more broadly on external expertise. An important contributing factor was 
ongoing changes in the way SIDA managed its aid projects, as the idea of 
country programming was being implemented in the planning of Swedish aid. 
Country programming was a concept that had gained influence in international 
and Swedish aid circles in the 1970s, after it was promoted in the well-known 
Jackson report, which proposed reforms of the United Nations Development 
Program. It could mean different things in different contexts, but at the core it 
was a method of organizing aid that sought to give responsibility for 
development planning to the recipient rather than the donor countries. Instead 
of locking funding into particular projects or sectors, the programming method 
worked from financial frameworks within which the recipient countries had the 
final responsibility for planning and implementing their own development 
activities.612 The gradual switch to country programming meant that SIDA 
needed access to a practice-oriented knowledge base that it could put at the 
disposal of the aid recipients, who needed more technical competence of their 
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own under the new system.613 SIDA also retained its own demands for 
technical expertise to plan and follow up its activities and increasingly had to 
rely on outside consultants. It had limited means to expand its own staff, and, 
moreover, considered the use of external consultants as one way to make the 
agency’s work more effective. As SIDA’s board of directors would put it in the 
agency’s appropriations request for 1978/79, there was “to a growing extent 
the contracting out of subtasks that alternatively could have been performed in-
house. This can include procurements, recruiting, project appraisals, result 
evaluations, etc.”614 
Within the agricultural sector, few commercial firms could provide 
consultants with both the requisite rural development expertise and with 
developing-country experience. SLU, on the other hand, already performed 
some of these tasks and could conceivably also handle the others within the 
framework of its ongoing relationship with SIDA. A few years earlier, Bo 
Bengtsson had, at the behest of LANT, studied the interaction between agrarian 
universities and development aid agencies in the United States, Canada, 
England, Germany, and the Netherlands. The first point of his 
recommendation, which drew on experiences from USAID and American 
universities, stressed how universities acting as permanent consultants could 
provide access “to the collected knowledge existing within the sector” and thus 
“contribute to an effective development cooperation.”615 
LANT’s management was mainly concerned with securing access to 
external expertise that could perform what it called “field studies,” which in 
this context did not solely refer to fieldwork as such but to a broad spectrum of 
appraisal, evaluation and planning activities LANT wanted to outsource. Sven 
Pellbäck, LANT’s new director, stated in a meeting at SLU in the summer of 
1977 that SIDA’s main interest in the rural development division at SLU lay in 
the agency’s “difficulties in finding people for field studies.”616 So although 
there was an agreement in force between SIDA and SLU, there was not yet a 
collaboration structure that satisfied SIDA’s increasing need for consultants. 
SIDA’s push for “field studies” to be performed by SLU came to be a crucial 
juncture for the rural development pair. It led to such activities being given a 
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prominent place in the proposal for a new rural development division that 
Croon had asked Isaksson and Holmberg to work out, and they came to be the 
focal point of the future collaboration. 
Isaksson and Holmberg sent their proposal to Hjelm, who approved and 
passed it on to SIDA. After modifications by Hjelm,617 it listed four goals for 
SLU’s participation in development aid: 
 
a) to do documentation, education and information work relating to 
developing-country agriculture and rural development 
b) to help SIDA recruit staff 
c) to actively engage the resources of SLU in investigation and planning for 
SIDA and other clients 
d) to increase the amount of developing-country research at SLU, in 
particular related to rural development 
 
a) and b) were already established fields of work, c) referred to the new type of 
“field studies” requested by SIDA, and d) was a matter pushed for by SLU 
rather than SIDA, to which I will return below. 
As mentioned, the director of LANT was now Sven Pellbäck. He was a 
crop production agronomist who had matriculated at the Agricultural College a 
year after Isaksson and knew the latter well. He had been involved in 
agricultural aid since the mid-1960s, when he worked with the Swedish Peace 
Corps in Zambia, and had been at LANT since its creation. Like Gösta 
Ericsson, who had been promoted and left the division, Pellbäck was an 
enthusiastic supporter of tying SLU closer to SIDA. This facilitated the next 
decision: Hjelm, who favored the reorganization but also looked out for the 
university’s interests, had insisted that SIDA needed to provide long-term 
financial guarantees for a new rural development center so as to ensure its 
survival even if SIDA’s demand for its services fluctuated. With both Pellbäck 
and Ericsson strongly in favor of finding a solution, a proposal was worked out 
that satisfied both parties.618 According to Isaksson, a final condition from 
SIDA was that he accepted the position as division manager. SIDA wanted 
someone it knew, and Isaksson accepted.619 
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Figure 16. Professor Nils-Ivar 
Isaksson (b. 1932), head of 
IRDC 1978–1981 and 1987–
1996. Photographer unknown. 
From the collections of the 
Royal Swedish Academy of 
Agriculture and Forestry. 
The new International Rural Development Center was organized into four 
units: one for recruitment; one for education, documentation and information; 
one for the consulting work (initially known as the field study unit but later 
only as the consultant unit); and one for research. The research unit had a 
mostly theoretical existence, to which I will return below. Linking the center 
to SLU, SIDA, and SAREC was a new advisory board, appointed by SLU’s 
board of directors. It was chaired by Hjelm and consisted of representatives 
from SLU’s faculties and staff organizations, as 
well as from SIDA and SAREC. Unlike the 
earlier advisory committees at the colleges, such 
as the initial CADU committee at the 
Agricultural College, this advisory board was not 
tasked with giving scientific advice. It was 
intended as a coordinating organ, and, in 
practice, functioned as a board of directors for 
the rural development division, making decisions 
on its budget proposals, organization, and the 
general orientation of its work. The link to the 
expertise represented at the university’s 
departments was instead supposed to be 
reference groups established at each of the three 
faculties. These were intended primarily to 
support recruitment efforts but were also 
available for other subject-related discussions.620 
Shaping the Rural Development Pair 
The new organization was the outcome of a process in which actors at both 
SIDA and SLU attempted to cultivate the rural development pair. SIDA’s 
agricultural division needed better access to external expertise, and its 
management, staffed with Ultuna-trained agronomists, tried to use its 
existing relationship with SLU to fill this need. SLU’s rural development 
division favored deepening the relationship, but it struggled with the 
consequences of merging the three colleges and found it hard to come to 
grips with this task. Only after interventions by Lennart Hjelm could the 
process continue. Though Hjelm was preoccupied in the mid-1970s with the 
creation of SLU and could devote less attention to the aid activities compared 
with the 1960s, he interceded at important junctures to secure the future of 
the rural development division. First, he supported Ingemar Croon when the 
latter wanted to develop a new organization for the division, and then he put 
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his weight behind the Isaksson–Holmberg proposal for SLU’s role in the 
collaboration with SIDA, specifically demanding and securing financial 
guarantees from the aid authorities. 
As should be clear, the establishment of the new IRDC hinged on the 
existence of informal personal networks both within SLU and between SLU 
and SIDA. These networks, which thus underpinned the rural development 
pair, were built up both within the student life at the Agricultural College, with 
its generally close-knit relations among many of the students and staff, and 
through the experiences from CADU and its successor project EPID (consider, 
e.g., figure 11 above).621 They wielded profound influence, as we have seen in 
the previous two chapters as well. I have not attempted to analyze the networks 
as such, mostly because I have had very limited access to personal 
correspondence between the involved actors, but their shape is still apparent 
enough. Hjelm was the central figure, with whom both Nekby and Isaksson 
enjoyed a very good relationship. Both were his former students and could rely 
on access to him; Isaksson recalled that he could get in touch with Hjelm at any 
time.622 Hjelm and Isaksson (and Nekby as well, though he was not as central 
to the future developments at Ultuna) were both well connected at SIDA. 
Hjelm enjoyed particularly good relationships with Ernst Michanek and Anders 
Forsse. Since his involvement with CADU, the latter, who succeeded 
Michanek as director-general in 1979, was also favorably disposed both to 
SLU and to rural development. Furthermore, LANT’s first two directors, Gösta 
Ericsson and Sven Pellbäck, were both agronomists, as was Lars Augustinsson, 
another influential LANT employee who represented SIDA on IRDC’s 
advisory board and who would later come to direct the agricultural division. 
All three enjoyed good relations with Ultuna. These partly social and partly 
professional connections not only facilitated the expansion of SLU’s 
engagement but also ensured a very informal relationship between IRDC and 
LANT. 
In the following, I will first discuss what came to be the central organizing 
feature of the pair: the consulting activities IRDC performed on behalf of 
LANT. Through the good personal relationships and the perceived need for 
SLU to fill manpower and competence gaps at SIDA, these activities propelled 
IRDC into a period of sustained growth that lasted for most of the 1980s. This 
period was also characterized by a growing realization at SLU that the strong 
dependency on SIDA was problematic, and so attempts were continuously 
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made to redefine the relationship by diversifying the division’s activities and 
finding other clients besides SIDA. These were, however, all ultimately 
unsuccessful. I will then discuss the flip side of the consulting: the idea of 
establishing a permanent developing-country research agenda related to the 
collaboration with SIDA. Outlined in the Isaksson–Holmberg plan as a task 
parallel to consulting, such research never really got off the ground within 
IRDC. Only as the consulting activities wound down could it, for other 
reasons, be established more permanently at SLU. By then, however, the rural 
development pair had ceased to be of relevance. 
Development Consulting and Service Export 
A main impetus for reorganizing SLU’s development aid activities was, as 
we have seen, SIDA’s agricultural division’s need of external expertise. At 
the outset, the new organization was also seen as a way to provide returning 
field experts with short-term employment; to function as a platform from 
which they could share their experiences while managing the sometimes 
difficult readjustment to the Swedish labor market, or while looking for 
new foreign assignments.623 But this idea, suggested already in the 
Agricultural College’s first project sketch from 1964, never really came to 
fruition: most of the consultants came to remain at the center once 
employed there. IRDC never became the intended temporary platform for 
returning experts. Instead the consultants became permanent SLU 
employees, while the consulting unit evolved into a specialized extension 
of LANT. According to an analysis IRDC presented in 1984, the consulting 
unit was a “practical arrangement” that provided SIDA with a “permanent 
reserve capacity” to deal with arising needs.624 
While self-appraisals need to be read with some skepticism, the center did fill 
a manpower and knowledge gap at LANT in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Moreover, LANT’s officers seem indeed to have seen it as a practical 
arrangement. Instead of having to go through a procurement procedure when 
outside expertise was needed, the IRDC staff was on permanent standby at 
Ultuna, ready to help with anything from simple advice to more complex 
analytical tasks or fieldwork. In this context, IRDC’s optimism about its own 
future was very strong. At a meeting during the reorganization in 1978, Isaksson 
estimated that the division could employ fifty people by 1985, which would 
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amount to more than doubling its size in seven years.625 This never materialized, 
but the division did expand continuously during most of the 1980s. 
While the expansion suggests that its expertise was in high demand, IRDC 
was nonetheless in a fundamentally uncertain position on account of its hybrid 
nature and its one-sided relationship to SIDA. Though nominally a part of 
SLU, its only real relevance was in the context of the rural development pair. It 
was wholly dependent on SIDA funding, and its sole link with the rest of the 
university’s activities was the courses on developing-country agriculture it held 
for SLU students. Attempts to integrate IRDC more with the rest of SLU by 
bringing its consultants into contact with the regular university departments 
and by setting up reference groups at the faculties largely failed.626 
Struggles over Agricultural Service Export 
SIDA never claimed exclusive rights to IRDC’s expertise. On the contrary, the 
way in which the center was set up opened up the possibility to sell services 
outside of the context of the rural development pair, and this idea had in fact 
been on the agenda since the reorganization period in 1975–1978.627 Little 
came of it initially, but it was pushed to the forefront in 1979 by the work of 
the Consultant Export Inquiry (Konsultexportutredningen), a government 
inquiry appointed by the center-right coalition government in late 1978 to 
examine the possibilities of increasing the export of services from public 
utilities and other government agencies. Its background lay in an ongoing 
discussion of Sweden’s negative trade balance and its rapidly growing public 
sector. From their traditional distant supervisory role, the public authorities had 
expanded to “plan, control, and supervise developments in entire sectors of 
society,” as it was phrased in the summary of the inquiry’s report.628 In many 
cases, this meant that government agencies had developed in-house expertise 
that could in principle be sold on an international market, primarily to 
developing countries, thus helping to offset the negative trade balance. 
In 1980, a few government agencies were already active exporters, notably 
the Swedish National Land Survey, which operated abroad under the trade 
name SwedSurvey. Other agencies had founded subsidiary companies to 
perform international consulting. Important examples of such companies were 
Swedtel, SwedPower, and SwedForest, which belonged to the Swedish 
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Telecommunications Administration, the Swedish State Power Administration, 
and the Swedish Forest Service, respectively.629 Looking at these examples, the 
Consultant Export Inquiry proposed ways to further stimulate the export of 
services from public authorities and public companies, including those of the 
agricultural sector. After studies of the present setup of how SLU and other 
institutional consultants provided services to SIDA’s agricultural division, the 
committee proposed the formation of a new consultancy company that would 
export services from the public agricultural sector as a whole.630 It was to work 
in close conjunction with existing companies in related areas (this particularly 
referred to SwedForest), and its presumed clients would be foreign 
governments interested in agricultural development, most likely those already 
working with SIDA. IRDC’s consultant unit, or at least parts of it, would 
constitute the core of the new company.631 
The proposal implied yet another reorganization of IRDC. While it would 
keep some of its staff and tasks, the new company would take over 
responsibility for much of the consulting work. The company would then be 
able to hire SLU staff as well as experts from other parts of the sector, on a 
contract basis to carry out its assignments. In the inquiry’s report, this structure 
was motivated by its ability to gather relevant competencies not just from SLU, 
but from all the agencies under the Ministry of Agriculture. SIDA and SLU 
initially supported the proposal, with both having reasons to believe that the 
proposed new organization would be beneficial. There are indications that 
SIDA, while positive to the services provided by its institutional consultants, 
was beginning to have concerns about how the system worked. The Consultant 
Export Inquiry noted that an internal SIDA investigation had suggested that the 
present system of using institutional consultants created improper mutual 
dependencies and limited both competition and SIDA’s ability to manage its 
consultants, all of which could increase expenses.632 If nothing else, a company 
representing the whole sector would reduce mutual dependency effects by 
virtue of being a broader enterprise. SLU, for its part, might have seen a 
strategic advantage in involving the entire public agriculture sector, including 
perhaps its own principal, the Ministry of Agriculture, in development-aid-
related service export. A study performed mainly by representatives of the 
three major stakeholders (SLU, SIDA, and the Ministry of Agriculture), 
                                                        
629 SOU 1980:23, 13. 
630 SIDA’s agricultural division had a group of institutional consultants providing services under 
similar terms, though SLU was by far the most important of them. The others were the Swedish 
Cooperative Centre, the land surveying section at the Royal Institute of Technology, the 
Department of Social Anthropology at Stockholm University, and the Fishery Board of Sweden. 
631 SOU 1980:23, 296–99. 
632 SOU 1980:23, 128. 
 223 
appended to the Consultant Export Inquiry’s main report, noted that the 
proposed organizational structure presumed such an arrangement: 
 
One demand on the organization is that it facilitates connections with the entire 
public agricultural sector, including research and experimentation. This ought to 
presuppose active participation from the Ministry of Agriculture, for example by 
the ministry representing the owner. The present rural development division at 
SLU, or parts thereof, can constitute the core of the new company. In that way, 
the present experience of consulting activities abroad can best be utilized.633 
 
If the ministry’s interest in aid matters could be increased by a company of this 
kind, it could also facilitate SLU’s developing-country work more generally. A 
chief obstacle to that work, and which indeed had been formative of the setup 
of IRDC as a SIDA consultant, was that SLU deemed it impossible to 
internally redistribute ministry funding to support development-oriented work 
(a point I will return to below). If this was to change, SLU would find itself in 
a very different position with respect to its relation to the developing world. 
In early 1980, IRDC’s advisory board decided to adopt a cautiously positive 
attitude to the creation of an independent company out of parts of the 
consulting unit.634 Other parts would work directly with SIDA as before, as is 
clear from a set of joint SIDA-SLU comments on the Consultant Export 
Inquiry’s subreport on service export from the public agriculture sector. These 
comments suggested that some tasks could be handled by a company; for 
others, SIDA needed to maintain SLU as an institutional consultant.635 A 
crucial factor if this reorganization was to be achieved, stated by the advisory 
board and reiterated in the SIDA-SLU comments, was that the government 
would have to come up with financial guarantees for the company, separate 
from either SIDA’s or SLU’s budget.636 
The latter point is interesting, for both the advisory board and the comments 
strongly emphasized the need to establish the new company in close proximity 
to, and for it to collaborate closely with, IRDC. Some new areas of expertise 
might be added, representing other sectors under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
but for most intents and purposes, the new company would be very closely 
linked to IRDC, which SIDA provided financial guarantees for. Of course, 
underwriting the finances of what was intended to be a company competing on 
the open market was something quite different from guaranteeing the budget of 
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635 “SIDAs och Lantbruksuniversitetets preliminära synpunkter på ett bolag för export av 
konsulttjänster från den statliga lantbrukssektorn,” 10 March 1980, IRDC, series A4, vol. 1. 
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IRDC, to which SIDA had a privileged relationship. But it is also likely that 
both SIDA and SLU used the new situation to try to bring in funding from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, thus increasing the latter’s interests in development 
aid. That was something which could well help secure the future not only of 
the new company but also of developing-country activities at SLU. 
Money from the ministry would not be forthcoming, however. Following 
consultations with the Center Party minister of agriculture, Anders Dahlgren, 
the government bill that was based on the inquiry’s report forwent proposing 
the formation of a company and instead suggested that further analysis of the 
matter was needed.637 After more deliberation, the Ministry of Agriculture 
clarified its stance by issuing a memorandum. Among other things, the 
ministry argued that the boundary between the proposed new company and the 
existing SwedForest company would become a problematic issue.638 By 1982, 
SIDA had also begun to hesitate, arguing that as a government agency it could 
not provide any sort of financial guarantees to a commercial company, that the 
present organizational structure was adequate, and that there was no need to 
introduce another actor.639 As an alternative, the Ministry of Agriculture 
suggested that one person in every agency under the ministry should be 
appointed responsible for coordinating service export matters. SLU found this 
option insufficient, but had little possibility to push the matter further.640 
Following the parliamentary election in 1982, a Social Democratic cabinet 
replaced the previous center-right one, and the formation of public service 
export companies faded somewhat from the political agenda. 
Further Expansion of the Rural Development Pair 
Concurrent with the negotiations over the company formation, the scale of the 
SIDA-SLU cooperation continued to grow. The number of tasks SIDA gave to 
IRDC increased through the early 1980s, a development further stimulated by 
the naming of Sven Pellbäck as acting director of IRDC in 1982, when Nils-
Ivar Isaksson took up an assignment in Kenya.641 Johan Holmberg, who had 
                                                        
637 Government Bill 1980/81:171, om export av tjänster från statliga myndigheter och bolag 
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utredningar och remissvar,”  Central Administration archives, list I, series F1, vol. 619, Swedish 
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640 Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet, “Yttrande över promemoria angående tjänsteexport från 
jordbruksdepartementets verksamhetsområde,” 8 November 1982, IRDC, series A4, vol. 1. 
641 Görel Oscarsson to Forsse, “Angående professor Lennart Hjelms och byråchefen Pellbäcks 
engagement i U-landsavdelningens verksamhet m m,” 16 August 1982, SIDA, series F1 AD, 
vol. 1726. 
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been instrumental in creating IRDC, succeeded him as the director of LANT. 
Pellbäck soon became heavily involved in expanding IRDC and its role in 
Swedish development aid, and the center grew rapidly (see table 4).642 
Table 4. Payments in millions of SEK from SIDA to SLU during the period 1978–1988. All 
amounts in 1979 prices.643 
78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 
3.1 3.3 3.5 3.5 4.0 5.7 9.5 11.0 14.9 15.6 
These increased costs did not only pertain to the consulting unit. As discussed 
above, IRDC performed a range of other tasks, including education, recruiting 
(the primary SIDA counterpart for this task was not LANT, but PB, the agency’s 
personnel aid division), and documentation. By the mid-1980s, IRDC was also 
given funding for what was known as trial and method development, carried out 
in cooperation with academic departments at the university. This was a very 
broadly defined area of activity aimed at testing and evaluating methods and 
techniques of relevance to SIDA’s rural development programs.644 
The rapid growth of SLU’s engagement created a number of issues of 
cooperation and coordination with LANT in Stockholm. The mutual trust (and 
need) and good personal relations between IRDC and LANT that undergirded 
both operative and managerial work had resulted in largely informal and often-
unstructured ways of working. The very boundary between LANT and IRDC 
was also growing blurred. Consultants from IRDC would sometimes work at 
SIDA without a formal specification of their task or a clear delimitation from 
SIDA’s own staff. Furthermore, IRDC would at times initiate work on a 
project before a budget had been drawn up and an official decision had been 
taken at LANT. By the mid-1980s, these and other issues made LANT’s 
management increasingly concerned about work routines and its ability to 
follow up on IRDC’s work. This is evident from a 1985 letter from Inge 
Gerremo at LANT to Sven Pellbäck in which the former summarized a number 
of new routines intended to improve the institutional collaboration.645 Some of 
the routines Gerremo proposed in this letter, such as making sure that IRDC 
would not start working on an assignment before LANT had issued a written 
                                                        
642 Holmberg, interview; Norén, interview. 
643 The table is constructed on the basis of data from Mothander and Sedin, “Översyn av 
samarbetet,” 8. Adjustment for inflation through Rodney Edvinsson’s historical currency 
converter (http://www.historia.se/Jamforelsepris.htm). The rapid increase in payments after 1982 
also corresponds to the transfer of power back to the Social Democratic party after a six-year 
period of center-right rule, but I have not been able to find evidence of a causal relation. 
644 Mothander and Sedin, “Översyn av samarbetet,” 14. 
645 Inge Gerremo to Pellbäck, 20 September 1985, SIDA, series F1 AD, vol. 5205. 
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decision and provided a budget, are so basic that the mere fact that he had to 
bring them up gives an idea of the informal way in which the rural 
development pair was working. 
The growth of IRDC also revived the idea of service export. The premise 
was somewhat different from 1980. Since the original idea of organizing a 
company representing the entire agricultural public sector was no longer 
viable, SLU instead asked the ministry’s permission to form a subsidiary 
company of its own. A first proposal to this effect was made in February 1985 
but the Social Democratic cabinet rejected it. Following an intervention by 
Anders Forsse, then director-general of SIDA, the matter was taken up again 
and continuously discussed in 1985 and 1986, before it was finally rejected by 
the Ministry of Agriculture in 1987.646 
By then, SLU found itself in a conundrum. Although the original idea of the 
institutional consultant was that it should provide accessible expertise to SIDA 
for clearly defined tasks but not administrate entire aid projects, in the mid-
1980s plans were nonetheless made for SLU to take active part in managing 
rural development aid projects in Guinea-Bissau and Bangladesh on behalf of 
SIDA. This hinged, however, on finding a way for SLU to employ staff abroad 
under attractive terms and conditions for a period of a year or more. It was 
impossible under the normal regulations for SLU employees but could be done 
in the company form.647 SLU’s management of the Guinea-Bissau and 
Bangladesh projects eventually fell through when the processing of the request 
to form a company dragged on, but by 1987, SLU had gone on to plan an even 
greater involvement in another project that was to support Ethiopian forestry 
education. This involvement, which will be the topic of my final chapter, 
would, according to IRDC’s estimates in 1987, require up to twenty full-time 
employees in Ethiopia within two years.648 To achieve this, there were no 
realistic alternatives to forming a company. Given the ministry’s rejection, 
SLU instead decided to create a company nominally independent of the 
university, owned by interested employees as private individuals. Founded in 
1987, the company was named Agriuniverse.649 
Many of the practical reasons for which Agriuniverse was founded were thus 
also reasons that motivated the earlier proposal to form a subsidiary company. 
                                                        
646 I will not discuss these drawn-out negotiations further, as they add little to the analysis. They 
can be followed in SLU’s archives, notably in IRDC, series A4, vol. 1–2. 
647 Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet, “SLUs u-landsengagemang, tjänsteexport och bolagsbildning,” 
IV, 26 May 1987, IRDC, series A4, vol. 2. 
648 This project did not expect to draw directly on the expertise represented at IRDC but rather on 
staff from various parts of the Faculty of Forest Sciences. See further my analysis in chapter 6. 
649 Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet, “SLUs u-landsengagemang, tjänsteexport och bolagsbildning,” 
appendix. 
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Both SIDA and SLU found that SLU’s administrative routines and employment 
conditions were constraints on the use of SLU’s expertise and staff for 
development aid.650 But SLU’s original company proposal had another objective, 
which Agriuniverse did not fulfill: it saw the formation of a company as a way to 
reconfigure the relationship with SIDA. In an interview with SLU’s staff 
magazine in 1983, Pellbäck spoke candidly on the matter: “I think it is necessary 
at present with this dual command [SLU and SIDA’s joint responsibility for the 
division]. We are still working mostly with SIDA’s activities. But as our 
assignments grow beyond SIDA, we should find a more independent form with 
only one principal. We could then spend more time on service, recruitment, 
inquiries, education . . . also for other organizations than SIDA.”651 It is clear that 
the dependency on SIDA was seen as a problem, at least in a longer perspective. 
In more general terms, what SLU sought to do to tackle this problem was to 
refine its development aid roles. The way IRDC was organized, set up as a 
crossover between a university division, a consulting firm, and a SIDA branch, 
constrained SLU’s ability to make strategic decisions about its own 
development-related work. One way forward was to attempt to separate 
potentially commercial consulting activities from those integral to the 
institutional consultant relationship, such as the recruitment, education, and 
documentation services IRDC performed for SIDA. Concurrently, SLU also 
wanted to add a third area of activity, which, at least in some ways, would fit 
more naturally in the university setting: rural development research. A vision 
of the future IRDC organized in this way was presented by the center in 1984: 
 
Figure 17. An organizational outline from 1984 of a possible future IRDC. This organization 
would consist of three separate divisions under one management: a unit for rural development 
studies (the left box), a division for recruitment, education, documentation, and investigations on 
                                                        
650 See also Gösta Edgren to Mårten Carlsson, 23 August 1984, IRDC, series A4, vol. 1. 
651 May-Inger Frischenfeldt, “SLU bit för bit: U-landsavdelningen, Ultuna,” SLU-ringen 6, no. 4 
(1983): 10–11. 
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behalf of the aid authorities (the institutional consultant role; central box), and a service export 
foundation (the right box).652 
SLU brought up the idea of a new research institute for rural development at 
the same time as it reintroduced the discussion about a service export company, 
and, in my view, these developments need to be understood in conjunction.653 
Both were part of a strategy designed to create a stabler context for 
development-related work at SLU. As I will show next, the prospect of 
creating room for what was intended to be social-science-oriented development 
research at SLU was one of the main reasons why the university management 
had agreed to create and support IRDC in the first place. Below, I examine the 
attempts to achieve this and the consequences of them. 
Rural Development Research at IRDC? 
In 1966, when sketching the future of the Agricultural College, Lennart Hjelm 
had argued that it ought to host development-related research. As I discussed in 
chapter 3, this was part of an attempt to broaden the college and take it beyond 
the boundaries of its traditional role. But while a number of individuals at the 
college and later SLU became involved in development-oriented research 
related to personal interests and competencies, no permanently funded research 
on rural development or developing-country agriculture was established at the 
university before 1996, when IRDC was closed down and replaced by the new 
Department of Rural Development Studies (presently part of the Department of 
Urban and Rural Development). This was despite the fact that IRDC and SLU 
continuously pushed for a research program to be established. Earlier I outlined 
the reorganization of IRDC in 1978 as being driven by SIDA’s need to secure 
the long-term availability of external rural development expertise. I will now 
argue that alongside this, Hjelm and others at SLU also considered the 
reorganization an opportunity to introduce a new type of interdisciplinary rural 
development research at the university. 
Development Research and the Sectoral Principle 
Since 1973, the Agricultural College had had a declared goal of considering 
(“in relevant respects”) both Swedish and developing-country problems.654 
Swedish problems nevertheless wholly dominated the college’s research 
                                                        
652 From U-landsavdelningen, “SLUs u-landsengagemang,” attachment I. 
653 See Johan Holmberg, “Forskningscentrum på SLU för landsbygdsutveckling,” 4 February 
1985, SIDA, series F1 AD, vol. 5205. 
654 Långtidsplan för Lantbrukshögskolan, 67. 
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agenda and the tension between goal and practice became increasingly 
apparent in the mid-1970s. One manifestation was a debate carried on by and 
within the student union. In April 1975, the union had arranged its first 
“developing-country week,” intended to stimulate discussions about Swedish 
development aid (among other things, the union arranged a debate on CADU 
and collected money that would buy agricultural literature for North 
Vietnam).655 Subsequently, the focus turned to the matter of how research at 
the Agricultural College could benefit the developing world. At the request of 
the editorial team of the student union magazine, Ultunesaren, economics 
professor Frank Petrini wrote an article highlighting how the college’s own 
long-term planning implied the importance of discussing the issue.656 The 
students themselves took up the debate in the next issue of the magazine, 
which had a special theme: the question of whether there was “meaningless 
research” at the Agricultural College. It included an interview with Vice-
Chancellor Hjelm in which the magazine’s principal editor asked him about 
research priorities and whether the college’s resources would do more good if 
they were increasingly geared to research problems of relevance to developing 
countries; it also included a more analytical piece asking whether Ultuna was 
an “isolated island” with respect to global issues as well as several other 
articles dealing in different ways with the developing world.657 The magazine’s 
editors were careful to present both sides of the story, but it is clear that they 
were critical of the discrepancy between plan and reality. 
The students were not the only ones noticing this state of affairs. In his 
SIDA-commissioned report on integrated rural development (see note 607 
above), published the following year, Johan Holmberg specifically noted 
the problem of a limited Swedish resource base for rural development. One 
reason for this problem, he suggested, was that SLU spent so little of its 
research resources on problems relating to this field.658 And though Hjelm 
had defended the focus on Swedish problems and argued that research 
priorities were ultimately matters of government policy when he was 
interviewed by the student union magazine, he was in fact actively working 
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to create room for development-related research at Ultuna. In his version of 
the proposal for the reorganization of the rural development division, he 
drew on Holmberg’s report in pointing out that it was problematic that only 
an “extremely small” part of the university’s resources were devoted to 
matters of relevance to developing countries.659 Hjelm admitted that there 
were good reasons why conditions in Sweden were the focus of SLU’s 
scientific work and acknowledged that its research funding was supposed to 
be used for problems of relevance to Sweden. But he then pointed out, just 
as Olga Sztarkier had done in Ultunesaren the year before, that this was 
incompatible with the long-term planning of the Agricultural College and 
SLU. He also noted that it was likewise incompatible with the attention 
paid to developing-country research in “general proclamations, government 
inquiries, etc.” 
Thereafter Hjelm turned to the question of what sort of aid-relevant 
research could be suitable for SLU, assuming that money could be found. On 
the one hand, there was the natural science approach, in line with the general 
focus of the university’s research, and on the other hand, the field of rural 
development, which was strongly emphasized in the international aid debate 
at the time. Focusing on rural development meant contributing to a highly 
prioritized area, and Hjelm also suggested that SLU could make a special 
contribution to the field: 
 
Today research with links to rural development is chiefly carried out by social 
scientists covering mostly social aspects. [SLU] ought, with respect to both its 
staff and its general orientation, to have good opportunities to work in this area 
with a broader focus than many other organizations.660 
 
The application of social science to development had been advocated since the 
1960s by important institutions like the UN Institute for Social Development 
and the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University in the United 
Kingdom. These institutions tended to be committed to politically radical 
viewpoints, “denouncing,” in the words of political scientist Christine 
Sylvester, “the naivety . . . of those who equated development with economic 
growth.”661 Judging by his stance in the CADU debate, Hjelm was far more 
conventional in his conceptual understanding. When he saw “good 
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opportunities” to introduce the field of rural development at SLU, he 
presumably did not envision antigrowth studies. Rather, he wanted to link 
social studies of development to the university’s core competencies in the 
fields of agricultural economics and agricultural science in order to create an 
interdisciplinary endeavor that could provide input to Swedish rural 
development aid projects and policies. 
These arguments were connected to something the Developing Country 
Research Inquiry (U-landsforskningsutredningen) had discussed five years 
earlier. Hjelm had been one of the experts attached to this inquiry, which had 
proposed the creation of SAREC. But it had also made other proposals: in its 
final report, the inquiry suggested that the existing Swedish research 
organization ought to be complemented in a number of fields, among them 
rural development, and it put forward that this should be done in the form of 
what they called interdisciplinary base groups: teams of researchers who, while 
organizationally remaining at “the research departments where their 
[respective] subjects are located,” were to work together on development 
research.662 The list of subjects proposed as relevant to rural development 
largely reads like an excerpt from the Agricultural College’s course catalog: 
crop production, soil science, animal and dairy science, and agricultural 
economics, complemented with the social science subjects of anthropology and 
human geography. The inquiry’s archives confirm that Hjelm had been a chief 
proponent of the importance of rural development, and its published report’s 
arguments on this topic were cited at length in the Agricultural College’s long-
term plan from 1973.663 All this points to a larger project of establishing 
developing-country research at Ultuna, something Hjelm had been interested in 
since the mid-1960s as a part of his attempt to broaden and transform the 
Agricultural College. Fully in line with this, he also argued in 1980 that 
increased emphasis on international development should be a part of a more 
general effort aimed at counteracting the threat of “scientific isolation” of SLU, 
which, Hjelm suggested, was a university of its own kind and could risk 
becoming a world unto itself.664 
By the late 1970s, Hjelm’s project also needs to be understood in the larger 
context of Swedish research policy. From the late 1960s to the late 1980s, this 
                                                        
662 SOU 1973:41, 138. 
663 Meeting minutes, Developing Country Research Inquiry, 6 March 1973, 13–14, Developing 
Country Research Committee (YK 6082) archives, vol. 1, Swedish National Archives; Lennart 
Hjelm, “Synpunkter på forskning om landsbygdsutveckling,” 28 March 1973, Developing 
Country Research Committee (YK 6082) archives, vol. 5, Swedish National Archives; 
Långtidsplan för Lantbrukshögskolan, 47–48. 
664 Meeting minutes, Board of Directors of SLU, 12–13 March 1980, § 97, SLU-CF I, series A1, 
vol. 3. 
232 
policy was characterized by a strong focus on the role of various public 
authorities in setting research agendas. Historian and philosopher of science 
Aant Elzinga describes how, under this sectoral principle for public research, 
 
[u]niversity research was to bear upon problems perceived to be important in the 
various “sectors” of social endeavor assigned to particular ministries or 
associated public agencies: housing, energy, environment, research support to 
developing countries, etc. Universities, as part of the State system, were the 
main repositories of all public research, including mission-oriented programmes 
and projects, and in fact mandated research dominated Swedish science policy 
during the 1970s.665 
 
Because it came under the Ministry of Agriculture, SLU was in a special 
position with regard to the sectoral principle, and its sectoral responsibilities 
predated the general implementation of sectoral research policies. Hjelm, 
however, seems to have sought to move beyond SLU’s responsibilities to the 
agrarian sectors and link SLU to sectoral research of relevance to development 
aid. As a contemporary observer noted, the creation of SAREC fell into the 
sectoral “research policy pattern” to the extent that it funded research in 
Sweden that sought to improve Swedish development aid (SAREC also, and 
primarily, supported international research and research in developing 
countries).666 It was here Hjelm argued that SLU had a special contribution to 
make: it could be a forum for the synthesis of social and natural sciences in the 
context of rural development research which ultimately aimed to improve 
SIDA’s aid programs. SAREC, which partially was intended to function as a 
sectoral purchaser of research, could perhaps fund such research. 
On paper, a research unit was established at the reorganized IRDC. In 
SIDA’s staff magazine, Maria Larsson and Gunilla Åkerlund from SLU 
presented the new organization in 1978. Apart from a central administrative 
unit, it had units for education, documentation and information, recruiting, 
field studies (i.e., consulting), and research. Larsson and Åkerlund explained 
that the new research unit consisted “of one (!) person, but the intention is to 
link researchers from the different departments within the Swedish University 
of Agricultural Sciences to the unit in connection with certain projects.”667 This 
idea was very reminiscent of the proposal for base groups that the Developing 
Country Research Inquiry had presented five years earlier. 
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The researcher recruited when the rural development division was 
reorganized was Lars-Erik Birgegård. He had field experience from Africa and 
Asia and held a PhD in economics, awarded by the Stockholm School of 
Economics in 1976 for a dissertation titled The Project Selection Process in 
Developing Countries. Birgegård was headhunted for the position. As soon as 
SLU and SIDA had come to an agreement on the new organization and its 
financing, Isaksson and Pellbäck sent a joint telegram to Birgegård, then 
working in Nepal, informing him of the developments and hoping for his 
“positive response.” Birgegård sent a telegram back accepting the “post at 
Ultuna.”668 
Considering Birgegård’s economics PhD, it is a reasonable assumption that 
his hiring was planned as the first step in constructing an interdisciplinary 
research program at IRDC. The center itself also evidently considered a 
research unit to have been established after the reorganization in 1978. But the 
archival material contains little evidence that any research activities actually 
took place. The quarterly reports the center sent to SIDA during the late 1970s 
made no mention of any research, and in 1980, in an analysis of IRDC’s first 
few years of operation, Isaksson conceded that its research activities had been 
of a “limited scope,” and that few attempts had been made to coordinate with 
other departments at SLU.669 
That the attempt to establish a research program failed can largely be 
explained by institutional configurations and responsibilities. The way in 
which SLU, and primarily Hjelm, formulated its interest in rural development 
research was seemingly geared toward SAREC and its role as sectoral 
purchaser of aid-related research. But less than 10% of SAREC’s budget was 
allocated to funding Swedish research, and it preferred to use these scarce 
resources to finance individual research projects in regular university 
departments rather than fund special organizations like IRDC.670 SIDA, for its 
part, had no interest in financing research at SLU. While having authorized the 
establishment of a research unit, SIDA assumed—and had also communicated 
this to SLU—that research funding was SAREC’s responsibility.671 SIDA’s 
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economic responsibilities to IRDC only encompassed activities of direct 
relevance to its own work, which in this context meant the consulting, the 
recruitment, the education, and the library at the division. Birgegård, formally 
employed as a consultant, was consequently mainly assigned consultancy tasks 
and had little time to plan research. Most importantly, he became involved with 
drawing up SIDA’s new strategy for rural development aid, which emphasized 
both growth and social equity and called for public participation and increased 
productivity among small farmers.672 He then left Ultuna in 1981, and with that 
the plan of making IRDC into a platform for interdisciplinary development 
research was temporarily dropped. 
A Science-Practice Hybrid: IRDC’s Analysis Unit 
The idea resurfaced two years later, when Ingemar Croon proposed that SLU 
ought to engage in interdisciplinary rural development research, parts of which 
IRDC could host.673 A study visit to the World Food Program and the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development in Rome, led by SLU’s new 
vice-chancellor Mårten Carlsson, had “strengthened the opinion within the 
university about the need for capacity development for studies on rural 
development matters.”674 SIDA’s new rural development strategy, in part 
designed by Lars-Erik Birgegård, also helped revive the issue. It was 
considered very ambitious and had raised new questions about SIDA’s 
capacity to analyze rural development to meet the strategy’s demands. The end 
result was a proposal by Croon to establish a research unit at IRDC—an 
“Institute for Rural Development Studies.”675 SLU envisioned this as an 
academic institute with a professorship for a Swedish researcher, along with a 
guest professorship for a researcher from a developing country. The costs 
would be split between SIDA, SLU and SAREC. 
In the summer of 1984, Mårten Carlsson called a meeting with a number of 
SIDA and political officials to discuss the future of SLU’s development aid 
work. The group included, among others, Johan Holmberg and Anders Forsse 
from SIDA, Bo Bengtsson as the representative of SAREC, and the state 
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secretaries from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs.676 In a memorandum serving as a basis for the discussion, SLU 
proposed that a new unit for “qualified, interdisciplinary studies of rural 
development” ought to be established at the university.677 Both Forsse and 
Holmberg were cautiously positive to the idea, on the condition that SLU and 
SAREC contributed financially. SAREC was, however, hesitant, again 
probably because of its limited resources. Furthermore, the candidate SLU had 
had in mind for the professorial chair—political scientist and Africanist Göran 
Hydén—declined the position.678 
As SIDA was not prepared to fund research at SLU without the financial 
participation of SAREC, nothing came of the proposal to establish an 
academic research institute focused on rural development. But unwilling to 
give up the idea altogether, SLU instead entered into new negotiations with 
SIDA over the possibility of creating a unit for qualified but more practice-
oriented studies. Such a unit would have a natural home at IRDC, where 
there already was a relevant library and an administrative apparatus in place, 
and where there also were established links to SIDA, the intended primary 
benefactor of the work. 
SIDA was receptive to the idea but insisted that the unit should only 
perform studies aimed at producing results directly relevant to its desk officers. 
At a meeting about the scope of the new unit’s activities, Johan Holmberg 
acknowledged that this would imply “a limitation of conventional academic 
freedom.”679 Partly because of this, the far more academically-oriented SAREC 
advised against establishing the unit even though it was no longer asked to 
contribute funding. In its consultation response, written by Bo Bengtsson, 
SAREC noted that while it was positive that SIDA planned to place 
development aid funds at the disposal of researchers, this ought “to be done in 
line with the criteria used by the research community.”680 SIDA was largely 
unconcerned about this side of things, however. Later, when discussing 
whether or not it should be described as an “analysis” or a “research” unit, 
Johan Holmberg expressed the view that “SIDA is less interested in 
nomenclature than in seeing that the [unit] addresses itself to problem areas 
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which are relevant for SIDAs needs in such a manner that SIDA policy makers 
and others can easily make use of the results.”681 At the same time, SIDA 
emphasized that the work had to be conducted at an analytical level which was 
clearly distinct from the regular consulting work IRDC did.682 
SIDA also saw the unit as a way of bringing Lars-Erik Birgegård, now 
widely considered an important development thinker, back into the agency’s 
sphere of influence.683 He was interested in the prospect of trying to distill 
aspects of practical relevance from the voluminous body of development-
related social science research being produced and agreed to lead the unit. 
Established in 1986 as a subdivision of IRDC, it was eventually named the 
Rural Development Analysis Unit, or the analysis unit for short. It was fully 
funded by SIDA.684 
The unit’s goal was to analyze “rural development problems in the Third 
World.”685 This did not include performing empirical research. In an article in 
IRDC’s journal, Birgegård described the work of the unit, noting that it would 
be geared toward pertinent problems for aid administrators: 
 
The work has a practical and operative focus. The problems under study shall be 
regarded as relevant by those tasked with designing and carrying out rural 
development aid. Around such problems, the unit attempts to gather, analyze, 
summarize, and communicate the considerable range of research results and 
earlier experiences.686 
 
It thus focused on analyses and syntheses of previously published research, and 
even if the work was grounded in a scientific approach, the resulting 
publications were written with SIDA’s aid administrators in mind and did not 
target an academic audience. Footnotes were avoided, and conclusions and 
recommendations were as far as possible formulated without ambiguities. In 
this way, the unit suggested in a presentation brochure, “[a]n overworked desk 
officer [at SIDA] can . . . become acquainted with the gist of up to 150 
references in roughly 15 pages devoid of disciplinary jargon.”687 The unit was 
thus essentially an attempt at establishing a new kind of interface between 
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SIDA and SLU, more scientifically grounded than the consulting activities, but 
still geared strongly toward practical applicability. Besides Birgegård as 
director, the unit included a junior researcher, agricultural economist Melinda 
Fones-Sundell, and, for a few years, an African senior researcher, sociologist 
Benson Nindi from the University of Dar es Salaam. 
Initially, the unit collected research results and disseminated them in what 
it called issue papers. These dealt with a range of issues related to rural 
development: during the first year, there were papers on the role of 
agricultural research, price policy as a production stimulant, experiences with 
integrated rural development, and farming systems research. Between 1987 
and 1991, a total of thirteen issue papers were produced and disseminated, 
primarily at LANT, but they were also sent to other agencies and 
organizations with an interest in rural development. In addition, the unit 
organized seminars at SIDA, SLU, and other institutions to discuss the 
findings.688 Beginning in 1989, its work shifted to the design of sector 
strategies, an activity in which the unit collaborated directly with 
representatives from Zambia and Mozambique.689 
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Figure 18. Taken from a self-produced brochure presenting the analysis unit, these images 
illustrate how it was intended to work. Distilling researchers’ ideas into issue papers, the analysis 
unit would be a knight in shining armor, coming to the rescue of SIDA’s desk and field officers 
struggling with broken-down tractors, or worse. But with the benefit of hindsight, the cartoon 
takes on an ironic quality. The inability to adjust its output to the intended audience was the 
analysis unit’s major problem, and this is easily construed from the drawing: what good is a 
theoretical paper when needing a mechanic?690 
The latter tasks, more operative than what had previously been considered 
appropriate for the unit, reflected the growing insight that the analysis unit had 
failed to function as a bridge between science and practice. In a self-evaluation 
from 1991, Birgegård emphasized that the unit had had problems with 
“reaching out to and influencing” SIDA’s desk officers.691 An external 
evaluation presented the year after reached similar conclusions. It noted that 
the unit had done high-quality work but stated that its impact nevertheless had 
been limited. It had not “been given the academic weight and critical mass 
needed to create a research environment,” but on the other hand, the work had 
not been “close enough to SIDA’s and SLU’s operative work to be considered 
immediately useful.” In the end, “researchers have sometimes considered [the 
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analysis unit’s] reports to be mission research or consulting, whereas the 
purchasers at SIDA often found the reports too academic and demanding.”692 
Looking ahead, the evaluation proposed that SIDA should increase its 
internal capacity for performing the kind of analyses the unit had been 
producing, while SLU should be given the opportunity to concentrate on 
academic research. It suggested that SLU’s “social science and 
interdisciplinary research competence in developing-country matters ought to 
be strengthened, and SIDA ought to have a positive attitude to financing such 
an effort.”693 The basic conclusion was thus that the science-practice hybrid 
work the analysis unit had attempted had not been successful. The roles ought 
to be separated instead: such analysis as was necessary for the administration 
of Swedish aid was a task for SIDA to handle itself, while SLU should be 
given the resources it needed to build up a proper research program in this area. 
This was, as we have seen, very much in line with SLU’s own objectives. 
Commenting on the evaluation of the analysis unit, IRDC remarked that “SLU 
considers it . . . important to obtain fixed resources for an enlarged and long-
term research and education activity . . . within the field of Third World rural 
development.”694 But SIDA remained reluctant to finance research, and for 
SLU, work on problems relating to rural development abroad remained beyond 
what could reasonably be argued to fall within its sectoral responsibilities. Its 
comments on the evaluation explicitly stated that “SLU’s mandate and 
mandateship do not allow . . . the internal redistribution of resources. We need 
additional resources from somewhere else than from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, under which SLU belongs.”695 The situation amounted to a 
deadlock: SLU could not use its core funding from the ministry for the rural 
development research it desired to initiate; SIDA was ready to fund what it saw 
as useful work at SLU, but this did not include academic research, and SAREC 
could fund individual research projects but was reluctant to support the 
establishment of a new research field at a Swedish university.696 
The impossibility of uniting SLU’s interest in a new field of academic 
research with SIDA’s demand for practical utility makes the case of the 
analysis unit a good example of the more general tensions that tend to 
characterize organizations with the goal of facilitating cooperation and flows of 
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information between the academy and external stakeholders; what American 
political scientist David Guston has described as boundary organizations.697 
Earlier research shows that tensions between scientific and practical demands 
and interests are typical for university-based boundary organizations. To be 
able to handle these tensions the organization needs to have a good ability to 
manage boundaries by adjusting its activities and by balancing different 
stakeholder needs.698 
The analysis unit, and IRDC as a whole (which can be understood as a 
boundary organization in itself), lacked this boundary management ability. 
This was due to the way in which the rural development pair functioned. 
There was an uneven distribution of power between the main principals, SLU 
and SIDA. Though its advisory board was dominated by SLU 
representatives, its financial dependence on SIDA meant that IRDC was not 
in a position to make its own strategic decisions. The situation of the analysis 
unit thus became impossible because SIDA made incommensurable 
demands: the aid administrators would not make use of its reports, but the 
nature of the reports could not be changed. Giving them a more academic 
focus was impossible because it conflicted with SIDA’s condition of direct 
relevance, but making the reports more practical would undermine the unit’s 
raison d’être. The “solution” of beginning to work more operatively in a 
different way was appreciated by SIDA, but was not a foundation on which 
the unit’s continued existence could be built. 
In conclusion, I interpret SLU’s attempt at creating a research environment 
as a kind of counterpart to its endeavors to set up a service export company. 
While there were likely scientific motives in play as well, on a strategic level it 
was part of the same overarching effort to reconfigure the rural development 
pair in order to stabilize the conditions for development-related work at SLU. 
Both attempts essentially failed due to diverging stakeholder interests, and 
SLU remained fully dependent on SIDA to provide direct funding for most of 
its development work. Throughout the 1980s, this funding had continuously 
increased, but by 1992, when the analysis unit was officially closed down, 
conditions were rapidly changing. New circumstances meant that a serious 
challenge was then being posed to IRDC and to the entire institutional 
collaboration between SLU and SIDA. 
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The Department of Rural Development Studies 
Nils-Ivar Isaksson returned from Kenya in 1986 and resumed his position as 
director of IRDC from January 1987.699 He came back to an organization that, if 
judged by its growing number of staff and turnover, seemed to be thriving. But 
its organization embodied SLU’s failure to refine and clarify its development aid 
roles. IRDC remained an independent unit within the university, neither 
academized nor commercialized. It approached the end of the 1980s 
fundamentally in the same state as it had entered it: wholly dependent on SIDA’s 
demand for its services. That demand, sustained throughout the 1980s by a 
significant interest in rural development, would however weaken significantly at 
the end of the decade as SIDA’s priorities shifted. 
“The End of the First Generation” 
When Isaksson returned to IRDC, the center looked rather different from when 
he left in 1982. As SIDA’s demands on SLU had increased, IRDC had 
expanded and somewhat changed its role and functions. Recruitment, 
education, and documentation went on much like before, but the analysis unit 
and the method development work had been added, and the consulting 
activities had expanded and transformed. During the first half of 1987, IRDC’s 
consultants only performed a third of the commissions from SIDA in-house, 
with the rest being contracted either to other parts of SLU or to external 
partners, giving the center more of a supervisory role.700 
A first sign that this state of affairs would change came in the fall of 1988, 
when SIDA’s management decided to reappraise the agency’s relation to SLU, 
motivated, among other things, by the fact that “the financial extent of SLU’s 
tasks has grown so substantially.”701 The somewhat sinister implications of this 
wording were confirmed when, in early 1990, SIDA’s evaluators published 
their report. The two independent consultants assigned to the task, Björn 
Mothander and Bo Sedin, considered the SIDA-SLU cooperation “in many 
ways unique,” not only in terms of its size and structure but also its history.702 
But they found it unfortunate that it had developed into a relationship 
characterized by mutual dependency, in which LANT was reliant on SLU’s 
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expertise, and SLU was dependent on SIDA financing its developing-country-
related work. Ultimately, this made Mothander and Sedin critical of the SIDA-
SLU collaboration’s form, particularly of the informal contacts between IRDC 
and SIDA and the mixing up of roles that these contacts led to. “SLU had 
become,” they noted, “a general resource base from which, for example, staff 
were recruited or ‘borrowed’ to posts at LANT or as field personnel at various 
SIDA offices, while being continuously employed by SLU.”703 They further 
noted that it was difficult to get an “overview of a cooperation which is largely 
unspecified and concerns a large number of often small, nonformalized 
assignments,” and considered it a serious problem that it “is often impossible to 
discern SLU’s position and role in different types of commissions.”704 They 
especially disapproved of what they understood as instances in which SLU 
designed and planned projects that it then secured a commission to manage, 
and used the forestry education project in Ethiopia which had started in 1986 
(see next chapter) as a principal example. 
SLU disagreed with Mothander and Sedin. In a set of written comments on 
the first draft of their report, the university argued that they had misunderstood 
the collaboration’s origins and purpose and had thus drawn misleading 
conclusions. Close teamwork was necessary in the complicated realities of 
rural development, the university argued, and the insinuations that SLU gave 
advice designed to secure commissions for itself were “unjustified and 
completely unfounded.”705 The comments also contained a paragraph 
discussing the origins of, and SLU’s interest in, the collaboration: 
 
Finally, we want to point out that it is not SLU that has approached SIDA to 
obtain assignments or to initiate developing-country work or IRDC. It is an 
initiative that was taken by SIDA already a quarter of a century ago – and which 
SIDA has found reason to expand at the rate that Swedish development aid and 
SLU’s competence have expanded in the relevant areas. SLU has no primary 
interest in maintaining or running this activity.706 
 
This statement, denying the Agricultural College’s very active role in 
establishing CADU and the subsequent institutional collaboration as well as 
SLU’s active maneuvering to get IRDC started, was at least as misleading as 
anything Mothander and Sedin had written. Indeed, the strong and annoyed 
reaction to Mothander and Sedin’s criticisms in fact betrayed the very interest 
in the collaboration that the comments attempted to deny. 
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Mothander and Sedin slightly revised their report in response to the 
comments. SLU considered the changes insignificant, even if Isaksson 
acknowledged that some of the more formal criticism was “principally 
correct,” if difficult to apply to the practical reality in which the collaboration 
took place.707 At any rate, the damage was done. SLU’s comments 
notwithstanding, many at SIDA recognized their daily work situation in 
Mothander and Sedin’s conclusions. IRDC had even begun to be talked of as a 
“monster at the agency’s bosom.”708 
The mutual trust was further eroded through changes of key personnel at 
both SIDA and SLU. In 1989, Gösta Ericsson and Lars Augustinsson retired 
from SIDA. As I noted earlier, both Ericsson, then head of department at the 
agency, and Augustinsson, then director of LANT, were Ultuna-trained 
agronomists who always had been keen to maintain good relations with SLU. 
Augustinsson’s replacement as director of LANT, Klas Markensten, had a 
wholly different background and did not share his predecessors’ rural 
connection. An economist by training, he had been at SIDA since 1970, but 
having mostly worked with economic planning, he had had no previous 
contacts with SLU and little experience of rural development.709 
Ericsson’s and Augustinsson’s retirements coincided with Lennart Hjelm’s 
stepping down as chairman of the advisory board to IRDC, which he had 
headed since it was first established as the CADU committee at the 
Agricultural College in 1967 (Hjelm was 74 years old in 1989, having stayed 
on as chairman of the advisory board long after his professional retirement in 
1982). Far from it being an honorific position, his chairmanship involved 
active work, mostly high-level coordination with SIDA and other agencies and 
organizations.710 His importance in this position, and the influence he exercised 
at SIDA, should not be underestimated: in internal SIDA correspondence in 
1985, Johan Holmberg noted that Hjelm was “responsible for much of the 
management” of IRDC.711 
In reference to these three retirements, Isaksson described June 30, 1989, as 
“the end of the first generation of Swedish rural development cooperation – 
and particularly of the SIDA-SUAS cooperation.”712 Isaksson’s identification 
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of this as a significant event confirms the importance afforded to personal 
relationships in sustaining the rural development pair. That he called it “the end 
of the first generation” suggests that the pair now transcended those individuals 
who had constructed it and thus would live on past their retirement. Isaksson 
was right in the sense that there was a formal relationship between the two 
organizations that was independent of particular individuals. But this was true 
only in theory, as the collaboration had always depended on personal 
relationships and mutual trust. This would be lost with the retirement of the 
first generation, for there would be no similar second generation to replace it. 
The new decision-makers, particularly at SIDA, would approach the 
collaboration in a wholly different way. 
A Clash of Cultures 
Despite SIDA’s attempts in the mid-1980s to formalize its relations with 
IRDC, much of the work had still been handled in accordance with the 
established informal praxis that Mothander and Sedin had severely criticized. 
When Markensten became the new director of LANT, these informalities came 
to a definite end. From the budget year 1989/90, all activities had to be 
formally specified and budgeted.713 
The changes Markensten implemented were in line with the trend toward 
New Public Management (NPM) at the time. To expand on the transformations 
of Swedish public administration that came with NPM’s increasing influence is 
beyond the scope of this study: suffice it to say that it was a governance and 
management philosophy, inspired by private sector methods, which left little 
room for state agencies to informally reach out to one another.714 Management 
by objectives replaced management by rules, and formalized transactions 
replaced informal cooperation. In the late 1980s, the Social Democratic 
government began to push for such changes, which, according to Inge 
Gerremo, were promoted at SIDA by Social Democrat Carl Tham who had 
replaced Anders Forsse as Director-General in 1985.715 The changes in how the 
rural development pair was administrated were thus primarily linked to these 
more general developments in Swedish public administration. While the 
retirement of the “first generation” clearly facilitated the introduction of the 
new routines, it was not the cause of them as such. But the personnel changes 
at both SIDA and SLU exacerbated their negative effects on the relationship. 
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Alongside the new administrative forms, the operative side of the SIDA-
SLU relationship was reconfigured through changes in aid priorities. If the 
1970s had seen rural poverty replace the population-resource dilemma as the 
overarching challenge agrarian development aid was to meet, the late 1980s 
then saw a shift away from rural development toward environmental goals. In 
1983 the United Nations had appointed the former Prime Minister of Norway, 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, to lead a commission tasked with the question of how 
to reconcile development with environment. When published four years later, 
the Brundtland Commission’s report made environmental challenges an 
important part of the international development debate. It popularized the 
notion of sustainable development, which soon became integrated into the aid 
discourse. Subsequently, in 1988, the parliament introduced an environmental 
objective for Swedish development aid.716 As a consequence, environmental 
issues came to eclipse agrarian questions on SIDA’s agenda, and LANT 
gradually changed its orientation and eventually also its name, becoming the 
Natural Resources Management Division (Naturbruksbyrån or NATUR).717 
Operatively, this shift meant that Swedish rurally-oriented aid began to leave 
its earlier productivist inclination behind. Support to food production had, in 
the 1960s, become established as a method to counter the population-resource 
dilemma, and increasing the yields of food as well as other crops remained 
important to the poverty-focused rural development programs of the 1970s and 
1980s.718 Much of this latter aid had, in fact, included environmental issues 
(including forestry efforts, an example of which will be analyzed in the next 
chapter, which often were very geared to environmental aspects) either directly 
or indirectly. But in these contexts, environmental issues were generally 
conceptualized in the first instance as production problems and were thus 
approached in a way that still afforded a prominent role to SLU’s more 
practical expertise.719 With the shift toward explicitly environmental goals 
from the end of the 1980s, the problems SIDA wanted to solve became 
increasingly distant from agricultural production. This thus posed a direct 
challenge to the relevance of the consultants at IRDC as well as to SIDA’s 
general interest in the rural development pair. 
                                                        
716 For a (critical) overview of the the Brundtland Commission and its notion of sustainable 
development, see Rist, History of Development, 178–87; on the introduction of the environmental 
goal, see Odén, Biståndets idéhistoria, 106. 
717 Markensten, interview. 
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Birgegård and others in 1979–1980. 
719 Inge Gerremo mentions the example of soil conservation work in East Africa, which LANT 
understood as a productivity-enhancing project but which also contributed to a positive 
environmental development. Gerremo, “Några reflexioner,” 1. 
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This new orientation also meant that the profile of the staff at NATUR 
changed. Many of the younger SIDA officials were skeptical of the 
modernist understanding of agriculture that they saw SLU as representing. 
Even if they often had studied at SLU, they held rather different views 
compared with the older staff, who mostly had appropriated the productivist 
views prevalent within the organizations and public authorities of the 
agrarian sectors (for example, the “first generation” men Ericsson and 
Augustinsson had both begun their professional careers in the service science 
domain of agricultural extension, with its focus on hands-on support to 
agricultural production). They also lacked both direct and indirect experience 
of CADU and of the formative stage during which the close collaborative 
relationship with SLU had been forged. Thus they could see the rural 
development pair from the outside, and they were often unimpressed. The 
resulting clash of cultures is well illustrated by a memorandum by Amalia 
Garcia-Thärn, who worked at NATUR and in 1991 became the desk officer 
responsible for the cooperation with SLU. In the memorandum, written in 
1993, Garcia-Thärn presented some reflections on the relationship with SLU 
and its historical baggage. She noted many of the same problems pointed out 
by Mothander and Sedin and explicitly referred to the changes at SIDA: “The 
new [SIDA officers] do not have the same historical links to SLU, even if 
most have been trained there, and have not been in the same kind of 
dependent relationship to SLU as older [officers] at the division.”720 
A good example of how the new generation of SIDA staff were unmoved 
by SLU’s older goals and priorities can be found in Garcia-Thärn’s treatment 
of the veterinary courses in reproduction and pathology, which, at the time of 
her writing, were about to be canceled. At IRDC and at SLU’s veterinary 
faculty, these courses were venerated as long-standing and tremendously 
successful examples of agrarian development aid and were strongly defended 
against SIDA’s threats of cancellation.721 But Garcia-Thärn, unmoved by the 
Lagerlöfian heritage, was brief and dismissive, describing the courses as “an 
old activity which SIDA has wanted to cancel although strong political 
pressure has as of yet made that impossible.”722 That these views were gaining 
ground at SIDA by the early 1990s implies that SLU’s expertise was losing its 
ability to shape the direction of Swedish agrarian aid. 
                                                        
720 Amalia Garcia-Thärn, “Reflexioner om SIDAs samarbete med Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet,” 
p. 1, 24 November 1993, SIDA, series F1 AD, vol. 5219A. 
721 See e.g. Ingemar Settergren’s celebratory account; published in 1993, it was certainly part of 
an attempt to defend the status quo (cf. also figure 5 above): Settergren, “Kurser i 
husdjursreproduktion 1; Settergren, “Kurser i husdjursreproduktion 2; Settergren, “Kurser i 
husdjursreproduktion 3.” 
722 Garcia-Thärn, “Reflexioner om SIDAs samarbete med Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet,” 3. 
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Attempts to Find New Funding 
Three years after Isaksson’s return, IRDC thus found itself in precisely the type 
of situation it had tried to prevent by attempting to reduce its dependency on 
SIDA. It clearly recognized that the changes it was facing threatened its future 
existence. At an in-house training day for the center’s staff in January 1990, the 
topic was “our own structural adjustment.” It was based on two future 
scenarios, “apathetic erosion” and “specialized expansion,” with the former 
being the expected fate unless changes were made.723 
As a consequence of this analysis, both the center and SLU began to take a 
new, more active stance in the matter of establishing permanent academic 
development-related activities at the university. In a strategic plan published in 
1990, the university’s central administration opened up for a discussion about 
the need for basic resources for developing-country research. That discussion 
was also part of the preparation for SLU’s proposals for the upcoming 
government bill on research during the spring of the same year.724 
At the same time, a major government review of SLU was under way, 
conducted by what was known as the SLU Inquiry (SLU-utredningen). It 
included IRDC, and Isaksson wrote a proposal for a consultation response to 
the inquiry’s final report, in which he very explicitly stated the need to include 
developing-country research in the basic responsibilities of the university: 
 
The developing-country related activities must become a part of SLU’s regular 
activities. . . . In the same way as SLU today collaborates with the USA, the EC, 
the Nordic countries, and other developed countries, the developing-country 
collaboration should be prescribed as part of the university’s mission. This 
means . . . that SLU must be granted permanent resources for its fundamental 
activities in this field.725 
 
The assertion that the developing-country related activities must be 
incorporated into SLU’s regular tasks and be formalized as part of the 
university’s mission reflected the recognition that the rural development pair 
was breaking down and that, from a longer-term perspective, IRDC’s situation 
thus was untenable. SLU would need its own resources and a formal 
government instruction to carry out normal academic activities in the area. 
Otherwise there would be few possibilities for continued work, except on the 
                                                        
723 See “IRDC – framtida scenarior,” January 1990; Johan Toborn to Klas Markensten, 7 January 
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724 Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet, “Framtidsplan för SLU 1990/91 – 92/93 samt budgetförslag för 
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basis of individual initiatives. By situating the question in the context of 
internationalization more generally, the argument was also in line with 
Mothander and Sedin’s review of the SIDA-SLU institutional collaboration, 
which had suggested that “the internationalization of the universities. . . has 
developed so as to make it natural that [the course program at IRDC] is 
financed directly by SLU’s funding from the Ministry of Agriculture.”726 
Furthermore, Mothander and Sedin had considered it “natural that the 
government supports the developing-country research at SLU by the 
establishment of special researcher positions.”727 
The government also seems to have signaled that changes were coming. A 
new center-right coalition government had come into power following the 
September 1991 election, and as early as October 1991, Inge Gerremo at 
NATUR wrote a letter to the National Board of Universities and Colleges, 
discussing “SIDA, SLU and the future.”728 The National Board of Universities 
and Colleges was an agency under the Ministry of Education, which suggests 
that plans were being made to change SLU’s ministerial allegiance. Quite in 
line with what the university then argued with increasing passion, Gerremo 
contended that, from SIDA’s point of view, it would be beneficial if SLU could 
obtain fixed resources for developing-country work so that it could develop its 
own profile in the field without being wholly dependent on SIDA. If changes 
were being planned for SLU’s mandate and position, perhaps possibilities 
would open up in this regard as well. 
In the end, SLU remained under the Ministry of Agriculture, but the 
government nonetheless changed the university’s mission with the bill on 
research presented in 1993. The bill not only entailed a significant reduction in 
SLU’s funding, it also signaled a partially new direction for the university. It 
transferred responsibility for funding the closely production-related 
experimentation from the state to the agricultural sector, and redefined the goal 
of SLU’s scientific activities in terms of sustainable utilization of natural 
resources.729 These changes amounted to a redefinition of SLU’s sectoral 
responsibilities, something that opened up fresh avenues of research. At this 
time, the Ministry of Agriculture also showed an increased interest in 
developing countries, with the new state secretary, Mats Denninger, having 
personal experience of foreign aid.730 This was reflected in the bill, in which 
the government stated that the “aid activities at SLU are essential” and that 
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728 Gerremo to Ulla Åhgren-Lange, 30 October 1991, SIDA, series F1 AD, vol. 5215. 
729 Government Bill 1992/93:170, Forskning för kunskap och framsteg, 363–65. 
730 Isaksson, interview. 
 249 
SLU would later be “guaranteed funding for several years to establish certain 
fundamental activities.” This was later clarified to be a multi-year guarantee of 
SEK 3 million annually.731 
In an earlier appropriations request, SLU had identified four subject areas 
that, after a dialog with SIDA and SAREC, it considered suitable for 
interdisciplinary work: farming systems, ecology–environment–resources, 
animals and veterinary medicine, and socioeconomics with a particular focus 
on the interaction people–society–natural resources.732 The idea was to build 
up developing-country research and education in these fields. Isaksson later 
reformulated them into more well-defined subjects, and IRDC’s advisory 
committee decided to prioritize three socioeconomic subjects: rural 
development, small farming systems, and human ecology.733 The new 
government funds would be used to establish professorships in these subjects 
in order to initiate research and education. 
The End of the Rural Development Pair 
While SLU negotiated with SIDA and the government about these new 
professorships, the older IRDC-SIDA collaboration was eroding and the niche 
that IRDC occupied disappearing fast. Writing to Isaksson in August 1992, 
Markensten confirmed that SIDA’s demands for SLU’s practical and largely 
experience-based expertise was rapidly decreasing. He stated that 
 
the number of bilateral recruiting assignments [from SIDA] to SLU [has] been 
substantially reduced as the number of aid efforts carried out by SIDA directly 
has decreased. Project execution is increasingly the responsibility of the 
recipient country, and Swedish participation is increasingly delegated to 
consulting firms. The requirements for proper procurement along with demands 
and opinions from the recipient countries on individual experts and competence 
profiles further complicates the possibilities of continuously using a number of 
IRDC’s general consultants and recruiters for short-term consulting 
assignments.734 
 
The practical consequence for IRDC was a forced significant staff cutback and 
a considerable reduction in its activities as SIDA no longer had continuous 
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need for its services and, by this time, no interest in attempting to find a 
solution that could salvage the collaboration.735 
While IRDC struggled to cope with the phasing out of most of its tasks and 
the laying-off of most of its staff, planning for the use of the new government 
funds continued. In February 1994, SLU’s board of directors formally decided 
to create the three new professorships. Selecting candidates took some time, 
however, and finding them a place in SLU’s organization was a complex 
problem. Four alternatives were considered. The first was to maintain IRDC as 
an independent center and employ the new professors there. The second was to 
appoint them to the existing Department of Economics. The third was to create 
a new social science department together with the Department of Economics. 
The fourth and final option considered was to create a new department solely 
for the new professors.736 What problematized things, from IRDC’s 
perspective, was the idea of interdisciplinarity. Informing a working group 
tasked with presenting recommendations on the university’s future 
organization and priorities, Isaksson wrote: 
 
The departmental structure is today considered necessary in order for the work 
to be conducted according to prevalent academic forms, and for the necessary 
intrascientific rigor to be upheld. Or is this a myth that ought to be dismantled? 
The [departmental] form is not satisfactory to ensure the desired problem-based 
applied interdisciplinary approach that the developing-country work needs.737 
 
Isaksson advocated a research center based on the existing IRDC, possibly 
with something like a departmental structure within it. If this was not 
considered suitable, he proposed a new department for rural development and a 
new international office at the central university administration. This 
suggestion implied that IRDC’s functions would be divided between two 
separate organizational entities within SLU. 
The major advantage a center had over a traditional department was, from 
Isaksson’s point of view, that it would be more sheltered. A new 
interdisciplinary department was, he argued, atypical for SLU, and there would 
be differences in “organizational culture” and “norms and paradigms.”738 It 
would not be easy to fit this new research orientation into an SLU that, while 
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noticeably broader than before, still had a self-image largely characterized by 
natural science, production-oriented perspectives, and goals still primarily seen 
in relation to the Swedish agricultural and forestry sectors. Nonetheless, at a 
meeting in November 1994, the center’s advisory board decided to recommend 
the second option, the creation of a new department.739 No motivation can be 
found in the meeting minutes, but the decision was probably a result of the fact 
that by this time no one was interested in maintaining either the rural 
development pair or remnants of the structures on which it had rested. IRDC 
was increasingly seen as irrelevant not just to SIDA but also to SLU. A new 
vice-chancellor, Thomas Rosswall, had been appointed in 1994, and he did not 
have the same relationship with IRDC as Lennart Hjelm and Mårten Carlsson 
had had before him. According to his own recollection, he saw it as “an 
organization that had run its course.”740 
After the usual process, three new professors were eventually appointed—
Janice Jiggins in human ecology, David Gibbon in small farming systems, and 
Kjell Havnevik in rural development—and in September 1996, the new 
Department of Rural Development Studies was created. After more than three 
decades, SLU had thus finally achieved what the Agricultural College had set 
out to obtain in the mid-1960s: a permanent organizational framework for 
developing-country research and education. It still exists today; rural 
development in the global South is presently an active research and teaching 
discipline within SLU’s Department of Urban and Rural Development. But the 
establishment of a research department meant that IRDC had reached the end 
of its road. The center was closed down, and its remaining staff and tasks were 
divided between the new department and the central administration’s new 
international office. With this, the close SIDA-SLU relationship that I have 
called the rural development pair also ceased to exist. 
The Rise and Fall of the Rural Development Pair 
My use of the term rural development pair is intended to indicate both the 
constitutive role the SIDA-SLU relationship played in Swedish agrarian and 
rural development aid and to highlight its relatively long existence and the 
important role played by interpersonal relationships in upholding it. Largely 
forged in the crucible of CADU, the relationship over time developed into a 
large-scale permanent collaboration. The recruiting, documentation, 
consulting, education, and other functions of IRDC were, for some time, quite 
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important to the realization of Swedish agrarian development aid. It is fair to 
say that significant parts of this aid were co-produced by SLU and SIDA, from 
the CADU project and through the 1980s, after which the relationship was 
reconfigured and then came to an end. 
The rise and subsequent fall of the rural development pair illustrates general 
changes in Swedish development aid and in the organizational landscape of the 
Swedish agricultural sector. The pair came about in a context where Swedish 
development aid was new and mostly administered by SIDA directly, where an 
older ethos of mutual support still existed among government agencies, and 
where the number of commercial firms offering expertise relevant to agrarian 
development aid was limited. By the early 1990s, this context no longer 
existed. Having gained more experience of aid, and as a response to changing 
trends in the international aid debate, SIDA began to focus less on agrarian 
questions and also largely withdrew from the direct administration of field 
projects. At the same time, the increasing emphasis on procurement routines 
and formalized relations that came with the growing influence of NPM left no 
room for arrangements such as the permanent connection between SIDA and 
IRDC, which built on long-term financial commitments that were difficult to 
change in response to shifting needs. IRDC, which had largely failed at selling 
its services to other clients than SIDA, then saw its financial base disappear. 
But as the relationship with SIDA fell apart, SLU was instead able to secure 
money and instructions from the government to realize a long-standing goal, 
namely, the creation of a department of rural development and the appointment 
of three professors responsible for research and education in the field. 
These developments can be described in terms of academic drift. 
Contextual changes led to developing-country work at SLU losing its close ties 
to the practice of rural development aid. Instead it became associated with 
academic practices and value systems, so that in the 1990s, SLU became more 
concerned with teaching and studying rural development rather than 
participating in it. The aid projects it still played a more direct role in also 
focused on academic activities (see next chapter). This implies that SLU lost 
the practice-based agrarian expertise that had been gathered at IRDC, but 
which by the mid-1990s was in much less demand in the context of Swedish 
development aid. In this respect, the closure of IRDC marks a breaking point: 
Nils Lagerlöf’s courses, the Agricultural College’s support to CADU, and most 
of IRDC’s consulting activities had all been expressions of a service science 
ideology in the sense that they were closely bound up with practical expertise 
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and emphasized direct connections with agricultural production.741 This lost 
institutional ground when academic activities became more important. 
There is no evidence to suggest that SLU’s own attempts to institute 
academic rural development research in the 1980s reflected a desire to replace 
service science norms with academic ones. Direct participation in development 
aid was assumed to go on alongside education and research of relevance to 
such participation. The academic activities were thus intended to complement 
and support the practical ones as well as create a more stable situation for SLU 
in Swedish development aid. But by the mid-1990s, the original context of this 
project was gone, and its implementation had definitely proven impossible. In 
this respect, the developments at and around IRDC mirror those at the 
university as a whole, which was—and, to a degree, still is in the twenty-first 
century—likewise struggling with the tension between the ideal of service 
science on the one hand, and its academic identity on the other.742 An 
important turning point came in 1993, when the government bill on research 
gave SLU new goals and divested it of responsibility for the important service 
science task of closely production-oriented experimentation. The 
contemporaneous decline and fall of IRDC was, at least in part, a reflection of 
the same broader process of reconfiguring agrarian expertise in Sweden.743 In a 
sense, SIDA’s 1988 environmental goal is mirrored in SLU’s 1993 goal of 
contributing to the sustainable use of natural resources.  
At SLU, the interest in rural development cooperation and the global South 
survived this reconfiguration. Though it was not realized as originally 
envisioned, by 1996 development-related research and education had in fact 
been permanently established at SLU. It is fair to say that the rural 
development pair, though it was by then collapsing, provided the necessary 
credibility and legitimacy to the arguments SLU made for funding 
development-related research. Without a long tradition of aid work and 
engagement in the developing countries, SLU would hardly have been able to 
secure funding for three new professorships, and if so, rural development in the 
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global South would probably not have been an active research and education 
discipline at SLU today. 
My final comment on the rural development pair relates to Fridlund’s 
discussion of development pairs as a characteristically Swedish phenomenon. 
In the introduction, I raised the possibility that something in the way the 
Swedish public administration has been organized has tended to facilitate the 
creation of long-term couplings between government agencies and outside 
organizations for the realization of joint projects. My study can hardly be said 
to either support or weaken such a hypothesis. However, I would like to 
suggest as an avenue for further research comparative studies of government 
agencies that, like SIDA, were established in the 1960s and their need for 
technical expertise. Historian of science Jenny Beckman’s analysis of the 
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and its relationship with other 
organizations in the context of its species protection work suggests some 
similarities with how SIDA worked with some of its outside partners.744 It 
would be interesting to introduce more examples to see whether this was a 
more general phenomenon and, if so, what its characteristics were and how it 
developed over time. Did other government agencies, like SIDA, begin to 
demand new forms of expertise, or new forms of access to expertise? And was 
the dismantling that the rural development pair went through in the 1990s a 
typical outcome, or could such relationships generally be reconfigured and 
continue to function even as circumstances changed? 
In the wider context of the dissertation, this chapter has demonstrated the 
continuity from the Agricultural College’s engagement in the CADU project 
through SLU’s IRDC and its prominent role in Swedish agrarian aid. It has 
then looked at the discontinuity and the changing role of SLU in development 
aid that came with the establishment of the Department of Rural Development 
Studies, today part of the larger Department of Urban and Rural Development. 
The latter, as I have argued, amounted to a process of academization of 
agrarian expertise in development aid. A turn toward academic activities, 
though still with a distinctly practical flavor, also characterized SLU’s major 
field engagement in development aid in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Again set 
in Ethiopia, this was a project of transferring knowledge and skills in support 
of forestry education, driven primarily by SLU’s Faculty of Forest Sciences. 
Like IRDC, Swedish support to Ethiopian forestry could trace its roots to 
CADU, but SLU’s direct involvement began in earnest in another project that 
started in 1986, a project to which we now turn.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Silvi-Cultural Encounters 
SLU and Swedish Forestry Aid to Ethiopia, 1986–2009 
EVEN TWENTY YEARS on, SLU’s expertise would return to CADU and 
draw on the Chilalean experiences, which had been so important in the early 
days of Swedish agrarian development aid. The continuity was explicitly 
expressed in the opening paragraph of the preface to a 1988 report on a 
potential collaboration between SLU and Ethiopia in the field of forestry 
education: 
 
In the past few years the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SUAS) 
has again gradually become involved in implementation of development work, 
including in education, in Ethiopia. Last time this came about was in the CADU 
project in the mid 1960s.745 
 
But CADU, the report’s authors argued, was a rural development project to 
which the Agricultural College provided mostly practical support. What their 
report proposed was rather an effort focused on the core areas of SLU as a 
university: 
 
[T]here has been a move away from the previous predilection for integrated 
rural development projects to efforts more geared to higher education, trials and 
research. This is the core competence of SUAS and the field where the 
responsibility to implement a project can successfully be bestowed on one or 
several institutions of SUAS.746 
 
The responsibility for administrating SIDA’s support to academic forestry 
education in Ethiopia was indeed eventually “bestowed” on the Faculty of 
Forest Sciences at SLU. This endeavor would ultimately include support to all 
academic levels of education, including doctoral training. SIDA contracted the 
different education-support activities to SLU, which implemented them and 
employed a number of staff in Ethiopia, both on a short-term and long-term 
basis. When the project concluded in 2009, SLU had been active in Ethiopian 
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forestry for twenty-three years, making this a highly significant part of both 
SLU’s aid history and the history of SLU and its forestry faculty in general. 
My study of it is primarily linked to my first and second research problems: 
How and why did SLU’s forestry faculty in the 1980s begin a more purposive 
work of framing its expertise in relation to foreign development? What 
strategies did the Swedish foresters advocate? How did the faculty’s 
involvement develop? What effects did it have? A recurring theme will be the 
tensions that arose out of the project of bringing a Swedish forestry education 
model to a country where social and natural conditions differed markedly from 
Sweden. These tensions also went beyond the practice of forestry education to 
encompass general epistemology and academic and social cultures. To 
illustrate that they included both forestry matters and wider sociocultural 
issues, I use the term silvi-cultural to describe them. Silviculture is a term for 
the practice of forest cultivation, and the dash is intended to create an 
association with socio(-)cultural aspects as well. 
There is little earlier research on this project, and nothing that qualifies as 
historical scholarship. Most of what is written has been authored by people who 
themselves were involved, and is of a summative and sometimes evaluative 
nature.747 As in the earlier chapters the analysis is otherwise based on a mix of 
sources mainly originating from SLU and the Swedish aid authorities as well as 
on a few interviews. SLU sources drawn on include IRDC’s archives as well as 
the central administration archives, which includes material from the Faculty of 
Forest Sciences and SLU’s administrative unit in Umeå. I have also made use of 
the SIDA dossier on the Ethiopian forestry program, as well as the dossier on the 
cooperation with SLU. For the last part of the chronology, this material comes 
not from the Swedish National Archives but from the reorganized Sida’s (the 
lowercase acronym was adopted in 1995 following the merger with SAREC and 
several other aid organizations) headquarters in Stockholm. I also draw on 
material from a new source, namely SIDA’s Development Cooperation Office in 
Addis Ababa. The development cooperation offices, or DCOs, were part of 
SIDA’s field organization (whereas the dossier files originate from the workings 
of the head office in Stockholm) and were based at the Swedish embassies in 
most of the main recipient countries of Swedish development aid. The DCO 
                                                        
747 Sven-Olov Bylund, “Lämnar Wondo Genet efter 30 år,” Resurs, no. 3 (2009); Gessesse Dessie 
and Menfese Tadesse, “Rethinking Forestry and Natural Resources Higher Education in Ethiopia: 
An Education for Sustainable Development Perspective,” Southern African Journal of 
Environmental Education 29 (2012/2013); Björn Lundgren, Reidar Persson, and Sten Norén, 
“Swedish-African Forest Relations,” Kungl. Skogs- och Lantbruksakademiens tidskrift 150, no. 2 
(2011); Mats Sandewall, “Swedish Support for Forestry Education in Ethiopia – What Was the 
Outcome?,” Forest Facts: Results from the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, no. 9 
(2014); Toborn, “SLU och etiopisk skogsutbildning; Toborn, “Etiopien.” 
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institution was created in 1969 and its importance grew throughout the 1970s. It 
carried out initial preparation for new aid efforts and oversaw the administration 
of ongoing ones.748 
A notable visibility problem in regards to this source material has to do with 
the impact of the engagement on the Swedish expertise itself. The sources 
clearly show that many Swedish foresters considered this project both 
interesting and important. It is much less evident what effect it had on their 
own expertise, for example, in terms of introducing new topics into research 
and education. This could perhaps have been mitigated by bringing in more 
material from the individual departments of the forestry faculty. Such material 
would possibly also have enabled a closer study of the reception of Ethiopian 
students in Sweden, in particular the large number of doctoral students who 
arrived in the 1990s and 2000s. As it stands, their education in Sweden has not 
been included in the present study. Like before, the problem of symmetry 
caused by a lack of Ethiopian source material also remains. 
Early Forestry Paradoxes 
As noted by the report quoted at the start of this chapter, Swedish forestry 
support to Ethiopia had originated with CADU’s forestry activities. There had 
been some subsequent activity during the last days of empire, but conditions 
changed radically in the aftermath of the revolution as all forests were 
nationalized. Ethiopia then slid into violence as a civil war was brewing and as 
the new regime, led from 1977 by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, initiated a 
series of bloody purges of opponents known as the Red Terror.749 
Nevertheless, in the late 1970s SIDA and the Ethiopian government reached 
agreement on resuming development cooperation in support of Ethiopia’s 
forestry sector. The agreement included support to state forests, community 
forests, research, training and information, and the state forestry 
administration. As pointed out by Björn Lundgren, Reidar Persson, and Sten 
Norén in their review of Swedish-African forest relations, it was a very 
ambitious initiative, in particular in light of the manpower situation: Ethiopia 
could only muster some ten foresters and twenty forest technicians in 1975 
(none of which were trained in the country). Political problems also obstructed 
many of the initiated projects, and the turnover of aid personnel was high.750 
                                                        
748 For a summary of the field presence of the Swedish aid authorities up to 1990, see SOU 
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749 See Bahru Zewde, History of Modern Ethiopia, 236–256. 
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As a first step towards the creation of a corps of Ethiopian forest 
professionals, forest technician training was initiated with Swedish support in 
1978. This was a nonacademic education with a strongly practical orientation, 
given at the new Wondo Genet Forestry Resources Institute established at a 
former Norwegian mission station outside the town of Shashemene, two 
hundred kilometers south of Addis Ababa. At the time, this area had a 
comparatively large and untouched Afromontane forest climbing the slopes 
toward the highlands. Along with the other forestry development projects that 
SIDA supported, the institute at Wondo Genet came under the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Agriculture rather than the Ministry of Education, which otherwise 
was responsible for similar training institutes in other fields. Swedish support 
to the institute was contracted by SIDA to a consortium of two Swedish 
consultancy companies, ORGUT and SwedForest. This arrangement lasted 
until 1986, after which SIDA took over direct responsibility. 
Table 5. Timeline of important events in Ethiopian history between 1974 and 2009 (of relevance 
for the dissertation). 
1974–1991 1991–2009 
1975: Land reform effected 1987: New constitution adopted, Mengistu 
assumes the office of civilian president; 
People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
proclaimed 
1977: Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam 
emerges as the leader of the military 
government 
1987: The forestry faculty at Alemaya 
University of Agriculture opens 
1977–1979: Red Terror, purges of political 
opponents 
1989: Political and security situation worsens; 
most Swedish development aid suspended 
1977: Post-revolutionary tensions escalates 
into open civil war 
1991: Government defeated in the civil war; 
power passes to the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front; development 
aid eventually resumes 
1978: Wondo Genet Forestry Resources 
Institute opens with Swedish support 
1994: New constitution adopted, regional 
autonomy increases 
1984–85: Catastrophic famine 1996: Forestry faculty is transferred to Wondo 
Genet College of Forestry; eventually (2000) 
becomes part of Debub (now Hawassa) 
University 
SLU and Ethiopian Forestry Development 
The underlying technical motivation for supporting Ethiopian forestry was the 
consensus belief among forest experts that Ethiopia suffered from far-reaching 
and ongoing deforestation with associated environmental problems. Though they 
believed that this process could be halted and reversed, they also recognized that 
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political, social, and institutional conditions in Ethiopia made what they 
considered proper solutions almost impossible to implement.751 In light of this, 
the experts saw education as a way to strengthen institutions in order to make 
rational forest management possible in Ethiopia. However, the diploma training 
provided at Wondo Genet was increasingly seen as too limited to achieve this 
objective. The course prepared students for work in practical forestry but did not 
open the way to higher-level administrative or management posts. Furthermore, 
as the institute lacked accreditation from the Ministry of Education, its students 
were unable to continue with an academic education within the Ethiopian 
university system.752 As an attempt to remedy this situation, the program for the 
Swedish-Ethiopian forestry sector cooperation for the five-year period from 
1984/85 to 1988/89 had as a main theme the “up-grading of staff and training 
activities at various levels.”753 The principal initiative was the idea of 
complementing the diploma-level forest technician training at Wondo Genet with 
an academic instruction in forestry aimed at present diploma holders. 
SLU was proposed as the implementing organization for this training 
program. The most important reason for this was that a key person in SIDA’s 
forestry assistance to Ethiopia, Sven-Gunnar Larsson, was otherwise the dean of 
SLU’s School of Forest Engineers in Skinnskatteberg in central Sweden. In the 
mid-1980s, Larsson was on leave from the school and was instead employed by 
SIDA as manpower coordinator at the Natural Resources Conservation 
Development, Main Department (NRCD-MD), the subdivision of the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Agriculture that oversaw forestry development. Larsson, 
characterized by an internal SIDA memo as having strong “personal authority 
along with a marked ability to cooperate,” was a very influential figure.754 The 
same memo suggested that he acted as de facto coordinator of the entire forestry 
development program and that he had the full confidence of the vice-minister in 
charge of the NRCD-MD, Aklu Girgre. His person thus linked the NRCD-MD to 
SLU, and he strongly contributed to the Ethiopian enthusiasm for the latter. 
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This enthusiasm became evident when Aklu Girgre visited Sweden in the 
summer of 1985. He participated in meetings at Ultuna in order to discuss 
Larsson’s idea of a new Bachelor of Science (BSc) program in forestry for 
Ethiopian students. Among others, Aklu met SLU’s university director (the 
head of the university administration), Görel Oscarsson, who was a close 
associate of former vice-chancellor Hjelm. As I discussed above, Hjelm 
retained an active interest and involvement in SLU’s aid-related affairs even 
though he had retired as vice-chancellor in 1982. He and Oscarsson, who had 
gotten along well with Aklu, were eventually nominated by SIDA to take part 
in a review of the Ethiopian forestry program. In conjunction with this, they 
wrote a concrete proposal for a training program for a BSc degree in Forestry 
Management for Ethiopian students, to be given by SLU’s forestry faculty.755 
In March 1986, Aklu Girgre then contacted the DCO at the Swedish Embassy 
to formally request the implementation of this new degree program as part of 
the ongoing forestry cooperation. Aklu further stated that, as had been 
proposed in the earlier report, the new BSc program should be “planned, 
organized, implemented and monitored by the Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences, SLU.”756 
As SLU was willing to participate, and SIDA readily made funds available, 
it proved straightforward to gain approval for the project. In June 1986, SLU’s 
board of directors formally authorized the BSc program.757 Following further 
negotiations, agreements between SLU, SIDA, and the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Agriculture were also finalized. The program they had designed was to build 
on the diploma training at Wondo Genet and completion of that course would 
be a prerequisite for enrollment. It would take place over five semesters, with 
the third semester taking place at the School of Forest Engineers in 
Skinnskatteberg (which was to be the implementing department at SLU). The 
other four semesters would take place at Wondo Genet. SLU would award the 
degree of Bachelor of Science in Forestry Management to those successfully 
completing their studies.758 A board of study was formed to supervise the 
course and exercise ultimate responsibility for its implementation. This was a 
wholly Swedish group with no Ethiopian representatives. It was chaired by 
Per-Ove Bäckström, the dean of the forestry faculty, and consisted of several 
SLU forestry professors as well as Sven-Gunnar Larsson, the designated course 
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manager, Sven Sjunnesson, the head of academic affairs at the Wondo Genet 
institute, and Sten Norén from IRDC at Ultuna.759 The Ethiopian Ministry of 
Agriculture retained responsibility for selecting the participants among Wondo 
Genet graduates, but the selection remained subject to final approval by the 
board of study. 
Integrating Theory with Practice 
As planned, the BSc program was based on an integration of theory and practice. 
The terms of reference appended to the contract between SIDA and SLU defined 
the course’s primary objective as providing the student with the “scientific 
background and practical experience” needed to serve as a forestry management, 
research, or education professional. It was also to give the students “a solid 
motivation to conserve, develop and manage the natural resources of the 
country.” The terms of reference further stated that the course was tailor-made 
for Ethiopian conditions to meet the “urgent need” for forestry expertise.760 Its 
contents were made up of an integration of formal lectures, field visits and 
exercises, laboratory work, and a final thesis. So while it was an academic step-
up from the diploma course and included scientific training, it was to remain 
firmly grounded in practical forestry work. The course was thus intended to 
create a group of professionals who could staff administrative positions without 
their having lost touch with the practice of forestry. It was also for this reason 
that the course was directly based on the diploma training and was geared toward 
students with some earlier forestry experience. 
The first batch of sixteen students started their training at Wondo Genet in 
the fall of 1986, with introductory courses, in among other things, the English 
language, “Ethiopian studies,” and mathematics and statistics. The main 
forestry subject taught at the start of the course was forestry mensuration, i.e., 
quantitative measurements of forest stands. During the second semester, this 
was complemented by teaching in silviculture, forest and wood technology, 
integrated forestry management planning, and a few other subjects.761 Most 
teachers were expatriate Swedes from SLU. The third semester in 
Skinnskatteberg was then devoted to subjects and kinds of training deemed 
impossible or impractical in Ethiopia, including some minor subjects for which 
it was judged unreasonable to send Swedish teachers to Wondo Genet. More 
importantly, however, the semester gave the students a taste of forestry under 
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completely different conditions from what they were used to in Ethiopia. The 
stated main purpose of the semester in Sweden was to “let the students take 
part of and live in a society and an envirionment [sic] where forestry plays 
such an important role, and to have an easy and natural access to educational 
and learning resources.”762 The schedule was dominated by a continuation of 
the courses in silviculture, forest and wood technology, and integrated forestry 
management planning. 
However, as taught in Sweden these subjects took on a different flavor, for 
access to educational resources meant, in no small part, access to large forests 
tracts for practical training. Such training, integrating different subjects, was 
emphasized during the Skinnskatteberg semester: 38% of the teaching hours 
were spent on applied exercises in forest locations, and the students also made 
a number of practice-oriented study tours in south and central Sweden.763 A 
good example of the integrated approach is the course in stand treatment, of 
which a major part “consisted of an integrated exercise in silviculture, 
operational planning and ergonomics. In this practical thinning-exercise all 
operations were fulfilled by the students themselves: Planning, selection of 
trees, felling operations, time studies, ergonomic studies and a final follow-up 
of the results.”764 Similar practical and applied exercises were important in 
most subjects, and, in general, strong emphasis was put on complementing 
theoretical instruction with practical training. 
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Figure 19. Ethiopian BSc students in the library of the Adelsnäs estate, Åtvidaberg, Sweden, in 
the summer of 1987. Adelsnäs is the center of Baroniet Adelswärd AB, a major forestry 
enterprise, and the visit exemplifies the sort of study trips undertaken during the semester in 
Sweden. The students appear engrossed in a map, probably of some part of the productive forest 
areas around the estate. In the background is Torgny Söderman from SLU’s School of Forest 
Engineers. Photo Sven Sjunnesson. 
Out of the forest, the course was, however, marred by tragedy and political 
dissent. One of the students passed away during the semester. Three others left 
Skinnskatteberg unexpectedly and later applied for political asylum in 
Sweden.765 Such defections were not unusual among Ethiopian students 
abroad, and the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture was not particularly 
concerned, citing much higher rates in other countries.766 But the ministry was 
presumably keen to maintain the flow of Swedish aid money. It was a much 
more serious issue for SIDA, who could only justify the project as long as it 
produced graduates for the Ethiopian administration and education system. 
The following year, a second batch of students arrived in Skinnskatteberg 
for their Swedish semester, and as it concluded, another four students applied 
for political asylum. By then, another Ethiopian forestry student on a 
scholarship at Umeå University had also defected, and the issue became 
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critical.767 Lars Leander (who earlier featured in this dissertation as a young 
agronomist at CADU), the deputy head of the development cooperation office 
in Addis Ababa, wrote to the NRCD-MD that this was a “drain of trained 
people” that “the [Ministry of Agriculture] can ill afford.” He further noted that 
it also had “certain implications in Sweden.”768 These implications led the 
DCO to consider proposing to keep all training for the third and final batch of 
bachelor students in Ethiopia. 
The prospect of relocating the third semester to Ethiopia alarmed those 
responsible at SLU, who were quick to point out that such a decision would 
have “a lot of practical as well as pedagogical consequences” for the training 
program.769 A memo by Per Rudebjer at SLU, the course director in Sweden, 
outlined some of them.770 A problematic practical consequence was that more 
Swedish teachers would be needed in Ethiopia, but the third semester was 
scheduled from May to September, a period when many Swedes hesitated to 
work abroad. But worse, moving the semester to Ethiopia undermined the 
pedagogical idea of using the period in Sweden to integrate studies of different 
subjects within the general framework of a country with a strong industrial 
forestry sector. It also meant that the opportunities for applied field exercises 
would be limited. The latter point had been put more forcefully in the final 
evaluation of the Swedish semester for the first batch of BSc students, in which 
Rudebjer and teachers Lars Höök and Gustav Fredriksson had stated that if the 
third semester moved to Ethiopia, “[t]he practical touch of the training will be 
considerably weaker, due to the lack of research trials, suitable and varying 
forests for exercises, various types of forest enterprises and organizations as 
hosts for excursions and field trials etc.”771 They argued that this, together with 
other practical and pedagogical consequences, meant that it would not be 
“possible to maintain the present quality of the training if the third semester 
would be transferred to Ethiopia.”772 After some vacillation, the semester in the 
end remained in Sweden for the third and final batch of BSc students. The 
Ministry of Agriculture was, as Leander summarized it, “not too worried” 
about the defection rates, and SLU’s concerns were probably also taken into 
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account.773 The final batch of students graduated in 1990, and with them, the 
Wondo Genet/Skinnskatteberg BSc project concluded. 
 
Figure 20. BSc degrees in Forestry Management being awarded at Wondo Genet in 1988. On the 
left are the project’s founding father, Sven-Gunnar Larsson, and the dean of SLU’s Faculty of 
Forest Sciences, Per-Ove Bäckström. The ceremony takes place under the portrait of Mengistu 
Haile Mariam, the leader of the Derg, who in 1987 had been proclaimed president of the newly 
established People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Photo Sven Sjunnesson. 
A Paradoxical Approach 
The BSc course was the first formal collaboration in forestry education 
between SLU and Ethiopia. It was always intended as a temporary program 
and was relatively small-scale compared to the major institutional collaboration 
between SLU and the Ethiopian Ministry of Education being simultaneously 
planned and which is the topic of the next section of this chapter. But the 
importance the Swedish foresters attached to practical training foreshadows 
issues that would later arise and that arguably were intrinsic to the entire effort 
of teaching Swedish forestry in Ethiopia. More specifically, the BSc course is a 
first illustration of how a practically oriented Swedish forestry education model 
struggled in the face of silvi-cultural conditions in Ethiopia. It was only, SLU 
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felt, by providing part of the training in Sweden that the quality in terms of 
conditions for practical exercises could be maintained. 
There is, however, an apparent paradox here. The course was supposedly 
tailored to Ethiopian needs, but if the practical training was so place-bound as 
to require a semester in Sweden, was it then really applicable to Ethiopia? 
There is a more general dimension to this silvi-cultural problem: to what extent 
was the encounter with Swedish forestry practice relevant to an Ethiopian 
forester who would work in Ethiopia? During the planning stages, this had in 
fact been pointed out as a problem. A major planning meeting at SLU had 
discussed the potential benefits and drawbacks of a semester in Sweden, and 
noted that “there was a certain risk that [the students] would learn techniques 
less well adapted to Ethiopian conditions.”774 The meeting nevertheless 
identified a number of arguments for a Swedish semester, of which the most 
important one was that Sweden had a holistic and systems approach to forestry 
that was unusual in other places, and that it would benefit the Ethiopian 
students to come into contact with it. This notion of the special status of the 
Swedish (or perhaps Nordic) forestry system and forestry expertise became a 
major ideological motivation for the curriculum design, with its extensive 
study tours and integrated practical exercises. 
 
Figure 21. SLU’s deputy vice-chancellor, Hilmar Holmen, observes a field exercise while visiting 
Wondo Genet for a graduation ceremony. In the background, partially obscured by the student 
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closest to the camera, is forester Gunnar Rutegård, one of the teachers of the BSc course. The 
connection to SLU’s School of Forest Engineers is apparent from the students’ tracksuits, which 
prominently feature the school’s name and logo on the back. Photo Sven Sjunnesson. 
There is only ambivalent evidence as to what impact this had on the Ethiopian 
students. An account of the trip to Sweden by course participant Taye Bekele, 
written for the graduation magazine produced in May 1990 for the third group 
of students, notes that “practical experiences” were a highlight of the trip but 
provides no details about the forestry education in Sweden. Rather, it focuses 
on more touristy experiences of the country.775 While hardly incontrovertible 
proof, it is perhaps an indication that the students found it hard to grasp what 
the practical applications of the time in Sweden were. An evaluation was also 
made of the first course, in which the students noted that they appreciated the 
integration of theory and practice. They also directly addressed the 
applicability of the Swedish semester. Summarized by the course management, 
it reads: “[t]he training is possible to apply to ethiopian [sic] conditions.”776 
While it is impossible to know what the students actually thought or to what 
extent they felt free to give their true opinion on the matter, this might suggest 
that while they enjoyed the practical training, they perhaps had a rather 
lukewarm attitude toward its practical relevance for Ethiopian conditions. A 
tentative conclusion is that the Swedish semester of the BSc courses prioritized 
demonstrating Swedish forestry over direct aid effects. In the terms I have 
used, the Swedish experts thus aimed at inculcating the Ethiopian students not 
just with forestry knowledge but also with a Swedish silvi-culture. They were 
convinced that demonstrating modern Swedish forestry, as an example and 
perhaps also as inspiration and a future goal, would be beneficial in the long 
term even if it had few immediate effects and little direct relevance for 
Ethiopian conditions. Moreover, it is clear that the Swedish experts were 
convinced of the necessity and long-term utility of a practically oriented 
forestry education in Ethiopia itself, as I will expand on in the following 
sections. 
Forestry Education without Forests? 
SLU’s engagement in the temporary BSc program rested on the influence that 
Sven-Gunnar Larsson could exercise both on SIDA’s forestry program and on 
the NRCD-MD, as well as on the mobilization of old SLU interests in Ethiopia 
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through the retired vice-chancellor Hjelm and his close colleague Görel 
Oscarsson. The project slotted nicely into the larger context of SIDA’s forestry 
cooperation with the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture. But at the same time, 
the Faculty of Forest Sciences at SLU had begun to cultivate contacts with the 
Ministry of Education in Ethiopia. These contacts soon found SLU’s forestry 
experts clashing with SIDA over the contents of Swedish forestry aid, while 
simultaneously having to deal with intra-Ethiopian political conflicts over the 
control of academic forestry education. In the midst of this, the Swedish 
foresters attempted to plan and push for a new forestry curriculum for 
Ethiopian students, building on and developing experiences from the 
temporary BSc program at Wondo Genet. 
Alemaya on the Agenda 
The main official motive behind the temporary BSc program was to solve 
problems related to the Ethiopian forestry administration’s lack of trained staff. 
At the root of this problem was the fact that, unlike agriculture, forestry had 
never been an academic subject in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Ministry of 
Agriculture had provided a number of scholarships for forestry studies abroad, 
mostly in East Germany and Britain, but these courses were judged costly and 
struggled with grantees not returning home after their studies.777 But by the 
mid-1980s, the government of Ethiopia had decided to create a permanent 
faculty of forestry at the Alemaya University of Agriculture (AUA). Alemaya 
was situated between the cities of Dire Dawa and Harar in rural eastern 
Ethiopia, more than six hundred kilometers by road from the forestry institute 
in Wondo Genet. 
The university in Alemaya was, as mentioned in chapter 4, founded in 1952 
as an American aid project. It was initially linked to and modeled on the 
Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College. It later became a faculty of 
Addis Ababa University, and was given the status of an independent university 
in 1984.778 As such, it came administratively under the Ethiopian Commission 
for Higher Education (CHE), the subdivision of the Ministry of Education that 
oversaw the country’s universities. With Alemaya’s independence, the 
commission wanted to concentrate all higher education related to the 
agriculture and forestry sectors there. The existing faculty of veterinary 
medicine was to be relocated from Debre Zeit (Bishoftu) to Alemaya, and a 
new faculty of forestry was to be established. The creation of this new center 
for agrarian expertise rested on a credit application submitted in 1986 by the 
commission to the International Development Association (IDA), a World 
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Bank-affiliated organization that provided credit to the world’s most 
impoverished countries. It had accepted most of the proposal and had, among 
other things, agreed to support the establishment of a forestry faculty with a 
yearly intake of twenty-five students to an undergraduate study program.779 
At the outset, the application to the International Development Association 
was not connected with the Swedish aid program. The institute at Wondo Genet 
and the BSc course in forestry management were part of the wider forestry 
collaboration between SIDA and the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and did 
not involve Alemaya or the Commission for Higher Education. However, SLU 
had concurrent contacts of its own with the Ethiopian Commissioner for Higher 
Education, Taye Gulilat, who was eager to enlist SLU and SIDA to support the 
new forestry faculty. According to Per-Ove Bäckström, the first contacts 
between SLU’s forestry faculty and the commission were taken on the initiative 
of Mårten Bendz, a former vice-chancellor of the College of Forestry who was 
working in Ethiopia at the time.780 
These contacts bypassed SIDA, which caused some bad blood at the 
agency. It had in fact come to SIDA’s attention already in February 1986 that 
the CHE was interested in obtaining Swedish support for its new faculty. 
Deciding, however, that its loyalty in Ethiopian forestry issues lay with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the agency had not taken up the matter.781 SLU had 
then gone ahead on its own, with Per-Ove Bäckström having contacted Taye to 
communicate SLU’s interest in collaborating with Alemaya. When Johan 
Holmberg, the head of LANT, accidentally found out about this through a 
chance encounter with Mårten Bendz while traveling in Africa, he annoyingly 
telexed Stockholm asking them to communicate to Bäckström and SLU that 
“we cannot work in this manner and that this project is not presently an issue 
[for SIDA].”782 
This message was relayed to SLU, and it says something about its 
enthusiasm that the rebuff did not deter it, despite the general dependence on 
SIDA for all its aid activities.783 Vice-Chancellor Mårten Carlsson instead 
proceeded to invite Taye to visit Sweden and SLU in the summer of 1986. The 
latter cordially accepted, stating that the visit would provide knowledge that 
would “form the bases [sic] for gainful further cooperation between the 
                                                        
779 See the discussion in Bäckström, Toborn, and Wibom, “Forestry Mission,” part B. 
780 Per-Ove Bäckström, interview by author, 25 February 2015. 
781 Engström to LANT, 26 February 1986, 2, SIDA, series F1 AD, vol. 2984. 
782 Holmberg to Lars Sandahl (telegram), 9 April 1986, SIDA, series F1 AD, vol. 2984. 
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Commission and the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.”784 SIDA 
was presented with the invitation as a fait accompli, which did not go over well 
with it. Holmberg wrote a stern letter to Sven Pellbäck at IRDC, in which he 
censured SLU’s attempt at manipulating SIDA by inviting Taye and demanded 
that SIDA be given a say in any similar future invites.785 
On one level, the evident conflict between SLU and SIDA was about 
influence over the content of the aid program, a matter that SIDA justifiably 
considered its prerogative. But the situation was further complicated by a 
potential conflict between the involved Ethiopian ministries. As far as the 
forestry aid went, SIDA had been dealing with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
had developed a good working relationship with Aklu Girgre, the head of 
NRCD-MD. In a letter from Jan Engström at the DCO in Addis Ababa to 
Stockholm, the former noted that Aklu was “unwilling to even discuss the 
faculty matter.”786 SLU’s courting of Taye and eagerness to become involved 
in Alemaya thus posed a problem for the forestry aid program as a whole. 
SLU was less concerned about SIDA’s other interests in Ethiopia and was 
very eager to go ahead with the project. As noted in chapter 5, at this time IRDC 
pushed for a more active role for SLU in managing aid projects. A development 
initiative in Ethiopia also appealed to many prominent actors at the Faculty of 
Forest Sciences. The faculty was developing a general interest in the developing 
countries at this time, something which coincided with the naming of Per-Ove 
Bäckström as dean in 1985. In September of that year, the faculty had appointed 
professor Per Wramner to investigate “the faculty’s future engagement in 
developing countries.”787 Wramner was to study possible forms for such an 
engagement, including education and research but also informal and formal 
collaborations between the faculty and institutions in developing countries.788 
It remains unclear why the Faculty of Forest Sciences’ interest grew at this 
particular time. As Per-Ove Bäckström recalled it, his interest was triggered by 
discussions with Mårten Bendz.789 The disastrous Ethiopian famine of the mid-
1980s also increased social (with Irish rock musician Bob Geldof’s Live Aid 
concert perhaps the most salient expression of this) and political awareness of 
                                                        
784 Taye Gulilat to Carlsson, 29 April 1986, SLU-CF I, series F1, vol. 624. 
785 Holmberg to Pellbäck, 5 June 1986, SIDA, series F1 AD, vol. 2984. 
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landsverksamhet: Utredning med förslag till riktlinjer för ett utökat u-landsengagemang,” 
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the situation in the country, and at SLU the old Ethiopian engagements were 
still held in high regard. Both IRDC and SLU’s central management favored 
the initiative, which might have stimulated the faculty’s interest as well. At any 
rate, from 1986 onward the forestry faculty strongly supported a collaboration 
with Ethiopia. Almost immediately after the matter of Alemaya had first been 
raised, a rapid investigation had been commissioned to study if “the Faculty of 
Forest Sciences can and ought to become engaged in the development of a 
forestry faculty at the agricultural university in Alemaya, Ethiopia.”790 This 
feasibility study reached generally positive conclusions, though it pointed out 
that several issues needed to be considered in greater detail. 
Forestry without Trees? 
Nothing had been decided about SLU’s eventual involvement in Alemaya 
when the Wondo Genet/Skinnskatteberg BSc course started in the fall of 1986. 
But the matter was brought up in the lead-up to the annual review of the Ethio-
Swedish forestry sector cooperation, in which SLU—on account of its role in 
the BSc program—had been invited to participate. The annual reviews, where 
SIDA representatives met with their counterparts in the recipient countries, 
were tools intended to make sure that project orientations and goals were 
coordinated between donors and recipients. In preparation for the 1987 review, 
Vice-Minister Aklu Girgre wrote to the Swedish Embassy restating the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s view that manpower was the main constraining factor 
for the development of Ethiopian forestry and that the ministry would like 
SIDA to keep financing collaborative efforts with SLU to improve the 
situation. Aklu clearly expressed that he wanted SLU to assist with all levels of 
training as well as research: “The envisaged role for the Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences is in short to provide professional advice and expertise in 
the whole spectrum of forest training. Training on higher levels is closely 
linked to research but also for the foreseen major expansion of forest activities 
research is a sine qua non.”791 
Though seemingly a reconciliatory statement, it did not in fact indicate 
agreement with the Commission for Higher Education about the way forward. 
The latter had also further complicated matters by proposing a transfer of the 
temporary BSc program from Wondo Genet to Alemaya University of 
Agriculture, where the new forestry faculty was due to open in August 1987. 
The commission argued that relocating the SLU-supported program to 
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Alemaya would strengthen the new faculty, but its initiative was undoubtedly 
intended more as an attack on the Ministry of Agriculture and the NRCD-MD 
than motivated by educational concerns. This manifestation of a power game 
within the Ethiopian government brought CHE into SIDA’s negotiations over 
the forestry aid and, conveniently for both CHE and SLU, forced SIDA to take 
a stand on SLU’s relationship with Alemaya. 
When the stakeholders gathered at the annual review meeting, the 
commission’s representatives accordingly proposed to move the BSc program to 
Alemaya as soon as possible. The other parties resisted, arguing that it was 
unclear whether the facilities at Alemaya were sufficient, what a move would 
imply in terms of costs, and when it would be most suitable to carry out. The 
meeting eventually agreed to a solution that SIDA and SLU had earlier proposed 
to CHE.792 A special mission involving representatives from all interested parties 
would be carried out to investigate the implications of the move. Its terms of 
reference suggests that the commission had insisted strongly on the move, but 
that there was general concern among the other parties about the state of affairs 
at Alemaya, which was just about to open its forestry faculty: “Questions were 
raised if Alemaya presently has dormitories, classrooms, laboratories, apartments 
for teachers, teaching capacity etc.” Not only were university resources lacking, 
but natural resources were a problem as well: “Another question also raised was 
if forests for the students’ exercises existed at acceptable distance from Alemaya, 
both natural and man-made forests.”793 
This was subtle language for what the Swedish experts had now begun to see 
as a major obstacle, not just to the transfer of the temporary program but to the 
forestry faculty at Alemaya as a whole. Unlike the Wondo Genet institute, which 
had both natural and plantation forests on and in proximity to its premises, the 
Alemaya campus was in an area with little woodland. The lack of forests within 
easy reach of Alemaya would hinder the development of a curriculum with 
exercises in practical forestry, which SLU, as we have seen, considered limited 
even at Wondo Genet. CHE was unmoved by this objection. It had already 
designed its own curriculum, which built entirely on theoretical instruction and 
required no previous experience with forestry for admission. Its first two years 
were co-read with agronomy students, after which two years of forestry courses, 
but no practical education, followed.794 Thus there were two diverging views of 
what a forestry education entailed. For the SLU representatives, a BSc program 
in forestry was something similar to the Swedish three-year forest engineer 
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course, which, like the program SLU ran with the Ministry of Agriculture, had 
practical forestry experience as an admissions’ requirement and included a 
number of practical courses. Hence, there were now two intertwined conflicts 
over the future collaboration: one had to do with the balance between theoretical 
and practical training, and the other with potential conflicts over the home of 
forestry education, and forestry education aid funds, within the Ethiopian 
government.795 
 
Figure 22. Alemaya University of Agriculture, surrounded by farmland. The arboretum in the 
center of the image allowed limited practical forestry exercises on-site, but SLU deemed this 
insufficient. This picture can be contrasted with the image of the comparatively lush and forested 
area around Wondo Genet in figure 24 below. Photo Mats Sandewall.796 
A New Curriculum 
In October 1987, the mission to examine the possibilities of relocating the 
temporary BSc program to Alemaya began, in conjunction with a separate 
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mission that examined the conditions under which SLU could contribute to the 
long-term development of forestry education there.797 Johan Toborn from 
IRDC at Ultuna, who had worked at CADU and EPID and had extensive 
experience from Ethiopia, and Marianne Wibom, an education planner from 
the Faculty of Forest Sciences, were SLU’s representatives. When circulated 
for comments, the mission’s preliminary report was criticized by CHE, which 
apparently believed that SLU was giving itself too large a role. Many of its 
comments had to do with safeguarding the autonomy of Alemaya and its 
Ethiopian management.798 A second visit to Ethiopia then followed, during 
which Toborn and Wibom were joined by Per-Ove Bäckström, and a final 
report was completed and published in early 1988. 
The report’s answer to the main impetus for the mission, namely, CHE’s 
proposal to move the temporary BSc program to Alemaya, was short enough: 
Toborn, Wibom, and Bäckström believed that “the question should never have 
been posed.” In characteristic expert fashion, they dealt with the fundamentally 
political question by providing technical answers: the lack of facilities at 
Alemaya and the practical orientation of the temporary BSc program made the 
transfer impossible. Student motivation, perceived to be much higher at Wondo 
Genet than at Alemaya, with its “overcrowded dormitories” and “lack of 
forestry facilities,” was another factor.799 
With this issue out of the way, at least as far as the report’s authors were 
concerned, the rest of the report was devoted to an analysis of SLU’s possible 
engagement in an institutional collaboration with AUA. The concern over the 
possibility of providing practical training was central. One section of the report 
presented the Swedish forestry education system, and made sure to point out 
the importance of forestry practice. Practical training was described as “vital” 
to the Swedish nine-semester professional degree in forestry 
(jägmästarutbildning), which was now suggested as the closest equivalent to 
the new BSc course at Alemaya. The Swedish study program started with “4.5 
months forestry vocational training,” both at a forest school and a forest 
company, after which two years of basic courses followed, “including a lot of 
out-door training and excursions.”800 
Having described the Swedish system as a baseline, Bäckström, Toborn, 
and Wibom proceeded to compare the SLU-run BSc program at Wondo 
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Genet/Skinnskatteberg with the new permanent program at Alemaya. They 
opened with the general viewpoint that “[a] major difference between the two 
B.Scs is the emphasis on practical training in the SUAS program.” Those 
enrolled in the Wondo Genet course were already forest technicians. They thus 
started from a solid practical forestry background and were then given 
extended training towards the BSc degree. It was not “immediately evident” 
that the significance of this had been recognized in AUA’s curriculum. 
Another difference lay in the SLU course’s emphasis on integrating different 
forestry disciplines, something particularly important during the semester in 
Sweden. Such integration, the authors noted, was “hard to attain in a fully 
satisfactory manner in Ethiopia.” But, they argued, both integration and 
practical training were still necessary to ensure the quality of the education and 
to meet the needs of the students’ future main employer, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, where “the great majority of posts” demanded “practical, allround 
forresters [sic].”801 
Another distinct dissimilarity, which had its roots in different approaches to 
higher education in general, was the design of the program curriculum 
according to a philosophy of blocked courses contra a philosophy of credit 
hours. The former, practiced at SLU, meant that students took one or two 
courses at a time. The credit hour system, imported from the United States and 
favored by AUA, meant that the students took a larger number of courses in 
parallel. SLU argued that the block system was necessary as the courses had to 
follow one another in a logical order. It also tied in to the more practical 
approach advocated: “A strict application of the credit hour system with all the 
courses running simultaneously all through the semester cannot satisfy the 
requirements of a logical sequencing. Nor is it possible to have extended 
practical training, if a strict credit hour approach is applied.”802 Besides the 
pedagogical reasons, SLU also deemed a blocked curriculum necessary for 
staffing purposes as the credit hour system would require guest lecturers to be 
at Alemaya one or several times per week over extended periods, instead of 
doing all their teaching during a few intensive weeks. 
Based on these considerations, the three SLU experts proposed a revised, 
blocked, curriculum for the AUA BSc course. It included more practical 
training, primarily by extending the fourth semester with a two-month 
integrated exercise in practical forestry. They also advocated new admissions 
regulations to further increase the student’s practical knowledge: they 
suggested that diploma holders from Wondo Genet should be made eligible for 
the course after some work experience and a preparatory course in the natural 
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sciences. To make the two sets of students more equal in this respect, they also 
proposed that those entering the course after high school would receive 
intensive practical training at Wondo Genet before starting the forestry-specific 
courses in year 3.803 
Finalizing the Planning 
For reasons not fully clear to me, SIDA’s resistance to the SLU-AUA 
collaboration decreased following the annual review of the forestry program in 
the spring of 1988, and the agency decided to allocate funding for further 
planning so as to allow SLU and AUA to jointly work out a detailed plan of 
operations. The schedule agreed to by SIDA, SLU, and the Ethiopian 
authorities was that the plans would be finalized in August 1988, and SLU 
would have staff present at AUA from September 1989, when the collaboration 
would start in earnest. During 1988, SLU and AUA then developed a joint plan 
of operations, building on the earlier report by Bäckström, Toborn, and 
Wibom, which outlined the proposed collaboration in detail. But the schedule 
soon proved untenable. SIDA had the plan reviewed by Norwegian professor 
Gustav Klem, who had experience from a similar Norwegian aid project in 
Tanzania.804 Klem criticized the plan, not least because he deemed it unclear 
about what the Ethiopian input would be and generally biased toward the SLU 
contribution. This left him with the impression “that the activities will be 
SUAS projects in Ethiopia, not Ethiopian projects with financial and technical 
support from Sweden.”805 The comment evoked CHE’s criticism of the earlier 
report by Toborn and Wibom, and the same sentiment was also discernible in a 
set of comments CHE produced on the plan of operations.806 The new 
administrator of the Ethiopian forestry program at SIDA in Stockholm, Lisbet 
Bostrand, went to Ethiopia in late 1988 to try to work out the remaining 
difficulties, and a final version of the plan was then completed in December.807 
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What SIDA was presented with in December 1988 was in fact not a single 
plan of operations but rather three separate ones, though understood at SLU as 
being part of the same wider project. The first plan discussed the forestry 
faculty at AUA and the second Master of Science and PhD training programs 
that were intended to increase the level of forestry competence among AUA’s 
teaching staff. These two plans had been prepared jointly by SLU and the dean 
of AUA’s forestry faculty, the East German–trained plant scientist and forester 
Badege Bishaw. The final plan detailed a proposed collaboration with the 
Forestry Research Centre (FRC) in Addis Ababa, and this had been put 
together by SLU alone.808 FRC, earlier known as the Silviculture Research 
Centre, was a long-standing concern within the aid program: SIDA had 
considered it to have been functioning poorly for some time on account of it 
being underfunded and inadequately staffed.809 The new plan proposed to 
remedy some of the issues through SLU-administered support but did not 
commit the center in terms of a research program or research priorities. 
The other two plans were closely related. They proposed that SLU would 
initially support the permanent BSc program in forestry already being taught at 
Alemaya and also set up a temporary postgraduate course in the same vein as 
the earlier temporary BSc. The postgraduate course would also take place at 
Wondo Genet and in Sweden and lead to a Master of Science (MSc) degree. Its 
purpose was to continue the work of strengthening the capacity of various 
Ethiopian forestry authorities but also to bolster AUA’s forestry faculty by 
giving its staff postgraduate training. In consideration of the Ethiopian 
concerns about autonomy, the degree would officially be conferred by AUA, 
but with SLU as an external examination body. As envisioned in the plan, 
AUA would gradually take over responsibility for the MSc course and 
implement it as a regular degree program, though the plan did not elaborate on 
this, instead stating that any such planning had to await “inter alia the 
experiences from the initial M.Sc. programme.”810 A third component of the 
collaboration was a four-year PhD program in Sweden for selected candidates 
from Ethiopia. These would be enrolled as regular PhD students at SLU but 
were expected to choose a dissertation topic related to Ethiopia as well as to do 
fieldwork in-country.811 The plan also proposed that Alemaya would 
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eventually have its own doctoral program in forestry, though this was 
scheduled to happen only after the year 2000. 
The basic outline of the plan was thus that SLU would, to strengthen 
Alemaya’s faculty as well as Ethiopian forestry in general, support Alemaya’s 
forestry BSc course and simultaneously run MSc and PhD programs on a 
temporary basis. As time passed, this would enable AUA to shoulder more and 
more of the responsibilities, with SLU’s support eventually being phased out. 
But until then, SLU would be carrying out a large-scale, complex project in 
Ethiopia (see figure 23 below) that was expected to go on for more than ten 
years and would require a significant number of teachers and project managers 
to be employed, both in Ethiopia and in Sweden. 
 
Figure 23. An outline of the proposed organization for SLU’s support to Ethiopian forestry 
education, giving a good idea of the complexity and size of the intended project.812 
The general design of the proposed support to Alemaya drew considerably on 
what was judged to be positive experiences from the temporary BSc program. 
The new plans for postgraduate training were based on an extension of the 
same principle of combining training in Ethiopia and in Sweden. Moreover, 
practical training was central to SLU’s proposed curriculum as it was in the 
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temporary program. The plan explicitly discussed the virtue of such training in 
the Ethiopian context: 
 
In recent years it has become generally accepted that Ethiopian university 
studies in natural sciences are deficient in terms of practical training. For 
agricultural students this is verified by the practical training now given to the 
students during one of the otherwise summer holidays. The SUAS B.Sc. forestry 
management training [the temporary program] constitutes an interesting 
alternative to the AUA B.Sc. training as once suggested. According to the SUAS 
model, students are to have passed the diploma training at Wondo Genet where 
much practice is included, work for a couple of years, and only then take up 
B.Sc. studies where again much practical training is comprised. In view of the 
experiences, the original AUA curriculum was therefore made to accommodate 
the request for more practicals.813 
 
SLU’s position that more practical training in forest locations was needed was, 
to its experts, founded on earlier experiences from Ethiopia and implied an 
adaptation to Ethiopian needs for certain forms of expertise. The importance of 
practice was the central factor by which SLU’s proposed curriculum differed 
from the original plans created by AUA and CHE. But as had been discussed 
both with regard to the temporary BSc program and the course at Alemaya, 
there were natural constraints on the possibilities for practical training, in 
Ethiopia in general, but in particular in Harrarghe province, where Alemaya 
was located. In light of this, it becomes clear how SLU’s proposed curriculum 
was firmly rooted in the Swedish conception of forestry education and in the 
Swedish foresters’ sense of professional identity. For other perspectives with 
other premises were also available, as is demonstrated by an interview with 
AUA’s dean of forestry Badege Bishaw in U-landsskogisen, a Swedish 
newsletter for development-interested foresters.814 Badege admitted that it was 
impossible to teach the practicals of large-scale forestry in Harrarghe, but still 
defended the location of forestry education to Alemaya. He argued that large 
tracts of forest were unlikely to reappear in most parts of Ethiopia given the 
pressures on available land, and so Ethiopian foresters needed to be able to 
work in close conjunction with farmers and the agricultural extension services. 
This meant that it was an advantage to train foresters in the same place as 
agricultural experts, and that the need for practical exercises in large forests 
was less pronounced. 
Even so, the plan of operations, written jointly by SLU’s experts and 
Badege, concluded that 
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B.Sc. training in forestry cannot be confined to Harrarghe only. The limited 
representativeness of ecological conditions and the poor access to forests of 
different characters make impossible [sic] to retain all practical training in the 
region. As a first approximation the practical and theoretical parts of the courses 
in the curriculum . . . are located to suitable areas.815 
 
This had also been discussed in the earlier report, which had noted that while 
several areas in Harrarghe could be interesting with respect to conservation and 
afforestation work, “[n]atural forests and plantations in the region are no 
substitutes for the mature plantations of Munessa and the natural forests of the 
same area.”816 During the simultaneous discussion of the Swedish semester of 
the temporary BSc program (see preceding section), SLU’s representatives 
argued that even at Wondo Genet and Munessa, conditions were far from 
optimal for practical forestry training. In that case, they argued for keeping the 
semester in Sweden; here the argument was for the implementation of a more 
practice-based curriculum in Ethiopia, and then Wondo Genet and Munessa 
(which had been the location of CADU’s forestry activities) had to do. SLU 
thus presented a list of proposed locations for all the courses in their suggested 
new BSc program. Most were to be located to Alemaya, some in Wondo 
Genet, a couple in Munessa, and a few others in various places in Ethiopia. 
While logistically problematic to implement this curriculum, it was, from 
SLU’s point of view, the least bad option. 
Political Complications 
After the lengthy process of putting the plan together, revising it, and preparing 
a final version, it was dispatched to Ethiopia in January 1989. By then, SLU 
was becoming concerned about the slow rate of progress in securing SIDA’s 
final approval for the project. In a letter dated early February, Mårten Carlsson 
and Görel Oscarsson expressed their worries about SLU’s ability to begin the 
collaboration by the start of the fall semester in August unless the remaining 
formalities were speedily resolved.817 However, by then events beyond the 
control of SLU had begun to rapidly change the conditions of any collaboration 
with Alemaya. At the Ministry of Agriculture, Aklu Girgre had been replaced 
as director of the NRCD-MD by Berhanu Debele, whom SIDA’s staff found it 
much harder to work with. During the first half of 1989, the forestry program 
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was largely brought to a standstill on account of personal as well as policy 
differences between the ministry and SIDA.818 
While this complicated things in the larger context of Swedish forestry aid 
to Ethiopia, it might not have been enough to stop the collaboration with CHE 
over Alemaya on its own. The worsening political and security situation in the 
country saw to that, however. Ethiopia had been in the grips of a civil war 
since the overthrow of Haile Selassie. A number of rebel groups were fighting 
the government, of which the two most important were guerrilla groups in 
Eritrea and in Tigray province.819 By early 1989, the government’s military 
position in the conflict was deteriorating, and the war was an increasing drain 
on the national economy. A SIDA memo, drafted in April 1989, noted that 
defense spending then amounted to over half of the national budget and that the 
civil society increasingly suffered from the effects of the war. Morale was also 
low in the administration.820 Things were further aggravated after a foiled coup 
d’état against Mengistu in May 1989, and by summer, the situation had 
deteriorated to such an extent that the Swedish government decided to no 
longer support the regime through development aid. It instructed SIDA to steer 
available aid resources away from development and to concentrate on 
emergency relief and disaster prevention. Ongoing development projects were 
allowed to continue on a year-by-year basis, but no new projects were to be 
initiated. This effectively put a sudden stop to SLU’s planning. Nils-Ivar 
Isaksson communicated this news to the Ministry of Education in Addis Ababa 
and restated SLU’s willingness to take part in a collaboration in the future, if 
Alemaya and the Ministry of Education were still interested.821 For the time 
being, however, the implementation of the comprehensive plans that had been 
put together was off the table. 
The Centrality of the Forest as Place 
SLU’s proposals on the new undergraduate curriculum for the forestry faculty 
at the Alemaya University of Agriculture demonstrate clearly how its 
conception of forestry education was tied to practical forest work and so was 
inextricably bound up with the forest as place rather than as theoretical 
abstraction. Harrarghe province had little woodland, however, and this created 
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a problem: how to design a forestry curriculum suitable for an area with no 
forests? Badege Bishaw, AUA’s dean of forestry, put forward one potential 
solution: focus primarily on forestry’s relationship to agricultural practice and 
expertise. To Badege, Alemaya was a good location for such a training 
program, which, in his view, would also be better adapted to Ethiopian needs. 
To instead maintain the amount of practical training in real forest conditions 
that SLU’s experts advocated, it would be necessary to move the students 
around the country, something that posed logistical and pedagogical challenges 
even under the best of conditions. Put in other words, the silvi-cultural 
conditions in much of Ethiopia were different enough from Sweden to pose 
fundamental obstacles to the project of implementing a Swedish forestry 
education model. These problems were further exacerbated by the divergent 
views on theory and practice within Swedish and Ethiopian academia. Matters 
were also complicated by the tensions between the Ethiopian ministries of 
agriculture and education. These tensions and the Commission for Higher 
Education’s strong commitment to AUA prevented any alternative 
localizations of the new undergraduate program. There is no evidence that SLU 
or SIDA attempted to challenge AUA as a location (except when it came to the 
proposed relocation of the ongoing temporary BSc program at Wondo Genet), 
but any such attempt would likely have failed. This evidently did not make the 
Swedish foresters question the value of their model for the educational 
program at Alemaya; they instead tried to create workarounds that would 
enable its use. On one level, it is perhaps praiseworthy to stand by what one 
sees as the only viable solution to a development problem. There is no reason 
to doubt that they believed furthering the virtues of practical forestry was 
relevant to Ethiopian forestry and in fact necessary if Ethiopia’s forestry 
problems were to be solved. But the attempts at implementing their educational 
model in a new silvi-cultural environment led to paradoxes and complications. 
That a strong belief in the value of Swedish forestry experience for Ethiopia 
permeated the effort was nothing unusual. There was a general belief in the value 
of Swedish forestry experience to the developing countries within Swedish 
forestry aid at the time, based on the Swedish forestry sector’s self-image of a 
successful development from a deforestation and forest depletion crisis at the end 
of the nineteenth century to a rational, efficient, and sustainable forest production 
by the mid-twentieth.822 To be sure, some, like Erland von Hofsten in his 1968 
appeal for forestry aid, acknowledged the need for “radical adaptation” of 
Swedish knowledge and prescribed “a modicum of humility” with respect to the 
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difficulties involved.823 But others were less interested in problematizing the 
issue of adaptation. When interviewed by the forestry journal Skogen in 1983, 
the state secretary responsible for development aid at the Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, Gösta Edgren, was asked about the applicability of Swedish 
knowledge to developing country problems. Edgren provided the brush-off 
answer that the Swedish experts “mostly managed to quickly adapt their 
knowledge to the country in question.”824 His downplaying of the difficulties of 
adaptation suggests a centrist view of forestry development, which unavoidably 
was problematized when it encountered the developing world. Trying to fit one’s 
prior understanding into a new natural and social environment could, as my 
study of SLU’s planned collaboration with Alemaya demonstrates, in fact be 
both a complex and contradictory process. Moreover, the desire to adapt 
sometimes only went so far. The parallel with Nils Lagerlöf’s totalizing vision of 
veterinary obstetrics-gynecology is striking: like Lagerlöf, the Swedish forestry 
experts were open to the need of taking local conditions into account and of 
adjusting curricula so that the education provided would be relevant to its 
recipients. But this openness did not extend to the option of making fundamental 
changes to the general framework on which it was ultimately based. 
The centrality of the Swedish model of forestry education as a frame of 
reference impacted both on the curriculum design and on the general pedagogical 
approach, with its strong focus on extensive practical training in different kinds 
of forest locations. In this respect too, there is a striking similarity to Lagerlöf’s 
aid project at the Veterinary College thirty years earlier. Just like Lagerlöf, 
SLU’s Faculty of Forest Sciences advocated a Swedish rather than American-
style curriculum based heavily on practical training that would provide both the 
skills needed to effectively serve primary production and a suitable practice-
based professional identity. 
There is also a crucial difference: while the main defining characteristic of 
SLU’s proposal for Ethiopian forestry education was its emphasis on practical 
training, the project was always intended as an academic endeavor. Unlike 
Lagerlöf’s courses, which solely aimed at skills development and only awarded 
the sometimes-useful but academically vacuous FRVCS title to its participants, 
the collaboration with Alemaya had as its direct objective the production of 
academically trained Ethiopian foresters and forestry researchers. This was at 
least in part a result of an explicit strategy by SLU’s management, which 
wanted to engage in an aid project more directly tied to the university’s core 
tasks. There is no evidence that either SIDA or SLU engaged in discussions 
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about possible negative effects of steering considerable aid funds to academic 
forestry education at any time during the 1980s. The positive effects of 
academic education were apparently taken for granted. Even so, there was an 
obvious tension between academy and practical utility behind the planning 
process. This was most saliently expressed in the conflict between the 
Ethiopian ministries of agriculture and education, in which the former was very 
hesitant to discuss any project that might reduce the aid funding to the 
activities under its own auspices. 
SLU, for its part, very clearly pushed for cooperation with Alemaya and the 
Ministry of Education and often had to drag SIDA along in a manner 
somewhat similar to how the Agricultural College interacted with the aid 
authorities in the 1960s. But for all of SLU’s efforts, the collaboration with 
Alemaya could not start as intended in 1989. Much of the planning, along with 
its inherent tensions between theory and practice; academy and utility, would, 
however, be recycled as relations between Sweden and Ethiopia thawed in the 
1990s. SLU remained eager to engage in Ethiopian forestry and would get a 
new opportunity to do so. 
A Post–Civil War Interlude 
In September 1994, the Wondo Genet College of Forestry (WGCF) received an 
unusual number of prominent guests from Sweden. The visitors included Per-
Ove Bäckström, Görel Oscarsson, and Ann-Cathrine Haglund, governor of 
Malmöhus County and chairman of SLU’s board of directors.825 The occasion 
was the inauguration of a new educational program leading to the degree of 
Master of Science in Forestry for a select number of Ethiopian students. The 
celebratory mood abruptly ceased, however. SLU’s dignitaries had hardly left 
Ethiopia before the newly enrolled students revolted. They sent a strongly 
worded protest letter to Genet Zewdie, the Ethiopian minister of education, 
stating that they “were embarrassed by the living conditions, the course 
syllabus and the experience of the course coordinator and instructors.”826 As 
the letter suggests, the new MSc program was full of silvi-cultural challenges 
similar to those we have already encountered. But what was the context and 
cause of this conflict, and what had happened to Swedish forestry aid to 
Ethiopia? 
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A New Aid Program 
The new MSc program was part of Swedish attempts at revitalizing the 
Ethiopian forestry development program. The civil war had ended three years 
earlier: after a series of successive defeats for the government forces, the 
regime fell in May 1991, with President Mengistu disappearing into 
Zimbabwean exile. Power passed to the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front, an alliance of various ethnic insurgent groups.827 By the 
end of the war, Swedish forestry aid to the country had been in limbo for 
some time on account of the uncertain political situation and the 
dysfunctional relationship between SIDA and the Ministry of Agriculture. In 
a biannual report to Stockholm, SIDA’s development cooperation office 
noted that Swedish forestry aid had been cut by more than 50% in 1991 
compared with the previous year, and what remained was mostly used for 
equipment purchases and construction work. Most actual development work 
had been halted, with the exception of the diploma training. The diploma 
courses at Wondo Genet, which had been upgraded from a forestry institute 
to a college in 1988,828 had continued until late March, when the entire 
college was shut down, along with most other higher education 
establishments, “following intensive recruitment to the army.”829 At the 
Alemaya University of Agriculture, academic staff from a group of American 
universities, funded by the IDA loan, supported the undergraduate forestry 
education. There was also a small Swedish presence as SIDA sponsored 
some short-term teaching engagements by SLU staff and provided minor 
funding for equipment purchases.830 
With the fall of the Mengistu regime, new possibilities for development 
cooperation opened up, and in a memo from early 1992, SIDA’s agricultural 
division outlined some principles for a renewed forestry effort.831 These 
reflected the changes at SIDA and in the international aid debate that I 
discussed in conjunction with the decline of IRDC in chapter 5 but probably 
also a changing approach to forestry in Sweden, where from 1993 the national 
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forestry policy compromised between production and environmental goals.832 
These new attitudes to forestry and to the goals of rurally-oriented aid 
manifested as a change of focus for the forestry aid to Ethiopia, from forestry 
development (with its implied emphasis on industry and production) to natural 
resource management. The decreased interest in the institutional collaboration 
with IRDC did not directly affect SIDA’s inclination to cooperate with the 
university on this project: the memo emphasized research and education and 
explicitly mentioned SLU in the context of possible further support to 
Alemaya. SLU’s position at the time was summarized by Johan Toborn at 
IRDC, who argued that while SLU had been able to place a few guest lecturers 
at Alemaya, “there are reasons to believe that the quality of the [BSc] course 
has been very low. SLU’s efforts have only been able to affect the quality 
marginally.”833 No postgraduate studies had taken place, with the exception of 
some master’s-level ad hoc studies abroad. On a more positive note, three 
teachers from Alemaya had started their PhD studies outside Ethiopia, two of 
them at SLU. But as a whole, the education at Alemaya was substandard and 
SLU’s position vis-à-vis the forestry faculty there problematic. Toborn also 
briefly outlined SLU’s view of the future, noting that a “broad cooperation” 
was still the goal.834 This encompassed cooperation on all the levels proposed 
in the 1988 plan, which remained SLU’s baseline. 
SIDA’s planning for a new forestry program continued throughout 1992 
and resulted in a draft plan with five components. Its main emphasis was on 
education and research, which was proposed to be contracted to SLU. 
Education-related efforts amounted to support to Wondo Genet and the 
forestry faculty at Alemaya, and also included a temporary MSc program in 
accordance with the earlier plans. The last two would be carried out in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Education, whereas the support to Wondo 
Genet and all other program activities would be the responsibility of the 
newly created Ministry of Natural Resources Development and 
Environmental Protection (MNDREP).835 This plan became the basis of a 
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new agreement between Sweden and Ethiopia, signed in 1993. SLU was 
contracted to support most of the included projects.836 
Progress and Problems 
Developing SLU’s activities in Ethiopia came to be slow and fraught with 
problems. These had to do both with SIDA and the Ethiopian authorities and 
were largely of a bureaucratic nature, and I will not elaborate on them here.837 
Suffice it to say that the support to the forestry faculty at Alemaya remained ad 
hoc. While SLU provided teaching support, it was administered without 
recourse to a long-term strategy for institutional development and under 
generally unfavorable teaching as well as living conditions. SLU was also 
contracted to support the Forestry Research Center, but little progress was 
made as the center was bogged down in the top-heavy Ministry of Natural 
Resources.838 At Wondo Genet things were a little more positive. The College 
of Forestry worked with SLU’s School of Forest Engineers on institutional 
development, and SLU considered it to be functioning reasonably well. Finally, 
a temporary MSc program, designed in accordance with the earlier outlines, 
could be initiated in September 1994. While the program was a collaborative 
effort between SLU and AUA and was to take place both in Ethiopia and 
Sweden, its Ethiopian semesters took place at Wondo Genet, just as the 
temporary BSc program had.839 It was the first batch of students admitted to 
this program that initiated the protest I described at the start of this section. 
The MSc program was planned with three specializations: farm forestry, 
plantation forestry, and management of natural forests.840 These reflected both 
the current conception of the forestry situation in Ethiopia and changing 
priorities within a larger forestry aid discourse. Particularly the first 
specialization is significant: farm forestry, or agroforestry, was the discipline 
that AUA’s dean, Badege Bishaw, had viewed as particularly suitable for 
Ethiopian foresters. Agroforestry attempts to combine agriculture and forestry, 
and in this case, the farm forestry specialization implied a focus on the 
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participation of local peasants and an emphasis not just on scientific forestry 
but also on training in, for example, sociology and communication.841 SIDA 
had been interested in such community-oriented approaches to forestry since 
the mid-1970s,842 but only with the MSc program did this really begin to 
influence SLU’s education efforts in Ethiopia.843 As such, the farm forestry 
specialization was a step away from the earlier focus on productivity-oriented 
and commercial forestry and also represented an attempt to move beyond the 
older Swedish forestry paradigm that had hitherto been the basis of all of 
SLU’s efforts in Ethiopia. It was an attempt to shift from a forest focus to a 
focus on rural people, and their priorities, in forestry development cooperation. 
SLU considered the initiation of the MSc course to be the first real progress 
made in Ethiopia since the restart of forestry aid in 1992 and had, as noted, 
even brought the chairman of its board of directors to Ethiopia for the course’s 
inauguration. It was thus embarrassing for SLU that the students were 
displeased enough to go directly to the minister of education with their 
concerns. Their main issue was financial: they were dissatisfied with the 
allowance they were to be paid. But through veiled references to the course 
syllabus and the instructors’ CVs they also hinted that the quality of the 
education was substandard. Not stating their actual concern in these matters, 
they asked the minister to look into them. 
The course management, eager to defuse the situation, decided to negotiate 
with the students, and a few months into the course most matters had been 
settled. Retrospectively, SLU’s staff in Ethiopia explained the conflict as 
resulting from time constraints on the planning and start-up process, which had 
led to misunderstandings by the prospective students. But there were clearly 
other tensions involved as well. While the exact nature of the students’ 
concerns cannot be identified in the material studied here, the DCO director, 
Michael Ståhl, gave his version of events to the minister of education, and this 
letter gives a clue. Ståhl pointed out that because “the course is designed to 
give the students practical experience in addition to the theoretical lectures, 
instructors with long international field experience have also been engaged for 
shorter periods.”844 This suggests that part of the criticism originated in the 
students considering the instructors’ theoretical qualifications as more 
important than their practical experience, a view SLU did not share. 
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Similar tensions also arose around a preparatory course given in 
conjunction with the second student batch of the MSc program. The 
preparatory course was intended to give students with an undergraduate degree 
in biology or plant science a basic forestry background to enable them to join 
the MSc course. As these students were not foresters, they found it hard to 
understand the rationale behind the practical forestry courses. In his biannual 
report, Bengt Frykman, SLU’s MSc coordinator and liaison officer in Ethiopia, 
noted that some of the preparatory course students were “complaining about 
some of the practical exercises given and seem to consider theory being more 
important.”845 Even after close to ten years of giving forestry instruction in 
Ethiopia, SLU thus remained caught up in silvi-cultural tensions. Its insistence 
on the union of practice and theory as necessary for proper forestry education 
met with continuing resistance not just from Ethiopian education planners but 
from students as well. The tensions also went beyond forestry issues to 
encompass general epistemology, as is clear from the following quote from an 
annual report discussing the MSc semester in Sweden: 
 
Discussions between students and teachers on the issues of science and research 
took place during some of the modules and outside the regular lecture context. 
These discussions were triggered by the general attitude at SLU, and maybe 
especially of the teachers involved in this specialisation, of a healthy reluctance 
to claim to possess “the one and only truth.” Some of the students were not used 
to this modest and pluralistic approach which they understood as a lack of solid 
academic foundation. 
During the courses, however, most of the students revised their views on 
their roles as academicians and researchers. These formal and informal 
discussions brought about a more humble and realistic view of what research is, 
and also improved the capacity to critically scrutinise results from research.846 
 
Despite the initial problems, the evident cultural-epistemological differences, 
and a new round of student defections, SLU’s MSc coordinator and liaison 
officer in Ethiopia still considered the MSc courses mostly successful and 
improving with time.847 The other forestry research and education activities 
had made far less progress. No improvement at all had been recorded at the 
Forestry Research Center. SLU’s annual report for the 1993/94 period noted 
that the “tepid performance” of the research center was common to projects 
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involving interdisciplinary approaches and which necessitated central ministry 
decisions.848 Furthermore, the new focus on farm forestry, natural forests, and 
socio-economic aspects of forestry problematized the more narrowly technical 
orientation of the FRC. Given the institutional position of the center, SLU 
questioned the utility of its own involvement, and SIDA accordingly decided to 
cut its support from 1995/96. At the same time, SIDA also resolved to phase 
out virtually all of its support to the central ministry, reducing its forestry and 
natural resource activities in Ethiopia almost exclusively to support to 
education and educational institution-building.849 
But that support also had its issues. The situation at Alemaya remained 
problematic. SLU’s task there was to help increase the quality of Alemaya’s 
undergraduate forestry program as well as support the institutional 
development of the forestry faculty. The primary contribution was a series of 
guest lecturers as well as a permanent lecturer at Alemaya. Besides the on-site 
teaching, the project also included PhD studies at SLU for AUA staff, general 
support to make necessary equipment purchases, and advice on curriculum and 
institutional development. While SLU considered the PhD program in Sweden 
relatively successful, the other activities were hindered by a combination of 
factors relating to divergences of opinion between SLU and AUA staff as well 
as by the remote location of Alemaya and various transport, infrastructure and 
safety problems. Frykman summed up the sentiment in the final report of his 
assignment in 1997: 
 
There were a lot of struggle [sic] to arrange for reasonable living standards for 
the long-term lecturer and the guest lecturers in AUA. The lecturers also met a 
lot of practical problems in carrying out their duties. The security problem in the 
area also made it difficult to fully engage yourself in a long-term planning 
process for the development of the Faculty of Forestry in Alemaya.850 
 
Furthermore, at a seminar on institutional method development held in 1993, 
SLU noted that “[c]urriculum development is one area where Swedish and 
Ethiopian perceptions of what is entailed differ.”851 This suggests that there 
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were pedagogical differences undergirding the difficulties SLU experienced at 
Alemaya, in addition to the purely technical issues and the problems of 
achieving a satisfactory working relationship with some of the AUA staff.852 
Most likely, the pedagogical differences were at least partly related to the 
recurring problem of providing what SLU saw as the necessary practical 
training in the Alemaya area. Students were given the opportunity to visit 
Wondo Genet and Munessa, but SLU judged the trips to have taken on the 
character of sightseeing rather than useful education. They could not make up 
for “the limited possibilities to carry out practical training around Alemaya.”853 
These problems with the SLU-AUA cooperation also spilled over into the MSc 
program, which originally was a joint effort between the two universities. It 
had been planned with the intention that Alemaya would gradually assume 
responsibility for the course. This did not happen, and SLU retained its control 
over the MSc program. In 1996, the failure of SLU’s cooperation with AUA 
was affirmed when the coordination committee, intended as the main forum for 
coordination between the two universities, was dissolved by the SLU-
dominated Board of Study on account of it having not “fulfilled its 
function.”854 From then on, SLU took full responsibility for the MSc courses. 
From Alemaya to Wondo Genet 
The difficulties at Alemaya were exacerbated by the fact that the faculty’s 
future was uncertain. As part of the new Ethiopian government’s strategy of 
increasing regional autonomy, a discussion started in 1994 about possibly 
establishing a “Southern University” consisting of the Wondo Genet College of 
Forestry, the Awassa College of Agriculture, and the Arba Minch Water 
Technology Institute.855 A first step in this direction had already been taken 
when the government transferred the Wondo Genet college to the Ministry of 
Education in late 1993.856 These plans put the future prospects of forestry 
education at Alemaya in question as it would hardly be feasible to have two 
separate institutions of higher forestry education in Ethiopia. The discussions 
went back and forth during 1995, but in the spring of 1996, the Ethiopian 
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government settled for the Wondo Genet option and decided that the forestry 
faculty would be transferred there. In light of the troubles experienced at 
Alemaya, the Swedes involved in the project unanimously welcomed the news: 
Daag Skoog at the development cooperation office called it “excellent,” and 
SLU’s liaison officer, Bengt Frykman, described it as a “relief” and further 
noted that “in the long run” it would be “the best solution for the forestry 
education in the country.”857 NATUR at Sida in Stockholm also welcomed the 
development and since this seemed to improve the prospect of success, it 
recommended a continuation of Sida’s support until at least 1998.858 As 
Swedish support to the Forestry Research Center had been judged a failure, 
Sida also wanted to support the development of a research program at Wondo 
Genet, declaring in a 1997 consultation with the Ministry of Education that it 
was a “high priority,” and that it needed to incorporate a “social 
forestry/farming systems” perspective. The idea of participatory research, 
involving local farmers, was also discussed at the meeting and was seen as a 
“priority” to initiate as a pilot activity.859 All in all, the move to Wondo Genet 
seemed to Sida and SLU as an opportunity to give the project new traction. 
Seen in retrospect, the period 1992–1998 appears as something of an 
interlude in SLU’s support to Ethiopian forestry education. The plans put 
together in the late 1980s had been foiled by the war, and when they eventually 
formed the basis of the implementation in the mid-1990s it proved impossible 
to achieve a coordinated effort. Many of the problems were due to general 
difficulties in cooperating with the Ethiopian forestry administration as well as 
with the administration of Alemaya. But these problems were exacerbated by 
divergent ideologies of education, with the central tension point remaining the 
question of theoretical versus practical expertise. At times, this tension could 
grow into open conflict, as with the first batch of MSc students. The only 
component of the aid program that SLU felt worked reasonably smoothly was 
the Wondo Genet College of Forestry (including, after a while, the MSc 
program that was taught there). It had been receiving Swedish assistance since 
it was started in 1977, and SLU’s staff tended to attribute the relative success 
to the fact that WGCF was used to working with Swedish experts and in a 
development aid framework. This perception of Wondo Genet as a functional 
forestry training environment, as opposed to Alemaya where SLU’s staff found 
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both the natural and the social conditions unconducive to their idea of forestry 
education, meant that the Ethiopian decision to transfer the forestry faculty 
there was received positively. They would, however, find out that transferring 
the faculty was not enough to make the fundamental tensions of teaching 
Swedish forestry in Ethiopia disappear. 
Academization Completed 
From SLU’s point of view, a key advantage of Wondo Genet over Alemaya 
was that the former location featured better training environments in the shape 
of both natural and plantation forests. But when WGCF’s former dean of 
academic affairs, Swedish forester Sven Sjunnesson, visited the area two years 
after the faculty’s relocation, he was distraught by scenes of extensive 
deforestation. His account described how the natural forest along the valley 
slopes was being devastated by local peasants and how the college’s own 
plantation forests had been left unmanaged in a state of decay: 
 
As I continue my walk through the forest plantations, my despair grows. The 
forest has grown tremendously, even the domestic species. But it seems to be 
forgotten that plantations exist to be used! Thinning-out and clearcutting, 
everything is needed, but I can see little evidence of forest utilization. Certain 
stands are about to expire!860 
 
Sjunnesson’s observations signaled a serious problem with the support to 
Wondo Genet achieving its goals, for by the late 1990s, these goals explicitly 
included deforestation prevention. As it was becoming increasingly difficult to 
find development funding for a project formulated only in terms of support to 
academia, the proposal for renewed support to Wondo Genet had been phrased 
in terms of higher education as a means to combat deforestation, which would 
benefit not only larger forest owners but also poor small-holders with some 
sort of forest access.861 
Beneath this surface, the project that SLU and Wondo Genet planned to 
implement was still distinctly about academic institution-building. The college 
was to offer diploma training and BSc and MSc programs, and SLU would offer 
an extensive PhD program in Sweden for Wondo Genet staff.862 In line with 
                                                        
860 Sven Sjunnesson, “Återbesök med blandade känslor,” Tenaestelin: Medlemsblad för svensk-
etiopiska föreningen 41, no. 2 (2000): 12. 
861 Annika Otterstedt, “Bedömningspromemoria: Institutionsutveckling vid skogsfakulteten i 
Wondo Genet, Etiopien, 1999-2003,” pp. 5–6, 10 May 1999, folder NATUR 1999-2236, Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency archives (hereafter cited as Sida). 
862 “Institutional Development of Wondo Genet College of Forestry, 1998/99-2002/03,” 15 April 
1998, Sida, folder NATUR 1995-0226, vol. 1. The MSc program still included a shorter period in 
294 
Sida’s desires, the plan also proposed a research program that took up the idea of 
interdisciplinary, participatory research in order to bring the college closer to the 
local farming community. This was, however, not enough to satisfy the agency. 
In 1999, a Sida assessment memo evaluating the latest version of the program 
document pointed out that a focus on higher forestry education could not be the 
only solution to Ethiopia’s forestry problems.863 These matters were further 
discussed at a meeting at Sida in May 1999, at which participants noted that the 
project was “weak” from a poverty reduction perspective and that it was hard to 
see the link between support to Wondo Genet and combating deforestation.864 
Though claiming to be about deforestation, the meeting noted that the project 
was actually about academic development, with any positive effects on 
deforestation being at most side effects.865 For the first time, Sida’s 
administrators—perhaps partly because the rural development pair was no longer 
a constraining factor in any way—did not simply accept SLU’s expert views on 
academic forestry education as a development factor. Instead, they engaged in an 
explicit discussion about who actually was to benefit from academic aid as well 
as about what sort of forestry-related aid Ethiopia needed. And as Sjunnesson’s 
observations suggest, the path chosen at Wondo Genet did not produce 
unambiguously positive results. 
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Figure 24. Vista from a viewing point in the mountain ridges at Wondo Genet in the 1980s, with 
the college’s compound visible through the greenery (cf. the image of Alemaya in figure 22). The 
area around Wondo Genet would also begin to suffer from deforestation in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Photo Sven Sjunnesson. 
The Consequences of Academization 
Enough changes were eventually made to the project proposal to satisfy Sida’s 
managers, and they approved another four years of funding. SLU’s support to 
Wondo Genet could thus continue. It was clear, however, that the college had 
changed markedly after the forestry faculty was transferred there. During its 
first decade, the then institute was geared, like the courses SLU eventually 
began to give there, to practice. In an account from 1983, forester Anders 
Dahlqvist, who taught at Wondo Genet, remarked that the incoming students 
generally held the view that being admitted to continuing education, even to a 
comparatively low-level course like the Wondo Genet diploma one, meant that 
the student was above practical work. In light of this, Dahlqvist (echoing Nils 
Lagerlöf’s pronouncements from thirty years earlier) stated that much of the 
teaching at Wondo Genet focused on practice and on trying to achieve 
“changed attitudes to . . . working with one’s hands.”866 
It is instructive to compare Dahlqvist’s description of Wondo Genet with that 
of forester Birger Hjelm, who worked there about one and a half decade later, 
from May 1999 to April 2001. Upon concluding his assignment, Hjelm noted 
                                                        
866 Anders Dahlqvist, “Skogslärare i Etiopien: Ilska, glädje, men aldrig tråkigt,” U-landsskogisen 
11 (1983): 10–11. 
296 
that “there is no doubt that the academic level has been raised. This raising of the 
academic level is of course an advantage and benefits a higher learning 
institution and more students get an opportunity to graduate with a higher 
degree.”867 Hjelm thought, nevertheless, that this advantage was more than 
outweighed by the disadvantages of academic drift as it applied to the Wondo 
Genet context: 
 
However, at the same time we can see that practical oriented education has 
declined at the college. Students in all levels get little or no proper practical 
training in forestry subjects. Many colleagues confirmed that previously (about 
10 to 15 years ago) students where given more practical exercises and 
participated directly in forestry operations at the college. The decline in forestry 
operations has resulted in miss-managed forest plantations and, consequently, 
there are few demonstration plots showing sound management and most of the 
research trial are abandoned. Due to lack of management, there is also a 
continuously great loss of economical value since the resources isn’t utilized in 
a proper way. As stated above, academic improvement can be a development 
factor, but not on the expense on neglecting practical activities which is the 
whole base for the College. The objective to establish improved academic level 
is, in my opinion, to ensure improved management, utilization and sustainable 
development on the natural resources. I must be honest and say that I didn’t see 
much of this connection at the college.868 
 
The final point was particularly serious as it undermined the supposed link 
between academic education, sustainable management of natural resources 
and, ultimately, poverty alleviation, which was the main justification for the 
project.869 To Hjelm, this was clearly manifested in the lack of management of 
the college’s own forests. He noted that “such an essential tool” as a forest 
management plan had been lacking for most of the time he had spent at Wondo 
Genet. With a hint of sarcasm, he suggested that “[o]ne reason for this was that 
people responsible for production of the plan spent time preparing for their 
coming Ph.D. studies.”870 
The college’s inability to restrict access to the natural forest above its 
premises was not directly related to internal change at Wondo Genet but must, as 
Sjunnesson argued in his almost-contemporaneous account, be understood in the 
larger context of political developments in post-Mengistu Ethiopia. Increased 
regional autonomy, with the regions organized along ethnic lines, had reduced 
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the college’s maneuvering room: in a conflict between local farmers and the 
college over access to resources, the new regional and local authorities would 
tend to support the former. The lack of management of the college’s plantation 
forests and exercise areas was, however, another matter. To Sjunnesson as well 
as Hjelm, this was a problem directly linked to a change in the college’s profile. 
Sjunnesson noted that practical training had been “one of Wondo Genet’s 
distinctive features” but that it had “largely disappeared” in 2000 as the teaching 
had been “academized.”871 Hjelm reported that he had “faced an attitude among 
lecturers that practical exercises in a course can be handled over [sic] to 
subordinates and assistants,” and he argued that “practical exercises and 
operations must be given higher priority and status. More training and exercises 
must occur in field by the academic staff.”872 
There is no reason to believe that SLU directly caused or desired these 
changes, but it was nonetheless implicated in them in the sense that its push for 
academization and its continuous attempts to mobilize Sida resources had 
enabled Wondo Genet to develop from forestry school to academic faculty. 
The result was ironic, for it was the attempt to convey the idea of academic 
forestry education as a union of theory and practice that was the clearest 
characteristic of SLU’s support to Ethiopian forestry education. As it turned 
out, by the early 2000s most Ethiopian teachers at Wondo Genet were 
academically qualified but, at least as the Swedish experts understood it, 
largely uninterested in practical work. Consequently, the diploma training, the 
original raison d’être of the college, was discontinued in 2004, leaving only the 
undergraduate and postgraduate academic programs.873 
Sida’s ambition to create a new research program at Wondo Genet that 
would be oriented to social forestry and participatory research had likewise 
struggled. One part of strengthening the college’s research capacity was to 
upgrade its staff by providing suitable candidates from the faculty with PhD 
training at SLU. This had been implemented vigorously, so that in 2003, four 
teachers with new PhDs were back at the college, nine were in the program in 
Sweden, and three more scholarships were to be awarded.874 But while the 
number of PhD students was significant and their PhD research could well 
constitute the basis of a future permanent research platform at the college, the 
program had not done much to stimulate local participation or a broader 
research program. A 2003 review of the project noted that the PhD candidates’ 
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topics were focused on “natural science” and “traditional forestry realms.” 
Despite SLU’s participation, the PhD scholarships had thus not “fully secured 
the College the desired broader range of staff capabilities.”875 
Attempts had also been made to implement a research program at Wondo 
Genet itself. In the college’s own newsletter from 2000, a joint article by the 
college’s dean Tesfaye Teshome, Sven-Gunnar Larsson, and Daag Skoog 
described an ambitious plan to introduce “interdisciplinary and client 
orientation approaches in education, research and community service.” 
Building on “the insight, that problems pertaining to the complexities of 
man/natural resource relations need to be solved with natural and social science 
in conjunction,” the newsletter article discussed how “more holistic 
approaches” geared to the perceived problems of external stakeholders would 
“complement the traditional disciplinary perspective.”876 But this plan, which 
played directly on Sida’s priorities, proved impossible to implement. Since 
many of the senior academic staff were in Sweden for PhD training, lack of 
manpower was a serious constraint. The Ethiopian researchers available at the 
college were academically inclined and discipline-oriented, and SLU had not 
done much, or been able to do much, to affect their choice of research topics. 
While, as the 2003 review noted, “the 1999 Project Document discusses the 
need for increased interdisciplinary focus and farmer participation,” little such 
research had taken place. Instead, “the projects selected are almost exclusively 
classical natural science projects without participatory elements. Many of these 
have not been completed for various reasons.” Some caution is appropriate 
here as I have not had access to the views of the Ethiopian researchers involved 
and cannot draw conclusions about their reasons for choosing certain research 
topics over others. It seems, however, that SLU did not particularly push for 
interdisciplinarity; the 2003 review suggested that “[t]he drive by SLU on 
interdisciplinary research has been limited.”877 An Ethiopian silvi-culture was 
thus perhaps being created here, but it was a theoretic, academic, and 
discipline-oriented silvi-culture, emphasizing neither SLU’s preference for 
theory and practice in combination nor Sida’s preference for research into 
social aspects of forestry and farmer participation. 
In 2003, as the end of the latest agreement between Sida and Ethiopia drew 
near, the situation at Wondo Genet was complex and multifaceted. On the one 
hand, the project could demonstrate a number of notable successes. Full 
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responsibility for both the BSc and MSc forestry programs had been 
transferred to Wondo Genet and its parent institution, then known as Debub 
University (and presently as Hawassa University). The number of staff with 
higher academic degrees had increased significantly and would continue to do 
so as more fresh PhDs returned from Sweden. This had, according to the 2003 
review, contributed to “the recognition of WGCF as a leading academic 
institution in the natural resources sector.”878 But since there were few 
noticeable trickle-down effects and in fact some evidence that the 
academization had impacted negatively on local forest management, the 
apparent success was deeply problematic both for the funders at Sida and for 
SLU’s advisors and experts (again, I have not been able to examine how their 
Ethiopian counterparts viewed the developments). Both organizations had held 
high hopes for better knowledge transfer conditions once all parts of the project 
were gathered at Wondo Genet, but now they had reason to be disappointed in 
the silvi-culture that had taken hold there. SLU’s practical teaching model had 
not been adopted, the interdisciplinary and participatory research advocated by 
Sida had not gotten off the ground, and the mismanagement of Wondo Genet’s 
forests seemed to indicate that academic education in fact did not contribute to 
the sustainable management of natural resources. This posed a fundamental 
challenge to the project and its potential continuation, well formulated by 
Birger Hjelm in a manner that, in its way, was not too far removed from the 
1970s debate over CADU: “One reflection and a fair question: If all or most of 
the input goes to already privileged groups, how is this meeting up to Sida’s 
main objective: the fighting of poverty?” In the copy of this document stored at 
Sida’s head offices in Stockholm, someone has underlined Hjelm’s question, 
probably considering it an important issue to be brought up in future 
negotiations.879 
Action Research: The Final Push 
SLU was aware that the lack of progress in areas Sida considered crucial would 
come to be a concern in future negotiations and had taken steps to mitigate the 
situation. In 2002, a joint WGCF/SLU investigative mission was 
commissioned to more thoroughly examine the prospects of interdisciplinary 
and participatory research at Wondo Genet and propose “a feasible structure 
for such a programme, including a strategy for its initiation.”880 Reminiscent of 
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SLU’s earlier attempts at obtaining resources for development-related 
interdisciplinary research in Sweden, the mission highlighted that the (revived) 
FRC, now part of the Ethiopian Agriculture Research Organization, had 
“pointed out that the major research problems in forestry relates [sic] to socio-
economic issues, whilst the present research by 99% relates to biophysical 
issues.”881 In other words, even if it by this time was generally acknowledged 
that socioeconomic factors were crucial to forestry development, this was not 
reflected in the research programs at Wondo Genet. 
To attempt to change this, the mission proposed to initiate what was labeled 
“development-oriented interdisciplinary thematic action research,” or DOIT-
AR for short, at Wondo Genet. The cumbersome concept essentially meant 
research grounded in, and guided by, the needs of a broad network of 
stakeholders, which would build on close interdisciplinary collaboration. By 
bringing in local interest groups such as peasant associations, the idea was that 
the college’s research could contribute more directly to the welfare of the 
population in the area. This meant that the focus would be more on people than 
on trees; the report noted that one implication of the DOIT-AR approach would 
be to “put the condition and well-being of the human population in the 
foreground.” In practice, this still depended on forest management, and the 
report continued by saying that “[a]t a more direct level,” the strategy would 
“contribute to develop farm and industrial forest, develop integrated and 
sustainable forest management that is socially acceptable and economically 
viable; diversify farming activities for better land use.” In the terminology I 
have employed in the dissertation, DOIT-AR represented an extensive attempt 
to introduce a service science perspective at Wondo Genet: it was intended as 
an attempt to learn from farmers, and it was to be forestry in the service not 
just of forest industries and forest administrators, but in the service of the 
people living in the vicinity of the college. The actual work was to be located 
at five sites, each representing a different type of forest environment. Most of 
the proposed research would focus on sustainable livelihood development in 
relation to land use and land access rights.882 
In the new program document, which became the basis for a final 
agreement on Swedish support to Wondo Genet from 2003 to 2008, DOIT-AR, 
to be implemented with support from SLU, was incorporated as an important 
part of the college’s activities.883 The document also included a kind of 
counterpart to DOIT-AR within the undergraduate education, with a ten-week 
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field attachment system called “Community-Oriented Practical Education,” or 
COPE, being made mandatory for the BSc students. COPE can be seen as an 
attempt to get back to the practical forestry education advocated by SLU but 
with a new focus on local communities corresponding to the idea behind the 
DOIT-AR research program. 
Sida welcomed the ambitious new action research plans, but also noted that 
the budget and activities for DOIT-AR were underspecified in the program 
document and that most of the activities indicated were workshops and 
seminars rather than “core activities,” i.e., participatory research in the field.884 
The program did indeed get off to a slow start: at a consultative meeting held in 
late 2007, at which representatives of Wondo Genet, Sida, and SLU discussed 
project operations for the final period up to December 31, 2008, the college, 
supported by SLU, requested an extension of the DOIT-AR program until 
2010. It had taken longer than estimated to initiate the program on account of it 
being a new and complicated endeavor with no previously developed 
approaches to build on. Nonetheless, the college described the efforts made as 
“very encouraging” and noted that the “[local] farmers have started to 
appreciate and reap the benefits of the program,” that “the interest and 
involvement of the staff has been considerably increased,” and that “[s]ome 
field results are serving as sources of curriculum enrichment.”885 Sida, 
however, saw no possibility of extending the program. 
The available written source material of interest to the present analysis 
effectively ceases with the minutes of this meeting. It is thus hard to judge the 
extent to which the DOIT-AR program and the COPE element of the BSc 
program fulfilled their objectives. Mats Sandewall, who was SLU’s project 
coordinator from 2002 to 2009, suggested that about twenty smaller research 
projects were initiated, but that the project was then phased out without 
becoming self-sustaining. Some of the smaller projects lived on for a while 
longer before being stopped.886 Probably contributing to the problems of 
getting things off the ground was that the number of students at Wondo Genet 
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had surged in the early 2000s as a result of new government policies. This 
became a large constraint on the college’s resources.887 
In 2009, DOIT-AR officially ended along with all Swedish development 
cooperation with Wondo Genet. SLU’s institutional collaboration with the 
college likewise ceased.888 To mark the occasion and summarize what had 
been learned over thirty years of cooperation, a concluding conference was 
organized at the college’s new conference hall. Invited speakers included 
present and former teachers and project administrators as well as Sida and 
Ethiopian officials. The Swedish ambassador also attended, as did the president 
of Ethiopia, Girma Wolde-Giorgis. That Wondo Genet had been radically 
transformed by three decades of Swedish support was readily apparent even by 
visual impression. Those visitors who had not been at the college for some 
time were greeted by a remade campus, much larger and with a number of new 
buildings, including the new conference venue (compare the image of the 
conference hall in figure 25 below with the venue of the 1987 graduation 
ceremony depicted in figure 20). Through both location and content, the 
concluding conference thus directly demonstrated how much Swedish aid and 
the interaction with SLU had changed Wondo Genet. But at least to some of 
the participants, there was a connection between the improved state of the 
college’s campus and the troubling state of the local forests.889 The campus 
improvements had been part of a project to create academic forestry education 
that had also consistently emphasized the virtues of practical training for the 
management of natural resources. But as it turned out, academia and practical 
forestry had proved hard to reconcile within the project and at Wondo Genet. 
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Figure 25. Sven-Gunnar Larsson (light suit) and other dignitaries at the 2009 conference that 
marked the conclusion of Swedish support to higher forestry education in Ethiopia. Sida’s 
extensive investments in Wondo Genet had, among other things, resulted in the construction of 
this new auditorium (compare with the graduation photograph in figure 20 above). Photo Sven 
Sjunnesson. 
Silvi-Cultural Encounters 
SLU spent twenty-three years teaching forestry and developing forestry 
education in Ethiopia, a significant development cooperation effort by any 
measure. Several factors explain why this engagement came about. First, both 
IRDC and SLU’s Faculty of Forest Sciences were searching for new forms of 
development engagements for SLU in the mid-1980s. IRDC favored securing a 
more active development aid role with the management of projects being 
commissioned to SLU, while the forestry faculty, under its new dean Per-Ove 
Bäckström, was interested in expanding and systematizing its contacts with the 
developing world. Second, Sven-Gunnar Larsson, the dean of SLU’s School of 
Forest Engineers in Skinnskatteberg, was in the right place at the right time 
when he worked in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s. He was of singular importance 
to the initiation of the cooperation due to the significant influence he exercised 
both in Ethiopia and in Sweden. Third, SLU’s central management backed the 
engagement. Both Vice-Chancellor Mårten Carlsson and university director 
Görel Oscarsson took an active interest, as did, at the outset, the retired vice-
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chancellor Lennart Hjelm. Fourth, the Ethiopian authorities welcomed Swedish 
aid in this field and expressly wanted to enlist SLU to provide it. 
The most characteristic feature of SLU’s attempt to teach forestry in 
Ethiopia was the emphasis on forestry education as a partially practical 
activity. This was a strong reason why the first undergraduates were sent to 
Sweden: alongside exposure to the Swedish forestry model and to Swedish 
academic culture, the trip enabled access to forests for practical training, 
something much less available in Ethiopia. Even the forested lands around 
Wondo Genet were inadequate, SLU argued: only by having one of the 
semesters in Sweden could the requisite practical training be provided. To 
continuously train Ethiopian undergraduates in Sweden was impossible, but 
access to forests remained a point of silvi-cultural tension. The conflict 
over how and when to possibly move the temporary BSc program from 
Wondo Genet to Alemaya reflected a dispute between the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Commission for Higher Education as well 
as concerns over practicalities like accommodation, but it also directly 
reflected diverging conceptions of forestry education. Alemaya had no 
forests and thus afforded little opportunity for on-site exercises. This was 
not a problem for the CHE, which conceived of its forestry degree as 
theoretical as well as general enough to be co-read with agronomy students 
during the first two years. Nor was it a major issue for Alemaya’s dean of 
forestry, who believed that Ethiopia was better served by another kind of 
forestry education that was more geared to agroforestry. But it was a 
problem for SLU, which was never fully satisfied with Alemaya as a 
location for forestry education as its experts understood it. 
This reflects how the Swedish model of such education, which shaped most 
of SLU’s work in Ethiopia, had developed in a silvi-cultural context where 
forests were an important economic resource and where easy access to forests 
was available to all who were interested. It rested on the belief that familiarity 
with practical forestry work was important on all educational levels and so 
required some practical experience for admission even to the five-year forester 
course. Consequently, most applicants to academic forestry education in 
Sweden had had early exposure to forest environments and were interested in 
outdoor activities. The situation in Ethiopia was completely different. There 
was little forest industry to speak of, no history of forestry education, and 
generally a strong focus on theory over practice in related applied science 
fields, such as agriculture. Thus, SLU’s involvement in Ethiopian forestry 
provides another example of the approach to development that we encountered 
in the earlier chapters. Though it strived to build local capabilities and was 
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practice-oriented, it rested on a form of centrist thinking that manifested as 
clear limits on what could and ought to be adapted. 
The particular example of forestry deserves some further attention 
because Swedish authorities have been very explicit in promoting the 
Swedish forestry model as relevant to the developing world. Success 
narratives of forestry as key to last century’s rural development in Sweden 
have functioned as a basic ideological premise of Swedish forestry but have 
also legitimated the export of Swedish forestry knowledge to the rest of the 
world. This was made explicit in the Swedish government’s 2011 forestry 
sector action plan, called The Forest Kingdom – With Values for the World. 
It updated older success narratives with the balance between production 
and environmental goals that characterizes the current national forestry 
policy. In addition, it stated as an explicit goal that “Sweden will spread 
knowledge [globally] about the Swedish model and sustainable forestry and 
thus contribute to increased poverty reduction and the fight against global 
warming.” The present study has demonstrated some characteristics of this 
Swedish model as applied abroad in the decades before The Forest 
Kingdom, and arguably highlights some risks of centrist thinking inherent 
in this kind of ideology.890 More historical research could provide further 
input into how Swedish forestry knowledge has been applied abroad and 
perhaps hint at other pitfalls to be avoided in the future. 
In particular during the 1990s and beyond, SLU increased its efforts to 
take the local context into account when designing its training programs. 
But the tension between the Swedish education model and conditions in 
Ethiopia nevertheless proved impossible to resolve. As the academization 
in Ethiopia continued and the forestry college at Wondo Genet drifted 
academically, the gulf between practice and theory grew rather than shrank. 
By the early 2000s, Swedish visitors and staff were distressed at the 
inadequate attention paid both to practical education and to the practical 
management of the college’s forest resources. In the final stages of the aid 
program, SLU then somewhat belatedly pushed for the implementation of a 
stakeholder-mobilizing action research project, which in many ways was 
pioneering but got off to a slow start and was then phased out when Sida’s 
support ended in 2009. Though an original approach within the project and 
a reflection of contemporary priorities for Swedish forestry aid, it also drew 
on the older Swedish ideal of service science. But its implementation, in 
                                                        
890 For a more in-depth analysis of the values and ideologies embedded in the Forest Kingdom 
strategy, see Sara Holmgren and Seema Arora-Jonsson, “The Forest Kingdom – With What 
Values for the World? Climate Change and Gender Equality in a Contested Forest Policy 
Context,” Scandinavian Journal of Forest Research 30, no. 3 (2015). 
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part as a response to forest management issues, reveals that the aid program 
had generated results never intended by SLU, which had always promoted a 
vision of academic forestry education based on a combination of theory and 
practice. In the end, SLU’s experts found themselves in a paradoxical 
situation: they were in favor of both academization and practical training, 
but these were two goals that turned out to be very difficult to combine 
under the conditions of their Ethiopian silvi-cultural encounters. 
In retrospect, SLU’s push for academization can be judged to have been 
successful in the sense that it constituted a crucial part of the creation of an 
academic forestry education and research environment in Ethiopia. When SLU 
concluded its engagement at Wondo Genet in 2009, the latter had been 
transformed from a small, aid-dependent forestry institute under the Ministry 
of Agriculture into a facility fully integrated into the national structures of 
higher education, competent to provide both undergraduate and postgraduate 
instruction on its own. The education provided had diversified over the years, 
with the largely production- and forest industry–oriented approach of the early 
years being complemented with environmental and people-oriented 
perspectives. However, the increasing academization also resulted in a 
decreased emphasis on practical training. In terms of creating a faculty founded 
on the forestry education values SLU had championed throughout the 
project—and this was in a sense the more important goal from SLU’s 
perspective—it was thus less successful. 
The effect the engagement in Ethiopian forestry has had on SLU and 
Swedish forestry expertise has been harder to discern from the sources.891 
What is clear is that, thanks to the large number of PhD students who came 
from Alemaya and Wondo Genet to SLU, a number of teachers and researchers 
in Sweden became acquainted with conditions and problems in Ethiopia, and 
this brought new perspectives and research topics to the faculty. As a very 
rough indicator, a search in SLU’s publication database, SLUpub, finds twelve 
publications from the forestry faculty since 2010 with the word Ethiopia in the 
title.892 While by no means a massive output, it indicates that some work 
connected with Ethiopian problems is still ongoing. Also, the home page of the 
School for Forest Management, formerly the School of Forest Engineers, notes 
that “[c]o-operation and exchange with educational establishments outside 
Sweden is a tradition” and that it is of great importance to staff and students.893 
                                                        
891 Perhaps it is also too early to draw conclusions about this; the engagement ended only three 
years before I started working on this book. 
892 http://www.slu.se/sv/bibliotek/soka/sok-i-slupub/, search performed 1 April 2015. 
893 “School for Forest Management,” http://www.slu.se/en/departments/school-of-forest-
management, last modified 16 December 2013. 
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This tradition was created by the engagement in Ethiopia. It remains, however, 
to be seen whether these two examples are just lingering traces of what 
concluded in 2009, or whether they are indicators of a more permanent effect 
that will continue to affect work at the faculty in the future. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions 
ARNE BJÖRNBERG, WHOSE voice opens this book, is largely forgotten as a 
historical figure today, as is the agency he headed. Both Björnberg and his NIB 
were perhaps rightly criticized for failing to meet the demands of the context in 
which they were to work. Yet his speech at Ultuna in 1962 was in line with the 
times, and his call for experts to turn to global problems of food production and 
agricultural development was, at least in part, realized. In fact, Swedish agrarian 
experts had already begun in the early 1950s to frame their knowledge in the 
context of foreign aid. Significantly increasing in numbers when the engagement 
began to be institutionalized in the following decade, Swedish veterinarians, 
agronomists, and foresters formulated strategies they believed would help 
produce more food for a growing global population, combat rural poverty, and 
contribute to a more sustainable use of natural resources. In the process, they 
cooperated closely with the Swedish development aid authorities, whose agendas 
both shaped, and were shaped by, the available expertise. My account and 
analysis of part of these developments make up the contents of the dissertation 
thus far, and in this four-part final chapter, I will offer a concluding discussion. 
In the first part, I explain why the three Swedish agrarian colleges began to 
strongly promote the relevance of their expertise to development aid, 
particularly in the 1960s. In the second part, I offer a characterization of 
Swedish agrarian expertise and discuss how the nature of the expertise shaped 
the interventions the experts designed and carried out. In the third part, I 
suggest a periodization of Swedish agrarian expertise in development aid and 
consider how the ways in which experts collaborated with aid authorities 
constrained or enabled certain activities. The fourth and final part does not take 
my research questions as a starting point but rather brings the historical 
findings to bear on the present and the future in a discussion of SLU’s present-
day development cooperation activities. 
Transcending Historical Tensions: Establishing Swedish Agrarian 
Expertise in Development Aid 
The initiation of significant aid activities at the three colleges can be dated 
rather precisely. Nils Lagerlöf began to give his international courses at the 
Veterinary College in 1954, the Agricultural College sent its proposal for a 
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development project abroad to NIB in 1964, and the College of Forestry signed 
an agreement of institutional cooperation with SIDA and established a 
developing-country section in 1970. The last-mentioned was largely modelled 
on the Agricultural College and is thus of less interest here. Considering the 
two other colleges, both Lagerlöf at the Veterinary College and Lennart Hjelm 
and his colleagues at the Agricultural College proceeded in a similar way. Both 
were presented with an opportunity to engage in a form of development aid. 
Both rejected the opportunity as presented, and instead formulated a new 
development problem, more congruent with their own expertise and interests. 
Finally, both were able to convince authorities and funding bodies of the 
suitability of their own proposal. 
In both cases, the initial impulse came from the outside, reflecting the 
growing demand for agrarian expertise at development agencies, such as FAO 
and NIB. This demand, part of the growth of a general political and 
administrative framework for development aid internationally and in Sweden, 
was a sine qua non for the engagement of the colleges and their expertise. 
More particularly, FAO needed experts for its program of sending technical 
consultants on modernizing missions across the globe and thought it had found 
one such expert in Nils Lagerlöf. As for NIB, it had been taking stock of the 
increasingly active discussion of agriculture in the international aid debate and 
reached out to the Agricultural College for its special competencies in 
agricultural education. In both cases, the experts can be said to have taken 
advantage of the demand for their expertise and used it to create something of 
their own. The process was similar both for Lagerlöf and for the Agricultural 
College: the initial proposal triggered network building and interest 
mobilization that culminated—again in both cases—in counterproposals far 
more ambitious than what had initially been on the table. Lagerlöf took a 
comparatively simple technology transfer project and turned it into a program 
of extensive specialist training, which he advocated as the only realistic way to 
modernize Indian cattle breeding. Hjelm and his colleagues were asked to help 
out with educating foreign students in Sweden but responded with a proposal 
for a major science-driven agricultural development project in Africa. 
Both Lagerlöf and the Agricultural College professors suggested that the 
original proposals for aid in their fields of expertise were methodologically 
inadequate and would fail to help the intended beneficiaries. Both were also 
able to convince funding bodies—NIB and SIDA, and the Central Committee, 
FAO, and the government of India, respectively—to sponsor their own, 
grander, proposals, which were eventually realized. But they had different 
reasons for engaging in this work of problem formulation and persuasion. For 
Lagerlöf, the courses in veterinary obstetrics-gynecology were primarily a 
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personal project, driven, besides his desire to help, by his own professional and 
scientific interests. These factors were certainly relevant at the Agricultural 
College as well: there is no reason to doubt that Hjelm and his colleagues had a 
genuine interest in development and a desire to assist poorer countries, and it is 
clear that engaging in development aid provided a way into new fields of work 
and new careers for several of those involved. But for Hjelm and the 
Agricultural College, there were also more complex institutional motives 
involved. It was not long before Hjelm began to afford a prominent place for 
developing-country work in the new visions he was formulating of the future 
of his college. He wanted to place Swedish agricultural science and expertise in 
new contexts, and envisioned the Agricultural College as a considerably 
broader institution, engaged in domains hitherto well beyond its boundaries. 
These included participating in development aid, training agronomists for 
assignments abroad, and performing research intended to have applications in 
developing countries. 
To understand Hjelm’s motives, we have to recall that earlier research on 
the history of Swedish agrarian institutions of higher learning has identified a 
shift or turning point in their history in the mid-1960s. Having up until then 
been small, sector-oriented, and, to a significant degree, practical institutions, 
they then began a process of change that created the broad research university 
SLU is today (presently, there is even a discussion about whether or not to 
remove agriculture from the university’s name altogether).894 Earlier studies 
explain this shift in terms of safeguarding the three colleges of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in a changing societal context, particularly with respect to criticism 
from the environmental movement that threatened the societal legitimacy of 
modern agriculture. The shift has also been explained as part of a struggle to 
secure for the institutions of the agrarian sciences a larger share of the funds 
that poured into the Swedish higher education system at the time. 
Both the impact of the environmentally motivated criticism and the 
comparative lag in funding growth could be understood as symptoms of a more 
fundamental problematic. Over the longer term, the establishment of modern, 
industrial Sweden implied that agriculture would lose its standing as the central 
sector of production in Sweden as in the rest of the industrialized world, and 
thus that its institutions would lose influence. As historian Kiran Klaus Patel 
puts it in summarizing what he describes as the declinist narrative of modern 
                                                        
894 In the spring of 2014, SLU’s then vice-chancellor Lisa Sennerby Forsse suggested on her 
official blog, with reference to other agricultural universities and faculties in Europe which have 
removed the word agriculture from their names, that it was time to start a discussion about SLU’s 
name as well. Lisa Sennerby Forsse, “Dags att lyfta namnfrågan för SLU,”  
http://blogg.slu.se/rektor/2014/04/14/dags-att-lyfta-namnfragan-for-slu/, last modified 14 April 
2014. 
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agriculture, “the economic, social and political leverage of agriculture shrank” 
as “it became Western societies’ sacrifice on the altar of modernity.”895 As 
Patel rightly notes, one might tell this as a success story instead—entailing a 
celebration of contemporary agriculture as a wonder of efficiency—and it is 
fair to say that the postwar transformation of Western and Northern European 
agriculture incorporated elements of both sacrifice and triumph. But whether 
the transformation is understood as the one or the other, one of its outcomes 
was a decreased influence for institutions associated with agricultural interests. 
Hjelm and his colleagues’ attention to development aid reflected a growing 
concern over this situation. To maintain the Agricultural College’s relevance, 
they had to widen its scope and make claims on new political domains; on new 
sectors of society that could complement the links to the domestic agricultural 
sector. As Hjelm perceived that the need for agrarian experts working in and 
for the developing world would increase significantly in the future, 
development aid came to be included among them. 
There was also a second aspect to the engagement, part of a slightly 
different project of legitimacy. Paying attention to global problems would not 
just widen the scope of the college but could also be a way to attract interest in 
wider social circles and among people and institutions perhaps less concerned 
with agriculture as such but very interested in developing-country problems. 
But this move came with its own set of paradoxes, as is indicated by the Ultuna 
Student Union’s magazine’s questioning of the relevance of the college’s 
research program in 1976, or by Hjelm’s frustrated response to the critics of 
CADU: that those who never had “caused a single seed to sprout” were 
unqualified to comment on problems of agricultural development.896 Both the 
internal and external criticism related directly to the college’s attempts to lay 
claim to agricultural development abroad as a new area of expertise: these 
attempts had placed its expertise and its strategies in new contexts where they 
could be discussed on fresh premises. 
To recapitulate, my argument is that the Agricultural College began to 
frame its expertise in the context of development aid as part of a wider process 
of broadening and change that, ultimately, amounted to a project of legitimacy. 
Such projects are central to the history of the agrarian sciences. As I discussed 
in the introduction, agrarian experts have historically been torn between their 
desire to appear legitimate in the eyes of, on the one hand, agricultural 
practitioners and agricultural policymakers, and on the other hand, natural 
scientists. In the 1960s, this traditional bipolar tension was problematized by 
                                                        
895 Kiran Klaus Patel, “The Paradox of Planning: German Agricultural Policy in a European 
Perspective, 1920s to 1970s,” Past & Present 212, no. 1 (2011): 239. 
896 See note 566 above. 
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challenges from environmental movements and by concerns over the future 
leverage of agriculture in an industrialized society. At least as it played out in 
the Swedish setting, the foray into foreign development was, I argue, part of a 
broader attempt to deal with this new situation. Ultimately, it was about 
transcending the historical tension between the sector and science by claiming 
new areas and striving to appear as relevant also in the eyes of a new and wider 
audience. Strategists like Lennart Hjelm believed that such transcendence was 
needed to counter the fundamental challenges faced by the institutions of 
agrarian expertise in the 1960s. 
The relationship established between the Agricultural College and the aid 
authorities as a consequence of this new framing thus served to help reposition 
the former in a changing domestic social and institutional landscape. But it also 
situated Swedish agrarian expertise in a new global context. Answering, as it 
were, Arne Björnberg’s call for agricultural experts to assume worldwide 
responsibilities, the Agriculture College’s experts set about devising agronomic 
improvements to developing country agricultures. Next I will discuss some of 
the characteristic features of how they and other Swedish agrarian experts 
related to this new situation of applying their expertise abroad. 
Practice and Localism: A Swedish Ideology of Agrarian 
Development 
Once established as relevant to Swedish development aid, the agrarian 
expertise represented at SLU and its predecessors exercised influence on it 
over more than five decades. This happened in two ways: by the direct 
influence the experts had on those projects in which they had prominent 
planning or supervisory roles, and by the direct and indirect influence they 
wielded through the existence of the institutional collaboration with SIDA. In 
the dissertation, I have discussed three development aid projects or programs in 
which SLU or its predecessors—or representatives of them—played a leading 
role: Nils Lagerlöf’s international courses in animal reproduction, the CADU 
project, and the Faculty of Forest Sciences’ support to forestry education in 
Ethiopia. These projects were far apart in both time and space. Two of them 
were primarily focused on achieving development through educating a social 
elite, while the third aimed directly at the development of peasant agriculture. 
But the three projects nonetheless had a number of things in common. All three 
aimed, directly or indirectly, at putting technoscientific research and 
knowledge to use in stimulating agrarian primary production. The experts who 
planned and managed them all championed local adaptations of knowledge—
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even if the scope of the actual adaptation varied—and also favored a large 
degree of practical instruction and work. 
The projects’ orientations directly reflected the fact that as practiced in 
Sweden the agrarian sciences were partly site-bound sciences, characterized by 
a strong service science ideal, through most of the twentieth century. The focus 
on the local in the Swedish agricultural and forestry experimentation system, 
which had its roots in the nineteenth-century establishment of the agrarian 
sciences, remained even after the start of more notable agrarian academic drift 
in the 1960s, and this focus carried over to development aid. Accordingly, the 
instances of agrarian development aid presented here were, for the most part, 
informed by localistic understandings of development. Swedish agrarian 
experts generally emphasized the importance of producing knowledge locally 
so that it would be directly useful in the intended settings. They also strived to 
build local capacities. 
Likewise, Swedish academic education in agriculture, forestry, and veterinary 
medicine included significant practical components through most of the period 
studied here, and this orientation to practice became an important part of the 
professional identities of those thus educated. This too carried over to 
development aid and is particularly recognizable in the education-oriented 
projects: both Lagerlöf’s courses and the forestry education support to Ethiopia 
strongly emphasized the development of practical skills. This clashed with 
conceptions in India and Ethiopia of practical work as associated with the 
uneducated and the lower social classes, and part of the idea of focusing on 
practical training had to do with changing these attitudes. One can discern an 
egalitarian motive behind the Swedish experts’ approach, with its concern that a 
modern expert, though in an elite position, nonetheless was under an obligation 
to lead by example and to get his or her hands dirty. This suggests an entire 
problem complex of intellectual history that concerns the relationship between 
intellectual elites and practical work in various times and places throughout 
history, and how this has shaped scientific and technological development. But it 
is also a concrete problem in the history of development aid that would be 
interesting to study further: How common or uncommon was this practical 
orientation in agrarian development aid generally? How did it affect results? 
How was it received in different settings, and for what reasons? 
Though concerned with the spatialities of knowledge transfer, the Swedish 
experts simultaneously tended towards centrist thinking: the (possibly 
inadvertent) universalizing of one’s own experiences, understandings, and 
ideologies. In the projects studied here, this primarily manifested in the experts’ 
strict keeping to the fundamental development models that they advocated. The 
models (even if they otherwise differed) all included a sensitivity to the need to 
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adapt to new settings, but this sensitivity did not extend to the models 
themselves. This is again especially salient in the education projects. Both built 
strongly and explicitly on Swedish blueprints. These were perceived as superior 
to available alternatives, and this led the experts to demand the adjustment of 
everything that they understood as falling beyond the strict limits of appropriate 
education. It is particularly notable in the Ethiopian case, where Swedish 
understandings of forestry and forestry education remained largely unquestioned 
starting points for a considerable time, even though it soon became apparent that 
these models faced a number of obstacles when implemented in Ethiopia. In that 
case, centrist thinking became a major counterweight to the localism nonetheless 
expressed by the foresters’ attempts at capacity-building and at creating curricula 
adapted to Ethiopian needs. 
To be clear, the above is not to argue that it is per definition a bad idea to 
promote Swedish models abroad. On the contrary, there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with choosing the model one is familiar with as a starting point for a 
knowledge transfer effort, and it seems clear that the Swedish experts 
promoted development strategies they genuinely believed were better than 
alternative approaches. My point is rather that it can be very hard to critically 
examine and adjust the fundaments of one’s own professional identity and 
knowledge base and that this ought to be taken into account, perhaps more than 
the Swedish experts tended to do when working in new environments. 
The strategies advocated within the three projects shared enough 
characteristics for me to propose that they manifest an underlying ideology of 
agrarian development, linked to and dependent on what I earlier described as a 
Swedish agricultural modernism and shared in and reinforced by the rather 
close-knit networks of experts associated with SLU. Its core components were 
a practical, productivist orientation and a local focus combined with a 
comparative inattention to social concerns and a degree of centrist thinking. 
The focus on the local and the practical contributed to the many technical 
successes the three projects achieved. Most notably, CADU’s bringing about of 
a local Green Revolution in Chilalo was directly due to the importance that the 
Agricultural College afforded to local, applied, and adaptive research work. 
Compared with many other rural and agricultural development projects in 
Africa, CADU’s research strategies produced impressive results particularly in 
terms of increasing yields. In its time, CADU’s success in these respects was 
probably unequaled on the continent. 
The ideology’s second dimension reflected another side of the Swedish 
agrarian research and education system, namely, that it prioritized technical over 
social aspects of agrarian development. For example, while nominally committed 
to the participatory research program Sida pushed for within Ethiopian forestry, 
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it was only by the end of the program that SLU began to demonstrate an active 
interest in such work (and then seemingly as a reaction to the looming 
cancellation of the project). More importantly, CADU’s planners prioritized 
production above other factors, and this played a large role in the resulting 
evictions of tenants in Chilalo. The trope of technicians and social engineers 
blind to the human costs of their attempts to create a better world is not unheard 
of in narratives of Swedish modern history, and it has relevance here as well. 
There is little doubt that the Agricultural College’s experts had a technocentric 
approach to rural change in Ethiopia as well as in Sweden. It also deserves to be 
pointed out that for all the human consequences of expert interventions in 
Swedish agriculture—rural depopulation, farm abandonment, etc.—these 
interventions were part of a broader planned policy of social reconstruction and 
integration that included significant measures of support to those affected as well 
as good prospects for future employment. By contrast, the evicted farmers in 
Ethiopia could not expect government support nor be equally confident of being 
able to find alternative ways of making a living.897 
A question that arises with respect to this development ideology is to what 
extent it changed over time. On the one hand, accumulated experiences from 
development work as well as contextual changes apparently affected how 
Swedish experts construed agrarian development. This is particularly 
noticeable in the discussions over academization and in the Ethiopian 
education project. In both instances, Swedish agrarian experts presented 
opinions on, for example, social development and the need for socioeconomic 
approaches that were far advanced from attitudes expressed in the 1960s. Yet 
on the other hand, the core of the ideology appears to have been quite robust in 
practice—the focus on production and practical education remained throughout 
the period studied here—and perhaps part of what looks like change was 
largely cosmetic. It would be interesting to study other agrarian aid projects 
around the period of change in the 1980s and 1990s, to enable comparisons 
with respect both to how the ideology developed and how representative my 
SLU-centered findings are of Swedish agrarian aid in general. 
The discussion above also has some implications with respect to the 
literature. The Swedish experts conformed to what Scott calls a high-modernist 
ideology in the sense that they generally believed strongly in science as a 
positive social force and in that they were uninterested in modifying the core of 
their professional paradigms based on local encounters. At the same time, they 
promoted practice-based expertise and rejected universalism, instead striving to 
develop site-specific solutions. So while a project like CADU certainly was an 
                                                        
897 Thanks to Mårten Carlsson for making this point clearer to me. 
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expert-driven extension of the state’s power into new domains, and thus akin to 
the objects of Scott’s criticism, its leading experts still operated quite 
differently from how he suggests high-modernist experts normally proceed. 
This suggests that caution is needed before conflating what in practice can be 
distinct stances with overarching terms such as high modernism and that more 
attention should be paid to the exercise of power in different development aid 
settings. The Swedish agrarian experts in fact brought many of their service 
science ideals with them when they went abroad. They thus tended to strongly 
promote a union of theory and practice and could include significant localism 
in otherwise high-modernist agrarian development ideologies in a way that 
Scott’s theorizing does not wholly recognize. 
Though the Swedish agrarian experts favored far-reaching changes that they 
judged would promote modernization, they were unlike revolutionary 
modernization theorists in that they rarely advocated radical breaks with the 
past. Nils Lagerlöf explicitly argued that, for practical reasons, religious views 
on cattle that he himself found deeply problematic should still be factored into 
the planning as they were not likely to immediately disappear, and CADU’s 
Agricultural College planners envisioned development through improved 
rather than fundamentally new agricultural practices. While more limited in 
scope, these findings show for Swedish agrarian development aid experts 
something of what Helen Tilley and others have shown for British colonial 
expertise: scientists and development experts working abroad could 
demonstrate a considerable degree of interest in local environments and 
practices even as they were carrying out more or less radically transformative 
projects. But in the present case, this interest was primarily motivated by its 
contribution to the intended transformations, and unlike what often happened 
in the cases Tilley examines, it rarely began to influence the goals or the 
contents of the knowledge project itself. 
The consideration that practice was at least as important as theory was not a 
unique characteristic of the agrarian aid but was a strong ideological stance in 
many fields of Swedish development aid, particularly in its early days.898 I 
have not attempted cross-national comparisons, but there are strong indications 
that this ideology prevailed outside Sweden as well: writing on the Nordic 
Tanganyika Project, which started in the 1960s at Kibaha in Tanzania, Jarle 
Simensen suggests that “[t]here was a certain Nordic flavor to its activities, an 
emphasis on applied oriented curriculae, practical service and grass roots 
contacts.”899 In another work, Simensen also addresses a different and 
                                                        
898 See e.g. many of the accounts by early aid workers in Gumbel, Kärre, and Wieslander, ...och 
världen växte. 
899 Simensen, “Norwegian-Tanzanian Aid Relationship,” 59. 
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somewhat later Nordic collaborative project in Kenya, and notes that it was 
criticized for “focusing too much on the production for sale, and too little on 
the effects on society as a whole.”900 Other similarities abound as well: 
Norwegian fishery experts in India in the 1950s resisted simple technology 
transfer solutions in a manner that in some respects was very similar to 
Lagerlöf’s stance; and Norwegian foresters tried to support forestry education 
in Uganda through adapting Norwegian curricula and introducing practical 
training.901 These examples, and more could certainly be found, suggest that 
the Swedish agrarian experts approached development in ways similar to their 
Nordic counterparts. 
The dimension of centrist thinking was also possibly common to Swedish 
or Nordic aid at large. Political scientist Ann-Sofie Nilsson suggests as much in 
her discussion of a more general tendency of Swedish expertise to presume its 
own superiority. In her book on the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s 
international activism, Nilsson argues that the ruling Social Democrats, in their 
eagerness to make Sweden a “moral superpower,” acted as “[m]oralists – self-
appointed interpreters of right and wrong.” She seeks historical explanations in 
missionary traditions and a “Lutheran heritage” of moralizing but also suggests 
that the more specifically modern moralism was rooted in a belief in the 
superiority of the Swedish Social Democratic model for social development 
and welfare as well as in the Social Democratic approach to foreign relations. 
These explanations are interesting to consider in the present context, even if 
one does not otherwise share Nilsson’s openly tendentious criticism or is ready 
to accept her speculative claims about the influence of the “Lutheran heritage.” 
As I discussed in the introduction, the construction of the welfare state was 
closely linked to science and technology. It seems wholly probable that the 
evident successes in creating the industrialized welfare state at home suggested 
to Swedish experts that their approaches to development were valid. This could 
also hold for the agrarian domain. It could in fact be even more pronounced 
there, for there existed long traditions of “missionary” activities targeted at 
Swedish peasants, and by their very nature, such activities had a dimension of 
correcting errors. Even if the agrarian missionaries were committed to service 
science and were ready to assign a substantial role to farmers’ problems and 
skills in their research process, their role as experts still implied that they had 
some ability to discern between better and worse practices that the peasants 
themselves lacked. At any rate, international comparisons of expert-promoted 
                                                        
900 Simensen, Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. 1, 156. 
901 For the fishery aid example, see further my comparison with Lagerlöf in Bruno, “Nils 
Lagerlöf,” 42; about the Norwegian forestry education aid to Uganda, see Simensen, Norsk 
utviklingshjelps historie. 1, 148. 
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development ideologies within the Nordic region would be an interesting 
avenue for further research. Comparative studies could clarify both to what 
extent Simensen’s “Nordic flavor” and Nilsson’s moralism were more general 
features of Nordic development aid as well as whether or not these features 
were particularly prominent in the agrarian domain. It could also bring more 
insight into how transnational influences within this region shaped the practice 
of development aid. But an equally relevant research topic would be to 
challenge Simensen’s idea of a Nordic-flavored aid by contrasting it with a 
broader set of international examples. Did the Nordic countries consistently 
promote development in a unique way, or is this simply a self-image with little 
basis in historical fact? 
I also want to return to the question of the gendered nature of the expertise 
that upheld the development ideology and managed its implementations. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, agrarian education in Sweden was strongly 
gendered male at least until and through the 1980s. Most of the experts who 
feature in the dissertation were thus educated in male-dominated environments. 
It can be assumed that this background led to certain preconceived notions 
about male and female characteristics and proper roles that formed part of the 
more general centrist thinking and shaped the experts’ proposed strategies at 
different levels.902 While I have not actively engaged with this dimension in 
my narrative and analysis, I want to suggest it as another possible avenue for 
further research. Starting from the acknowledgment that gender is an important 
analytical dimension for the examination of power, and thus of expertise, a 
more serious investigation into the gendered nature of Swedish agrarian 
development would very likely add more nuances to the results presented here. 
To conclude, I finally want to caution against overstating the causal role of 
the agrarian development ideology I have discussed. It is better, I think, to 
understand it as having shaped rather than caused the positive and negative 
effects it resulted in, as these effects were also closely intertwined with a 
widespread authoritative conceptualization of the development process more 
generally. In the introduction, I quoted Timothy Mitchell’s argument about 
development being “a politics of techno-science,” bringing into play scientific 
and technical expertise to “improve the defects of nature, to transform peasant 
                                                        
902 There is an extensive literature on gender aspects of development, dating back to Danish 
economist Ester Boserup’s pioneering Woman’s Role in Economic Development from 1970. For 
an introduction, see e.g. Kum-Kum Bhavnani, John Foran, and Priya A. Kurian, “An Introduction 
to Women, Culture and Development,” in Feminist Futures: Re-Imagining Women, Culture and 
Development, ed. Kum-Kum Bhavnani, John Foran, and Priya A. Kurian (London: Zed, 2003). 
For a more general argument about the usefulness of gender analyses for historians, see Joan W. 
Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” The American Historical Review 91, 
no. 5 (1986). 
320 
agriculture, to repair the ills of society, and to fix the economy.”903 This belief 
in an expert fix, the basis of the entire concept of development, was extremely 
powerful during the postwar period, but was also deeply problematic, as 
Mitchell makes clear in his book. One particular problem, as this story of 
Swedish agrarian expertise illustrates, is that there is very often a fundamental 
incongruity between the ambition to improve nature and the aspiration to repair 
society’s ills. It seems impossible to implement techniques and ideals based on 
scientific rationality in new settings without resulting upsets in the social order. 
As I understand it, this is close to what Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing means with 
her metaphor of friction as both productive and destructive, and it is an 
observation also made much earlier by sociologist Bernard Barber: 
 
Rationality, wherever manifested, has the same effect of producing changes and 
of undermining established social routines. Social instability is in part, then, the 
price we pay for our institutionalization of rationality.904 
 
Barber’s conclusion is not particularly startling. To upset the social order is the 
very point of implementing rational methods in the name of development. The 
concept of development in fact implies the undermining of established routines 
and their replacement with something ostensibly better; it can, as John H. 
Perkins points out, be understood as a euphemism for the promotion of 
Schumpeterian creative destruction.905 Development experts have varied in 
terms of the extent to which they have wanted to replace old structures with 
new, and many, though far from all, have been sensitive to the human costs 
involved. But rather few have maybe been fully aware of the difficulties and 
intrinsic conflicts involved in applying expert knowledge in order to fix nature 
or transform peasant agriculture. Looking at my objects of study, and 
particularly perhaps at CADU, I would advance that they serve as good 
examples of what tends to happen when scientific rationality is efficaciously 
put to work in a new environment. Its effects then are often simultaneously 
productive and destructive. 
From Individual Projects to Academization: The Rural 
Development Pair in Swedish Agrarian Aid 
Much of Swedish agrarian and rural development aid was, up until the early 
1990s, characterized by its close links to external, institutionalized consultants 
who provided expertise. Of these consultants, the Agricultural College and 
                                                        
903 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 15. 
904 Bernard Barber, Science and the Social Order (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), 211. 
905 Perkins, Geopolitics, 15. 
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later SLU were the most significant and have been in focus in the present 
study. I have identified characteristics of, and traced continuities and 
discontinuities in, the SIDA-SLU institutional collaboration, which I have 
labeled a rural development pair. To facilitate a discussion of this pair, I will 
begin by suggesting a periodization of my findings on how SLU’s agrarian 
expertise has been involved in development aid: 
 
 Individual projects (1953–1961) 
 The formative moment (1962–1968) 
 The rise of the rural development pair (1969–1985) 
 The academization of agrarian aid (1986–2009) 
In early 1953, Nils Lagerlöf went to India on behalf of FAO. He was not the 
first Swedish agrarian expert to work in the developing countries, but his trip to 
India marks the start of the first significant agrarian aid project. The first period 
I propose, 1953–1961, therefore starts with him. It was a period of individual 
projects, of which Lagerlöf’s reproduction courses at the Veterinary College 
was the most prominent example (other individuals, for example Karl-Fredrik 
Svärdström at the Agricultural College, were also engaged as international 
experts or involved in small-scale teaching activities with a connection to the 
developing world at the time). Characteristic of Lagerlöf’s project as well as of 
these other activities is that they involved no attempt at establishing a more 
permanent development aid agenda. The activities, such as they were, reflected 
individual motivations and interests. This phase temporally corresponds to the 
Central Committee period of Swedish development aid and to a comparatively 
UN-centric and small-scale aid internationally, which is no coincidence: in the 
1950s, the three colleges had neither the reason nor the possibility to engage in 
more far-reaching aid efforts. They only had room for individual projects, 
which also was the only form compatible with the surrounding organizational 
structures for development aid. 
A second period, 1962–1968, can be described as the formative moment for 
Swedish agrarian aid. Between 1962 and 1968, the Agricultural College, led by 
Lennart Hjelm, strived to secure a role for itself and its expertise within 
Swedish development aid, and in doing so, laid down the foundation for what 
would later become the college’s, and then SLU’s, institutional role. The 
formative moment gradually came to an end, and by 1968, when a permanent 
coupling between SIDA and the Agricultural College was established through 
the developing-country section and the advisory committee at Ultuna, it can be 
said to have ended. But the link that by then had been established around the 
CADU project, a major SIDA effort initially directed by Hjelm’s former 
student Bengt Nekby, gave the Agricultural College a central position within 
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Swedish agricultural aid. Contributing to the college’s formative influence 
were the early problems at NIB, and particularly the troublesome experiences 
from an early agricultural project implemented without having adequate 
agronomic expertise involved. That there were few private firms in Sweden 
with the requisite expertise at this time contributed as well. Swedish 
agricultural modernization was a state-driven effort, and its experts 
congregated at the institutions of higher education and research as well as at 
other public authorities, such as the National Board of Agriculture.906 
Contributing to making this period formative for the agrarian aid was that it 
was a formative moment for Swedish aid more generally. The period stretches 
from the first government bill on development aid to the second, after which 
aid budgets began to swell in reach of the goal that 1% of the Swedish gross 
domestic product should be allocated to development assistance abroad. The 
period also extends from the establishment of NIB with its still-large degree of 
direct influence from the popular movements and the responsible minister Ulla 
Lindström, through the first phase of formalization and bureaucratization of 
Swedish aid effected by Ernst Michanek and his coworkers. By 1968, SIDA 
was firmly established. At the same time, Michanek began to lose political 
influence due to the general leftist political climate. In particular, he was 
challenged by the establishment of a politically radical aid department within 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
The period from 1969 to 1985 is characterized by the rise of the rural 
development pair. In this period, the colleges’, and then SLU’s, roles as long-
term, institutionalized consultants to SIDA took shape. It also saw the growth 
of institutional structures, first at the three colleges and then at SLU, to manage 
the collaboration with the aid agency. During this period, and particularly after 
1978, SLU functioned as a consultant, providing SIDA with primarily 
experience-based expertise in the fields of education, recruiting and consulting. 
Together, the rural development pair of SLU and SIDA coproduced significant 
parts of Swedish agrarian aid, largely through an informal relationship 
characterized by prominent personal networks and a blurred border between 
the two organizations. 
The rural development pair created problems for SLU. On the one hand, its 
management supported the cooperation with SIDA as it was enthusiastic about 
foreign development and wanted to make both development aid and 
development-related research permanent areas of work at the university. On the 
other hand, the university found itself in a situation where the International 
                                                        
906 A number of employees of the National Board of Agriculture would also provide expertise to 
the aid authorities, most notably Gösta Ericsson, who left the Board to work in aid and later 
achieved a very prominent position within SIDA. 
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Rural Development Center, an organization that in practice was oriented 
almost exclusively to SIDA’s practical needs and had no self-evident place at 
SLU, handled the core development activities. This was further aggravated by 
the Ministry of Agriculture’s lack of interest in SLU’s development aid 
activities. A twofold problem of the legitimacy of development aid at the 
university evolved. On the one hand, IRDC, essentially a developing-country-
oriented consulting organization with little academic expertise at hand, 
struggled for its legitimacy within SLU. On the other hand, SLU found no 
support for its aid activities at its principal ministry. SLU did not during this 
period achieve a satisfactory solution to either part of the problem. Its 
development aid activities nonetheless grew significantly owing to a general 
expansion of Swedish rural development aid. The latter created something of a 
self-reinforcing pattern in which the expertise gathered at SLU was a 
precondition for SIDA’s increased focus on rural development, which, in turn, 
drove an expansion of IRDC at SLU. But this pattern also exacerbated the 
problem of IRDC’s legitimacy, for its expertise was only to a very limited 
extent academic. 
Finally, the period from 1986 to 2009 can be described as the 
academization of agrarian aid. Toward the mid-1980s, SLU began in earnest 
to attempt to refocus its engagement in foreign development on the core tasks it 
had as a university. This meant providing support to universities abroad and 
providing academic expertise based on a platform of higher education and 
research; it implied the systematic academic study of development as a 
complement to participation in development aid. It was an attempt to solve 
issues of legitimacy primarily with respect to the aid authorities, which in this 
period gradually began to question the form of support SLU was providing. 
SLU’s and IRDC’s management thus strived to create a new form for the aid 
engagement. My interpretation is that this initially did not amount to an attempt 
to replace the more practical activities but rather to complement them in a way 
that would make them more congruent with SLU as a whole. 
The most apparent example is the struggle to secure permanent resources 
for rural-development-related teaching and research, which eventually led to 
the creation of the Department of Rural Development Studies in 1996. 
Another expression of the academization of aid is the Faculty of Forest 
Sciences’ education project in Ethiopia, explicitly founded on the idea of 
bringing SLU’s aid engagement closer to academic activities. This was also 
embedded in an overarching strategy of making SLU’s development-related-
activities part of the internationalization of the university more generally, 
something which became steadily more important over the course of the 
period. In part, the increasing push for academization was a response to 
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SIDA’s changed needs of expertise, both in terms of content and forms of 
access. As SIDA’s overarching goals for its rurally-oriented development aid 
shifted away from food production and agricultural development problems, 
SLU’s development expertise found it hard to demonstrate its continued 
relevance. These problems were exacerbated by the increasing influence of 
NPM methods that changed how government agencies could relate to each 
other. But the academization was also related to internal changes at SLU. A 
turning point seems to have come with the 1993 government bill on research, 
which partly redefined SLU’s role with regards to the agricultural sector and 
thus opened up for new fields of research. 
As I argued at the end of chapter 5, the changes both at SLU and SIDA with 
regards to what constituted relevant problems for the respective organizations 
reflect a broader reconceptualization of agrarian issues, in Sweden but also in 
the West more generally. While the Agricultural College and SLU had engaged 
with development aid partly in anticipation of such change, they had—until the 
early 1990s—only exported the older, productivist kind of agrarian expertise. 
After that, new perspectives became part of the development discussion at SLU 
and in the projects it was involved in, and the academization provided a 
framework for these perspectives. At the same time, as I suggested above, the 
older development ideology remained strong in practice and the tension 
between the older and newer approaches to agrarian expertise remains, at least 
in part, unresolved even at today’s SLU. 
The periodization above reflects the most significant trends of continuity 
and change in my study. But there were also continuities across the periods. 
Most importantly, there was strong support from the central management of 
SLU for development aid through most of the period studied here. From 
SIDA’s perspective, Lennart Hjelm’s personal engagement became a guarantee 
for the long-term viability of the cooperation. Hjelm’s successor, Mårten 
Carlsson, continued this engagement. Though he had no personal experience of 
foreign development, he was committed to its existence at SLU and helped 
safeguard the university’s relationship with SIDA after Hjelm retired. Görel 
Oscarsson, SLU’s university director under both Hjelm and Carlsson, also 
played an important role in this regard. 
Though attempts at academizing SLU’s development activities started in 
the mid-1980s, it would take another ten years before a university department 
of rural development could be created. The institutional collaboration between 
SLU and SIDA thus retained much of its nonacademic and informal character 
throughout the 1980s and continued to enable some activities while 
constraining others. The cooperation made much of SIDA’s work with agrarian 
development possible through its provision of recruiting, documentation and 
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consulting services. But the cooperation also served SLU’s purposes. It 
enabled the education of SLU’s students in matters relating to developing-
country agriculture. More importantly, for those keen to see SLU involved with 
development, the link to SIDA guaranteed a continuing role for the university 
in foreign aid. Its history of a long-term engagement in development assistance 
became an important argument for securing new funding as the collaboration 
with SIDA broke down. 
The way the rural development pair was set up also came to constrain 
activities on both sides. The existence of IRDC shaped SIDA’s access to 
SLU’s expertise. As noted, SIDA had easy access to the consultants at IRDC 
and the experience-based development expertise they represented. However, 
this also made it more difficult for SIDA to deal directly with the individual 
departments and the scientific expertise gathered there. And since IRDC 
remained dependent on SIDA for almost all of its activities, it came to be 
closely attuned to SIDA’s goals and functions, rather than to other interests 
within the university or the wider academic community. This dependence on 
SIDA became a major constraint also on SLU’s development-related activities 
and goals more broadly. The clearest example is in fact the push for 
academization itself. Though the aim of establishing permanent academic 
research on developing-country agriculture was first formulated as early as in 
the mid-1960s, it proved impossible to realize it within the framework of the 
rural development pair. 
From the Enskede Slaughterhouse to SLU Global 
Over the last years, historians and development scholars have begun to make 
joint arguments to the effect that practitioners and policymakers involved in 
development assistance have much to gain from historical studies which 
increase their understanding of the intellectual, practical, and institutional 
heritage of their work.907 A sophisticated understanding of past patterns of 
development, and through them of the present, can help future decision-
making.908 Presently, this might be especially important in relation to 
agricultural aid, which after a time of decline is now returning to the agendas 
of major development agencies. Against this, the final section of this 
                                                        
907 C. A. Bayly et al., eds., History, Historians and Development Policy: A Necessary Dialogue 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011); Ha-Joon Chang, “Rethinking Public Policy in 
Agriculture: Lessons from History, Distant and Recent,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 3 
(2009); Michael Woolcock, Simon Szreter, and Vijayendra Rao, “How and Why Does History 
Matter for Development Policy?,” The Journal of Development Studies 47, no. 1 (2011). 
908 For a more general argument on this point, see also John Tosh, Why History Matters 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), chapter 3. 
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dissertation will discuss some of the present ways in which SLU exports its 
agrarian expertise in light of the historical study that has preceded it. 
The year after SLU’s support to Wondo Genet ended, the university adopted 
a new strategy called “Science for Global Development.” In outlining the role of 
SLU in future Swedish development aid, this strategy makes explicit a number of 
assumptions about the agrarian sciences, economic development, and the 
possible contributions of SLU. The strategy’s premise is that agriculture and 
forestry are science-based activities, necessary for economic development. In 
light of the consideration that SLU has a unique scientific competence in these 
fields in Sweden, the strategy states that SLU has a “clear global mandate” to 
participate in development aid.909 More concretely, the strategy proposes three 
ways in which SLU can help alleviate global poverty: through research, capacity-
building, and the provision of expertise. Research refers to academic research 
performed together with partners in developing countries in areas of relevance to 
global development problems. Capacity-building primarily refers to the training 
of academics from developing countries and explicitly draws on SLU’s history in 
this regard. It is seen as a purely academic matter and mainly as a question of 
supporting education in developing countries, complemented by internationally 
oriented master’s programs at SLU. Provision of expertise, finally, is a role 
similar to the one earlier played by the consultants at IRDC. The strategy 
suggests that “many of SLU’s staff have built up expertise in areas of 
considerable relevance to the global development agenda,” and that this can 
support the decision-making of public authorities or other policy organs.910 
However, the strategy specifies the nature of the expertise as scientific, which 
contrasts with the primarily experience-based expertise that dominated at IRDC. 
These proposed roles thus indicate that the academization of aid at SLU has 
continued in the twenty-first century and that it now has fully replaced the 
older approaches. Theoretical and academic perspectives, rather than practice 
and experience, are today central to all forms in which SLU wants to export its 
expertise. But here one needs to be careful to distinguish between different 
senses in which the concept of academization can be used. Thus far, I have 
primarily used it in the sense of a shift from participating in development aid to 
teaching and conducting research on development (as in IRDC becoming the 
Department of Rural Development Studies), and in the sense of making SLU’s 
participation in development aid more academically focused (as in Ethiopia). It 
                                                        
909 “Vetenskap för global utveckling – SLU:s bidrag till fattigdomsbekämpningen (Dnr SLU ua 
10-186/10),”  https://www.slu.se/Documents/externwebben/overgripande-slu-
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910 “Vetenskap för global utveckling,”  3. 
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can, however, also be understood in a third sense, and this is increasingly what 
has happened at SLU more recently: as an ideologically motivated imperative 
to get in line with what is understood as international academic norms. 
Academization in the first two senses is not intrinsically opposed to practice 
and experience: studying development academically does not preclude 
practical participation (the Ethiopian forestry project went on long after IRDC 
was closed down), and there can certainly be room for an orientation to 
practice within, for example, academic capacity-building through support to 
universities abroad (as the Ethiopian case demonstrates). But the way the 
strategy is worded suggests the more ideological understanding: it clearly 
states that both capacity-building and the provision of expertise shall be based 
on “research of high scientific quality.”911 This is the language of academic 
drift of a kind that affords little importance to practice-based expertise, at least 
unless it happens to make impressions in high-impact scientific journals. 
The academization is also visible in the organizational structure created to 
implement the strategy. To help turn strategic goals into practical activities, the 
SLU Global program and office were established in 2011. The office comes 
directly under the vice-chancellor and thus occupies an organizational niche 
very similar to the one once filled by IRDC. SLU Global is, however, a rather 
different kind of organization. Its tasks include internal and external 
communication about SLU and global development, but it also coordinates 
four thematic research programs about topics judged important for the present 
situation in the developing world. The orientation is thus primarily scientific 
and academic. 
SLU Global carries the engagement at the central university level. Another 
part of SLU’s present engagement is Sida’s Helpdesk for Environment and 
Climate Change, perhaps the clearest example of an organization geared to the 
strategy’s goal of providing expertise. The helpdesk is situated at the 
Department of Urban and Rural Development and is run as a joint operation 
with a division of the University of Gothenburg. The former is the successor to 
the Department of Rural Development Studies, which itself was formed out of 
IRDC when the latter was disbanded in 1996. According to its self-
presentation, the helpdesk “gives support to Sida, on demand, by providing 
advice and strategic guidance on environmental integration at policy, program 
and project level.”912 This description of its task evokes an organization that, 
although smaller and much more limited in scope, is close to the IRDC’s 
consulting unit. Somewhat ironically, IRDC’s old organizational niche has thus 
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been filled by an academically oriented secretariat, whereas consulting tasks 
rather similar to IRDC’s are now housed within the academic department 
painstakingly created to replace it. But again, the kinds of expertise provided—
and demanded—have changed, as the name betrays: neither agricultural 
production nor rural development more generally is presently in focus. Even 
so, the consulting role and a more strictly research and teaching role presently 
coexist within SLU. Does this fact indicate that the university will be able to 
continue to play both roles in the future? On the one hand, the academization 
of aid is not likely to be rolled back, and so SLU’s main role vis-à-vis the 
developing world will most probably remain to collaborate academically with 
other universities. On the other hand, I see no reason why there would not be 
room for various helpdesk arrangements as well, in particular in areas where 
SLU has competencies that for one reason or another are difficult for Sida to 
acquire on the open market. 
The extent to which SLU will be able to play a role, either as academic 
partner or consultant, will largely depend on the stances taken by its leadership. 
Historically, the central management has often strongly supported developing-
country activities and this support has been central to the relative prominence 
of such activities at the university. Continued support seems a precondition for 
any significant involvement by SLU in future development cooperation. Such 
support will also be necessary in order to integrate global perspectives in all of 
the university’s activities, as the new strategy rightly points out as important. 
The relative isolation of IRDC and others working with development issues at 
SLU in the past were a notable constraint on earlier activities. 
Another precondition for a future SLU engagement is that the government 
continues to regard it as important that SLU plays a role. SLU’s future place in 
the governmental organization will influence this. Its position under the 
Ministry of Agriculture proved an obstacle to its development aid activities 
during the first four decades. The effects of its present position under the 
Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation remain uncertain. Beyond the 
organizational position, an even more determining factor is the development of 
Swedish aid policy. SLU only has a role to play as long as the goals and 
contents of Swedish aid develop in a way congruent with the expertise 
available there. 
This latter point, however, raises crucial questions of what sort of agrarian 
expertise SLU can, ought to, and will be expected to provide today and in the 
future. If the academic norms grow ever more dominant at SLU, as they seem 
to be doing today, I would argue that this represents a loss to the extent that it 
precludes attention to local and practical matters. Development aid may by its 
very nature be a fundamentally ambivalent endeavor, but if science-driven 
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agrarian development assistance is to be provided, then I believe local and 
practical perspectives are of central importance. For example, a project like 
CADU can be justifiably criticized in a number of ways, as indeed it was in its 
own time and occasionally still is today. But however much its top-down 
approach and technocentrism made it problematic, its fundamental premises of 
poverty reduction and support to small farmers through self-help by means of 
service science interventions still made it a more positive project than many, 
perhaps most, other attempts at the time. This crucially hinged on the 
importance afforded to the local by the designers at the Agricultural College. 
And local and practical perspectives will be as important, if not more, if new 
development strategies move away from highly fossil-fuel-dependent strategies 
to more ecological and energy-sustainable approaches. 
This should not be taken to mean that academization is a wholly negative 
or problematic process. SLU has a lot to contribute to academic research of 
relevance for agrarian and rural development, and the academic perspective 
is necessary in order to make these fields better integrated with the rest of the 
university and to open them up as academic career paths—both issues with 
which IRDC struggled and ultimately failed to solve. And as I noted, it is not 
an inevitable conclusion that academization precludes a focus on the practical 
and the local. However, the more academization becomes a matter of 
ideology, the more it comes to be opposed to the ideal of service science, and 
so there is cause for concern about the possibilities of uniting a very strong 
academic focus with a practical, local, and utilitarian orientation. The 
example of Wondo Genet demonstrates some of the problems that could 
conceivably arise. Furthermore, the present academic focus of SLU’s 
development cooperation activities reflects an accelerating academization, in 
the ideological sense, of the university as a whole at present.913 This process 
ultimately makes it an open question as to what extent local and practical 
perspectives will remain strong enough at SLU to exert any influence over 
future development-related activities. 
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Sammanfattning 
I föreliggande avhandling analyserar jag den roll teknovetenskaplig 
agrarexpertis spelade i svenskt utvecklingsbistånd från 1950 till 2009. Min 
empiriska utgångspunkt är de tre fackhögskolor som historiskt sorterade under 
Jordbruksdepartementet (och inte Utbildningsdepartmentet): Lantbruks-
högskolan, Skogshögskolan och Veterinärhögskolan, från 1977 sammanslagna 
till Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet (SLU). Dessa högskolor utgjorde viktiga 
centra för svensk agrarexpertis under efterkrigstiden, och min studie behandlar 
frågor om varför och hur deras forskare, lärare och administratörer ställde sina 
kunskaper i utvecklingsbiståndets tjänst. 
Avhandlingen analyserar tre olika problemkomplex. Det första rör hur olika 
slags svensk agrarvetenskaplig expertis kom att betraktas som relevant i en 
biståndskontext. Hur kom det sig att de tre högskolorna fick roller inom 
biståndet? Vilka aktörer var drivande? På vad berodde deras intresse? Jag 
identifierar ett antal ledande aktörer, och förklarar hur de lyckades formulera 
utvecklingsproblem som var kompatibla med den expertis som fanns vid 
högskolornas och samtidigt kunde accepteras av finansiärer och biståndsutförare. 
Jag visar också hur dessa problemformuleringar, i synnerhet på 
Lantbrukshögskolan, samtidigt användes för att uppnå andra organisatoriska mål. 
Det andra problemkomplexet handlar om hur de svenska experterna förhöll 
sig till utvecklingsproblematiken och till sin egen kunskaps tillämpning i 
biståndssammanhang. Någon systematisk kunskap om jord- och skogsbruk i 
den typ av miljöer som var aktuella fanns inte i Sverige då min studie tar sin 
början. Problematiserades detta av de ledande aktörerna, och i så fall hur? 
Vilka utvecklingsstrategier förespråkade de? Varför valdes dessa? Hur 
förändrades strategivalen över tid? Vilka konsekvenser fick strategierna när de 
omsattes i praktik? Dessa frågor besvaras genom att studera tre olika 
biståndsprojekt där högskolorna eller representanter för högskolorna har haft 
framträdande roller. Projekten var åtskilda i tid och rum, men strategierna de 
baserades på har ändå tillräckligt mycket gemensamt för att göra det möjligt att 
argumentera för att de alla var uttryck för en gemensam, underliggande agrar 
moderniseringsideologi. 
Det tredje problemkomplexet handlar om samarbete och samarbetsformer 
mellan den agrara expertisen vid högskolorna och Sveriges 
biståndsmyndigheter. Alla tre högskolorna, och sedermera SLU, arbetade med 
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biståndsmyndigheterna. Det viktigaste samarbetet var det institutionaliserade 
konsultförhållande som rådde mellan SLU och biståndsmyndigheten SIDA 
från 1978 till 1996. Hur och varför skapades detta institutionella, långsiktiga 
samarbete? Vad utmärkte det? Vilka slags aktiviteter möjliggjorde det, och 
vilka hindrade det? Hur utvecklades samarbetet över tid? Jag tydliggör att 
samarbetet tidvis var obalanserat och de båda parternas mål åtskilda, ibland 
mycket påtagligt. Samtidigt utmärktes det av starkt ömsesidigt förtroende, och 
kom under en period att utgöra en slags grund för det då relativt omfattande 
svenska lantbruksbiståndets teori och praktik. 
Någon tidigare historisk forskning som direkt behandlar Sveriges 
jordbruksbistånd och den agrara expertisens roll i detta bistånd finns inte. 
Avhandlingen orienterar sig emellertid mot två för ämnet relevanta och något 
bredare forskningsfält: de agrara vetenskapernas institutionella historia, och 
Sveriges biståndshistoria. Jag tar fasta på den framträdande spänningen mellan 
teori och praktik inom agrarvetenskapernas institutionshistoria, och redogör för 
tidigare forskning som visar hur även lantbruksvetenskaperna i Sverige har 
karaktäriserats av dessa spänningar. Av central betydelse är Lantbruks-
högskolans övergång till en bredare och mer vetenskaplig inriktning under 1960-
talet. Detta skifte är samtida med biståndsverksamhetens inledning på 
universitetet, men tidigare forskning har inte diskuterat eventuella samband 
mellan de två, och denna lucka fylls av föreliggande avhandling. När det gäller 
tidigare forskning om svenskt utvecklingsbistånd tar jag fasta på de kopplingar 
som har påvisats mellan biståndet och Sveriges inhemska expertis. Eftersom 
Sverige saknade en kolonial kunskapsbas fick biståndet i hög grad byggas dels 
på inhemsk kunskap, och dels på kontakter med andra länder. Saken har dock 
inte belysts på det agrara området tidigare, trots att landsbygdsutvecklingsbistånd 
särskilt under 1980-talet utgjorde en betydande del av det svenska biståndet. 
Då studien täcker en relativt lång tidsperiod gör jag inga anspråk på att 
inkludera alla händelseförlopp av relevans för ämnet. Istället har jag valt ut de 
episoder som enligt min bedömning har haft störst inflytande på den historiska 
utvecklingen från 1950 till 2009. Mitt källmaterial utgörs huvudsakligen av 
skriftligt material från SLU:s (inklusive de tre högskolorna) respektive de olika 
svenska biståndsmyndigheternas arkiv. Utländskt källmaterial används enbart i 
den utsträckning det har funnits i de svenska arkiven. Detta utgör ett möjligt 
problem som jag också diskuterar närmare i avhandlingen. Min bedömning är 
dock att det mest relevanta materialet för att besvara mina frågeställningar 
finns i svenska arkiv. Utöver det skriftliga materialet har jag också genomfört 
en serie intervjuer med individer som på olika sätt har varit involverade i 
utvecklingsbistånd på eller i samarbete med SLU. 
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I det följande sammanfattas innehållet i avhandlingens respektive empiriska 
kapitel kort. Därefter presenterar jag något utförligare mitt sista kapitel, med 
studiens slutsatser inklusive en diskussion om svensk teknovetenskaplig 
agrarexpertis i biståndet idag och i framtiden. 
Kapitel 2 – Praktisk träning för moderna praktiker: Nils Lagerlöf, 
Indien och tidigt svenskt utvecklingsbistånd på 
Veterinärhögskolan, 1950–1960 
Kapitel 2 diskuterar den första biståndsaktiviteten av betydelse inom ramarna 
för någon av Jordbruksdepartementets tre högskolor. Ämnet är 
Veterinärhögskolans professor i obstetrik-gynekologi, Nils Lagerlöf, och den 
specialutbildning i husdjursreproduktion inriktad mot u-landsveterinärer som 
han drev från och med mitten av 1950-talet. Kapitlet placerar in dessa kurser i 
kontexten av 1950-talets bistånd och dess allmänna betoning på 
tekniköverföring som moderniseringsinstrument. Under ett uppdrag i Indien 
som FN-expert hade Lagerlöf reagerat på vad han såg som naiv optimism inför 
möjligheten att rationalisera den indiska nötkreatursaveln genom att införa 
artificiell insemination. Han betraktade detta som en teknik som var dåligt 
anpassad till rådande förhållanden i Indien, och menade att reformer av Indiens 
veterinärutbildning var en nödvändig förutsättning för att börja använda ny 
seminteknik. De kurser han kom att ge i Sverige var, åtminstone till en början, 
tänkta som en del av dessa reformer. 
I kapitlet argumenterar jag för att Lagerlöfs biståndsprojekt kan förstås i 
ljuset av hans övertygelse att teknik- och kunskapsöverföringar måste anpassas 
till mottagarsammanhangen, och hans starka intresse av att exportera den 
svenska, praktiskt inriktade modell för undervisning i obstetrik-gynekologi 
som han företrädde på Veterinärhögskolan. Detta innebar att han förordade en 
utvecklingsstrategi som betonade anpassning till lokala förhållanden, men 
samtidigt byggde på en svensk modell som inte i sig var öppen för 
modifikation. Denna kombination av att vilja lokalanpassa sin kunskap för att 
underlätta dess tillämpning, men att samtidigt sluta sig inom sin egen expertis 
gränser, har Lagerlöfs biståndsaktiviteter i påtaglig grad gemensamt med de 
övriga projekt som behandlas i avhandlingen. Däremot skiljer det sig från dem 
genom att huvudsakligen vara ett individuellt projekt, där Lagerlöf framförallt 
drevs av personliga motiv och intressen. 
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Kapitel 3 – Det formativa momentet: Lantbrukshögskolan och 
formeringen av svenskt jordbruksbistånd, 1960–1965 
Ämnet för kapitel 3 är formeringen av ett biståndsengagemang vid 
Lantbrukshögskolan i Ultuna utanför Uppsala under den första halvan av 1960-
talet. Under denna period tillskansade sig högskolan ett stort inflytande på 
planeringen av svenskt bistånd på lantbruksområdet. I kapitlet analyserar jag 
framväxten av en koppling mellan Lantbrukshögskolan och de svenska 
biståndsmyndigheterna, liksom den uppfattning om lantbruksbistånd som 
högskolan företrädde i sina kontakter med de senare. Jag visar hur intresserade 
aktörer vid högskolan, viktigast rektor Lennart Hjelm, på ett aktivt sätt försökte 
koppla ihop arbetet vid högskolan med det växande svenska biståndet och med 
den internationella, vetenskapsbaserade jordbruksutveckling som senare har 
blivit känd som den gröna revolutionen. Detta kan förstås som en del av ett 
försök att säkra en bredare social och politisk legitimitet för högskolan, men 
drevs också av yrkesmässiga och vetenskapliga intressen. 
Den strategi högskolan förordade, och också fick biståndsmyndigheterna att 
acceptera, byggde på vetenskapliga insatser i mindre jordbruk i syfte att öka 
avkastningen, och i förlängningen jordbrukarnas inkomster, utan att minska 
behovet av arbetskraft på landsbygden. Strategin prioriterade forskning med 
syfte att anpassa kunskap och innovationer till lokala miljöer utifrån antagandet 
att bristen på lokal anpassning och tydligt gynnsamma alternativ var den 
främsta orsaken till bondemotstånd mot nya jordbruksmetoder och insatsmedel. 
Strategin var däremot inte i någon högre grad sysselsatt med sociala 
förutsättningar och konsekvenser, områden som låg utanför 
Lantbrukshögskolans expertisfält. Den utmärktes alltså, liksom Lagerlöfs 
strategi tio år tidigare, samtidigt av anpassningsvilja och slutenhet inom den 
egna expertisens gränser. 
Kapitel 4 – Från Ultuna till Addis och Arussi: Lantbrukshögskolan 
och svenskt landsbygdsutvecklingsbistånd till Haile Selassies 
Etiopien, 1965–1974 
Kapitel 4 fortsätter där kapitel 3 slutar, och analyserar följderna av 
Lantbrukshögskolans biståndsstrategi omsatt i praktik inom ramen för det så 
kallade CADU-projektet i Etiopien. Kapitlet undersöker också hur arbetet i 
Etiopien kom att påverka högskolan och bidra till att förstärka kopplingen mellan 
högskolan och SIDA. CADU är ett berömt (i vissas ögon ökänt) 
landsbygdsutvecklingsprojekt som har behandlats utförligt av tidigare 
samhällsvetenskaplig forskning. Min historiska studie av projektets ursprung på 
Lantbrukshögskolan innebär dock ett nytt fokus som på flera sätt nyanserar 
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tidigare arbeten, framförallt genom att jag tydliggör kopplingen till Ultuna och 
den expertis som fanns där. I kapitlet visar jag hur de lokala anpassningar som 
den svenska expertisen förespråkade nådde påfallande framgångar, även om 
anpassningen i många fall var svårare än man kanske hade räknat med. Jag visar 
också att bristen på sociala perspektiv medförde att produktionsökningarna fick 
negativa sociala konsekvenser för många av de fattiga jordbrukare som var 
projektets främsta målgrupp. 
Kapitel 5 – Landsbygdsutvecklingsparets uppgång och fall: Det 
institutionella samarbetet mellan SIDA och SLU, 1966–1996 
Ämnet för kapitel 5 är det institutionella samarbetet mellan SLU och SIDA 
som växte fram genom Lantbrukshögskolans engagemang i CADU-projektet, 
och som blev särskilt viktigt under 1980-talet då SLU:s u-landsavdelning 
fungerade som en så kallad institutionell konsult åt SIDA:s lantbruksbyrå. Jag 
beskriver samarbetet som ett landsbygdsutvecklingspar, ett begrepp som 
anspelar på teknikhistorikern Mats Fridlunds forskning om relationen mellan 
svenska tekniska storföretag och statliga myndigheter under 1900-talet. 
Begreppet används för att uppmärksamma vikten av nära personliga relationer 
för samarbetet, liksom dess relativt långa utsträckning i tid, bortom ramarna för 
enskilda samarbetsprojekt. 
Kapitlet spårar alltså landsbygdsutvecklingsparets ursprung tillbaka till 
CADU, men fokuserar särskilt på perioden efter SLU:s bildande 1977. Jag 
analyserar huvudsakligen två aspekter av samarbetet: dels den 
konsultverksamhet som ordnades vid SLU för att tillgodose SIDA:s 
lantbruksbyrås behov av extern expertis, och dels SLU:s egna strävanden att 
upprätta akademisk forskning om landsbygdsutveckling i anslutning till 
samarbetet med SIDA. Genom dessa två exempel kan de spänningar som 
karaktäriserade samarbetet synliggöras och analyseras. Huvudsakligen handlar 
det om spänningar kring gränserna för SLU:s engagemang och kring frågan om 
vilken slags expertis som var relevant för SIDA, men problem kring 
samarbetets organisationsformer berörs också. Kapitlet avslutas sedan med en 
analys av u-landsavdelningens avveckling och omvandling till en institution för 
landsbygdsutveckling 1996, något som också innebar slutet för 
landsbygdsutvecklingsparet. 
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Kapitel 6 – Silvi-kulturella möten: SLU och svenskt 
skogsutbildningsbistånd till Etiopien, 1986–2009 
Kapitel 6 undersöker SLU:s stöd till högre skogsutbildning i Etiopien under 
80-, 90-, och 2000-talen. SLU:s skogsfakultet engagerades i SIDA:s stöd till 
den etiopiska skogssektorn under mitten av 1980-talet, och en mer 
genomgripande institutionell samverkan med etiopiska utbildnings- och 
forskningsinstitutioner inleddes efter Mengistu-regimens fall 1991. Det pågick 
sedan fram till 2009, då SLU avslutade sitt engagemang i det som vid det laget 
var (och fortfarande är) en skoglig och naturresursorienterad högskola med 
utbildningar både på kandidat- och masternivå. 
I kapitlet diskuteras huvudsakligen hur det jag kallar silvi-kulturella 
spänningar uppstod när SLU:s skogsexpertis började tillämpas i Etiopien. 
Begreppet syftar till att fånga upp hur dess spänningar inte enbart handlade om 
skogsundervisningen i sig utan också berörde bredare socio-kulturella 
skillnader. Den huvudsakliga spänningen rörde SLU:s försök att tillämpa en 
svensk och i många avseenden praktiskt orienterad modell för undervisningen i 
ett land där både sociala och skogliga förhållanden skilde sig markant från 
Sverige. På ett mer generellt plan handlade det också om vad akademisk 
skoglig utbildning innebär och vilken inriktning den bör ha under de 
förhållanden som rådde i Etiopien. 
Kapitel 7 – Slutsatser 
I avhandlingens avslutande kapitel presenteras studiens slutsatser, 
strukturerade efter de tre problemkomplex som har undersökts. När det gäller 
frågan om hur olika slags svensk agrarvetenskaplig expertis kom att betraktas 
som relevant i en biståndskontext är den huvudsakliga slutsatsen att det byggde 
på ett aktivt arbete, framförallt från Lantbrukshögskolans ledning och med 
rektor Lennart Hjelm i spetsen, som syftade till att koppla ihop högskolan med 
biståndsmyndigheterna. Hjelm började efter sitt tillträde som rektor identifiera 
ett behov av nya verksamheter som kunde ge en ny slags politisk och social 
legitimitet. Högskolans verksamhet hade fram till dess huvudsakligen 
legitimerats genom sina nära kopplingar till de inhemska sektorsintressena. 
Denna legitimitet problematiserades av den framväxande miljörörelsen, som 
utmanade det moderna jordbruket som högskolan representerade i detta 
sammanhang. Ett annat, och allvarligare, problem var att jordbruket i allt 
mindre utsträckning uppfattades som en central näringsgren i det 
industrialiserade Sverige. För att behålla Lantbrukshögskolans relevans 
krävdes därför nya verksamhetsformer, bättre anpassade till de nya 
samhälleliga omständigheterna. Denna analys sammanföll i tid med 
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utvecklingsbiståndets alltmer framträdande roll i politik och civilsamhälle. 
Eftersom bistånd var ett område där agrar expertis var relevant blev det ett 
område som högskolan intresserade sig för. I mer generell mening kan man 
formulera slutsatsen som att högskolan under början av 1960-talet identifierade 
ett behov att komma bortom den traditionella position där legitimitet kunde 
hämtas antingen från naturvetenskapen eller från lantbruksnäringen. Ett 
engagemang i utvecklingsbiståndet var ett av flera sätt på vilket högskolan 
sökte sig bortom denna klassiska dikotomi. Slutsatsen ska emellertid inte 
förstås som att högskolan engagerade sig i biståndet enbart av egenintresse. Av 
allt att döma var dess företrädare övertygade om att expertisen de 
representerade skulle vara till stor nytta för utvecklingsländerna, samtidigt som 
ett engagemang där skulle kunna vara till nytta för högskolan. 
Frågan om hur den svenska expertisen förhöll sig till 
utvecklingsproblematiken och till sin egen kunskap i denna kontext diskuteras 
utifrån de tre biståndsprojekt som har studerats i avhandlingen. De tre 
projekten har tillräckligt mycket gemensamt för att möjliggöra slutsatsen att de 
alla byggde på en underliggande, agrar utvecklingsideologi. Denna byggde å 
ena sidan på en betoning av lokal kunskapsproduktion, lokala anpassningar och 
uppbyggandet av förmågor i mottagarlandet; och å andra sidan på en nedtoning 
av den agrara utvecklingens sociala aspekter och en viss slutenhet vad beträffar 
modifiering av de egna fundamentala utgångspunkterna. En viktig anledning 
till det förra var att agrarvetenskaperna i Sverige var åtminstone delvis 
platsbundna vetenskaper under större delen av 1900-talet. Det fanns ett fokus 
på det lokala särskilt inom det svenska jordbruks- och skogsvetenskapliga 
försökssystemet, som sedan fördes över till Sveriges agrara bistånd genom de 
tre högskolorna och sedermera SLU. Det fanns också en betoning på praktiska 
moment i utbildningarna vid alla tre högskolorna, och denna betoning på 
praktik som en oundgänglig del också av en akademisk yrkesutbildning fick 
även den genomslag i biståndet. Nedtoningen av det sociala reflekterar en 
annan dimension av det svenska agrara moderniseringstänkandet, nämligen en 
relativ avsaknad av intresse för jordbruksutvecklingens sociala dimensioner. 
Den välkända bilden av tekniker och sociala ingenjörer som agerar utan 
tillräckliga hänsyn har viss relevans här. Samtidigt får inte slutsatsen drivas för 
långt. Studien av CADU visar på en viss öppenhet för antropologiska studier 
och förmåga till självreflektion. Emellertid kom detta, i linje med 
moderniseringsideologin, till slut ändå att underordnas inom ramen för en 
strategi som framhöll vikten av inkomstdrivande produktionsökningar. 
Svaret på frågan om hur samarbetet mellan biståndsmyndigheterna och den 
agrara expertisen utvecklades över tid kan sammanfattas med hjälp av följande 
periodisering: 
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 Individuella projekt (1953–1961) 
 Den formativa perioden (1962–1968) 
 Landsbygdsutvecklingsparets framväxt (1969–1985) 
 Akademisering av det agrara biståndet (1986–2009) 
Periodiseringen tar fasta på de huvudsakliga kontinuiteterna och 
diskontinuiteterna över tid. Den inledande perioden, individuellt bistånd, 
karaktäriserades av individdrivna projekt som inte i någon större utsträckning 
var kopplade till respektive högskola som institution. Den formativa perioden 
under 1960-talet utgör också en formativ period för svenskt bistånd i stort, och 
i detta fall tar den specifikt fasta på hur framförallt Lantbrukshögskolans 
manövrerande gentemot biståndsmyndigheterna lade grunden för den roll SLU 
skulle komma att spela i svenskt bistånd under ungefär tre decennier. Namnet 
på nästa period, institutionellt bistånd, syftar både på SLU:s roll som 
institutionell konsult åt SIDA och på framväxten av institutionella strukturer 
för att hantera denna roll. Perioden utmärks av ett nära samarbete mellan SIDA 
och SLU, dock främst på SIDA:s villkor, och av en konsultverksamhet med få 
akademiska förtecken. Den sista perioden kännetecknas framförallt av en 
alltmer intensiv strävan från SLU:s sida att akademisera kontakterna med 
utvecklingsländerna och därmed inlemma dessa kontakter mer i universitets 
vanliga arbete. Det gäller både konsultverksamheten i Sverige, som så 
småningom avvecklades och ersattes av en akademisk institution, och arbetet i 
fält, vilket i avhandlingen representeras av skogsfakultetens engagemang i 
högre skoglig utbildning i Etiopien. 
Efter den diskussion av resultaten som sammanfattas ovan avslutas 
avhandlingen med en del som, utifrån den historiska studien, reflekterar över 
svensk agrarvetenskaplig expertis i utvecklingssamarbetet idag och framåt i 
tiden. Jag framhåller ett starkt engagemang från SLU:s ledning, samt en svensk 
utvecklingspolitik som tar fasta på landsbygds- och livsmedelfrågor, som 
avgörande faktorer för om denna expertis ska ha en roll att spela. Vidare 
diskuteras värdet av den lokala och praktiska inriktning som SLU och 
högskolorna historiskt har företrätt i utvecklingsarbetet, och den möjliga risken 
att den redan långt drivna akademiseringen inom dagens SLU leder till en 
nedtoning av denna inriktning. Det finns anledning att betrakta en sådan som 
utveckling som problematisk, eftersom det trots åtskilliga brister ändå finns fog 
att hävda att det är just den lokala och praktiska inriktningen som historiskt har 
varit den agrara expertisens viktigaste bidrag till svenskt utvecklingsbistånd.  
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Appendix A: List of key actors 
The information below, and corresponding unreferenced biographical information in 
the body of the text, comes from standard biographical resources like Svenskt 
biografiskt lexikon and Sveriges statskalender, or from resources specially focused on 
agrarian professionals: Svensk biografisk veterinärmatrikel, LHS Matrikel, Sveriges 
jägmästare och forstmästare, among others. I have also drawn on obituaries published 
in newspapers and professional journals. For the foreign actors, I have pieced together 
information from archival material, books, journals, and webpages. The resulting 
accounts are often inprecise and I have been unable to find years of birth and death for 
most Ethiopian actors. 
 
Name Short biography 
Aklu Girgre Ethiopian civil servant; vice-minister of 
agriculture and head of the NRCD-MD 1984–
1988. 
Augustinsson, Lars (b. 1924) Swedish agronomist; at SIDA 1966–1989, head 
of the agricultural division 1986–1987; 1988–
1989. 
Badege Bishaw (b. 1953) Ethiopian forester and plant scientist; dean of 
the forestry faculty at Alemaya University of 
Agriculture 1987–1989. 
Bane, Allan (1914–1997) Swedish veterinarian; professor of obstetrics-
gynecology at the Veterinary College/SLU 
1962–1978. 
Bendixen, Hans Christian (1897–1976) Danish veterinarian; professor of veterinary 
pathology at the Danish Veterinary and 
Agricultural University; veterinary officer at 
the Animal Production Branch of FAO 1951–
1952. 
Bendz, Mårten (b. 1937) Swedish forester; vice-chancellor of the 
College of Forestry 1972–1976; later active as 
independent consultant. 
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Bengtsson, Bo (b. 1939) Swedish agronomist; did SIDA-funded studies 
of tropical agriculture at the University of the 
West Indies (together with Lars Leander and 
Hans Johansson); then employed by CADU 
1967–1968; head of the Developing-Country 
Section (Agricultural College/JHS) 1968–
1976; later at SAREC, research director (head 
of the agency) 1983–1991. 
Bergenstråhle, Carl (1909–1977) Swedish diplomat; Ambassador to Ethiopia 
1967–1972. 
Birgegård, Lars-Erik (b. 1941) Swedish economist; consultant at SLU’s 
International Rural Development Center 1978–
1981; head of IRDC’s analysis unit 1986–
1994. 
Björnberg, Arne (1908–1983) Swedish civil servant; secretary-general of NIB 
1962–1964. 
Broadley, Herbert (1892–1983) British civil servant, deputy director-general of 
FAO 1948–1958. 
Brännäng, Eskil (b. 1924) Swedish agronomist; professor (statsagronom) 
of animal breeding at the Agricultural College 
1967–1980; member of the Agricultural 
College’s developing country advisory 
committee. 
Bäckström, Per-Ove (b. 1937) Swedish forester; dean of SLU’s Faculty of 
Forest Sciences 1983–1995. 
Carlsson, Mårten (b. 1936) Swedish agronomist; vice-chancellor of the 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
1982–1994. 
Croon, Ingemar (b. 1943) Swedish agronomist; worked at the 
Developing-Country Section (Agricultural 
College) 1972–1974; IRDC 1977–1985. 
Dagnatchew Yirgou Ethiopian agronomist; CADU crop production 
expert. Later appointed general manager of the 
Institute of Agricultural Research in Addis 
Ababa; member of the team responsible for the 
final appraisal of CADU and EPID in 1974. 
Dalling, Thomas (1892–1982) British veterinarian; veterinary officer at the 
Animal Production Branch of FAO in the 
1950s. 
Danell, Börje (b. 1939) Swedish veterinarian; student and associate of 
Nils Lagerlöf; director of the rural development 
division at JHS 1976–1977. 
Edgren, Gösta (b. 1935) Swedish civil servant; state secretary with 
responsibility for development aid at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1982–1990. 
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Ericsson, Gösta (1924–2005) Swedish agronomist; represented the National 
Board of Agriculture in NIB’s agricultural 
group; later director of LANT 1973–1976; 
head of department at SIDA 1976–1980; 1986–
1989. 
Fones-Sundell, Melinda (b. 1954) American agricultural economist; consultant at 
IRDC 1978–1986; junior researcher at IRDC’s 
analysis unit 1986–1991. 
Forsse, Anders (b. 1924) Swedish civil servant; head of division at NIB 
1963–1965; head of department at SIDA 1965–
1974; director-general of SIDA 1979–1985. 
Frykman, Bengt (b. 1938) Swedish forester; liaison officer and project 
coordinator for SLU in Ethiopia, 1994–1997. 
Garcia-Thärn, Amalia (b. 1950) Swedish civil servant; the SIDA officer 
managing the collaboration with SLU in the 
early 1990s. 
Gerremo, Inge (b. 1941) Swedish civil servant; held various positions at 
SIDA’s agricultural division and IRDC 
between 1968 and 1992. 
Gårdlund, Torsten (1911–2003) Swedish economist; interested in development 
problems; expert participant in the SIDA 
committee that reviewed the first report on a 
rural development project in Ethiopia 1966. 
Hansson, Artur (1909–1970) Swedish agronomist; professor of animal 
breeding at the Agricultural College 1962–
1970. 
Henock Kifle Ethiopian economist; executive director of 
CADU 1974(?)–1975. 
Heppling, Sixten (1918–2010) Swedish civil servant; executive secretary of 
the Central Committee for Swedish 
Development Aid to Less Developed Areas 
1952–1962. 
Hjelm, Birger (b. 1961) Swedish forester; worked at Wondo Genet 
College of Forestry 1999–2001. 
Hjelm, Lennart (1915–2009) Swedish agronomist; professor of agricultural 
economics at the Agricultural College 1955–
1971; vice-chancellor of the Agricultural 
College 1963–1977; vice-chancellor of SLU 
1977–1982; chairman of the Agricultural 
College’s developing country advisory 
committee 1968–1977; chairman of the 
advisory board to IRDC 1978–1989. 
Holmberg, Johan (b. 1942) Swedish civil servant; economist at CADU 
1971–1973; at EPID 1973–1976; head of 
SIDA’s agricultural division 1980–1986. 
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Isaksson, Nils-Ivar (b. 1932) Swedish agronomist; professor of agricultural 
economics at the Agricultural College 1972–
1977; director of IRDC 1978–1996. 
Kalderén, Lars (1928–2015) Swedish civil servant; head of division at SIDA 
1965–1970. 
Khan, Akhter Hameed (1914–1999) Pakistani social scientist; initiator of the 
Comilla project in East Pakistan 
Knutsson, Karl Eric (1932–2002) Swedish social anthropologist; attached to the 
CADU planning team in 1966; expert 
participant in the SIDA committee that 
reviewed the first report on a rural 
development project in Ethiopia 1966. 
Lagerlöf, Nils (1895–1970) Swedish veterinarian; professor of obstetrics 
and ruminant medicine at the Veterinary 
College 1934–1948; professor of obstetrics and 
gynecology 1948–1962; vice-chancellor 1957–
1962; initiator of the college’s international 
courses in animal reproduction; held various 
international expert assignments. 
Larsson, Sven-Gunnar (1936–2010) Swedish forester, dean of the School of Forest 
Engineers 1974–1996; held various positions 
and was a driving force in SLU’s forestry 
education collaboration with Ethiopia 1986–
2003. 
Leander, Lars (b. 1937) Swedish agronomist and civil servant; did 
SIDA-funded studies of tropical agriculture at 
the University of the West Indies (together 
with Bo Bengtsson and Hans Johansson). Later 
held various positions at CADU and SIDA 
1966–1974; at SIDA 1976–1978; and again at 
SIDA 1983–1990 (1987–1990 at the DCO in 
Addis Ababa). 
Lexander, Arne (1936–2006) Swedish social anthropologist, attached to the 
CADU planning team 1966–1967. 
Linder, Harald (1921–2009) Swedish agronomist; held various positions in 
agricultural societies and the Agricultural 
College’s special counselling division; head of 
CADU’s crop production department 1966–
1969; at EPID 1970–1973. 
Lundgren, Bengt (1916–1983) Swedish veterinarian; chief veterinarian of the 
Möre Breeding Association / the East Sweden 
Insemination Center 1945–1983; part of Nils 
Lagerlöf’s mission to India in 1953–1954. 
Markensten, Klas (b. 1942) Swedish civil servant; head of SIDA’s 
agricultural division/natural resources 
management division 1989–1994. 
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Michanek, Ernst (1919–2007) Swedish civil servant; secretary-general of NIB 
1964–1965; director-general of SIDA 1965–
1979. 
Nekby, Bengt (b. 1930) Swedish agricultural economist; member of the 
NIB/SIDA agricultural group 1964–1965; head 
of division at SIDA 1965–1966; Swedish 
development aid attaché in Ethiopia 1966–
1967; executive director of CADU 1967–1970. 
Norén, Sten (b. 1937) Swedish forester; head of the College of 
Forestry’s Developing-Country Section 1970–
1975; consultant at IRDC 1980–1994. 
Nyström, Harald (1898–1974)  Swedish physician and missionary; head of the 
mission hospital in Asella 1952–1966. 
Oscarsson, Görel (b. 1936) Swedish civil servant; university director of 
SLU 1977–1998. 
Paulos Abraham Ethiopian economist; executive director of 
CADU 1970–1974(?). 
Pellbäck, Sven (1933–2015) Swedish agronomist and civil servant; head of 
SIDA’s agricultural division 1976–1980; at 
IRDC 1982–1996; acting director 1982–1987. 
Pålsson, Ernst (1910–1985) Swedish veterinarian; chief veterinarian of the 
Ystad Breeding Association 1943–1967; 
teacher of artificial insemination at the 
Veterinary College 1967–1976; part of Nils 
Lagerlöf’s mission to India in 1953-1954. 
Rönquist, Per-Erik (1924–1965) Swedish civil servant; head of division at NIB 
1962–1965; acting secretary-general 1963–
1964. 
Rubarth, Sven (1905–1996) Swedish veterinarian; professor of pathological 
anatomy (from 1970 pathology) at the 
Veterinary College 1947–1971; director of the 
international pathology courses 1962–1971. 
Sandewall, Mats (b. 1953) Swedish forester; taught at Wondo Genet 
College of Forestry 1993–1995; coordinator of 
SLU’s support to Wondo Genet 2002–2009. 
Schmiterlöw, Carl G. (1916–1984) Swedish physician; vice-chancellor of the 
Veterinary College 1962–1977. 
Settergren, Ingemar (1922–2008) Swedish veterinarian; director of SIPAR 1970–
1987. 
Singh, G. B. (1906–1986) Indian veterinarian; participant in the first 
international course in animal reproduction at 
the Veterinary College 1954–1955. 
Sjunnesson, Sven (b. 1936) Swedish forester; dean of academic affairs at 
the Wondo Genet Forestry Resources Institute / 
Wondo Genet College of Forestry 1986–1990. 
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Skoog, Daag (b. 1942) Swedish agronomist; employed at IRDC from 
1980; later worked in various positions within 
SLU’s support to Ethiopian forestry. 
Ståhlberg, Harald (1914–1994) Swedish agronomist; FAO land reform expert 
in Ethiopia in 1965. 
Stålfors, Harry (1867–1938) Swedish veterinarian; professor of obstetrics 
and ruminant medicine at the Veterinary 
College 1917–1933. 
Svärdström, Karl-Fredrik (1908–1989) Swedish economist; professor of agricultural 
economics at the Agricultural College 1949–
1973. 
Taye Gulilat Ethiopian civil servant; commissioner of higher 
education in the mid- and late 1980s. 
Tesfa Bushen Ethiopian civil servant; vice-minister of 
agriculture in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Tham, Carl (b. 1939) Swedish liberal, later social democratic, 
politician and civil servant; director-general of 
SIDA 1985–1994. 
Toborn, Johan (b. 1945) Swedish economist; worked at CADU and 
EPID in the 1970s; consultant at IRDC 1981–
1996; managing director of Agriuniverse AB. 
Torstensson, Gunnar (1895–1997) Swedish agronomist; vice-chancellor of the 
Agricultural College 1958–1963. 
Wik, Martin (b. 1932) Swedish agronomist; at CADU 1968–1971. 
Åberg, Börje (1911–1994) Swedish scientist; professor of plant 
physiology at the Agricultural College 1956–
1977; member of the NIB/SIDA agricultural 
group 1964–1966. 
Åberg, Ewert (1909–1983) Swedish agronomist; professor of crop 
production at the Agricultural College 1962–
1976; member of the NIB/SIDA agricultural 
group 1964–1966. 
Åkerberg, Erik (1906–1991) Swedish agronomist; director of the Swedish 
Seed Association 1956–1971; member of the 
NIB/SIDA agricultural group 1964–1966. 
Öman, Signar (1910–1981) Swedish missionary; later director of NIB’s 
farm in Algeria in the early 1960s. 
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Appendix B: List of organizations 
English name Swedish name Acronym 
Agricultural College Lantbrukshögskolan LHS 
Agricultural Division (SIDA) Lantbruksbyrån LANT 
Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute 
Jordbrukets utredningsinstitut JUI 
Alemaya University of 
Agriculture (founded as the 
Imperial Ethiopian College of 
Agricultural and Mechanical 
Arts) 
--- AUA 
Central Committee for Swedish 
Development Aid to Less 
Developed Areas 
Centralkommittén för svenskt 
tekniskt bistånd till mindre 
utvecklade områden 
CK 
Central Institute for 
Agricultural Experimentation 
Centralanstalten för 
försöksväsendet på 
jordbruksområdet 
--- 
Centre for Agricultural 
Adjustment (Agricultural 
College) 
Arbetsgruppen för lantbrukets 
anpassning 
ALA 
Center for Agricultural and 
Economic Adjustment (Iowa 
State College) 
--- --- 
Chilalo Agricultural 
Development Unit 
--- CADU 
Children’s Nutrition Unit --- CNU 
College of Forestry Skogshögskolan SHS 
Commission for Higher 
Education (Ethiopian Ministry 
of Education) 
--- CHE 
Consultative Group for 
International Agricultural 
Research 
--- CGIAR 
Cornell University --- --- 
Danish Veterinary and 
Agricultural University 
Kgl. Veterinaer- og 
Landbohöjskole (på danska) 
KVL 
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Department of Animal 
Breeding and Genetics (SLU) 
Institutionen för husdjursförädling 
och sjukdomsgenetik 
--- 
Department of Crop Production 
(Agricultural College / SLU) 
Institutionen för växtodling / 
Institutionen för växtodlingslära 
--- 
Department of Economics and 
Statistics / Department of 
Economics (Agricultural 
College / SLU) 
Institutionen för lantbrukets 
företagsekonomi / Institutionen 
för ekonomi och statistik / 
Institutionen för ekonomi 
--- 
Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology (Veterinary 
College / SLU, founded as 
Obstetrics and Ruminant 
Medicine) 
Institutionen för obstetrik och 
gynekologi (ursprungligen 
obstetrik och bujatrik) 
--- 
Department of Rural 
Development Studies (SLU) 
Institutionen för 
landsbygdsutveckling 
--- 
Developing-Country Section 
(Agricultural College / College 
of Forestry) 
U-landssektionen --- 
Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic 
Front 
--- EPRDF 
Expanded Programme of 
Technical Assistance (United 
Nations) 
--- EPTA 
Extension and Project 
Implementation Department 
(Ethiopian Ministry of 
Agriculture) 
--- EPID 
Faculty of Forest Sciences 
(SLU) 
Skogsvetenskapliga fakulteten --- 
Faculty of Veterinary Medicine 
(SLU) 
Veterinärmedicinska fakulteten --- 
Federation of Agricultural 
Societies 
Riksförbundet Landsbygdens folk RLF 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations 
--- FAO 
Ford Foundation --- --- 
Forestry Research Centre / 
Silviculture Research Centre 
(Ethiopia) 
--- FRC / SRC 
Gothenburg School of 
Economics 
Handelshögskolan vid Göteborgs 
universitet 
--- 
Haile Selassie I University --- --- 
Hawassa University --- --- 
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Intensive Agricultural Districts 
Program 
--- IADP 
International Development 
Association 
--- IDA 
International Rural 
Development Center (SLU) 
U-landsavdelningen / IRDC IRDC 
Iowa State College --- --- 
Karolinska Institutet Karolinska Institutet KI 
Kasetsart University --- --- 
Kibaha Education Center --- --- 
Minimum Package Program --- MPP 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
(Sweden) 
Utrikesdepartementet UD 
Ministry of Agriculture 
(Sweden) 
Jordbruksdepartementet --- 
Ministry of Education 
(Sweden) 
Utbildningsdepartementet --- 
Ministry of Enterprise and 
Innovation (Sweden) 
Näringsdepartementet --- 
Ministry of Finance (Sweden) Finandepartementet --- 
Ministry of Natural Resources 
Development and 
Environmental Protection 
(Ethiopia) 
--- MNDREP 
Nagpur Veterinary College --- --- 
National Board of Agriculture 
(Sweden) 
Lantbruksstyrelsen --- 
National Board of Universities 
and Colleges (Sweden) 
Universitets- och 
högskoleämbetet 
UHÄ 
National Forestry Research 
Institute (Sweden) 
Statens skogsförsöksanstalt / 
Statens skogsforskningsinstitut 
--- 
National Institute for 
Agricultural Experimentation 
(Sweden) 
Statens jordbruksförsök --- 
National Research Institute for 
Farm Construction (Sweden) 
Statens forskningsanstalt för 
lantmannabyggnader 
--- 
National Veterinary Institute 
(Sweden) 
Statens veterinärmedicinska 
anstalt 
SVA 
Natural Resources 
Conservation Development, 
Main Department (Ethiopian 
Ministry of Agriculture) 
--- NRCD-MD 
Natural Resources 
Management Division (SIDA) 
Naturbruksbyrån NATUR 
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Oklahoma Agricultural and 
Mechanical College / 
Oklahoma State University 
--- --- 
Research Information Center / 
Special Counseling Division 
(Agricultural College) 
Konsulentavdelningen / 
Specialrådgivningen 
--- 
Rockefeller Foundation --- --- 
Royal Swedish Academy of 
Agriculture 
Kungl. Lantbruksakademien KLA 
Royal Swedish Academy of 
Agriculture and Forestry 
Kungl. Skogs- och 
lantbruksakademien 
KSLA 
Rural Development Analysis 
Unit (IRDC) 
Enheten för analys av 
landsbygdsutveckling 
--- 
School for Forest Management 
/ School of Forest Engineers 
(SLU) 
Skogsmästarskolan SMS 
School of Veterinary Medicine 
(Lusaka, Zambia) 
--- --- 
Stockholm School of 
Economics 
Handelshögskolan HHS 
SwedForest --- --- 
Swedish Agency for 
International Assistance 
Nämnden för internationellt 
bistånd 
NIB 
Swedish Agency for Research 
Cooperation with Developing 
Countries 
Styrelsen för u-landsforskning SAREC 
Swedish Government Advisory 
Board on International Aid 
Issues 
Beredningen för internationella 
biståndsfrågor (ofta känd som U-
beredningen) 
--- 
Swedish Government Research 
Advisory Board 
Forskningsberedningen --- 
Swedish Higher Education 
Authority 
Universitetskanslern --- 
Swedish International 
Development Authority 
Styrelsen för internationell 
utveckling 
SIDA 
Swedish International 
Development Cooperation 
Agency 
Styrelsen för internationellt 
utvecklingssamarbete 
Sida 
Swedish International 
Programme on Animal 
Reproduction 
--- SIPAR 
Swedish National Board of 
Public Building 
Byggnadsstyrelsen --- 
Swedish National Land Survey Lantmäteriverket --- 
Swedish Seed Association Sveriges utsädesförening --- 
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Swedish State Power 
Administration 
Statens Vattenfallsverk --- 
Swedish Telecommunications 
Administration 
Televerket --- 
Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation 
Landsorganisationen i Sverige LO 
Swedish Union of Agricultural 
Banks 
Sveriges jordbrukskasseförbund --- 
Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences 
Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet SLU (historically SUAS) 
Swedish University of 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Veterinary Medicine 
Jordbrukets högskolor och SVA JHS 
United Nations Development 
Program 
--- UNDP 
United States Agency of 
International Development 
--- USAID 
University of the West Indies --- --- 
Veterinary College Veterinärhögskolan VHS 
Wondo Genet College of 
Forestry 
--- WGCF 
Wondo Genet Forestry 
Resources Institute 
--- WGFRI 
World Bank (International 
Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) 
IBRD --- 
World Health Organization --- WHO 
 

375 
Index 
A 
Aklu Girgre, 259–60, 270, 271, 280 
Almaw Negassa, 163 
Augustinsson, Lars, 209, 219, 243, 246 
B 
Badege Bishaw, 277, 279, 282, 287 
Baleba Demeksa, 186 
Bane, Allan, 61, 63, 69, 90 
Belay Abal, 186 
Bendixen, Hans Christian, 63–64, 66–67 
Bendz, Mårten, 269–70  
Bengtsson, Bo, 163, 165, 208–09, 210–211, 
212–213, 216, 234–35 
Bergendal, Tomas, 173 
Bergenstråhle, Carl, 197–198 
Berhanu Debele, 280 
Beyene Chichaibelu, 163 
Birgegård, Lars-Erik, 233–34, 236–39 
Björnberg, Arne, 11, 105, 127, 129, 130, 
309 
Bostrand, Lisbet, 276 
Boyd Orr, John, 68 
Broadley, Herbert, 82 
Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 245 
Brännäng, Eskil, 167, 209 
Bäckström, Per-Ove, 260, 265, 269, 270, 
274–75, 284, 303 
C 
Carlsson, Mårten, 234, 251, 269, 280, 303, 
324 
Carlqvist, Katarina, 211 
Carson, Rachel, 124 
Clason, Carl, 163 
Croon, Ingemar, 215, 218, 234 
D 
Dagnatchew Yirgou, 164, 180, 200 
Dahlgren, Anders, 224 
Dahlqvist, Anders, 295 
Dalling, Thomas, 80, 82 
Danell, Börje, 89, 92–93, 211, 212–13, 215 
Denninger, Mats, 248 
Deshmukh, Ashok W., 96 
E 
Edgren, Gösta, 283 
Engström, Jan, 270 
Ericsson, Gösta, 134, 214, 217, 219, 243, 
246 
Erlander, Tage, 104 
Evang, Karl, 69 
F 
Fones-Sundell, Melinda, 237 
Forsse, Anders, 129–30, 145, 152, 158–59, 
162, 166, 171, 172–73, 177, 219, 226, 
234–35 
Fredriksson, Gustav, 264 
Frykman, Bengt, 289, 290, 292 
G 
Gabrielsson, Erland, 163 
Garcia-Thärn, Amalia, 246 
Genet Zewdie, 284 
Gerremo, Inge, 225–26, 248 
Gibbon, David, 251 
Girma Wolde-Giorgis, 302 
Gårdlund, Torsten, 172–73 
376 
H 
Haglund, Ann-Cathrine, 284 
Haile Selassie, 148, 149–51, 153, 159, 188, 
197–98, 199, 200, 202 
Hansson, Artur, 63, 109, 134, 149, 159 
Havnevik, Kjell, 251 
Henock Kifle, 191, 199 
Heppling, Sixten, 74, 80–82, 88–89, 91 
Hjelm, Birger, 295–97, 299 
Hjelm, Lennart, 107–08, 109–111, 113, 
115, 123–27, 129–33, 134, 137, 142, 149, 
167–68, 172–74, 177, 195–96, 197, 202, 
207–09, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217–19, 
228–32, 243, 251, 260, 268, 303–04, 
310–13, 321, 324 
von Hofsten, Erland, 210, 282 
Holmberg, Johan, 214–15, 217, 224–25, 
229, 234–35, 269–70 
Hydén, Göran, 235 
Hänninger, Ulf, 134 
Höjer, Axel, 69–70 
Höök, Lars, 264 
I 
Isaksson, Nils-Ivar, 197, 214–15, 217–20, 
224, 233, 241, 243–44, 247, 249, 250, 
281 
Ishaque, S. M., 84 
J 
Jacoby, Erich, 187 
Jiggins, Janice, 251 
Johansson, Hans, 163, 168 
K 
Kaikini, A. S., 90 
Kalderén, Lars, 103, 178 
Kesteven, K. V. L., 66, 80, 82 
Khan, Akhter Hameed, 136 
Klem, Gustav, 276 
Knutsson, Karl Eric, 149, 163, 166, 171–73 
L 
Lagerlöf, Nils, 57–64, 66–94, 97–99, 104, 
117, 121–22, 211, 246, 252, 283, 295, 
309–10, 313, 314, 317, 318, 321 
Larsson, Maria, 232 
Larsson, Sven-Gunnar, 259–61, 265, 267, 
298, 303 
Leander, Lars, 163, 165, 264 
Lexander, Arne, 163, 164–65, 166 
Linder, Harald, 163, 180, 184 
Lindström, Ulla, 103, 127, 322 
Lundgren, Bengt, 68, 70, 83 
M 
Markensten, Klas, 243, 244, 249 
McNamara, Robert, 197 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, 257, 258, 265, 
281, 285 
Mesfin Sahile, 163 
Michanek, Ernst, 129–33, 145, 162, 219, 
322 
Milosavljevic, Brana, 185 
Mohn, Paul, 81–82 
Mothander, Björn, 241–43, 248 
Mulegeta Ghebrewold, 163 
Myrdal, Gunnar, 69, 112, 140–41, 187 
N 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 70 
Nekby, Bengt, 109–11, 113, 121, 134–37, 
139, 145, 149, 152–53, 154–56, 160–61, 
162–64, 166–68, 171–74, 177, 178, 197, 
199, 207–08, 210, 214, 219, 321 
Nindi, Benson, 237 
Norén, Sten, 210, 212, 261, 286 
Nyerere, Julius, 202 
Nyström, Harald, 164 
O 
O’Heady, Earl, 110 
Odhner, Claes-Erik, 106–08, 122 
 377 
Ohlsson, Lennart, 163 
Oscarsson, Görel, 260, 268, 280, 284, 303, 
324 
P 
Patel, H. M., 83 
Patriksson, Hans, 163 
Paulos Abraham, 164, 191, 199 
Pellbäck, Sven, 216, 217, 224–25, 227, 
233, 270 
Petrini, Frank, 229 
Poulsen, Gunnar, 163 
Pålsson, Ernst, 68, 70, 79, 83 
R 
Rudebjer, Per, 264 
Rutegård, Gunnar, 267 
Rydén, Håkan, 134 
Rosswall, Thomas, 251 
Rostow, Walt Whitman, 104–05, 117 
Rönquist, Per-Erik, 129–30 
Rubarth, Sven, 94 
S 
Sandberg, Bengt, 175–76 
Sandewall, Mats, 301 
Schmiterlöw, Carl G., 94, 99 
Schultz, Theodore, 116–17, 138, 172 
Sedin, Bo, 241–43, 248 
Settergren, Ingemar, 89, 211 
Singh, G. B., 59, 62–63, 74, 75, 90 
Sjunnesson, Sven, 261, 293, 296–97 
Sjöberg, Anders, 194 
Skoog, Daag, 292, 298 
Ståhl, Michael, 158, 192, 288 
Ståhlberg, Harald, 154–56, 161, 189 
Stålfors, Harry, 60, 77, 84 
Svärdström, Karl-Fredrik, 321 
Sztarkier, Olga, 230 
Söderman, Torgny, 263 
 
T 
Taye Bekele, 267 
Taye Gulilat, 269–70 
Tesfa Bushen, 152–53, 158, 176, 177, 186, 
197–98 
Tesfaye Akalou, 163, 166 
Tesfaye Teshome, 298 
Tham, Carl, 94–96, 244 
Toborn, Johan, 274, 286 
Torstensson, Gunnar, 107, 108 
W 
Wallgren, Karl, 168 
Westring, Gösta, 175 
Wibom, Marianne, 274 
Wickström, Bo, 163 
Wijkman, Per, 74–75 
Wik, Martin, 188–89 
Williams, W. L., 60 
Williams, W. W., 60 
Wramner, Per, 270 
Å 
Åberg, Börje, 109, 134 
Åberg, Ewert, 109, 126, 134, 149, 164, 
168, 192, 209 
Åkerberg, Erik, 120, 134 
Åkerlund, Gunilla, 232 
Åkerman, Håkan, 209 
Ö 
Öman, Signar, 128–29 
